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Abstract 
Background 
Following a healthcare incident which has created a risk of blood borne virus 
transmission, a patient notification exercise can be implemented to inform 
patients that they have been exposed to an unanticipated and unacceptable risk 
of harm as a result of medical error. 
Those managing the incident must consider all the facts of the case as well as 
the negative and positive implications, before reaching a decision on whether a 
patient notification exercise is required. One of the goals of notification is to 
detect the presence of blood borne virus infection within the exposed patient 
population thus providing the opportunity for treatment. The risk of transmission, 
within this setting, however, is thought to be extremely low. 
Patient notification exercises are thought to create stress for patients, carry 
significant financial costs and reflect poorly on the health service. Most 
notification exercises identify very few new blood borne virus diagnoses and 
almost never identify incident-related transmissions (Close et al 2013; Mason et 
al 2008; Conrad et al 2011; Blatchford et al 2000; Roy et al 2005; Henderson et 
al 2017). Detection of transmissions and the concept of transparency must be 
balanced against any negative effects created by the exercise.  
Currently, incident management teams must make their risk assessment and 
decision regarding notification without the support of formal guidance and with 
no up-to-date synthesis of evidence from previous dental incidents. 
One of the aims of this doctoral study was to design and present an evidence-
based decision-making algorithm to aid the incident management team’s 
decision-making process regarding patient notification, following a dental 
infection control breach. 
Methods 
This doctoral work comprises a scoping review study with three components: a 
stakeholder consultation, a review of the published and grey incident literature 
and a policy mapping exercise (Davis et al 2009).  
In the stakeholder consultation, purposive sampling was utilised to seek out and 
record the responses of those with experience of managing United Kingdom 
dental incidents. Participants were interviewed using a specifically developed 
questioning route and semi-structured interview style. 
The literature review was used to identify articles which either reported or 
focused on the management of (a) specific dental incident(s) or were considered 
to be an opinion piece on large-scale medical patient notification exercises. In 
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regards to the grey literature, the chief investigator was directed to unpublished 
United Kingdom incident reports by key contacts and organisations. One of the 
chief investigators’ educational supervisors, Dr Roy had access to a number of 
Scottish reports through her role as senior epidemiologist within Health 
Protection Scotland and had historically been involved in the management of 
such incidents occurring in Scotland. The chief dental officers of each devolved 
United Kingdom nation were contacted and every health protection team across 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland were emailed. The UK Advisory Panel for 
Healthcare Workers Infected with Blood Borne Viruses (UKAP 2019) was also 
contacted and a list of the dental incidents for which they had provided advice, 
was supplied.  
Four different data extraction forms were used to collect information from 
reports and articles based on incident type, with the intention of presenting 
qualitative data as a narrative synthesis and quantitative data in the form of 
graphs and tables.  
In the guidance mapping exercise, an initial list of websites to search was 
formulated based on recommendations from stakeholder consultation 
participants, the medical college librarian and university public health lecturers. 
Further sites were included based on the chief investigator’s personal knowledge 
and utilisation of the resource ‘Grey Matters’ (Canadian Agency for Drugs and 
Technologies in Health 2015). Guidance documents were included if their use 
was cited by those managing incidents or they provided guidance on a) how to 
grade/assess the risk associated with an infected healthcare worker/infection 
control incident and/or b) when to notify patients following an infected 
healthcare worker/infection control incident and/or c) when duty of 
candour/disclosure standards are triggered.  
Results 
One hundred and forty nine dental incidents from six developed countries 
occurring between 1990 and 2017 were identified. Around half of infection 
control incidents (48% of 40) went to notification compared to 14% of those 
involving infected healthcare workers (n=107). Infection control incidents 
account for an increasing proportion of those managed (3.6% from 1990-1999 but 
35.8% from 2010-2017). 
The stakeholder consultation, literature and guidance revealed that transmission 
risk was considered to be the most influential decision factor regarding patient 
notification, however, level of risk was rarely applied to incident management in 
a structured or consistent way. There was a consensus that, although very 
important, risk could not be calculated accurately and that at best, only 
qualitative descriptions such as ‘low’, ‘very low’ or ‘negligible’ could be applied 
(Mason et al 2008; Millership et al 2007; Unpublished reports 2001-2017).  
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Minimal information could be drawn from historical ‘proven transmission’ events 
as they are rare, occurred long ago and/or lacked contextual detail. The limited 
conclusions that could be drawn suggested that incidents involving syringe reuse, 
multi-dose vials, extractions and oral surgery settings present a greater risk of 
patient-to-patient BBV transmission. 
Multiple sources suggested that if transmissions (patient-to-patient or healthcare 
worker to patient) have already been identified, or are strongly suspected, then 
notification and testing is necessary. However, of the four proven, reported 
dental blood borne virus transmissions since 1990, not one identified any further 
transmissions via their associated notification exercises. This suggests that any 
incident-related transmissions which require detection may all reliably be 
identified prior to the use of a patient notification exercise. 
This review suggested that there was significant pressure to be candid with 
patients following an incident, a mantra which has arisen due to historical 
paternalism and an awareness of the new Duty of Candour legislation which may 
override any consideration of risk level (CQC 2014; GMC 2015; Scottish 
Government 2018). Decision makers often contemplated; what the public would 
want and their reactions to finding out an organisation had not been open with 
them. Unsurprisingly, notification was deemed essential when the public were 
already aware of an incident. 
The professional and statutory Duty of Candour was often weighed against the 
perceived opportunity costs of conducting notification, the significant 
expenditure of time, staff and workload as well as the predicted psychological 
impact on patients and reputational consequences for the dental profession 
which could result in patients not seeking dental care. 
Notification appeared to be conducted based on the need to err on the side of 
caution. Patient safety was the priority and with a challenging risk assessment, 
no guidance or information from other incident management teams and unclear 
Duty of Candour guidance, notification and testing was utilised to respect the 
importance of transparency and mitigate the risks of both not adhering to 
legislation and leaving patients undiagnosed. 
Research gaps 
Decision makers were not only hampered by an absence of guidance but also by 
an inability or struggle to ascertain what others have done in the past. This 
doctoral work discovered that within the United Kingdom there is no central 
repository for incident data, incident details are rarely published (15%) and 
there is a lack of sharing of lessons learned amongst public health teams. When 
reports are made available or their data are presented in a published journal 
article, no standardised way of reporting exists and there are inconsistencies in 
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both the amount and detail of information presented. There was great 
variability in the types of journal that featured articles on patient notification.  
Creation of a central repository of ‘blood borne virus transmission risk’ incident 
information and an increase in publication activity with agreement on the most 
suitable type of journal is needed. Standardised data collection will facilitate 
comparison of homogenous incident outcomes. 
 
Duty of Candour and its application to large-scale incidents and dental practices 
must be clarified. It is recommended that further guidance is formulated, by 
those who drafted both the Scottish and English ‘Duty of Candour’ legislation, to 
aid incident management team members in understanding its applicability to 
large-scale patient disclosure (Care Quality Commission 2014; Scottish 
Government 2018). 
 
Findings from this doctoral study strongly support utilisation of a limited 
notification response. Limited notification can be seen as a compromise between 
the two options of conducting or not conducting a patient notification exercise. 
It involves adapting notification to reduce expenditure of resources or 
involvement of all practice patients. By notifying only those patients who are 
deemed to be at the highest risk, resources and time are saved with less 
patients having to undergo the distress of notification and testing. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Undoubtedly, there is a desire from those tasked with investigating and 
managing these incidents, for guidance that will support their deliberations on 
the need for patient notification.  The work of this thesis showed that such 
guidance would be challenging to develop, not just because of a lack of evidence 
to support the impact of a patient notification exercise (both positive and 
negative) but also because these incidents are all unique, and the investigations 
nuanced. Consequently, the best that can be provided is an algorithm which will 
standardise the approach to the discussion by identifying the key factors that 
should be considered. This does not of course mean that similar incidents will 
result in a similar management strategy, but it would ensure that any course of 
action is based on a robust appraisal of relevant factors and can be justified on a 
scientific, ethical and/or pragmatic basis. 
 
Findings from this doctoral scoping review study were incorporated into a novel 
process (the Patient Notification Exercise (PNE) post-Dental Decontamination 
Breach (DDB) Decision-Making (DM) algorithm). This research product is designed 
to guide the flow and structure of decision-making, reassure IMTs that all 
necessary factors have been considered and provide consistent justifications for 
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decisions made which, with reference to the algorithm, can easily be explained 
to third parties. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Blood borne viruses 
Blood borne viruses (BBVs) are spread via blood or bodily fluid contact with little 
to no transmission risk associated with saliva (Lala et al 2018). They are 
transmitted via broken tissues, mucous membranes or directly into the blood 
stream (Lala et al 2018). They include the hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C 
virus (HCV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). HBV and HCV replicate via 
the hepatocytes of the liver and can lead to hepatitis, cirrhosis and/or 
hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) (Mahboobi et al 2013). HIV targets the helper T-
cells of the host’s immune system (Lamont et al 2019) and can lead to the 
development of opportunistic infections and cancers (WHO 2019ᵈ). Those who 
are infected may undergo months or years of undetected, asymptomatic disease 
with uncontrolled liver damage or immune suppression (Lala et al 2018). 
For BBV transmission to occur from one person to another, a series of specific 
events must occur which result in an infected individual’s blood entering the 
blood stream of an uninfected person. This may occur via a direct or indirect 
route. An infected person could bleed directly onto the wound or broken skin of 
an individual. Indirect transmission could occur via an object contaminated with 
an infected person’s blood which then punctures the skin of the vulnerable 
person or contacts an open wound (Lala et al 2018). Blood-to-blood contact, 
however, does not always result in transmission. Chance of transmission depends 
on the type of blood borne virus involved, the viral load of the source (how many 
viral particles are circulating in their blood stream) the volume of blood 
inoculated and the immune status of the exposed person (Pfaender et al 2016). 
1.1.1 Hepatitis B 
1.1.1.1 Discovery, structure and survival 
Hepatitis B virus (HBV) was discovered in the mid-1960s with the Australia 
antigen (Hepatitis B surface antigen) being identified approximately ten years 
later (Lamont et al 2019). The Hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg) is a protein 
found on the surface of the virus particle and is a serological marker integral to 
both the diagnosis and monitoring of HBV infection (Lamont et al 2019). In 1980, 
the complete HBV genome was sequenced and the virus was assigned to the 
Hepadnaviridae family (Lamont et al 2019). 
Hepatitis B virus (HBV) is a DNA virus with a circular, partially double stranded 
genome (Lamont et al 2019). The genome, DNA polymerase and hepatitis B core 
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antigen (HBcAg) are encapsulated within a protein envelope - a lipid layer 
containing HBsAg (Lamont et al 2019).  
It is generally acknowledged that hepatitis B virus can survive on surfaces for at 
least one week (WHO 2019ᵃ), however, recent evidence suggests that survival 
time may be much longer, with one study concluding that HBV infectivity only 
reduced by approximately 10% after 28 days at room temperature (WHO 2019ᵃ; 
Than et al 2019) 
1.1.1.2 Morbidity and mortality 
Many people may be unaware of becoming infected with HBV as 70% of those 
who contract the virus are asymptomatic (Trépo et al 2014). For those who 
develop symptoms, they appear following an incubation period of two to six 
months (Lamont et al 2019). Symptoms can last for one to three months (Lala et 
al 2018) and can include fatigue, nausea, abdominal pain, vomiting, dark urine, 
pale stools and jaundice (PHE 2017ᵇ; Gupta 2018). 
Those that remain positive for HBsAg six months following infection and fail to 
develop the associated antibody (HBsAb) are considered chronically infected 
(Bowyer et al 2011). Fortunately, this is not the case for the majority of healthy 
adults (90-95%) who will clear the virus within six months, perhaps without issue 
or indeed knowledge that they were ever infected (Lamont et al 2019; Mahboobi 
et al 2010; Bowyer et al 2011).  
Recovery with immunity depends on age and presence of co-morbidities, which 
in turn are dictated by the efficacy of the individual’s immune system (Lamont 
et al 2019). Children between one and five and HIV-infected individuals have a 
70-80% of chance of viral clearance whilst for neonates, this figure drops to only 
5-10% (Bowyer et al 2011; Trépo et al 2014; Chu and Liaw 2016). 
In chronic infection, damage to the liver is caused by the body’s immune 
response (Lamont et al 2019; Trépo et al 2014) and is usually prolonged, varying 
in severity both over time and from person to person (Davison and Strasser 2014; 
Bowyer et al 2011). Whilst the annual rate of spontaneous recovery following 
diagnosis of chronic infection is 0.5-2%, 15-25% will develop hepatocellular 
carcinoma (HCC) or decompensated cirrhosis (Chu and Liaw 2016; Tang et al 
2018; Davison and Strasser 2014).  
Following acute HBV infection one percent of individuals develop fulminant 
hepatitis which, without liver transplantation, results in death in 80% of cases 
(Trépo et al 2014).  
Even though subclinical infection and viral clearance is common, HBV is overall a 
very serious world health issue. HBV is a leading cause of HCC (Lamont et al 2019; 
Rantala and van de Laar 2008) and was reported to be the tenth most common 
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cause of death in a 2010 Global Burden of disease study (Mahboobi et al 2010; 
Trépo et al 2014). In 2015, 887,000 deaths worldwide were attributed to HBV 
infection (WHO 2019ᵃ). 
1.1.1.3 Transmission routes and risks 
HBV is transmitted via mucosal or percutaneous contact with the blood or other 
high-risk body fluids of an infected individual (Lamont et al 2019). In developing 
countries HBV is most commonly transmitted from mother-to-child during birth 
whilst in developed countries transmission via sexual contact and needle sharing 
are common (Lamont et al 2019).  
HBV is the most infectious BBV and is estimated to be 75-200 times more 
infectious than HIV (Bowyer et al 2011). Following exposure to HBV-infected 
blood, depending on the viral load and Hepatitis B ‘e’ antigen (HBeAg) status of 
the source, transmission risk is cited as ranging from 5-30% (Coppola et al 2016; 
PHE 2014ᵃ; Health and Safety Executive 2019ᵇ), however, of out of 590 
healthcare workers who were occupationally exposed to HBV-infected blood in 
the UK between 2004 and 2013, none developed HBV infection (PHE 2014ᵃ). The 
viral load of HBV-infected individuals can be high, with as many as 1010-1012 
infective particles per ml of blood meaning that exposure to extremely small 
quantities of blood can result in transmission (Lamont et al 2019). 
Viral load may be significantly raised in the immediate period (approximately 2 
months) following infection or if the individual in question is 
immunocompromised (Lamont et al 2019; Bowyer et al 2011). Being HBeAg 
positive or being infected with a pre-core mutant strain of the virus, also 
increases infectivity (Davison and Strasser 2014; Trépo et al 2014). 
1.1.1.4 Prevalence 
HBV is categorised into ten genotypes, A-J, with genotype A being most 
prevalent in northern Europe (Trépo et al 2014; Rantala and van de Laar 2008). 
Around one third of the world’s population has been, at one time, infected with 
HBV (Mahboobi et al 2013; Trépo et al 2014) and currently, in 2019, it is 
estimated that 257 million people are living with the disease (WHO 2019ᵃ).  
Rates of infection are highest in South America, Africa and Asia, continents in 
which 45% of HBV-infected individuals reside, with prevalences of 8-15% 
(Mahboobi et al 2010; Trépo et al 2014, Lamont et al 2019).  
Countries with a low HBV prevalence (<2%) include Canada, the USA and 
Australia (Mahboobi et al 2010). In the UK, prevalence of chronic HBV is 
estimated to be 0.1-0.5% (Health and Safety Executive 2019ᵃ). 
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Although rates of HBV in developed countries are generally low, prevalence and 
genotype variation may be higher in those who have emigrated from high 
prevalence countries (Health and Safety Executive 2019ᵃ; Rantala and van de 
Laar 2008). A meta-analysis published in 2012 reported that the prevalence of 
HBV amongst refugees and migrants living in low prevalence countries was 
around 7.2% (Rossi et al). Prevalence in intravenous drug users (IVDUs) is also 
estimated to be significant and may be up to ten times higher than the average 
for any given country (Rantala and van de Laar 2008; Lamont et al 2019).   
1.1.1.5 Testing 
HBV markers within the blood are used to establish whether infection is present 
and, if so, the individual’s stage of infection (Davison and Strasser 2014). 
Patients are initially tested for HBsAg which is detectable two to ten weeks post-
exposure and indicates current infection (Tang et al 2018; Trépo et al 2014).  
Although presence of HBsAg indicates current infection it does not indicate the 
patient’s level of infectivity or whether they were recently infected (Lamont et 
al 2019). Viral load and presence of HBeAg are used to establish level of 
infectivity (Davison and Strasser 2014). Presence of the IgM antibody alone 
indicates recent or acute infection as it is the first antibody to be produced, 
later replaced by IgG antibody (Lamont et al 2019). Presence of antibodies to 
both the core and surface antigen (HBcAb and HBsAb) indicates resolved 
infection with immunity and presence of HBsAb alone indicates a history of 
vaccination (Lamont et al 2019; Davison and Strasser 2014). 
1.1.1.6 Treatment 
There is currently no cure for HBV. Treatment aims to reduce both viral load and 
replication, thereby lessening liver damage and the probability of progression to 
liver cirrhosis or cancer (Trépo et al 2014, Bowyer et al 2011). Decreasing viral 
load also reduces chances of onward transmission (Lala et al 2018). 
Currently, in 2019, seven medications are licenced for the treatment of HBV 
(Bagg et al 2017). They include immunomodulatory drugs like interferon and 
nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTIs) like Entecavir and Lamivudine 
(Bagg et al 2017). Although both forms of treatment may be effective in 
establishing sustained viral suppression, NRTIs are quickly becoming the favoured 
choice for treatment of HBV (Bagg et al 2017). 
Interferon is administered via injection for a limited treatment course of 
approximately 48-52 weeks (Trépo et al 2014). It is associated with several side 
effects such as fatigue, depression and bone marrow suppression (Trépo et al 
2014). Interferon’s efficacy has been shown to be linked to genotype, with 
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infection most effectively treated in those with genotype A or B (Rajoriya et al 
2017; Trépo et al 2014).  
NRTIs are administered orally and result in fewer side effects (Trépo 2014). 
Unlike interferon, life-long treatment with NRTIs may be recommended (Lala et 
al 2018) with an attendant risk of drug resistance (Bagg et al 2017). However, 
this issue can be minimised through careful choice of first line medications, such 
as Tenofovir and Entecavir, which are known to result in less resistance (Bagg et 
al 2017). 
Patients with HBV are likely to need life-long monitoring to assess liver health 
and drug efficacy (Bowyer et al 2011). Those with fibrosis or cirrhosis may need 
regular ultrasound scans or liver biopsies to promptly identify any developing 
tumours (Davison and Strasser 2014; Trepo et al 2014). 
1.1.1.7 Prevention 
An effective and safe HBV vaccine has been available since 1981 (Trépo et al 
2014). In the UK, vaccination is recommended for those at high risk such as 
HCWs and haemodialysis patients (PHE 2017ᵇ). The vaccine has also recently 
been added to the UK’s childhood vaccination schedule. All infants born since 
August 2017 have been offered the vaccine as part of a hexavalent, six-in-one 
immunisation (PHE 2017ᵇ). 
If an individual responds to the vaccine, effective protection is provided for 
approximately 15 years (Trépo et al 2014). However, not all respond adequately 
to vaccination with approximately 5% of people not producing the required 10 
mIU/ml of HBsAb titre (Mahboobi et al 2010; Trépo et al 2014). 
Post exposure prophylaxis (PEP) for HBV is available in the form of vaccination or 
immunoglobulin which must be given ideally within 24 hours of exposure and no 
later than seven days post exposure (PHE 2017ᵇ). 
1.1.2 Hepatitis C (HCV) 
1.1.2.1 Discovery, structure and survival 
HCV was discovered in 1989 (Pozzetto et al 2014). Before this time it was known 
as non-A non-B hepatitis (Westbrook and Dusheiko 2014). Although discovery 
occurred in the late 1980s, detailed information about the virus’ genetic 
material was not gathered until 1999 when a newly developed process called the 
replicon system facilitated creation of full length HCV genetic sequences 
(Carrozzo 2014). 
HCV is an enveloped, single-stranded RNA virus of the Flaviviridae family 
(Millman et al 2017; Lamont et al 2019; Pozzetto et al 2014). One of the most 
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significant features of HCV is its propensity to mutate rapidly in an attempt to 
evade the body’s immune system (Lamont et al 2019). Mutations often involve 
errors which can enhance or even destroy the virus (Lamont et al 2019) and 
beyond sub-genotype, result in a range of quasi-species (Millman et al 2017). 
HCV is categorised into six main genotypes (1-6) and multiple subtypes (Kamili et 
al 2012). Genotype 1 is the most common and accounts for approximately half of 
all HCV infection (Petruzziello et al 2016). 
It is generally thought that HCV can survive for several weeks on dry surfaces 
(NHS 2018ᵇ) and has been shown to remain infective in saliva at room 
temperature for 3 weeks (Pfaender et al 2018). The virus is inactivated and/or 
killed by steam sterilisation at a temperature of 60°C that lasts for ten minutes 
or more and is easily killed through antiseptic, alcohol and peracetic acid use 
(Pozzetto et al 2014). 
1.1.2.2 Morbidity and mortality 
Following infection with HCV less than 25% of people will experience non-
specific symptoms (WHO 2019ᶠ) which arise approximately 2 weeks to 6 months 
after infection (WHO 2019ᶠ). 
Compared with HBV, progression to chronic infection is much more likely. 75-80% 
of those infected develop chronic HCV infection with associated risks of cirrhosis 
and HCC (Pozzetto et al 2014; Westbrook and Dusheiko 2014; Mahboobi et al 
2013). Chronic infection is diagnosed based on the persistent detection of HCV 
RNA more than six months after infection (Cresswell et al 2015).  
Once chronic infection is established the individual has a 16% chance of 
developing cirrhosis within 20 years and a 41% chance of its diagnosis within 30 
years (Westbrook and Dusheiko 2014). Cirrhosis and HCC are more likely if the 
patient is older, male, overweight, has a high alcohol intake, has type 2 diabetes, 
or is co-infected with another BBV (Westbrook and Dusheiko 2014). 
Presence of cirrhosis indicates a poor prognosis, with affected patients having an 
annual 1-5% and 3-6% risk of HCC and liver failure respectively (Westbrook and 
Dusheiko 2014). After liver failure is diagnosed, chances of patient death within 
the following year are 15-20% (Westbrook and Dusheiko 2014). 
HCV is not only linked to HCC and fibrosis but other extra-hepatic diseases such 
as diabetes, non-Hodgkins B cell lymphoma, lichen planus and 
glomerulonephritis (Millman et al 2017). 
HCV is the most common reason, worldwide, for patients requiring a liver 
transplant and 350,000 people die every year from HCV-related conditions 
(Westbrook and Dusheiko 2014). 
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1.1.2.3 Transmission routes and risks 
HCV is less infectious than HBV but more infectious than HIV. Following a sharps 
injury1, where the source patient is infected, Public Health England cite a 1 in 
30 (~3%) chance of HCV transmission with the Health and Safety Executive 
outlining a 1-3% risk, (PHE 2014ᵃ; Health and Safety Executive 2019ᵇ). However, 
evidence from the literature suggests that seroconversion rates following 
occupational exposure may be lower. In 2002, Jagger presented evidence from 
14 studies involving 11,383 exposed healthcare workers and the average 
seroconversion rate was only 0.5%. Similarly, in 2017, Egro et al published a 
study with 13 years’ worth of data, which demonstrated an occupational 
exposure seroconversion rate of 0.1% out of 1361 healthcare workers. However, 
the seroconversion rate of 2.2% in Tomkins et al 2012 study, was more in line 
with Health and Safety Executive estimates. 
Those at high risk for HCV include intravenous drug users, HCWs who perform 
exposure prone procedures (EPPs), dialysis patients, those who received blood 
transfusions before 1992, individuals born between 1945 and 1965 who engaged 
in drug use during the 70s and 80s, men who have sex with men (especially if 
they are already infected with HIV) and ethnic minorities with links to high 
prevalence countries (Leao et al 2006; Westbrook and Dusheiko 2014; Weaver 
2014; Millman et al 2017; Creswell et al 2015; PHE 2018). Unlike HBV, HCV is not 
effectively spread from mother-to-child during birth or via sexual contact 
(Pfaender et al 2016). 
Forty percent of diagnosed HCV cases do not have a proven, identified source 
(Mahboobi et al 2013) but a significant proportion of infection is linked to IVDU 
(Pozzetto et al 2014). In England it is estimated that half of IVDUs are infected 
with HCV (PHE 2018). 
1.1.2.4 Prevalence 
There are between 71 and 123 million people living with chronic HCV infection 
worldwide (PHE 2018; Westbrook and Dusheiko 2014; Pozzetto et al 2014). 
Developed countries have a lower HCV prevalence (<1%) compared to developing 
countries where it can be as high as 5% (Lamont et al 2019).  
There are estimated to be 210,000 people living with chronic HCV in the UK (PHE 
2018). The prevalence varies based on the devolved nation and associated 
proportion of high risk groups, such as IVDUs, residing there. In England and 
Wales prevalence is approximately 0.6% whereas in Scotland it is closer to 1% 
(Pozzetto et al 2014).  
                                                          
1 A sharps injury or percutaneous injury is an incident, which causes a needle, blade (such as scalpel) or 
other medical instrument to penetrate the skin (Health and Safety Executive 2019ᵃ) 
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Infection with HCV genotypes 1, 2 and 3 occur commonly in the U.S.A and UK 
(WHO 2017). Genotype 4 is most often found in Egypt (Lamont et al 2019) with 
genotypes 5 and 6 being associated with South Africa and Southeast Asia 
respectively (WHO 2017). 
1.1.2.5 Testing 
Patients are initially tested for the HCV antibody where a positive result is 
indicative of current or previous infection (Cresswell et al 2015). Presence of 
HCV RNA, detected through PCR, indicates current infection (Cresswell et al 
2015). HCV RNA testing can be used 1-2 weeks following exposure (WHO 2017) 
but is not routinely performed as a first line test due to cost, resource and time 
implications (Cresswell et al 2015). 
Unlike HBV, there is no specific HCV marker that indicates when infection likely 
occurred (Lamont et al 2014). Ways to establish if infection is recent have been 
developed and include measurement of viral load fluctuations, avidity testing2 
and immunoassays for the HCV core antigen (Kamili et al 2012). 
1.1.2.6 Treatment 
In the UK, the main treatment for HCV was historically a combination of 
pegylated interferon and ribavirin (Millman et al 2017). These drugs were given 
for approximately 24-48 weeks, depending on genotype but had significant side 
effects and variable efficacy (Millman et al 2017; Bagg et al 2017).  A sustained 
virological response (SVR), defined as absence of HCV RNA at 24 weeks post-
treatment (Carrozzo 2014), was achieved by around 50% of patients and was 
genotype dependent (Lamont et al 2019). 
Recently developed direct acting antiviral drugs (DAAs) such as Sofosbuvir and 
Ledipasvir are effective in the treatment of all HCV genotype infections and 
result in little to no side effects or drug interactions (Weaver 2014; Bagg et al 
2017). An 8-12 week course of treatment with DAAs results in over 90% of 
patients achieving a SVR (Millman et al 2017, Bagg et al 2017). 
If achieved before any liver fibrosis or damage, SVR is associated with an 
elimination of risk of liver failure, portal hypertension and/or HCC (Westbrook 
and Dusheiko 2014). If cirrhosis is present, risks are still significantly reduced 
with a 20% reduction in risk of HCC development (Westbrook and Dusheiko 2014). 
It is hoped that with the development of these new curative drugs, future, 
worldwide eradication of HCV is possible and the World Health Organisation aims 
                                                          
2 Avidity testing measures the strength of bond between antibody and antigen which becomes stronger the 
longer the patient is infected (Shepherd et al 2018). A low bond strength or avidity indicates that infection 
likely occurred within the last four to six months (Shepherd et al 2018). 
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to remove HCV as a major public health threat by 2030 (Millman et al 2017; PHE 
2018). It is important to note, however, that although these new DAA drugs are 
highly effective, controversy over high treatment costs have arisen and 
challenges remain in relation to reaching large numbers of patients in deprived 
areas (Bagg et al 2017; PHE 2018; Carrozzo 2014). 
1.1.2.7 Prevention 
Currently, there is no vaccine or effective post exposure prophylaxis (PEP) 
regimen available for HCV infection (Mahboobi et al 2013). A vaccine has been 
difficult to develop due to HCV’s many genotypes and its propensity to mutate 
within the body (Millman et al 2017). 
1.1.3 Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
1.1.3.1 Discovery, structure and survival 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was first described in 1981 when 
five homosexual men were diagnosed with the rare condition Pneumocystis 
carinii pneumonia (CDC 1981). This condition was indicative of severe 
immunosuppression which was later discovered to be caused by infection with 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and associated depletion of their immune 
system’s helper T-cell lymphocytes (Freed and Martin 2013; Lamont et al 2019).  
Although identified in 1981, it was not until 1983 that AIDS was identified as 
being the final stage of HIV infection and the HIV virus was isolated and studied 
(Ghosn et al 2018). It has been theorised that HIV originated in chimpanzees and 
that a virus infecting these primates mutated to facilitate infection of humans. 
Humans had repeated contact with chimpanzees throughout history via hunting 
practices. The earliest evidence of HIV-infected human blood was sourced from 
a sample collected in the 1950s (Lamont et al 2019) 
Like HCV, HIV is a single-stranded, enveloped, RNA virus (Pfaender et al 2016). 
HIV is part of the retroviridae family and has two strains, HIV-1 and HIV-2 
(Lamont et al 2019). HIV-1 is the most common whereas HIV-2 is mainly localised 
to West Africa and has a better prognosis (Lamont et al 2019). 
Of the three BBVs, HIV is the most fragile and does not survive for long outside 
the body (NHS 2018ᵃ). Most studies are linked to HIV’s survivability in water and 
transplant tissues rather than in environmental blood spillages. HIV has been 
shown to survive in room temperature (20-25°C) wastewater for approximately 
12 hours (Casson et al 1992) whilst another study showed that in 25°C water, 
infectivity dropped by 90% after one to two hours and by eight hours had 
dropped by 99.9% (Moore 1993). In 2000, a study showed that a temperature of 
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50°C for 30 mins resulted in a 1.12 log reduction of viable virus particles 
(Hernigou et al 2000).  
1.1.3.2 Morbidity and mortality 
HIV uses helper T-cells (CD4+ cells) to replicate, leading to their destruction and 
depletion (Maartens et al 2014; WHO 2019ᵈ). Helper T cells are vital to the 
immune response and so with a severely compromised immune system and 
helper T-cell numbers reducing over time, HIV-infected individuals are highly 
susceptible to a multitude of opportunistic infections and conditions such as 
tuberculosis, cryptococcal meningitis, pneumonia, candidosis and tumours 
(National Institute  of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 2019; Maartens et al 2014; 
WHO 2019ᵈ; NHS 2018ᵃ). Regardless of treatment with antiviral medications, 
around half of HIV-infected individuals may also experience a varying degree of 
impaired neurological function as infection affects the central nervous system 
(Nightingale et al 2014). 
There are generally three phases of HIV infection:  
1. primary infection in which around 50% of individuals will experience flu-like 
symptoms such as fever, fatigue, headaches, a rash on the thorax and 
lymphadenopathy which may last for approximately one to three months before 
resolving (WHO 2019ᵈ; Lamont et al 2019; NHS 2018ᵃ). 
2. a significant period of clinical latency (median=10-15 years) (Lamont et al 
2019). 
3. if untreated, a final progression to AIDS is associated with a very low helper T-
cell count (Pfaender et al 2016). It is diagnosed based on the presence of HIV 
infection and one or more of a list of specific clinical conditions such as 
Pneumocystis pneumonia and Kaposi’s sarcoma (WHO 2007).  
Since the initiation of widespread infection, approximately 70 million people 
have been infected with HIV and around 50% of them have died (WHO 2019ᶜ). 
Mortality rates associated with HIV have, however, dramatically reduced in the 
developed world with the widespread use of effective treatment (Poorolajal et 
al 2016) but in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa, where access to treatment is 
poor, the prevalence of HIV and associated deaths remains a major public health 
problem (Ghosn et al 2018) (Table 1). If not treated, HIV is fatal (Pfaender et al 
2016) and most individuals will succumb to their condition 2-4 years after 
diagnosis (Poorolajal et al 2016).  
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Table 1: Number of deaths, in different countries, due to HIV infection 
Country 
Population 
size in 2017 
(millions)ᵃ 
Number of 
deaths due to 
HIV in 2017ᵇ 
Percentage of 
population 
dying from HIV 
in 2017 (%) 
Approximate 
numbers of 
deaths per 
defined 
sample 
South Africa 56.72 110,000 0.19 1 in 500 
Zimbabwe 16.53 22,000 0.13 1in 1000 
South Sudan 12.58 12,000 0.09 1 in 1000 
United republic of Tanzania 57.31 32,000 0.06 1 in 2000 
Jamaica 2.89 1500 0.05 1 in 2000 
Thailand 69.04 15,000 0.02 1 in 10,000 
Cuba 11.48 <500 0.004 <1 in 25,000 
Pakistan 197 6200 0.003 1 in 25,000 
Mexico 129.2 4000 0.003 1 in 25,000 
Ireland 4.784 <100 0.002 <1 in 50,000 
Norway 5.258 <100 0.002 <1in 50,000 
Denmark 5.77 <100 0.002 <1 in 50,000 
Nepal 29.3 300 0.001 1 in 100,000 
Italy 60.59 560 0.00009 1 in 1m 
Australia 24.6 <200 0.00008 <1 in 1.25m 
France 67.12 <500 0.00007 <1 in 1.5m 
Philippines 104.9 760 0.00007 1 in 1.5m 
Germany 82.79 <500 0.00006 <1 in 1.5m 
Japan 126.8 <200 0.00002 1 in 5m 
Red = Countries where 1 in <10,000 people died from HIV/AIDS in 2017 
Orange = Countries where between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 100,000 people died from HIV/AIDS in 2017 
Green = Countries where less than 1 in 1 million people died from HIV/AIDS in 2017 
a = World Bank Data (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL) 
b = World Health Organisation. (https://www.who.int/gho/hiv/epidemic_status/deaths/en/) 
1.1.3.3 Transmission routes and risks 
Sexual contact between men is a well-recognised mode of transmission but rates 
of heterosexual transmission are now high and indeed comparable to men who 
have sex with men (MSM) transmission in the UK (National AIDS Trust 2018). 
46.4% of those being treated in the UK acquired their infection via sex between 
men compared to 46.2% who acquired infection via heterosexual contact. If not 
undergoing treatment for HIV infection, transmission from mother-to-child 
occurs, during birth, in around 25% of cases or via breastfeeding in 40% of cases 
(Pfaender et al 2016). Intravenous drug use (IVDU) remains a significant mode of 
HIV transmission (Ghosn et al 2018). 
HIV is the least transmissible of the three BBVs. The chance of transmission 
following a significant sharps injury exposure is cited as 1 in 300 (0.3%) (PHE 
2014ᵃ; Health and Safety Executive 2019ᵇ). This low rate of seroconversion is 
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supported by a recent review which reported that following assessment of 17 
studies from 1986 to 2015, only 10 out of 7652 HCWs who were exposed to HIV-
infected bodily fluids seroconverted (Nwaiwu et al 2017). Individuals with HIV 
are most infectious two to seven weeks post-infection (Lamont et al 2019). 
1.1.3.4 Prevalence 
In 2017 it was estimated that worldwide there were approximately 36.9 million 
people living with HIV and that around 75% of those who were infected lived in 
Sub-Saharan Africa where prevalence is around 4.1% (WHO 2019ᵇ). European 
prevalence was estimated to be 0.4% with the lowest rates of infection being 
found in the Middle-East and Asia (0.1%) (WHO 2019ᵇ). 
In the UK, prevalence was estimated to be 0.16% in 2018 (Office for National 
Statistics 2018; National AIDS Trust 2018). It was also estimated that 1 in 14 of 
those infected are unaware of their condition (National AIDS Trust 2018) but 87% 
of the total number of diagnosed and undiagnosed UK cases are estimated to be 
on treatment with significant viral suppression and an associated negligible risk 
of transmission (National AIDS Trust 2018). 
1.1.3.5 Testing 
Fourth generation assays can be used to detect HIV antibody and the p24 antigen 
from 4 weeks post exposure (BASHH and EAGA 2014). If first line testing is 
positive, further diagnostic tests such as a Western Blot assay are conducted to 
confirm diagnosis (WHO 2019ᵈ; Parekh et al 2019). 
1.1.3.6 Treatment 
Since the mid-1990s the main form of treatment for HIV has been a combination 
of anti-retroviral medications referred to as highly active anti-retroviral therapy 
(HAART), with each drug targeting a different viral element or process (Lamont 
et al 2014; Bagg et al 2017). This treatment regimen is highly effective at 
reducing viral load to often undetectable levels but there is still no cure for HIV 
(Bagg et al 2017). 
Earlier treatment results in better outcomes, longer life expectancy and reduced 
onward transmission (Bagg et al 2017). Current treatment is so effective that 
many HIV-infected individuals now have a close to normal life expectancy 
(Marcus et al 2016). 
1.1.3.7 Prevention 
There is currently no HIV vaccine as, like HCV, HIV frequently mutates, making 
vaccine generation difficult (Lamont et al 2019). 
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Post exposure prophylaxis (PEP) is available in the form of anti-viral medication 
which is ideally given within two hours of exposure. The PEP medicinal regimen 
is similar to that given for the long term treatment of HIV – Highly active anti-
retroviral treatment (HAART) (British Association for Sexual Health and HIV – 
BASHH 2019). A combination of nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors and 
interphase inhibitors are given for approximately 28 days (BASHH 2019).  A risk-
benefit assessment is advised before prescription as drug toxicity is high and side 
effects can be significant (BASHH 2019; Pfaender et al 2016). 
1.2 Blood borne virus transmission in healthcare 
The healthcare setting represents a unique environment where exposure of 
tissues and production of blood is combined with close quarters and complex 
interactions. Figure 1 shows the triangle of transmission, which identifies the 
possible routes of BBV transmission in healthcare (VHPB 2005).  
        
Figure 1: Diagrammatical representation of the possible pathways of BBV transmission in health 
care. 
 
When describing the sequence of events required for transmission, the ‘Swiss 
Cheese’ analogy is often used. This concept relates to the specific events (ie. 
the holes of the cheese) which need to align for transmission to occur (Curran 
2013). In a scenario where dental instruments have not been sterilised properly, 
for BBV transmission to occur, the following events would need to take place: 
1. A BBV-infected individual is treated at the dental practice. 
BBV 
BBV BBV 
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2. The infected individual undergoes an invasive procedure which results in 
instruments being contaminated with blood. 
3. The instruments are not cleaned or sterilised sufficiently in order to 
remove/kill viral particles. 
4. The next patient is susceptible to infection and also undergoes an invasive 
procedure with the contaminated instruments being used. 
5. Following a significant exposure3, chances of transmission occurring can be as 
high as 1 in 3 or as low as 1 in 300 depending on the type of blood borne virus 
involved and infectivity of the source patient (PHE 2014ᵃ; Health and Safety 
Executive 2019ᵇ). If the source patient is on anti-viral medication (which they 
are taking responsibly) chances of transmission will be negligible (Bagg et al 
2017). 
1.2.1 BBV transmission from patient to HCW 
BBV infection can be transmitted to a HCW via a sharps injury which occurs 
whilst treating a BBV-infected patient. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
from 2004 to 2013, 4830 events of significant occupational exposure were 
recorded (PHE 2014ᵃ). Of these, 71% were percutaneous needle stick injuries 
with 65% occurring during the clinical procedure, over half were in connection 
with a HCV-infected patient and 5-10% of all involved HCWs were dentists or 
dental nurses (PHE 2014ᵃ). None of the associated HCWs became infected with 
HIV or HBV but nine contracted HCV as a result of their exposure, reflecting a 
seroconversion rate of 1 in 285 (PHE 2014ᵃ). In total, since 2010, seven Scottish 
HCWs have been infected with HCV following occupational exposures (Health 
Protection Scotland and NHS Scotland 2018). 
1.2.2 BBV transmission from HCW to patient 
HCW-to-patient transmission is uncommon but can occur (Ward and Hartle 2015). 
In the UK between 1991 and 2015, 20 HCWs are known to have transmitted BBV 
infection to their patients (11 HCV, 9 HBV and 0 HIV) (PHE 2017ᵃ; Mawdsley et al 
2005; Molyneaux et al 2000). 
Transmissions of BBVs from HCWs to patients are most likely to occur during 
exposure prone procedures (EPPs) which are defined by the UK Department of 
Health as:  
“Invasive procedures where there is a risk that injury to the worker may result 
in the exposure of the patient's open tissues to the blood of the worker. These 
                                                          
3 a significant exposure refers to an event whereby a person is exposed to the blood of an individual known 
to be infected with a blood borne virus. 
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include procedures where the worker's gloved hand may be in contact with 
sharp instruments, needle tips or sharp tissues (eg spicules of bone) inside a 
patient's open body cavity, wound or confined anatomical space, where the 
hand or fingertips may not be completely visible at all times” (PHE 2016). 
EPPs are further classified into three categories based on the probability of 
‘bleed back’, which is defined as “the chance that following injury, the HCW’s 
blood will contact the patient’s exposed tissues” (Ward and Hartle 2015). 
1.2.3 BBV transmission from patient-to-patient 
Before current blood screening practices, BBVs were spread by organ 
transplantation (Gow and Mutimer 2001) as well as via contaminated blood and 
clotting factor transfusions (Prati 2006). In recent times, patient-to-patient 
healthcare associated transmission has been linked to dialysis, blood glucose 
monitoring and the reuse of multi-dose vials (Harling 2007; Duffell 2010; Kliner 
2015; Garvey 2017; Johannessen 2018). Published literature indicates that since 
the year 2000, there have been at least 5 healthcare-associated BBV outbreaks 
involving 29 patients (Appendix 1). 
1.3 Prevention of BBV transmission in the healthcare setting 
As all three BBVs are spread via bodily fluid contact, their routes of transmission 
in healthcare are comparable. Steps taken to minimise spread of one virus will 
result in reduced transmission of all three. 
1.3.1 Standard infection prevention and control 
The World Health Organisation (2019ᵉ) defines infection control as “a scientific 
approach and practical solution designed to prevent harm caused by infection to 
patients and health workers. It is grounded in infectious diseases, epidemiology, 
social science and health system strengthening”. The Department of Health 
outline that dental infection control includes “all aspects of the running of a 
dental practice: from attention to personal hygiene – hand-washing, masks, 
protective clothing – to the cleaning and sterilization of instruments and the 
maintenance of the equipment” (Department of Health 2013). 
In addition to HBV vaccination and screening of blood products, advances in 
infection control processes since the 1980s have resulted in a drop in the number 
of healthcare-associated transmissions in developed countries. ‘Universal 
precautions’ were introduced in 1987 and were based on the concept that the 
“blood and certain body fluids of all patients [should be] considered potentially 
infectious for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis B virus (HBV), and 
other bloodborne pathogens” (CDC 1988). These precautions have been 
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developed over time and today, in the UK, they exist in the form of ‘standard 
infection control precautions’ (SICPs). SICPs consist of ten categories of “basic 
infection prevention and control measures [which] reduce the risk of 
transmitting infectious agents from both recognised and unrecognised sources of 
infection” (NHS England and NHS Improvement 2019). They include hand hygiene, 
safe management of sharps and PPE use (NSS 2019ᵇ). SICPs should be applied to 
the treatment of all patients in the same way to minimise spread of infection 
with all patients’ blood and body fluids being treated as potentially infectious 
(NSS 2019ᵇ). 
1.3.2 Policies for identifying and managing BBV-infected 
healthcare workers 
Policies exist in the UK to prevent BBV-infected healthcare workers from 
transmitting infection to patients. Guidance published by Public Health England 
stipulates that “any HCW who may perform exposure prone procedures (EPPs) 
and who has been diagnosed with a BBV infection must seek expert occupational 
health (OH) advice to enable appropriate occupational health care to be 
provided, and any restriction of working practice (if required) to be 
implemented” (2017).  
NHS healthcare students and workers are screened for BBV infection prior to 
commencing a role where they will perform EPPs (PHE 2017ᵃ). HCWs infected 
with HCV are not permitted to perform EPPs whilst those with HIV and HBV must 
be continually monitored by both their physician and occupational health to 
ensure that treatment is consistently suppressing their viral load to a level 
where risk of transmission is negligible (PHE 2017ᵃ). BBV-infected HCWs working 
in the UK must also be registered on UKAP-OHR, a central confidential register, 
managed by PHE (PHE 2017ᵃ). Further information regarding specific viral load 
levels and UK working restrictions are provided in Table 41 (p207). 
1.4 Dentistry 
Dentists perform a range of procedures which vary in their propensity to produce 
blood or create risk of occupational injury. A plethora of re-usable instruments 
are used and then processed, with a high patient turnover. While the risk of 
transmission in these settings is considered low with current standards of 
infection prevention and control, transmission of BBVs (between patients, from 
patient to dental HCW and from dental HCW to patient) have been reported in 
developed country dental settings (Tomkins et al 2012; Oklahoma State 
Department of Health 2013; Robinson and Challacombe 1993). 
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1.4.1 Dental procedures 
Dentists maintain patients’ oral health through provision of advice to prevent 
disease, examination of the soft tissues, monitoring dentition development and 
growth, controlling gum disease, providing prosthetic tooth replacement options, 
managing the effects of dental trauma and, most commonly, treating the effects 
of tooth decay and/or infection via restoration, root treatment or tooth 
extraction. 
No routine dental procedures fall into the highest risk EPP category (Category 3). 
Many are considered to be either Category 1, or indeed non-EPP (PHE 2016). 
Therefore, there are few procedures that could potentially result in a patient 
being exposed to the blood from a BBV-infected dental professional (Table 2). 
Table 2: The general dentistry exposure prone procedure categorisation (PHE 2016) 
EXPOSURE PRONE 
PROCEDURE CATEGORY 
DENTAL PROCEDURE 
LEVEL ZERO 
(NOT EXPOSURE PRONE)  
(NO RISK OF BLEED-BACK) 
The taking of intra and extra-oral radiographs 
Visual and digital examination of the head and neck 
including soft tissue palpation 
Prescription of antibiotics or other drugs 
Routine oral examination, using mirror and any necessary 
probes 
All work associated with the construction or replacement 
of complete or partial dentures - excluding any prior 
surgical preparation of the hard or soft tissue 
Preventive procedures: oral hygiene instruction, fissure 
sealing, topical fluoride applications, saliva samples 
Taking impressions 
Topical application of, or irrigation with, therapeutic 
agents 
Suture removal where the hands or fingertips are 
completely visible at all times 
Supra-gingival or sub-gingival scaling of teeth using an 
ultrasonic/piezo-sonic scaler 
Polishing of teeth or restorations using a slow-speed hand 
piece with flexible polishing discs, polishing cups or 
brushes. 
Electro-cautery 
Use of laser when administered external to oral cavity 
Placement of dressings and temporary restorations not 
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requiring tooth preparations 
Orthodontic procedures using removable appliances or 
aligner techniques e.g. Invisalign®, except where 
interdental stripping with an abrasive strip is required 
Re-implantation of tooth/teeth following trauma without 
bone removal 
Bleaching of teeth, excluding the use of any rotary 
instrument to provide access required for internal 
bleaching 
Botox or fillers for modification of facial aesthetics 
administered external to oral cavity 
LEVEL ONE 
(LOWEST RISK OF BLEED-
BACK) 
Local anaesthetic injections 
Interdental stripping with a rotary device or abrasive 
strips for orthodontic purposes 
Biopsy of lip 
Suture of lip 
Polishing of teeth or restorations using finishing burs in 
high-speed handpieces 
Suture removal where the hands or fingertips are not 
completely visible at all times 
Supra-gingival or sub-gingival scaling of teeth using hand 
instruments 
LEVEL TWO 
(INTERMEDIATE RISK OF 
BLEED-BACK) 
Use of high-speed hand pieces for procedures such as 
intra-coronal restorations and crown and bridge work 
Polishing, finishing or removing overhangs from 
restoration 
Periodontal surgery 
Root canal therapy 
Root end surgery e.g. apicectomies 
Extractions of teeth including packing and suturing of 
sockets 
Orthodontic procedures with fixed appliances 
Placement of temporary anchorage devices in the context 
of orthodontic practice 
All other dento-alveolar surgery including: 
• surgical removal of impact/buried tooth/teeth; 
• surgical removal of complicated buried roots; 
• enucleation of cyst of jaw 
Surgical removal of intra-oral soft tissues, including 
biopsies 
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Frenotomy/frenectomy of tongue 
Suturing of intra-oral soft tissue injuries 
Surgical placement of dental implant 
LEVEL THREE 
(HIGHER RISK OF BLEED-
BACK) 
NONE 
Bleed back – Following injury the healthcare worker’s blood comes into contact with the 
open or exposed tissues of a patient.  
 
While dental treatment is considered to present a low risk of HCW-to-patient 
transmission, the risks of patient-to-patient transmission may be more 
significant. Rarely does a dental visit fail to result in some degree of patient 
bleeding, so there is a high chance that instruments, personal protective 
equipment (PPE) and environmental surfaces will be contaminated with blood, 
and in the absence of satisfactory infection control and decontamination, the 
potential for transfer to subsequent patients. Types of instruments that are 
regularly contaminated with blood during treatment are outlined in Table 3. 
Table 3: List of commonly used dental instruments which frequently contact patient bloodᵃ 
accompanied by descriptions of how they are used 
Periodontal probe 
Used to measure probing depths around 
the gums, usually during routine check-ups. 
Forceps, luxators, elevators 
Used to extract teeth. Placed between 
bone and tooth, deeply engaging the sides 
of the tooth. 
Endodontic files  
(should be single use) 
Used to remove tissue from the root canals 
within a tooth. 
Matrix bands  
(should be single use) 
A metal band which is placed around the 
tooth to aid restoration of teeth using filling 
material. Often engages deeply around the 
gum line. 
Local anaesthetic syringe carpule  
(should be single use) 
Glass capsule containing local anaesthetic 
solution. Inserted into syringe. Can become 
contaminated with blood during injection 
as blood is aspirated back from the 
patient’s tissues. 
Local anaesthetic syringe needle 
(should be single use) 
Attached onto syringe. Inserted into 
patients tissues during injection. 
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Periodontal hand scaler 
Used to scrape away calculus both above 
and beneath the gum line. 
Ultrasonic scaler 
Oscillates at high speeds to break up 
calculus above and beneath the gum line. 
Projects water onto tooth surface during 
operation. 
Rubber dam clamp 
Used to hold a rubber sheet around the 
tooth, isolating it from 
saliva/contamination during root treatment 
and certain types of fillings. Engages the 
tooth at gum line level. 
Scalpel, suture needle, scissors 
Used for raising mucoperiosteal flaps to 
facilitate bone removal during surgical 
removal of a tooth or to take a biopsy. 
Surgical hand piece and bur Specific hand piece used to remove bone 
a = All dental instruments may be contaminated with blood under specific circumstance. 
Table 3 represents those instruments most likely to be frequently/significantly 
contaminated. 
 
1.4.2 Dental infection prevention and control 
Dentists, like all UK healthcare workers, are advised to follow Standard Infection 
Control Precautions (SICPs) when treating patients (section 1.3.1, p43) (NSS 
2019ᵇ). To prevent patient-to-patient transmission of blood borne viruses, 
dentists must perform a number of tasks between patients which include 
appropriate disposal of clinical waste (including sharps), performance of 
adequate hand hygiene, changing of personal protective equipment and wiping 
down equipment and environmental surfaces with disinfectant based disposable 
cloths (Department of Health 2013; NSS 2019ᵇ).  
Methods used to clean and sterilise re-usable dental instruments are based on 
their predicted contact with patient tissues, as described in the Spaulding 
classification which delineates items based on whether they will contact intact 
skin (non-critical), intact mucous membranes (semi-critical) or tissues beneath 
these surfaces (critical) (Spaulding 1968). Most dental instruments are 
considered to be critical items and therefore require sterilisation (Rutala and 
Weber 2013).  
Steam is used within dental practices to sterilise instruments via the use of small, 
benchtop vacuum or non-vacuum sterilisers. Both international and European 
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standards define an adequate sterilisation process as one that produces an 
instrument with a less than 1 in 1 million chance of there being a viable micro-
organism present on it (WHO 2016ᵃ).  
Cleaning of the instrument before sterilisation is essential. Cleaning aims to 
remove, via physical and chemical processes, biological material which may be 
adherent to instruments, contaminated with prions and capable of inhibiting the 
steam sterilisation process (Walker 2014). Prions are abnormally folded proteins 
that reside primarily within the neural tissues (National Institute of Neurological 
Disorders and Stroke 2019). They are the causative agent of variant-CJD and are 
not denatured by conventional, dental, steam sterilisation (Walker 2014). 
The processes of cleaning and sterilisation are encompassed within an overall 
process known as the decontamination cycle (Figure 2) (Black 2016). In general 
dental practice this process is conducted within a separate room dedicated to 
instrument processing; a local decontamination unit (LDU) (Black 2016). 
 
Figure 2: Dental instrument decontamination cycle (reproduced with permission, Bagg et al 
2006) 
The main aspects of the decontamination process include cleaning, disinfection 
and sterilisation. In dentistry, cleaning and disinfection are ideally achieved via 
use of an automated washer disinfector (AWD). An AWD has five stages; an initial 
flushing with cold water (<45°C) to remove debris, a washing stage which uses 
detergent and removes any remaining debris, a rinsing phase to remove the 
detergent, a thermal disinfection stage and finally a drying phase to remove 
moisture (SDCEP 2014).  
Thermal disinfection is designed to destroy most viruses and all micro-organisms 
except spores (Rutala and Weber 2013). It is achieved by exposing instruments to 
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high temperatures for set periods of time (eg. 73-78°C for three minutes or 90-
95°C for one minute) (Health Facilities Scotland and NHS Scotland 2013). Use of 
an AWD is considered essential in Scotland (NHS Scotland 2017) and best practice 
in England (Department of Health and Social Care 2013).  
Before the widespread introduction of AWDs practices solely used manual or 
ultrasonic cleaning processes (Stankiewicz 2019). These processes involve 
washing instruments in a mixture of detergent and water at low temperatures 
(around 30-40°C, depending on detergent manufacturers’ instructions) and do 
not result in disinfection of instruments (Shropshire Community Health Trust 
2016).  An ultrasonic bath is a chamber of water and detergent with transducers 
affixed underneath (Shropshire Community Health Trust 2016). These 
transducers create high frequency soundwaves which vibrate through the water 
and create bubbles which collapse, disrupting dirt and residue from the 
instruments (Shropshire Community Health Trust 2016). It is essential that the 
water in an ultrasonic bath is changed at least every four hours or when the fluid 
is visibly contaminated (SDCEP 2014). 
Sterilisation is achieved in practice using a benchtop steam steriliser. The 
chamber must reach a specific temperature and hold this temperature for a set 
period of time under an appropriate level of pressure. There are a range of 
temperature/time combinations that result in sterilisation but the preferred, 
and most commonly used is 134-137°C for a minimum of three minutes at a 
pressure of 2.1-2.5 bars (SDCEP 2016).  
1.4.2.1 Dental infection prevention and control monitoring and regulation 
A plethora of decontamination guidance is available to UK dentists and is 
designed to aid them in meeting their legal requirements regarding instrument 
processing (Department of Health and Social Care 2013; Health Facilities 
Scotland and NHS Scotland 2013; SDCEP 2016). The legal obligations to use 
instruments which are safe at point of use are outlined in three key pieces of 
legislation; 
- The Consumer Protection Act 1987 
- The Medical Devices Directive (93/42/EEC)  
- The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 
(UK Government Legislation 1987; Council of the European Union 1993 and UK 
Government Legislation 1974) 
In practice these require a number of checks be performed and recorded to 
ensure that decontamination equipment are working effectively and that 
specific sterilisation and disinfection parameters are met for example: 
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- All paper print-outs for each steriliser, washer disinfector and ultrasonic 
cycle need to be kept and at least one for each piece of equipment needs 
to be checked and signed every day (SDCEP 2016).  
- Instruments need to be inspected after the washing/disinfection process 
to ensure no residue remains that will impede sterilisation (SDCEP 2016). 
- If instruments are wrapped for the sterilisation process, any packaging 
indicators need to be checked for appropriate colour changes at point of 
use.  
- Other tests include a daily steam penetration test for vacuum sterilisers 
and weekly cleaning efficacy tests for AWDs and ultrasonic baths (Health 
Facilities Scotland and NHS Scotland 2013). 
 
In Scotland, dental practices are inspected by their NHS health board upon 
opening, at three yearly intervals and/or if there are specific concerns regarding 
standards (Jones 2018). These combined practice inspections utilise a detailed 
checklist with 111 items pertaining to infection control (NHS Scotland 2017). In 
2016 unannounced inspections were introduced (The Scottish Government 2016).  
In England, each year, a 10% sample of practices are inspected by the Care 
Quality Commission (CQC) based on a randomised selection or risk-related 
information gathered from organisations, stakeholders and patients (CQC 2018ᵃ). 
The CQC uses the ‘Key Lines of Inquiry’ framework which is designed to assess 
whether healthcare delivery is safe, effective, caring, responsive and well-led 
(CQC 2018ᵇ). 
It is a legal requirement that all UK dentists be registered with the General 
Dental Council (GDC). Failure to adhere to GDC standards can result in a range 
of consequences, including being restricted from practising. GDC standards 
outline that dentists:  
“must find out about the laws and regulations which apply to your clinical 
practice [...] This will include (but is not limited to) legislation relating to: [...] 
• health and safety • decontamination • medical devices”(GDC 2013). 
1.5 Incident management 
In Scotland, guidance recommends that an incident management team (IMT) 
should be responsible for the public health investigation and management of an 
incident. This multidisciplinary team will typically by chaired by an NHS 
consultant in public health (when community based) or NHS consultant in 
infection control (when hospital based) (HPS and Scot Gov 2017). 
 
An IMT is normally established following a report of an infection control breach 
which could be brought to light in a multitude of ways: a report from a dental 
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nurse, a patient complaint or perhaps as a result of a routine inspection. The 
IMT must investigate the validity of any allegations and, if established to be 
credible, conduct a risk assessment which will aid in determining the risk 
management strategy which may include a PNE (Health Protection Scotland and 
The Scottish Government 2017). 
 
PNEs, also known as large-scale adverse events or look-back exercises, involve 
informing patients that they have been exposed to an unanticipated and 
unacceptable risk of physical harm as a result of medical error (Dudzinski et al 
2010). PNEs may be conducted following the diagnosis of a BBV-infected HCW 
and/or discovery of inadequate infection control practices (Dudzinski et al 2010). 
They may involve tens, hundreds or thousands of patients and often include 
encouraging patients to be examined or tested, to establish if harm has occurred 
(Dudzinski et al 2010). The goals of a PNE were described by a group of UK BBV 
expert panels in 2011 and include: 
 
- providing “patients with information about the nature of the risk to which 
they have been exposed” 
- detecting infection and providing “care to the infected person and advice 
on measures to prevent onward transmission” 
- collecting “valid data to augment existing estimates of the risk of HIV 
transmission from an infected worker to patient during exposure prone 
procedures” 
 
(AGH, EAGA and UKAP 2011) 
 
Notification is a spectrum of communication which can range from a letter or 
phone call to provide information that requires no further patient action, to 
correspondence that strongly recommends testing. 
 
If a PNE, with BBV testing, is deemed necessary, any patients with positive BBV 
results will be investigated further to establish if the infection control breach is 
the likely source of their infection. Presence of specific serological markers, 
avidity testing results (if available) and/or a history of recent seroconversion 
symptoms can indicate recent infection which can aid investigators in linking it 
to the breach.  
If two or more infected individuals are thought to be linked, genetic sequencing 
can be used to establish the similarity between their viral strains and therefore 
how likely it is that transmission has occurred from one to the other, or that 
their infection shares a common source (Garvey et al 2017). 
Myers (1994) explained that the similarity of different viral strains within an HIV-
infected individual is between 95-100% and those between an infected mother 
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and her child are likely to be between 94 and 98%. In the Acer case, where six 
patients were infected with HIV, the dentist’s and patients’ sequences showed a 
95-96% similarity whereas the dentist showed 84-94% similarity with local 
controls (Dickenson et al 1993). In 2007, an American investigation identified 
patient-to-patient transmission where patients had identical genetic sequence 
patterns in the viral regions compared (Redd et al 2007). 
Genetic sequencing results should, however, always be considered alongside 
epidemiological evidence, as there is always a possibility that similarity could be 
down to chance alone (Garvey et al 2017). Unfortunately, genetic sequencing 
can only be conducted if an individual has viral DNA or RNA actively circulating 
in the bloodstream (Mason et al 2008). 
1.6 Aims and research questions of this thesis 
When a dental HCW is diagnosed with a BBV, there is clear guidance on when to 
notify patients, as well as support of the expert panel, UKAP (UKAP 2019; PHE 
2017ᵃ). In contrast, there exists no clear UK guidance to assist IMTs when a 
dental infection control breach has occurred.  Absence of guidance results in 
inconsistencies regarding incident response and patient notification across the 
UK.  The decision to notify patients is particularly challenging, and involves 
careful consideration and a balancing of cost versus benefit (Weller 1999; 
Henderson et al 2017). There is a need to assess level of risk, often with 
inadequate information of what has happened and/or who is at risk, and 
consider what risks a reasonable patient would expect to be informed of (Weber 
and Rutala 2013). 
One of the aims of this doctoral work is therefore to support the decision-making 
process regarding the need for patient notification following the identification of 
a dental infection control breach through the development and presentation of a 
decision-making algorithm. Evidence for this algorithm will be obtained by 
establishing what both experts and the literature can tell us about the decision 
to notify dental patients following an infection control breach in a developed 
country setting. 
Evidence will be gathered via identification and analysis of historical dental ‘BBV 
transmission risk’ incidents (their contexts, investigations and outcomes), 
collation of the experiences and lessons learned by IMT leaders and examination 
of guidance available regarding the management of infection control breach 
incidents and patient disclosure. 
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Overall research question 
What can both experts and the literature tell us about the decision to notify 
dental patients following an infection control breach in a developed country 
setting? 
Sub-research questions 
i. What are both the real and perceived problems created as a result of dental 
PNEs within developed countries? 
ii. What are both the real and perceived benefits created as a result of dental 
PNEs within developed countries? 
iii. What are the influential factors behind the decision to notify patients 
following a dental ‘BBV transmission risk’ incident? 
iv. Do dental PNEs achieve that which they set out to do in relation to 
notification, testing, diagnoses made and identified transmissions? 
v. What guidance and/or documentation currently exists to guide IMTs through 
the decision-making process of whether or not to proceed to a PNE, following a 
dental infection control breach? 
vi. What research gaps lie within the field of dental PNEs that should be 
explored, in order to assist those in the decision of whether or not to proceed 
with one following a dental infection control breach? 
Aims 
i. To source and report on all dental incidents which may have resulted in the 
exposure of patients to a BBV transmission risk, within the dental setting in 
developed countries. 
ii. To present evidentially supported arguments for and against the 
implementation of PNEs following incidents which have created a risk of BBV 
transmission within the dental setting. 
iii. To identify and present current guidance related to the decision-making 
process of when to conduct a PNE following an infection control breach. 
iv. To design and present an evidence-based decision-making algorithm which 
will aid IMTs with the decision of when to notify patients following a dental 
infection control breach. 
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1.7 Structure of this thesis 
This thesis will consist of six main chapters (Table 4). The structure of the thesis 
is based around the scoping review study process, with each chapter addressing 
a different stage. They all however, contribute to the development of the 
evidence-based decision-making algorithm and the overall aim of the thesis; 
establishing what both experts and the literature can tell us about the decision 
to notify dental patients following an infection control breach. 
Chapter two describes the methodological approach chosen and the 
development of a novel 16-step scoping review study process, based on stages 
outlined in both methodological publications and scoping review studies. 
Chapters three and four address the first and second objectives using 
intelligence derived from a stakeholder consultation exercise and literature 
review with collation of published and unpublished incident outcomes. Chapter 
five addresses the third objective by presenting findings from a guidance 
mapping exercise. Chapter six pulls together the intelligence derived from the 
stakeholder consultation and review of the literature and guidance to create an 
evidence-based decision-making algorithm. This is designed to be used as an 
aide memoire by public health consultants to establish if patient notification is 
the appropriate course of action following a dental infection control breach 
incident. Finally, Chapter seven summarises the findings of this doctoral 
research, derives conclusions and makes recommendations for further research 
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Table 4: Overall structure of thesis 
 
 
1.8 A focus on the wider dental patient notification exercise 
evidence base 
Although the aims of this scoping review study are focused on the decision to 
notify patients specifically following a dental infection control breach, the 
research questions and chapter study designs focus on the wider dental patient 
notification exercise evidence base.  
It was predicted that many of the findings and outcomes of wider incident types 
e.g. public anxiety caused, uptake of testing, would also be applicable to the 
investigation of a dental infection control breach.  
The qualitative interview study and literature search process described in 
chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, focus on any dental incidents which created risk 
of blood borne virus transmission (Figure 3). 
The policy mapping exercise of chapter 5 includes guidance documents which 
give advice concerning large scale notification of patients following general 
medical incidents or adverse events (Figure 3).  
Chapter 6 outlines the creation of an algorithm to aid IMTs in their decision of 
whether to notify patients following a dental infection control breach and the 
algorithm presented in section 6.4 reflects this goal but has a focus on infection 
control incidents which involve contaminated instruments/decontamination 
breaches (Figure 3). 
 
Chapter 2 – Development of novel scoping review study methodological framework 
 
Chapter 3 - Scoping review study stakeholder consultation 
Chapter 4 - Systematic type review of grey and published literature  
Chapter 5 - Policy mapping exercise 
 
Chapter 6 – Results - Design of an evidence-based decision making algorithm to aid incident 
management team members with the decision of whether to notify patients following a dental 
infection control breach incident 
Chapter 7 - Discussion 
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Figure 3: Focus of thesis chapters in relation to type of adverse event or incident 
1.9 Publication arising from the work undertaken as part of this 
thesis 
During the stakeholder consultation exercise, discussions with colleagues in NHS 
Ayrshire and Arran, highlighted a number of challenges identified and lessons 
learned from a large patient notification exercise associated with a dental 
infection control breach incident. These were written up and published to 
facilitate peer review learning (Appendix 2): 
Henderson HJ, Hopps L, Roy KM (2017). Blood borne virus testing of 2250 
patients in an unusual, repeated dental patient notification exercise: challenges 
faced and lessons learnt. Public Health. Vol 151 p74-80. 
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Chapter 2. Development of a novel scoping review study protocol 
2.1 Introduction 
Public health decision-making should be evidence based to ensure patient safety, 
maximise beneficial patient health effects and facilitate optimal use of 
resources (Harvey 2011).  
When embarking on knowledge or evidence gathering research, methodological 
choices and interpretation of gathered data is influenced by the epistemological 
standpoint of the researcher i.e. how they separate truth from belief and know 
when an understanding of a fact has been reached (Sullivan 2010). Two broad 
schools of thought are presented in the literature regarding how knowledge 
exists, is discovered and interpreted – Positivism (or Realism) and Social 
Constructionism (or Relativism) (Sullivan 2010). 
Positivism suggests that truths or facts can only be established based on direct 
experiences or observations. It favours quantitative data and argues that it is 
possible for science to be truly objective and free from subjective influences 
(Sullivan 2010). 
Social Constructionism proposes that cultures, perspectives and context will 
always prevent true determination of fact and that examination of our 
perceptions of truths are the only way we can indirectly study them. Social 
Constructionism favours the study of language and is thereby suited to the 
interpretation of qualitative research study findings (Sullivan 2010). 
Although two separate ideas are presented, in reality, these standpoints lie on a 
scale with extreme realism at one end and extreme relativism at the other. 
Researchers may elect to adopt a middle ground with certain aspects of each 
theory being appreciated (Sullivan 2010). Critical Realism is such a standpoint 
and, in this doctoral study, it was this approach which was chosen to guide both 
the decisions behind study design and interpretation of findings (Sullivan 2010). 
Critical Realism is an approach which lies between the two extreme 
epistemological standpoints and suggests that even though we only have access 
to perceptions and social interpretations of facts, they do mirror the truth and 
that studying these perceptions can lead to meaningful conclusions that reflect 
fact (Sullivan 2010). 
With the principles of Critical Realism in mind, it was important to consider the 
proposed research questions of this doctoral work, what type or types of study 
design would be suited to answering them and what interpretive assumptions 
would be made about any findings. 
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It was predicted that both quantitative and qualitative data would play a part in 
answering the proposed research questions. When assessing the implementation 
of a complex process such as large-scale patient notification, quantitative data 
such as numbers of diagnoses made or financial costs incurred would contribute 
to understanding the benefits and consequences created. However, this type of 
data in isolation would not be enough to understand the other complex human 
factors that result in positive or negative outcomes for example, degree of 
patient anxiety or what conflicting ethical concepts decision makers wrestle 
with when making their decision on notification. 
A mixed methods approach was deemed suitable with language being studied to 
indirectly access the truths about how decision-making occurs and what the 
perceived benefits and negatives of notification are. This would be combined 
with an objective examination of numerical based incident outcomes.  
The chief investigator actively observing or being involved in the management of 
a relevant dental incident was considered impractical as one could not predict 
when or where one would occur, or indeed if it would occur at all during the 
chief investigators doctoral study period. This approach would also only provide 
data related to one incident which would result in a weak evidence base for 
recommendations. 
An examination and collation of historic incidents was deemed to be prudent as 
there was no evidence of such an exercise having been undertaken and the 
comparison of multiple incident outcomes would provide a richer evidence base 
with more data to support conclusions. A review of incidents, which captured 
the significant proportion of unpublished events, from across the developed 
world was considered, but how effectively would this answer the research 
questions being posed if we consider that these would simply be reflections of 
what the true facts are and would be greatly influenced by their contexts. 
A mixed methods approach would support findings through triangulation of 
information gathered via differing approaches. If concepts were found to be 
reflected in published literature, stakeholder opinion and guidance it was 
deemed that that would provide a more robust argument for conclusions drawn 
based on a Critical Realism perspective. 
A literature review which focused on dental incident management was 
determined to be a clear methodological choice for one part of the mixed 
methods study, but consideration had to be given as to what type of review 
would be appropriate.  
Three types of literature review were considered potentially appropriate for this 
research: a systematic review, a realist review and a scoping review study 
(Grant and Booth 2009).  
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1. a systematic review requires a narrow, specific research question and focuses 
on high quality studies such as randomised control trials (RCTs). 
2. a realist review aims to utilise a wide variety of literature sources and focuses 
on the context of an intervention; what works for whom, under what 
circumstances and why. 
3. a scoping review study aims to provide a very broad picture of the literature 
and evidence concerning a subject. It is characterised by distinct study phases, 
presentation of the data without assessment of study quality and no limitations 
regarding information sources.  
The main characteristics of the different approaches are summarised in Table 5.  
A systematic review approach was deemed inappropriate as an initial search of 
the literature requiring examination (dental incident reports) suggested they 
were often not of a high quality and certainly never explored in an RCT context.  
A realist review approach was also discounted as one of the aims of this work 
was not to examine the effectiveness of an intervention (large-scale patient 
notification) but, via creation of a decision making algorithm, consider whether 
it should be implemented at all. 
Table 5: Comparison of systematic, realist and scoping review study features adapted from the 
table presented by Brien et al in 2010. (Pawson et al 2005; Berg and Nanavati 2016) 
Systematic review Scoping review study Realist review 
Focused research question 
with narrow parameters 
Research question(s) often 
broad 
Asking what works for whom, 
in what circumstances and 
how. Theory driven. 
Inclusion/exclusion usually 
defined at outset 
Inclusion/exclusion can be 
developed post hoc 
Inclusion/exclusion usually 
defined at outset but can be 
iterative process 
Quality filters often applied Quality not an initial priority Quality not an initial priority 
Quantitative synthesis often 
performed 
Synthesis more qualitative and 
typically not quantitative 
Synthesis of both qualitative 
and quantitative data 
Formally assess the quality of 
studies and generates a 
conclusion relating to the 
focused research question 
Used to identify parameters and 
gaps in a body of literature 
Used to assess complex policy 
interventions within a specific 
context 
2.1.1 What is a scoping review study? Why was it deemed the 
ideal methodology to utilise? 
Scoping studies are literature reviews which aim to map out key papers, sources 
and data relating to a broad subject, whilst identifying research gaps and 
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presenting findings within an up-to-date policy context (Tricco et al 2016; 
Anderson et al 2008). 
The design of a scoping review study is suited to the exploration of a subject 
which is vast, complex and under-researched (Arksey and O’Malley 2005; Pham 
et al 2014). The area of dental incident management undeniably fits this 
description. It is: 
Vast: as dental incidents occur all around the world with high variability in their 
management and with relevant evidence being found within a variety of sources.  
Under-researched: as studies conducted in this field are currently limited in 
their amount, breadth and depth.  
Complex: as the decision to notify is influenced by a multitude of factors such as 
transmission data, ethical arguments and economical considerations. 
The scoping review study design facilitates the inclusion of multiple literature 
sources including grey literature (Levac et al 2010; Pham et al 2014). This is 
advantageous in the scrutiny of this topic as relevant dental PNE data are found 
within a variety of sources such as journal articles, opinion pieces and reports, 
both published and unpublished. 
A scoping review study involves the examination of literature in relation to broad 
research questions (Levac et al 2010). Scoping review study research questions 
often begin with phrases such as “What does the literature tell us about...” 
(Daudt et al 2013) or “What is the extent of published evidence on...” (Brien et 
al 2010). The focus on the identification of positive and negative outcomes of a 
complex process (large-scale patient notification) and exploration of the many 
factors that influence a difficult and multifactorial decision (whether to conduct 
a PNE) could certainly be considered broad. 
Scoping review studies typically do not assess the quality of the literature they 
identify and present (Armstrong et al 2011; Pham et al 2014; Victoor et al 2012). 
This is seen by some as a weakness of the method (Brien et al 2010; Grant and 
Booth 2009) but in fact this feature is ideally suited to the literature examined 
as part of this study as much of the literature on PNEs in dentistry exists in the 
form of historic governmental and health board reports. These reports are often 
a relaying of facts and as such are not suited to the rigorous examination of 
quality that would be conducted in the assessment of a clinical trial study paper 
for a systematic review.  
2.1.2 A history of scoping review study development 
Historically, scoping review studies were implemented as precursors to 
systematic reviews, but throughout the last decade they are more often being 
executed as extensive pieces of research in their own right (Davis et al 2009). 
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Comprehensive scoping review studies can take over a year to complete and 
those contemplating such a review are warned not to assume that they require 
any less time or resource input than a traditional systematic review (Armstrong 
et al 2011; Brien et al 2010; Pham et al 2014). Brien et al (2010) stated that 
scoping review studies are “often misinterpreted to be a less rigorous systematic 
review, when in fact they are a different entity”. 
A formal framework for the scoping review study methodology was originally 
devised by Arksey and O’Malley of York University in 2005 (Table 6) and has been 
enhanced by several researchers over the last ten years (Brien et al 2010; Daudt 
et al 2013; Levac et al 2010; Peters et al 2017; Rumrill et al 2010). 
Table 6: Arksey and O’Malley’s (2005) original scoping review study framework 
1. Identifying the research question 
2. Identifying relevant studies 
3. Study selection 
4. Charting the data 
5. Collating, summarising and reporting the results  
6. An optional consultation exercise 
 
Arksey and O’Malley’s (2005) framework was evaluated by Levac et al (2010) 
who made suggestions on how to break down and define the stages more clearly, 
making the framework more detailed and user friendly. Daudt et al (2013) 
examined each stage of the original framework with reference to the work done 
by Levac et al (2013) and provided recommendations as to what types of 
research questions were suited to a scoping review study methodology.  
2.1.3 Scoping review study standards 
There is virtually no guidance on how to report scoping review studies and no 
documents which provide direction on how to assess the quality of a scoping 
review study (Tricco et al 2016). The Joanna Briggs Institute in Australia did, 
however, publish a guide in 2015 on how to conduct a scoping review study 
which was updated in their most recent Reviewers Manual (Peters et al 2017).  
Tricco et al (2016) have also stated that they plan to produce a scoping review 
study reporting checklist. This project can be found on the PRISMA (Preferred 
Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis) website under 
‘Extensions in Development’ with the current title ‘The Preferred Reporting 
Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis extension for Scoping Reviews 
(PRISMA-ScR)’. 
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2.1.4 Scoping review study aims 
Arksey and O’Malley (2005) made the distinction between scoping review studies 
undertaken as an exploratory stage before a systematic review and those which 
are considered pieces of research in their own right. The former would focus on 
ascertaining the “extent, range and nature” of research within a specific field 
and aim to assess the value of conducting a full systematic review. The latter 
involves collation and publication of findings with identification of research gaps 
(Arksey and O’Malley 2005). The scoping review study conducted as part of this 
doctoral work fits into this second category. 
2.1.5 Scoping review study stages 
Anderson and his team (2008) commissioned many scoping review studies to 
gather evidence around healthcare service delivery and organisation. They 
outlined that scoping review studies are usually comprised of 1 to 4 distinct 
phases which include conceptual mapping, literature mapping, policy mapping 
and a stakeholder consultation (Figure 4) (Anderson 2008). 
 
 
Figure 4. Stages of this doctorate scoping review study. (Adapted from figure presented by 
Davis, Drey and Gould, 2009)  
*Conceptual mapping is 
acknowledged as a phase 
but was not conducted 
as part of this review 
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With multiple, complimentary study phases, the design of a scoping review study 
was deemed to be ideally aligned with the mixed methods approach that was 
postulated when originally considering the overall doctoral methodology.  
2.2 Methods 
A simple, exploratory Google search was conducted to identify appropriate 
scoping review study methodological literature and healthcare-related scoping 
review study examples.  
In addition to the formal protocol from the Joanna Briggs Institute (Peters et al 
2017) and Arksey and O’Malley’s original protocol (2005), seven key 
methodological papers and four scoping review study examples were identified 
and used to create a methodological framework to guide this scoping review 
study (Anderson et al 2008; Forbes et al 2007; Ross et al 2004; Victoor et al 2012; 
While et al 2005; Arksey and O’Malley 2005; Armstrong et al 2011; Brien et al 
2010; Daudt et al 2013; Davis et al 2009; Grant and Booth 2009; Levac et al 2010; 
Peters et al 2017; Rumrill et al 2010).  
All scoping review study stages recommended by the authors were merged and 
incorporated into a novel 16-step, methodological framework that was used in 
this doctoral project. Each stage of the process is set out in Table 7 along with 
an indication of where the results of each stage are presented within this thesis.  
2.3 Results 
Table 7: Novel scoping review study protocol 
Stage of scoping review study and features 
Reported in 
chapter/section 
References 
1. IDENTIFY AN OVERALL, BROAD RESEARCH 
QUESTION 
1.6 
Armstrong et al 2011;  
Levac et al 2010;  
Rumrill et al 2010                                                                               
Examples include; “What has been 
published...” and “What factors determine 
whether...” 
Rumrill et al 2010 
PCC structured question ie: population, 
concept, context 
Peters et al 2017 
Identify sub-research questions  
Armstrong et al 2011;  
Brien et al 2010;  
Levac et al 2010 
Consider design and nature of outputs at 
completion  
Ehrich 2002; 
Levac et al 2010                                                 
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2. CREATE TITLE 
Title page 
 
Should not be structured as a question and 
should include the term ‘scoping review’ or 
‘scoping study’. 
Peters et al 2017; 
Arksey and O’Malley 2005; 
Levac et al 2010    
3. PRELIMINARY LITERATURE SEARCH 
INCLUDING A SEARCH FOR OTHER SIMILAR 
SCOPING STUDIES/REVIEWS                                                                                                   
3.3.1, 4.3.1.1 
Daudt et al 2013; 
Peters et al 2017 
4. COLLATE PRELIMINARY FINDINGS TO BE 
USED IN STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION 
3.3.1, 3.5.3.2 Levac et al 2010 
5. STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION EXERCISE 
3 
Arksey and O’Malley 2005 
Utilise primary findings 
Brien et al 2010 
Levac et al 2010 
Ask for key papers/studies Armstrong et al 2011 
Identify a key theme from discussion   While et al 2005 
Ask about research priorities  Levac et al 2010 
Ask about definitions/key search terms  
Armstrong et al 2011; 
Brien et al 2010 
Ask about key 
organisations/journals/websites to search   
Armstrong et al 2011 
Obtain opinions on validity and structure of 
study  
Levac et al 2010 
Consider roles, regions and purposive 
sampling  
Ross et al 2003 
Framework guided thematic analysis of 
transcripts 
Ross et al 2003; 
O’Brien et al 2009; 
While et al 2005 
6. DEVELOP SEARCH TERMS FROM KEY 
ARTICLES IDENTIFIED IN STAGE 3 AND 
STAKEHOLDER ADVICE   
3.5.3.1, 4.3.1.2 Peters et al 2017                           
7. INCLUSION/EXCLUSION CRITERIA 
4.3.1.3, 4.3.1.4 
 
Ideally not many initial limitations  Armstrong et al 2011                                                                           
 
 
65 
 
Search parameters can be altered post hoc    
Armstrong et al 2011; 
Brien et al 2010; 
Rumrill et al 2010                                                                    
Involve librarian in search strategy   
Brien et al 2010; 
Victoor et al 2012                                                                                     
Create and publish an a priori protocol*  Peters et al  2017                                                                            
8. IDENTIFY RELEVANT STUDIES 
4.3.1.4, 4.3.2 
 
Utilise at least 3 electronic databases   
Arksey and O’Malley 2005; 
Armstrong et al 2011; 
Peters et al 2017; 
Rumrill et al 2010                                                                                                     
Duplicate removal, title scan, abstract scanᵃ, 
full text scanᵃ 
Peters et al 2017                                         
Full texts excluded with reasons Peters et al 2017                                                                                                    
Search reference lists of selected papers    
Arksey and O’Malley 2005; 
Armstrong et al 2011; 
Brien et al 2010; 
Peters et al 2017                                                                                 
Search citation histories of selected papers*  Arksey and O’Malley 2005                                                                     
Hand search key journals*  
Arksey and O’Malley 2005; 
Armstrong et al 2011; 
Brien et al 2010                                                                                                         
Contact authors if required  Peters et al 2017                                                                                                    
Create system or plan for update to search   Brien et al 2010                                                                   
Specific website/organisation searches   
Arksey and O’Malley 2005; 
Armstrong et al 2011                                                                                  
Grey literature databases  
Armstrong et al 2011; 
Brien et al 2010; 
Daudt et al 2013; 
Ehrich 2002                                                                                                             
Papers suggested by experts/stakeholders  
Armstrong et al 2011; 
Forbes et al 2007                                                                                 
Published books  Rumrill et al 2010                                                                                                                 
Use a reference manager programme  Pham et al 2014                                                                                 
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Create flowchart based on PRISMA structure 
with narrative description of search process  
Brien et al 2010; 
Peters et al 2017                                                                                                                                
No assessment of quality  
Arksey and O’Malley 2005; 
Armstrong et al 2011; 
Brien et al 2010; 
Grant and Booth 2009;  
Peters et al 2017; 
Rumrill et al 2010; 
Victoor et al 2012                                                                                                
a = at least 2 reviewers, with meetings to discuss 
discrepancies in choices   
Brien et al 2010;  
Victoor et al 2012                                     
9. CHARTING THE DATA 
4.3.3, Appendix 14 
 
Assign each paper a unique ID number   Daudt et al 2013                                                                                    
Create a data extraction form based on 
outcomes desired (can be altered later to 
reflect new discoveries)  
Levac et al 2010                                                                                                           
Can have multiple data extraction forms for 
different types of study/sources/concepts  
Levac et al 2010 
Team should meet to evaluate and pilot 
form(s) on 5-10 papers with further meetings 
to discuss discrepancies and refine design  
Daudt et al 2013; 
Levac et al 2010                                   
10. COLLATION OF QUANTITATIVE DATA  
4.4.3 
 
Tabular and graphical summary of 
studies/sources characteristics  
eg. location, years, methods, journals, terms 
used etc.   
Peters et al 2017;   
Grant and Booth 2009 
 
11. NARRATIVE SYNTHESIS OF QUALITATIVE 
DATA 
 
4.4.2 
Brien et al 2010; 
Davis et al 2009; 
Peters et al 2017; 
Victoor et al 2012  
12. POLICY/GUIDANCE MAPPING    
5 
Davis et al 2009; 
Rumrill et al 2010                                                                                                                    
Identify relevant websites to search through 
stakeholders, validated checklists etc.  
Brien et al 2010; 
Daudt et al 2013 
Identify inclusion/exclusion criteria  Ross et al 2004                                                                                      
Identify broad search terms  Brien et al 2010                                                                                                 
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Utilise website search boxes                                                                                              Brien et al 2010         
Manually search sites using links                                                                               Brien et al 2010          
Alter inclusion/exclusion criteria post hoc   
Arksey and O’Malley 2005; 
Armstrong et al 2011; 
Brien et al 2010; 
Levac et al 2010; 
Victoor et al 2012                                                                         
Narrative synthesis of guidance/policy 
context   
Anderson et al 2008;  
Peters et al 2017;  
Ross et al 2004                                                             
13. OVERALL RESULTS  
 
List of gaps in the research   
3.5.3.4, 3.6.3.3, 
4.5.2.3 
Levac et al 2010                                                                                                            
Recommend questions/methodologies for 
future research   
7.2.2, Appendices 
22, 23 and 24 
Levac et al 2010                                                           
“provide advice on what kind of research 
products might be useful in the ‘real world’” 
    6 Anderson et al 2008 
Summarise and disseminate research 
findings 
3-6 Daudt et al 2013 
14. SYNTHESIS OF DIFFERENT STRANDS OF 
THE EXERCISE 
6, 7 
 
Link results of guidance mapping, literature 
and expert opinion from consultation 
exercise  
Anderson et al 2008                                                                                                                         
15. SECOND CONSULTATION EXERCISE*  
N/A 
Levac et al 2010                                                                                                        
Validate outcome produced*  Arksey and O’Malley 2005                                                                                             
16. ADDITIONAL STEPS 
4.3.1.2 and reported 
throughout 
 
Consult with stakeholders throughout   
Brien et al 2010 
Daudt et al 2013 
Pham et al 2014                                                                                                
Iterative process   
Arksey and O’Malley 2005; 
Daudt et al 2013; 
Davis et al 2009                                                                                                                             
Encouraged to report on your experience of 
doing a scoping review study 
Anderson et al 2008                                     
 
 
68 
 
*White sections represent those steps which are recommended in the literature but were not executed 
as part of this study. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
Use of the scoping review study methodology as a comprehensive search strategy 
and study in its own right is a recent practice. The scoping review study protocol 
presented here can therefore be used by those who wish to follow not only the 
steps laid out by Arksey and O’Malley in their original 2005 framework but 
incorporate adaptations presented by other authors (Brien et al 2010; Daudt et 
al 2013; Levac et al 2010; Rumrill et al 2010) and the Joanna Briggs Institute 
(Peters et al 2017). Creation of this framework aligns with the call for 
researchers to report on their experiences of using a scoping review study 
methodology (Anderson 2008). 
2.4.1 Methodological choices 
This doctoral scoping review study comprises three of the four key components 
identified by Anderson (2008):  a stakeholder consultation, a review of the 
literature (both grey and published) and a mapping of relevant policy or 
guidance documents. Conceptual mapping was not deemed necessary as the 
main aspects of a PNE and its associated terminology were already well defined.  
The scoping review study framework developed, incorporated most suggested 
stages in the key methodological papers identified. It did, however, 
acknowledge a number of stages but did not incorporate them. The creation of 
an a priori protocol (as recommended in the JBI protocol) was not included, as it 
was felt this would limit the ability to both utilise an iterative search strategy 
and modify inclusion/exclusion criteria post hoc as is suggested throughout the 
scoping review study literature (Peters et al 2017; Armstrong et al 2011; Rumrill 
et al 2010). The extent of the review was deliberately limited through the 
omission of certain stages such as the second stakeholder consultation (Stage 15) 
and the searching of literature citation histories (Stage 8) as the breadth of the 
review had to be balanced against the time available – this is an important step 
described by Daudt et al (2013). Within the scoping methodological literature, 
hand searching of key journals is recommended. This, however, was deemed to 
be inappropriate as dental incident data were discovered within a variety of 
journal types which differed in subject focus eg. infection control, public health, 
dentistry, hepatology, microbiology etc. (Table 36). 
It is important to note that the literature search which influenced the content of 
the novel framework was not highly structured meaning that key methodological 
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documents may have been missed, however, this is considered unlikely as key 
documents were consistently identified from different sources. 
2.4.2 Scoping review study strengths 
Adopting a scoping review study methodology offers many advantages over the 
more traditional forms of literature review. First, scoping review studies do not 
put restrictions on the nature or quality of the studies that can be included in 
the review. Thus, published and unpublished heterogeneous data can be 
presented and made available for future reference. Second, scoping studies are 
not limited to a review of the literature alone. Incorporation of the stakeholder 
consultation means that results of the study can be tailored to the needs of the 
main research users, and increase the applicability and use, of research outputs 
(Anderson 2008, Colquhoun et al 2010, Daudt et al 2013), whilst inclusion of a 
guidance mapping phase places literature findings and stakeholder opinion 
within a policy context (Davis 2009). This approach lends itself well to the broad 
aim of this project; to establish what both experts and the literature can tell us 
about the decision to notify dental patients following an infection control breach 
in a developed country setting, and with such wide exploration and presentation 
of a topic it becomes easy to ascertain where further research is required. 
Current guidance on the execution of scoping review studies is limited therefore 
publication of theses and studies that utilise this novel methodology are a 
beneficial addition to the evidence base and contribute towards the 
development of a standardised methodology (Brien 2010). 
2.4.3 Scoping review study limitations 
The limitations of such an approach should also, however be acknowledged. 
Similar to other forms of literature review, the results represent a snap shot in 
time where findings can quickly become out of date (Brien et al 2010). There is 
also the danger that studies may be missed and it is always important to 
consider that studies examined may be susceptible to the individual reviewer’s 
bias (Pham et al 2014).  
Pham et al (2014) emphasised that scoping review studies are “...a relatively 
new approach for which a universal study definition or definitive procedure has 
not been established”.  As such there remains a degree of confusion in relation 
to the purpose of a scoping review study (Daudt et al 2013; Davis et al 2009). 
This uncertainty coupled with the lack of a validated tool to assess the quality of 
scoping review studies, can limit the acceptance of the methodology and lead to 
questions regarding its credibility (Brien et al 2010; Davis et al 2009; Levac et al 
2010, Pham et al 2014).  
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A further reason why scoping review studies may experience limited acceptance 
relates to the lack of a quality assessment phase for included studies (Brien et al 
2010; Pham et al 2014). Accordingly, the results of scoping review studies must 
be interpreted with caution. Ehrich et al (2002) emphasised that the conclusions 
of a scoping review study are “indicative and suggestive rather than definitive”. 
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Chapter 3. Semi-structured qualitative interviews of those with 
experience of managing dental ‘BBV transmission risk’ public 
health incidents – A stakeholder consultation with use of a novel 
thematic analysis framework. 
3.1 Introduction 
A scoping review study stakeholder consultation exercise involves liaising with 
those your research is intended to aid (Colquhoun et al 2010) and is achieved via 
a range of methods from expert panels (Forbes et al 2007) and focus groups 
(Rumrill et al 2010) to conferences (While et al 2005) and one-to-one interviews 
(O’Brien et al 2010). Stakeholders can be patients, managers, policy makers, 
educators, researchers etc. (O’Brien et al 2010) and numbers involved can range 
from as few as ten participants (Brien et al 2010) to as many as 113 (While et al 
2005).  
Literature searching and networking strategies can be enhanced through 
stakeholders’ suggestions of search terms, research contacts, literature sources 
and relevant organisations (Armstrong et al 2011; Forbes et al 2007). 
Stakeholders can also provide in-depth insight into a subject area thereby 
directly answering research questions or highlighting research gaps (Anderson et 
al 2008; O’Brien et al 2010). 
In 2014, Pham et al conducted a review of scoping exercises which found that of 
344 identified, 39.8% included a stakeholder consultation. Of these, 74.5% were 
conducted during the search strategy phase, 30.7% asked stakeholders to 
interpret preliminary findings and 25.9% involved interaction with stakeholders 
throughout the study. Arksey and O’Malley’s original scoping review study 
framework (2005) described the stakeholder consultation as an optional step, 
whereas both Daudt et al (2013) and Levac et al (2010) agreed it is an essential 
component. 
3.1.1 Related studies 
Although not part of a scoping review study and not labelled specifically as a 
stakeholder consultation exercise, Maguire et al (2016ᵃ) examined the positive 
and negative aspects of the US Veterans Health Administration’s large-scale 
disclosure policy through qualitative, semi-structured interviews with patients, 
leaders and employers who had been involved in a range of medical incidents, 
including one dental infection control incident. Focusing on two specific aspects 
of the notification process, communication and culture, data were analysed 
using the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research (CFIR), 
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concentrating on three domains: ‘inner setting’, ‘intervention characteristics’ 
and ‘process’ (Maguire et al 2016ᵃ). 
Maguire et al (2016ᵃ) reported that participants felt communication from higher 
management was often poor with staff feeling cut off from key information and 
uncertain about their job security during incident management. One of the 
largest costs of notification was reported to be loss of patient trust which was 
made worse by delayed communications, inappropriate vehicles of message 
delivery and first learning about the incident from the media rather than the 
involved health care organisation. Benefits of notification included the morality 
behind being transparent, respecting the patient’s right to know, the 
opportunity for organisational team building and the assessment of infection 
control with resulting improvements. Staff also expressed a desire to share their 
experiences with other organisations that may have yet to deal with such a 
scenario (Maguire et al 2016ᵃ). 
Maguire et al (2016ᵃ) concluded their study by stating that there would be merit 
in identifying early indicators of an infection control breach, for example, an 
organisation’s culture and/or the content of historic safety reports, which could 
indicate an environment that could be more prone to the occurrence of breaches. 
They also stated that while US guidance indicated the types of incidents that 
required patient notification, they did not provide guidance on the manner in 
which they should be conducted. Consequently, they expressed a desire to 
develop a toolkit which would assist US IMTs in the execution of large-scale 
patient notification (Maguire et al 2016ᵃ). 
3.1.2 Rationale for study 
While many of the findings from Maguire et al (2016ᵃ) can be applied to a UK 
context, there are key differences in the delivery of healthcare between the US 
and UK, that may limit the applicability of the findings. The stakeholder 
consultation executed as part of this scoping review study would present insights 
into the challenges faced by IMTs from a UK perspective and provide a deeper 
insight into the influential factors and challenges relating to the decision to 
notify patients following a dental incident. 
In addition, it was felt that conducting a literature search without guidance from 
those who have experience of managing these exercises would be unwise as they 
possess knowledge regarding terminology (that would help define search terms), 
details of unpublished incidents/grey literature, relevant guidance, websites and 
expert contacts. 
As one of the aims of this doctoral study was to design and present an evidence 
based PNE decision-making algorithm, it was thought to be prudent to seek 
feedback from those who may utilise such a resource in the future. Furthermore, 
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networking with key research end-users would facilitate dissemination of the 
final research product. 
3.2 Aims 
i. To provide a deeper insight into the subject beyond that which the literature 
can provide, specifically regarding the influential factors and challenges relating 
to the decision to notify patients following a UK dental infection control 
incident4. 
ii. To facilitate obtaining further resources to aid in the (grey) literature scoping 
review study search such as publications, websites and expert contacts. 
iii. To identify key search terms. 
iv. To identify research priorities. 
v. To receive feedback from stakeholders as to whether the design of the 
scoping review study research is valid and its anticipated outcomes useful.   
3.3 Methods part 1 
3.3.1 Participant recruitment 
One-to-one interviews were conducted with UK public health staff with 
experience in the management of incidents which had created a risk of BBV 
transmission within the dental setting; either a dental infection control breach 
incident and/or discovery of a BBV-infected dental HCWs. 
A list of potential participants was formulated using i) recommendations from Dr 
Kirsty Roy of HPS and ii) a list of authors of UK dental PNE publications. An 
attempt was made to include at least one participant from each of the devolved 
nations.  
Participants were invited to take part in the study via an email with an attached 
Participation Information Sheet (Appendix 3). If the contact was happy to 
participate, emails were exchanged and an interview time and place were 
arranged. Participants were sent two documents to review before the interview:  
1) A summary of preliminary research findings which was created following an 
initial exploratory literature search. 
2) An outline of the aims, research questions and methods of the PhD project. 
                                                          
4 Defined as those that created risk of/caused BBV transmission, in the dental setting, to patients (either 
from a BBV-infected HCW and/or inadequate dental infection control). 
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3.3.2 Questioning route design 
A pre-prepared interview questioning route (Appendix 4) was designed based on 
the study’s aims, the principles of a scoping review study stakeholder 
consultation as presented in the literature (Levac et al 2010; Daudt et al 2013; 
Brien et al 2010; Peters et al 2017; Rumrill et al 2010), information from 
qualitative interview methodology publications (Britten 1995; Kreuger and Casey 
2000; Silverman 2013) and guidance from a University of Glasgow qualitative 
research expert (HH). 
3.3.3 Study design 
Following the consent process, participants were interviewed for approximately 
90 mintutes. All interviews were audio recorded and structured around the pre-
prepared interview questioning route mentioned above (Appendix 4). 
Recordings were transcribed verbatim and any sensitive and/or identifiable 
information was removed. Transcriptions, in their anonymised form, were 
emailed to each participant to read and confirm content veracity (a respondent 
validation phase). 
3.3.4 Ethical considerations 
University of Glasgow MVLS Ethics Committee approval was sought and a 
research passport or letter of access was created and approved for each 
participating board/trust. 
At the start of each interview, participants were given a detailed and 
comprehensive Consent Form to read (Appendix 5). Participants were asked to 
initial each consent form statement if they were comfortable with its content. 
Both participant and investigator then signed and dated two copies of the 
completed consent forms. One copy was given to the participant to keep for 
their personal records. 
3.4 Methods part 2 – strategy for thematic analysis of interview 
transcripts 
3.4.1 Framework guided thematic analysis 
This study utilised a framework assisted thematic analysis method. Thematic 
analysis involves breaking qualitative data down to facilitate the identification 
of themes and patterns. In grouping similar concepts together, wider conclusions 
can be drawn from the data (Gale et al 2013).  
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Smith and Firth (2011) outline three different types of thematic analysis: 
- “Socio-linguistic methods that explore the use and meaning of language such as 
discourse and conversation analysis”  
- “Methods that focus on developing theory, typified by grounded theory” 
- “Methods that describe and interpret participants’ views such as content and 
thematic analysis”.  
The differences in methodology mainly relate to whether a deductive or 
inductive approach is taken. An inductive method involves the analysis of data 
with no predetermined theories or frameworks. The researcher ideally begins 
with no preconceptions of what the data will reveal allowing theories and/or 
themes to emerge from the data with repeated open coding (Gale et al 2013). A 
deductive approach involves coding the data around a pre-determined structure 
for example a framework or set of research questions (Gale et al 2013).  
Thematic analysis of this study’s transcripts could be described as both 
deductive and inductive. As an initial step, the CFIR framework, was used to 
guide the deductive identification of themes. However, in an inductive manner, 
the chosen framework was altered and expanded to allow inclusion of emerging 
novel themes and concepts (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). 
3.4.2 The chosen framework 
The type of conceptual framework appropriate for the analysis of this data was 
considered. Insight was needed into the way a multifactorial, public health 
decision was made and/or the positive and negative aspects of a public health 
intervention.  
Primarily four frameworks were considered, two of which related to public 
health decision-making; “a new transdisciplinary model of evidence based 
practice” (Satterfield et al 2009) and “a model for evidence-informed decision-
making in public health” designed by The National Collaborating Centre for 
Methods and Tools (Ciliska et al 2008). Both of these frameworks were presented 
as Venn diagrams and outlined the influential factors in public heath decision-
making. They included public health expertise, resources, local and 
organisational context, political preferences, population characteristics and best 
available research evidence (Ciliska et al 2008; Satterfield et al 2009). 
The third framework was entitled the “Behaviour Change Wheel” (Michie et al 
2011). This wheel, formed of concentric ringed sections, meant that central 
layers were always considered within an outer ring context. For example, the 
framework showed that behaviour is connected to capability, opportunity and 
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motivation but that these factors exist within an environment of education and 
legislation (Michie et al 2011).   
The fourth framework, the Consolidated Framework for Implementation 
Research (CFIR), is highly detailed, presented in tabular form and comprises five 
main themes with 39 sub-themes (Damschroder et al 2009). It is traditionally 
used to assess the feasibility of introducing a new health-related intervention to 
an organisation (Damschroder et al 2009). Many of its categories are inspired by 
the context in which the intervention is being introduced (Damschroder et al 
2009). 
Although more suited to assessing the predicted success of a healthcare 
intervention, many CFIR constructs were applicable to the consideration of 
large-scale patient notification and, in fact it has already been employed for this 
purpose (Maguire et al 2016ᵃ). 
3.4.3 The thematic analysis process 
Data was coded and interpreted using an ever evolving form of the CFIR 
framework with new themes being added, removed, expanded and condensed 
based on the data. This process was guided by the Braun and Clarke (2006) 
method (Table 8). An example of how transcript extracts were coded and 
assigned to themes is presented in Appendix 6. 
Table 8: Braun and Clarke’s five stages of thematic analysis (2006) 
Familiarisation with the data 
Generation of Initial Codes 
Searching for themes 
Reviewing themes 
Defining and Naming themes 
 
Familiarisation with the data 
 
The chief investigator (LG) transcribed all interviews verbatim to optimise 
familiarisation with the data. Transcripts were then carefully read and re-read, 
to not only increase knowledge of interview content (Braun and Clarke 2006) but 
to facilitate removal of information that may result in identification of specific 
individuals, boards or trusts. 
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Generation of initial codes 
 
Raw transcript data was studied line by line and divided into ‘meaningful 
segments’ based on the CI’s interpretation of where one concept ended and 
another began (Campbell et al 2013). Sections were labelled with initial 
thoughts and key ideas; a distillation of what the stakeholder was trying to 
convey.  
 
Searching for themes 
 
Codes were initially assigned to themes based on the CFIR framework. The 
framework having already been studied and interpreted to aid in its application 
to a dental patient notification exercise decision making process (Appendix 7). 
Ideas or concepts were aligned with CFIR codes where applicable and where they 
were not, were grouped with other unassigned concepts. 
Reviewing themes 
 
Themes were continually reviewed in an effort to incorporate all ideas 
presented in the data and facilitate an understanding of the decision to notify 
and all its influential factors. Every time the thematic structure of the 
framework was deemed to have changed significantly thematic allocation was 
repeated from the beginning of the transcript data. 
 
Defining and naming themes 
 
A decision on the set of themes to be used for final coding of the data and 
presentation of results was made at the point when the chief investigator felt 
that all influential decision factors identified from the data had been 
incorporated into a clear structure of concepts and that extracts could be 
assigned to themes in an unambiguous and logical way.  
The final NFBI framework can be seen in Appendix 8 and comprises six categories 
with 24 subcategories. Themes were created based on inspiration from the CFIR 
framework, feedback from coders and the interview data itself, with a focus on 
what specific factor influenced the interviewee in their decision-making. 
To validate the applicability of the newly created NFBI framework to the data 
and reinforce that it is an accurate reflection of the ideas presented in the 
transcripts, it was prudent to assess the level of inter-coder reliability and 
agreement associated with its use. This process and its results, are outlined in 
Appendix 9. 
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3.5 Results 
Narrative synthesis results are presented in section 3.5.2 under the six major 
NFBI theme category headings. Interpretation of the themes and explanations 
are accompanied by supporting interview transcript extracts. 
Following presentation of the narrative synthesis, section 3.5.3 outlines further 
stakeholder consultation findings that were utilised to: 
- facilitate literature searching 
- enable effective and useful presentation of data  
- validate utility of research outcomes 
- identify research gaps and future research projects. 
These ‘further results’ reflect the additional purposes of a scoping review study 
stakeholder consultation which go beyond the main aim of obtaining a deeper 
insight into the subject area. 
3.5.1 Participant demographics 
Those interviewed had experience of managing an incident which had created a 
risk of BBV transmission to patients within the dental setting. All participants 
interviewed were public health consultants, but one had progressed to a higher 
management role and another was specifically a dental public health consultant. 
In total, 11 participants were interviewed. Two worked in England, one in Wales 
and the other eight were based in seven different Scottish NHS boards. Number 
of years of experience within a public health consultant role ranged from 5 to 21 
years (  = 11.5 years). The number of dental incidents managed by each 
participant ranged from one to six. 
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3.5.2 Narrative synthesis 
3.5.2.1 Theme 1: Transmission risk 
Table 9: Theme 1 – Transmission risk and its sub-themes 
THEME 1: TRANSMISSION RISK 
T1 (Background prevalence) Prevalence of BBVs in local/practice populations 
including levels of immunisation. 
T2 (Profile of HCW) Profile/Characteristics of HCW such as health status, 
infectivity, type of pathogen, skill level. 
T3 (Incident details) Incident details including nature of breaches, length 
of time patients at risk, types of procedures 
performed. Integrity of practice (which may create 
suspicion of further, more serious breaches). 
T4 (Transmission risk estimation) Evidence of transmissions having already occurred. 
Index/source patients identified via cross matching. 
Transmission risk estimation based on scientific 
evidence and outcomes of historic investigations. 
 
Perceived transmission risk was reported to be the most influential factor behind 
the decision to notify (Table 9). Participants implied that often it was the only 
significant incident management aspect and reported that assessment of 
transmission risk was often considered a separate entity in the decision-making 
process, conducted before consideration of any other factors: 
 
P – “if the risk was negligible and the answer was we really would not be expecting to 
find a case then the answer would probably be no [...] Cause [...] if you don’t expect 
to find a case, why would you bother?” 
P - “what we’ve tried to do [...] is to separate [...] the risk assessment with the 
decision-making.” 
 
Although respondents conveyed how influential the risk assessment was to the 
decision-making process, they did express concern over its reliability and 
accuracy (T4 – Transmission risk estimation) with no participant indicating a 
specific level of risk (i.e. a cut off) above which they would notify patients. The 
uncertainty surrounding risk assessment motivated many participants to call for 
more research concerning how proficient different decontamination processes 
are in the removal of blood and inactivation of viruses: 
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P – “it would be useful to have more information about the decontamination process 
itself, exactly, you know, which stage of the decontamination hasn’t worked and so for 
example, if you’re washing an instrument with detergent, does it deal with 99.9% of 
the viruses? Does it matter if they didn’t get the heat treatment? So having a more 
detailed knowledge about each of the processes will give me more confidence in my 
risk assessment. I think that some of this (research) is missing.” 
 
 
The features of an incident were only cited as influencing the risk assessment in 
a general way (T3 – Incident details). Only three specific scenarios that would 
definitively raise or lower the perceived level of risk were outlined. Higher risks 
were associated with re-use of multi-dose vials and if patients had been exposed 
to unsafe treatment conditions for longer periods of time: 
 
P –“you can actually see how it’s happening so, you stick the thing in and inject 
somebody [...] you’re drawing it, you’re leaving some of the blood in there [...] and 
then you go back and then draw another one [...] and that vial actually keeps [...] the 
virus, alive, you know, it’s a medium” 
P – “we recommend that the practice review their procedures to make sure it’s just a 
one off accident so the more serious incidents are, in my experience, incidents where 
there has been a continuous problem and a failure of processing and monitoring” 
 
 
In contrast, risks were considered lower if contaminated instruments had 
remained unused for a significant period of time, as viable BBV virus particles 
are known to not survive for long outside the body: 
 
P – “cause we know that some of these things [...] they’re not alive too long outside 
(the body) so even if they’ve not done it (decontamination) and maybe it’s been sitting 
out for a long time, probably the risk of any organism remaining alive is low” 
 
 
There was often uncertainty regarding the extent and severity of breaches that 
had occurred (T3 – Incident details). Often incident management teams had no 
way of ascertaining that allegations represented an isolated event or were 
indeed even true. Suspicions of more extensive breaches were strengthened if 
the practice were uncooperative, had a history of poor conduct or were being 
investigated for other infractions such as fraud: 
 
P - “if you’re including things in the risk assessment that are a bit softer as well like, is 
this a good dental practice in terms of quality of care? [...] do your dental advisors say 
this is normally a really good dentist’s practice? [...] he happens to be [...] a dental 
practice advisor [...] what do the recent inspections show? is it normally compliant? 
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have they got great training records to show they’ve trained all their staff and this has 
just been an error or a new locum or a...you know, what’s [...] the overall context of 
this? Is it a bad failing practice or is it an exemplar teaching dental practice?” 
 
 
Participants explained that uncertainty could also be caused by a lack of faith in 
the organisations that monitor dental infection control within general dental 
practice (T3 – Incident details). Respondents made it clear that reports of good 
practice by those conducting inspections did not provide much reassurance 
around there being an absence of infection control issues: 
 
P – “The impression was that having come in to an incident we couldn’t assume that 
infection control was being monitored to any great extent.” 
 
 
Uncertainty surrounding allegations was considered an argument both for and 
against notification (T3 – Incident details). Decision makers wished to err on the 
side of caution in response to uncertainty but the IMT may similarly be inclined 
to conduct notification if, in contrast, they felt as though the evidence against a 
practice was strong and allegations had been verified by a number of reliable 
sources: 
 
P – “if it had just been somebody just coming and saying, you know, I observed this, it 
would have been given less weight....but here we had [...] evidence statements from 
other people in the practice that showed [...] that this was a systematic thing.” 
P – “So, I think we just had too much to say that there was potentially a risk here [...] 
because we had witnesses and because it was able to be verified and seen by people, 
we felt we had to do something.” 
 
Many participants associated the general field of dentistry with a minimal risk of 
BBV transmission due to the low number of high category EPPs conducted in 
comparison to other medical fields (T3 – Incident details). They also felt that 
specifically UK dental treatment carried a lower risk than that provided in the 
US where use of sedation and performance of more invasive procedures, in the 
general dental practice setting, was perceived to be more common: 
 
P – “in those ones (American dental incidents) [...] the circumstances [...] were such 
that, you know, transmission was probably more likely than in the common kind of 
circumstances that we [...] investigate because many of the (UK) dentists [...] tend not 
to deal with exposure prone procedures as compared to those ones which you have 
described in the U.S” 
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P – “it’s important to look at actually dentists and dental practice cause dental 
practice is dental practice and actually, you know, the risk from a cardiothoracic 
surgeon to his patient is very different from the risk from a dentist because of the 
nature of the procedure.” 
 
 
The identification of index cases (BBV diagnoses established to be most likely 
linked to the incident in question) was outlined by participants to be a very clear 
indicator of whether to proceed to notification (T4 – Transmission risk 
estimation). Respondents emphasised that, following the discovery of an 
infected HCW, UKAP utilise this investigation finding as a key factor in their 
decision regarding patient notification: 
 
P – “largely with health care workers, whether they’ve transmitted or not is a material 
decision as to whether you do the notification exercise or not but particularly with the 
infection control failures often it’s a theoretical risk actually without any evidence of 
transmission and there I think you might be much more nuanced in eh, the way you 
present it...” 
 
Participants were generally aware that outcomes from historical dental incidents 
had indicated very low transmission risks but it was clear that more information 
was desired and, if made available, would be utilised in decision-making (T4 – 
Transmission risk estimation). Participants expressed the need for an increase in 
publication of incident findings with one participant going on to say that a 
central repository for incidents and details of their management, which could be 
accessed by public health consultants, would be valuable. Another similarly 
expressed that a list of incidents, which outlined the breaches that had occurred, 
their associated risk estimations and IMT responses would be a useful resource: 
 
P – “there should be  a push for people to actually write up lessons learned from some 
of these incidents [...] Lessons learned [...] will help you so that when you’re planning 
yours you can actually, ok, have that at the back of your, [...] once you’ve decided to 
go to a notification, what are the likely things they’re going to face em, and then [...] 
people have done other things so how can you learn from other people” 
P – “it is quite em, strange that we don’t really have [...] a repository where all these 
things are...and a lot [...] of the ones that we do and this particular one, you know, 
should have been published...it just got stuck in (location) and never got released so 
there’s a wealth of sort of, information and experience there that is sitting on a shelf 
somewhere and probably won’t see the light of day” 
P – “and based on what we’re seeing from the UK ones, what are the behaviours that 
are leading to these notification exercises [...] what are the poor behaviours or 
practices that are leading to the notification exercises in the UK? and can we group 
them and begin to get an idea of risk given that we’re not seeing evidence of 
transmission in the UK?” 
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Even though there may be no evidence of transmissions or index patients before 
notification, there will undoubtedly be a pool of potential source patients within 
the practice population (T1 – Background prevalence). Respondents stated that a 
high background prevalence of BBV infection may make one more inclined to 
conduct notification: 
 
P – “one other thing you take into account is [...] the background level of blood borne 
virus in the community [...] (in) certain parts of (the UK) the prevalence will be higher 
than others because of the deprivation and drug injecting users and so on” 
3.5.2.2 Theme 2: Perceived complexity 
Table 10: Theme 2 – Perceived complexity and its sub-themes 
THEME 2: PERCEIVED COMPLEXITY 
C1 (Predicted efficacy) Predicted efficacy of notification (ability to contact 
patients, get them to take up testing, identification of 
diagnoses) also includes availability of and access to data. 
Profile of local area/population (ages, language barriers, 
mental capacity) 
C2 (Gaps in knowledge) IMT members’ gaps in dental knowledge or experience 
C3 (Profile of dental 
practice) 
Levels of co-operation with investigation. Obstructive 
behaviour. 
C4 (Public/media 
awareness) 
Pre-notification exercise awareness of the incident by the 
public or media 
 
Creation of the NFBI theme ‘Perceived complexity’ (Table 10) was inspired by 
several CFIR sub-constructs; ‘patient needs & resources’, ‘compatibility’, 
‘available resources’, ‘access to knowledge & information’ and ‘complexity’. 
 
Although barriers to notification are not considered negative incident 
management outcomes per se, merely hurdles to be overcome, their presence 
and perceived impact could affect the feasibility of meeting PNE aims and thus 
perhaps influence the decision of whether to proceed with one. 
 
Public health consultants, without a dental background, explained that assessing 
the risks associated with a dental incident could be complicated by a lack of 
technical, dental knowledge (C2 – Gaps in knowledge): 
 
P – “and then you need [...] the dentist, you know, supporting you to provide 
additional dental expertise, maybe with regard to, what, if there’s infection control 
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failure, type of procedure, how much risk does each procedure actually pose or 
different types of dental instruments, what are they used for [...] are they used for, 
you know, invasive procedures?”  
 
Participants also reported that the unprofessional actions of a practice or 
individual can make notification more challenging and complex (C3 – Profile of 
dental practice). Dental HCWs can delay the acquisition of patient notes or 
inspection of the practice. They can present false documentation, fail to share 
details of practice processes and generally be uncooperative in the identification 
of patients who may have been harmed: 
 
P – “there’s a loss of...a potential for loss of business sometimes that’s why you find 
some of the organisations themselves are very reluctant to help [...] and [...] they can 
be obstructive [...] some of them are more em, you know, absolutely horrified 
something has happened, want to be open, want to sort it out” 
 
 
Decision makers were shown to be influenced by their perception of whether 
notification would have the desired outcomes (C1 –Predicted efficacy). IMTs 
were reported to consider whether all ‘at risk’ patients would be identified and 
contacted and if so, would messages regarding the incident and risks involved be 
effectively conveyed and understood? Would patients come forward for testing? 
Would infections linked to the incident in question be identified? 
Contacting ‘at risk’ patients 
An inability to identify the population at risk was reported to be a significant 
barrier in achieving comprehensive patient notification. Being unable to identify 
this population may be due, in part, to the difficulty in clarifying the specific 
length of time patients were at risk (C1 – Predicted efficacy). 
 
LG – “what kind of reasons would you expect for (IMTs) deciding not to notify 
patients?” 
P – “one of the first is, if you can’t identify your population at risk.” 
P – “multiple lapses of infection control were picked up but trying to establish how 
long this person had been doing this was difficult” 
 
Respondents reported that failure to identify or contact the ‘at risk’ population 
could be caused by inaccurate or missing patient records (C1 – Perceived 
complexity). Record inaccuracies could be the fault of the practice or created 
through patients moving and failing to update their information. A number of ‘at 
risk’ patients may also have died in the time between the incident and proposed 
notification: 
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P – “Well either, you can’t contact them because they’re dead em, or [...] (it’s) much 
more difficult to narrow down their current address [...]. The really big ones go back 
into the dim past and the further you go back the more difficult it is to trace and 
identify people” 
 
Participants emphasised that improvements were needed in relation to dental 
record quality and storage. One respondent proposed that research be 
conducted on how easily dental practices were able to generate lists of patients 
seen from specific time spans: 
 
P – “...it would be quite valuable to, maybe it’s just some audit work, around that? 
(dental record retrievability and comprehensiveness) [...] it’s for dentists’ reassurance 
themselves [...] if they fall into such an incident em and you say ‘ok give us, we want a 
list’ [...]. Can you please fax us a list of all of your patients that you’ve seen in the 
last 3 months. And, you know, some of them might think ok I’m gonna have to 
manually look through all of my records, and look at the dates, hopefully none of them 
are in that state now” 
 
Participants also explained that health board or trust powers, in relation to 
accessing private patient notes, required clarification as permissions to obtain or 
view records were sometimes denied by dental practices: 
 
P – “uncertainties around [...] do they have to pass us patient identifiable information 
and concerns around confidentiality until it’s understood that actually we do have a 
role [...] in knowing individuals’ names and what procedures they went under to [...] 
risk assess it. And it’s all about explaining it so there can be lots of misunderstandings” 
P – “as a private or self-employed business, apparently clinical records are the property 
of the practitioner” 
 
The ability to contact all ‘at risk’ patients could be further complicated by 
patients residing in a variety of locations (C1 – Predicted efficacy). The majority 
of ‘at risk’ patients could be local to the practice or spread far and wide across 
the UK depending on whether the incident affected patients seen in the recent 
past or those seen over an extended period of time: 
 
P –“they get really nice and difficult when they cross more than one nation in the UK 
[...] and you’ve got to coordinate that.” 
 
The profile of the local area and/or practice population may complicate efforts 
to notify all ‘at risk’ patients (C1 - Predicted efficacy). Careful consideration has 
to be given to the age, mental capacity and clinical health status of patients. 
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Participants emphasised that notifying terminally ill patients or those with 
severe mental incapacity would be inappropriate: 
 
P –“they might be on the list but em they have either mental incapacity or the health 
situation is such that if they are notified it would worsen their situation, so, it is not 
worthwhile [...] so the people from that category are people who are mentally ill, 
people who are senile or elderly” 
 
Adaptation of the PNE process (limited notification) can be used to overcome 
challenges such as the inability to identify all patients who have been put at risk 
(C1 - Predicted efficacy). Respondents suggested that one can begin with 
notification of those who can be identified and/or those deemed to be most at 
risk. If no BBV cases, linked to the incident, are identified from this initial pool 
of patients, the notification process can be concluded at that point: 
 
P – “...then the other benefit of course is that em, if you start off with offering testing 
to patients most at risk and you don’t get any transmission events [...] that gives you 
that reassurance not to extend beyond those most at risk, that’s often an approach we 
use to sort of try and define a subgroup who may be most at risk to keep the costs 
down” 
P – “look, let’s start off with (contact) the ones (patients) that we can, that we have 
easy access to, cause that was my plan, if we start with these, we do the notification 
exercise, if we find any evidence of transmission then yes we will have to [...] consider 
how we’re going to obtain [...] the other records.” 
 
One participant also explained that if a large percentage of ‘at risk’ patients 
could not be traced then local media could be used to disseminate incident 
information: 
 
P – “we always think about other ways of [...] informing people, so that’s where the 
press or the media comes in, sometimes if you have a large number of people that you 
can’t tell where they’ve been em then the media bit about ‘if you were treated about 
this time, by, you know, at this practice or so, so, then you may consider...” 
LG – “yeah, using them to get the message out and notify people” 
 
Appropriate Communication 
Appropriately communicating the level of risk involved with an incident is also 
an essential aim of notification but was reported by participants, to be very 
challenging (C1 – Predicted efficacy). Finding the right language to use in 
presenting the risk was difficult and striking a balance between encouraging the 
uptake of testing without causing alarm or distress was problematic: 
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P – “and while you might be able to get [...] a number, numbers don’t mean much to 
people so it’s how do you quantify to people and we debated about what does 
extremely low mean, what does very low mean, what does low mean?” 
P – “it’s also about the way the information is presented to people and the way you 
portray the risk [...] you might want people to be tested but you also don’t want to be 
unduly worrying people and lots of worried well turning up so that’s one of the things 
that’s very difficult is how do you quantify the risk to the population?” 
 
One participant highlighted the contradictory nature of conveying a very low risk 
in the letter, but conveying to the patient that the risk was still clearly high 
enough to justify notification: 
 
P – “cause they’re (notified patients) thinking well...oh I didn’t know about this and 
well they’ve told me there’s no risk but why are they writing to me to tell me there’s 
no risk?” 
 
Testing uptake 
If challenges regarding contacting patients and conveying an appropriate 
message are overcome, participants explained that the predicted testing uptake 
may have an impact on your decision to conduct a PNE (C1 – Predicted efficacy). 
Aspects of the incident, notification process or local population such as age, 
deprivation or ethnicity, may lead you to believe that the number of patients 
seeking out testing will be lower or higher: 
 
LG – “What do you feel about that graph in terms of the amount of people that come 
forward for testing?”  
P – “Em, well it’s certainly a factor in em, deciding whether you’re going to go ahead 
with one (a PNE) or not, if you think that a lot of people aren’t going to come forward 
for testing” 
LG – “As in, it wouldn’t be worth it almost?” 
P – “Yes” 
P – “it (testing uptake) depends (on) [...] the population at risk cause sometimes in 
very, very deprived areas sometimes people [...] don’t engage to the same degree as 
people possibly in more affluent areas who sometimes are more worried about their 
health, or take things more seriously but again these are impressions.” 
P – “anecdotally [...] (in relation to testing uptake) ethnicity appears to play a role, 
that may be related to whether people actually speak or understand English or not” 
P – “I’ve also found that the age of the people you contact can play a role so with 
regards to children we tend to get a really good response rate (for testing), but with 
very elderly people, the response rate can be lower sometimes” 
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P – “I think the impact of getting a letter about your child might have a different 
impact to getting a letter about yourself [...] I suspect you would probably worry a lot 
more if you got a letter through your door about your child. Em, I think you’d worry 
more and I think you’d want to get them checked.” 
 
Factors which can be controlled by the IMT and could potentially affect testing 
uptake include the wording of the letter and both the number and manner of 
communication attempts. Factors out with the control of the IMT included 
patients making their own risk assessment of the situation, not trusting the 
organisation involved or not wanting to be tested because they are unclear or in 
denial about the risks involved: 
 
P – “the community is also very clever, they have capacity to risk assess so sometimes, 
depending on which kind of community you’re dealing with [...] you might be dealing 
with those who are able to risk assess and say “this is not serious, I’m not going to go, 
I’m not going to waste my time or I’m alright” 
P – “some people don’t want to know whatever is wrong with them and also that word 
‘I just don’t want to know, don’t tell me, I don’t care whatever it is’ and they don’t 
want to know” 
P – “lack of confidence, I would say [...] if the institution recently had a problem for 
instance and people are disenchanted or not happy with the way it is performing then 
people may not take it (the offer of testing) quite seriously.”  
 
 
Participants explained that if a low proportion of ‘at risk’ patients are tested, 
you can be less certain that transmission has not occurred with one respondent 
stating that patients who do come forward for testing may be those who are, for 
a number of reasons, less at risk of BBV infection: 
 
LG – “when you read a report and at the end it says ‘transmission was not proven’, how 
confident do you feel in that recommendation?” 
P – “If they used a decent set of criteria to determine that there was no evidence that 
transmission occurred then I would feel confident that transmission hadn’t occurred in 
the group they tested but then I’d be thinking what about the other half or 60% or 70% 
or whatever.”  
P – “and then you also have to ask yourself [...] whether the patients who actually 
agree to be tested might be those that for a variety of reasons would be least at risk” 
 
Participants contemplated the effect that different levels of knowledge about 
BBVs, or perceptions concerning these infections, may have on a patient’s desire 
to seek out testing: 
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P – “if you say things like Hepatitis B or Hepatitis C I think the average UK person isn’t 
very familiar with those infections because they disproportionately in the UK affect em 
either migrants or injecting drug users [...] most people, [...] will not have come across 
those infections so I think [...] when they hear they might have been exposed to it 
they’re not as concerned, but you say HIV. Now everyone’s heard of HIV [...] despite 
the fact that HIV is the one they’re least likely to get, that’s the one they’re most 
worried about. So, sometimes it depends on what they’re being tested for and if you 
say you’re screening people for HIV the response might be higher than if you say you’re 
screening people for hepatitis B or C” 
P – “(For testing following notification) I guess some people will turn up, some people 
won’t. Em, and it might be because [...] they have no idea of the implications” 
 
 
They outlined that the language of the notification letter, especially in regards 
to how the risk is presented, can have a dramatic effect on uptake of testing. 
IMTs can use the letter’s wording to encourage or discourage testing, depending 
on the perceived level of risk: 
 
P – “I think that you would tailor your message towards what you perceive to be the 
risk [...] in a situation where you’ve got  transmission, where you expect there might 
be other cases [...] you’re gonna be giving a message that’s gonna [...] more strongly 
encourage people to come forward for testing” 
P – “but in the end it was only (a small number of) folk that came forward and we 
didn’t letter them again [...] we were reassuring about it and [...] I guess if we were 
successful in our endeavour [...] nobody would have come forward because we didn’t 
think they required testing, since the risk was so low but for anxiety reasons we felt it 
was useful to offer testing.” 
 
One participant elaborated on this point by stating that if you feel the risk is 
high further steps can be incorporated into the notification process such as 
utilising a recorded delivery process to send letters or telephoning patients. 
Notification was deemed essential if the local area already had some knowledge 
of the incident in question, firstly to reassure patients and secondly to facilitate 
more control over the content of public messages (C4 – Public/media awareness). 
Concern over the media leaking incident information first created time pressures 
in regard to incident management. Participants explained that it was highly 
important that in response to this sensitive and distressing issue, the public 
received the correct information and an accurate description of the associated 
low risks: 
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P – “the public are aware and em, you know if there’s such a serious issue that I can’t 
have my appointment for the next week or so, what’s going on? So, you have to explain 
something” 
P – “we knew that people who had been [his/her] patient, might be concerned because 
sooner than later it will become public domain so we’d rather they got the information 
from us rather than through the media [...] we don’t always necessarily write because 
we think they’re at risk. But you write to a certain extent, to manage the risk. 
Because, it’s more important that people get the proper facts from us rather than 
being concerned about what they get in the media, so, there’s a multi-purpose for 
writing to the patient” 
 
 
Identification of transmission 
The primary purpose of patient notification is to identify and consequently treat 
any patients who have acquired a BBV infection as a result of the incident under 
investigation (C1 - Predicted efficacy). Respondents went on to explain that not 
only are BBV-infected persons rarely identified, but it can be very difficult to 
link any cases found, to the dental practice or HCW involved.  
Respondents often compared the investigation of an infected HCW to that of an 
infection control incident. They stated that when dealing with an infected HCW, 
the investigation often begins with a blood sample to compare with any patient 
samples gathered later. With an infection control incident, however, two 
samples from two different patients are required to establish if transmission has 
occurred. If it is predicted that notification and testing will not result in the 
identification of a proven, linked transmission, then respondents explained a 
PNE may not be appropriate: 
 
P – “they’re (PNEs) unlikely to turn up anyone with a new infection so maybe there 
might be other reasons for doing them. Em, like reassurance” 
P – “when you look at past experiences of PNEs [...] and [...] the results you then think 
well [...] the chances of actually finding you know, [...] infection that’s actually 
related to transmission from the dental practice are probably very minimal” 
P – “Sometimes it’s very straightforward, particularly more recently if you’ve got a 
sample from the health care worker, they (the lab) can [...] sequence it, you get stuff 
from patients, they sequence it they [...] work out the probabilities.... 
LG – “yeah, cause you’ve already got that healthcare worker blood sample to start off 
with” 
P – “you’ve got it to start with , eh, with the patient to patient stuff it is much more 
difficult at times isn’t it to know, you don’t have a complete, you’ve not tested 
everybody” 
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3.5.2.3 Theme 3: Benefits 
Table 11: Theme 3 – Benefits and its sub-themes 
THEME 3: BENEFITS 
B1 (Diagnoses) Diagnoses made as a result of the notification 
exercise leading to earlier treatment and reduction 
of onward transmission 
B2 (Reassurance) Reassurance that no harm has occurred for patients 
already aware of incident, dental staff who made 
error and IMT 
B3 (Spotlight on infection control) Emphasises the importance of good dental infection 
control for dental HCWs. Highlights specific 
improvements needed. 
B4 (Trust built) Trust built, maintained or engendered through 
being open with patients and taking complaints 
seriously 
B5 (Gathering further evidence) An opportunity to gather further data so that dental 
transmission risk estimates become more accurate 
 
Themes relating to the benefits of patient notification were inspired by the CFIR 
constructs of ‘relative advantage’ and ‘cost’ (Table 11). Many participants 
emphasised that the decision-making process essentially comes down to an 
assessment of the benefits versus the risks. 
The opportunity to identify BBV-infected persons within the patient population 
was described as a key benefit of notification (B1 – Diagnoses). Treatment, 
particularly if accessed early, can lead to a better prognosis for the patient or 
even resolution of their infection. Those who are aware of their infection can 
also employ precautions to prevent onward transmissions and being on 
treatment dramatically reduces viral load, further reducing the chance of 
secondary transmission: 
 
P – “Well, if there is a likelihood of an incident resulting in transmission of blood borne 
viruses em, its critical in terms of patient safety, in terms of population health and 
wellbeing to conduct a notification exercise to identify people who have been infected 
and to put them on proper treatment and care. [...] so you can prevent onward 
transmission in the population” 
P – “I think the benefit would be [...] if people have been exposed and infected, early 
diagnosis and with early diagnosis you’re most likely to have a better outcome so for 
instance with HIV, if people are infected, it’s good to get them early otherwise they 
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present late when they have symptoms, which could be 1-15 years later and when 
people have symptoms and they present late, you know, they tend to have more 
complications and, and, mortality is higher in that group” 
P – “with HIV, if the viral load is undetectable em, chances of people transmitting is 
lower and that can only happen if you’re on treatment.” 
 
Informing persons of their BBV infection was reported to always be prudent, but 
the identification of incidental BBV diagnoses (those unlinked to the incident) 
was not deemed to be a significant motive for conducting a PNE. One participant 
elaborated by stating that the detection of unrelated cases was merely an 
indication that another form of BBV screening within the community was needed: 
 
LG – “So you would say the main benefits would be transparency and picking up cases 
related to the incident or cases in general?” 
P – “Cases related to the incident, I mean, cases, cases in general is kind of a happy by-
product of it but I would never do it for that reason because there’s other systems in 
place for doing that.” 
P – “(If in another PNE) they identified 10 cases of blood borne virus whatever and two 
of them were definitely because of the dental incident and eight were not, I don’t 
think that would be a good reason to do a PNE [...] how can we get to those people in 
another way? cause that kind of implies that we should be doing population screening” 
 
The decision to notify patients could be influenced further by the contextual 
fact that there are now highly effective treatment regimens for those with BBV 
infections. Advancements in the treatment of BBVs, especially HCV, may 
encourage IMTs to proceed to notification, as any infections found (whether 
related to the incident or incidental) can reliably be treated in a highly effective 
way or even cured: 
 
P – “with HIV at least you can have viral suppression and live an...well, an almost 
normal life, I mean, life expectancy is probably the same now with people with HIV and 
people who don’t have HIV and people on treatment”  
P – “I’d have thought maybe twenty years ago with hep C, you know, the benefit of 
actually identifying a patient would be much less than it is now.....Because now the 
treatment has 95% efficacy you know, you’re just taking a tablet by mouth as opposed 
to giving injections with about twenty percent efficacy” 
 
Respondents spoke of how notification can provide reassurance to patients, 
especially those who already have some awareness of the incident (B2 – 
Reassurance). Participants commented that if transmission was not detected 
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following a PNE, the organisation who managed the incident and perhaps the 
associated dental practice could also be reassured: 
 
P – “reassurance of the investigators, reassurance of the population that yes, while this 
happened, there is no risk to you, so, that, you get that sort of reassurance” 
P – “it may be higher risk than you appreciate so doing a PNE gives you that 
reassurance, if you find nothing then its fine.” 
 
Publicity of the incident was theorised to have a beneficial effect on the dental 
profession’s appreciation for infection control (B3 – Spotlight on infection 
control). It was felt by respondents that the IMT’s serious and detailed approach 
to the breaches involved would remind dental HCWs of the importance of 
infection control. This would hopefully lead to improvements in infection control 
standards and prevent occurrence of such incidents: 
 
P – “there’s also a positive of doing a patient notification exercises [...] which is really 
to focus the mind of dentists and dental practices on the importance of infection 
control because unfortunately there are still individuals out there who, you know, 
don’t take it as seriously as it should be taken [...] it can also lead to either a local 
review or if there are issues that might affect more than one dental practice it may 
lead to a review of practices and ultimately have, and you might have improved 
patient outcomes, safer practice” 
P – “It also shows that you’re taking it seriously from a regulatory point of view that 
em, infection control is important in clinical practice and there are risks that we’re 
trying to mitigate against” 
 
Participants explained that by deciding to notify patients, the board/trust is 
able to demonstrate its commitment to transparency, putting patients first and 
taking complaints seriously (B4 – Trust built). It was felt that a degree of 
mistrust towards organisations exists and that being notified as part of a PNE 
may either propagate this idea or conversely could increase patient trust: 
 
P – “the other thing is to address a complaint because our incident came to light 
because of staff concerns in the practice and therefore we had to investigate and doing 
a PNE was one way of showing that we were investigating it thoroughly, taking them 
seriously rather than just” 
P – “I think actually it tends to build trust, you might lower trust initially [...] but I 
think in the long term actually it builds a better long term relationship” 
P – “in a sense it can instil confidence that people are being open, systems being open 
with patients” 
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P - “I think there’s a trust issue as well, really, you know, people are not trusting 
necessarily of governments, organisations or whatever.” 
 
It was reported by participants that publishing findings concerning PNEs would 
not only put a spotlight on dental infection control but would add to the 
evidence base concerning PNEs, specifically in regard to the level of risk created 
by incidents (B5 – Gathering further evidence): 
 
P – “if you look at the evidence, actually you think, well, why do we even bother, we 
shouldn’t even be bothering because we’ve never documented anything. But, you 
know, the more evidence we can gather the more, we may be able to come to a 
position [...] to be able to look at this risk and actually say well, the risk is so low we 
don’t actually (need to notify)” 
P – “it’s also a learning opportunity, you know, because as the evidence base 
accumulates you might be able in the future to pin point with more certainty which 
types of incidents are really putting patients at risk and which, you know, have less 
risk” 
3.5.2.4 Theme 4: Negatives 
Table 12: Theme 4 – Negatives and its sub-themes 
THEME 4: NEGATIVES 
N1 (Anxiety) The anxiety caused to notified patients and staff 
involved in incident 
N2 (Resources) Resources used e.g. time, money, staff. Workload 
and logistics. Opportunity costs. 
N3 (Legal vulnerability) Effect of notification on lawsuits filed. 
N4 (Reputation of board/trust) Reputational damage to organisation managing 
incident. 
N5 (Reputation of dental profession) Reputational damage to the field of dentistry 
which could result in reduced uptake of dental 
treatment and services 
N6 (Reputation of involved 
dentist/practice) 
Reputational damage to dental 
practice/individual involved resulting in loss of 
business and/or reduced patient base. 
 
All participants were aware and concerned about the distress and anxiety caused 
to patients as a result of notification (N1 – Anxiety). Some participants went on 
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to state that the anxiety caused was often not worthwhile, in light of the low 
risks involved: 
 
P – “the anxiety that is generated you may find that eh, you have more damage to the 
population than you have helped them. Cause you have told them, you’ve kept them 
stressed and waiting eh, for results and you worried them, then at the end of the day, 
you tell, them oh, after all, there isn’t anything. So that is not good” 
P – “and I think if we knew the actual amount of distress that we were causing by 
letters and notification that would push us even more to not doing these things 
unnecessarily”  
 
 
Participants emphasised that the severity of anxiety caused to a patient may be 
heightened if a specific BBV was involved or if they were already suffering from 
a great deal of stress or mental illness:  
 
P – “I remember when HIV first came out and all the noise about it [...] and about how 
you could get it from your dentist” 
P – “some people are probably at that point where their mental health is really 
strained or something so you don’t really want to tip somebody into something that, 
you know, this (PNE) will trigger something”  
 
 
Participants emphasised that anxiety is not only caused to patients but also 
those working at the dental practice associated with the incident: 
 
P – “then of course you create anxiety to them (dental practice staff). Sometimes 
there’s loss of earning as well [...] during that time they’re not working or they’re 
stressed, worried about the problem.” 
P – “it can impact on the wellbeing and the health of the (dental practice) staff there 
because they do lose staff, people leave. Em, you know, and the ones who are left, you 
know, have to sort of pick up the pieces so it can be, it can be a very difficult time [...] 
for them.” 
P – “We [the board/trust] can be seen to not be understanding of how hard they’re 
working you know that actually 99% of the time things have gone very well [...] it can 
lead to individuals feeling very insecure and I presume it can lead to anxiety or even 
depression from a personal point of view and questioning of their, you know, work 
generally [...] and lead to problems with confidence, it can also presumably create 
problems within the practice amongst staff and lead to you know, blaming each other 
em, and if there were underlying issues it can just all explode, I guess.” 
 
 
Participants explained that they do not receive much, if any, feedback on how 
patients react to notification. Anxiety is presumed but neither the levels of 
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distress caused are known nor whether this distress impacts upon future uptake 
of dental treatment. Participants called for research in relation to these effects 
as well as exploration into how dental practice staff are impacted by incident 
management: 
 
P – “so you’re going to do that, and that’s actually what would be really interesting (a 
patient questionnaire study assessing reaction to notification) because [...] unless you 
actually assess what a patient thinks of [...] when they get the letter, you’re not going 
to know.” 
P – “the one thing [...] which would add a lot of flavour to your work [...] (is) trying to 
look at people who have gone through notification and they say ‘you have received a 
letter telling you that you might have been exposed, how do you feel?” 
 
 
Participants were aware that notification exercises are resource intensive. Staff, 
patient and laboratory time was the resource most frequently reported as being 
heavily utilised (N2 – Resources). Respondents commented that financial costs 
were considerable and underestimated: 
 
P – “we had at least two consultants, there was (person) and (person), consultant wise 
and then we had [...] health protection nurses [...] we had helplines and stuff so, I 
mean, at any one time there could have been 2/3 of them plus admin staff, big call on 
admin staff plus people at (organisation) that were helping us update addresses. 
People within the dental contracts team were also heavily involved at the time also 
the (organisation) people em because they had the contract with the practice, so they 
were supporting the incident also [...] there were people who had to take the bloods so 
they had to set aside the time for that em, and that involved clinical and admin 
people.” 
LG – “Yeah so it’s a huge, huge operation” 
P – “it was, it took over our work for quite a few days” 
P – “they had to commission the testing clinics, they also commissioned the helpline 
and they had two full time project managers working on it plus just the weekly 
incident meetings, all that time and effort” 
LH – “gosh” 
P – “oh, a lot of money” 
 
 
Although the significance of a PNE’s financial cost was clearly acknowledged it 
was not shown to influence the decision-making process to proceed with one (N2 
– Resources): 
 
P – “although it is a huge cost to the (board/trust) em, when it happens you just kind 
of, you just kind of get on with it and accept that its gonna cost you a lot of money and 
actually you don’t really have a choice once you decide to go ahead so. It’s not that the 
money’s not an issue, cause it is an issue but it’s kind of, it’s sort of, the least of your 
worries because you’re wanting to just get on and do it.” 
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P –“and we did not take into account em the cost, we actually excluded the cost from 
our thoughts” 
 
 
The majority of participants reported that it was more important to consider 
opportunity or indirect costs. By using time and money to conduct a PNE you are 
in effect diverting resources away from other projects: 
 
P – “I’m a big believer in transparency but I think when transparency comes at a huge 
cost to those people and a huge opportunity cost to your team and your organisation 
where you’re diverting money that could have bought you an awful lot more, for 
patients, I’m less swayed by that transparency argument now, not because I don’t think 
you should be transparent but I think when it comes at a huge cost to patients, I don’t 
think you’ve got a great argument for transparency in that situation.” 
P – “with everything we do, because we have limited resources there’s always an 
opportunity cost so especially with big incidents like the one in (location), [...] a 
number of public health professionals, [...] when they were dealing with this exercise, 
they couldn’t do, they couldn’t spend the time on doing other things possibly even you 
know even preventative...” 
 
 
Costs were reported to be difficult to calculate due to the many indirect costs to 
be considered. Expenditures were also often not monitored as they were not 
considered a priority when the main focus is on managing the incident correctly 
to protect public health (N2 – Resources): 
 
P – “well even [...] lab costs, there’ll be a test cost but that probably doesn’t include 
the scientists’ time or the consultants’ time to read all the results and to collate them 
together and present them back to the next IM team blah, blah [...] I think the NHS 
isn’t set up to, to record costs very well” 
P – “in the middle of an incident it’s very hard to capture that stuff (financial 
expenditures), em and it’s very difficult to gauge, it’s not, it’s not always your top 
priority so you may have missed that.” 
 
 
Participants explained that during a PNE the public’s eye is focused on the 
organisation managing the incident (N4 - Reputation of board/trust). One 
participant described how the need to manage the incident in a highly 
competent way, was even more important when the board/trust involved had 
historically been scrutinised by the public in relation to other issues: 
 
P –“If you don’t get it right it can lead to reputational issues em it sets the 
(board/trust) in this incidence in the spotlight [...] there’s strong media, there are 
interviews and things that are needed.” 
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P – “I can think of one (incident) that was years and years ago when we, we as a 
(board/trust) were under a lot of pressure because [...] we couldn’t provide enough 
NHS dentists so there was recruitment issues [...] so there’d been a lot of adverse 
publicity about the (board/trust)’s provision of dental services and that came up in the 
discussions at the em, IMT as one factor why we needed to handle this properly and 
make sure that we didn’t tarnish the reputation of the [board/trust] anymore with 
regard to dentistry and bad practice or unsafe practice” 
 
Respondents explained that damaging the reputation of dentists and practices 
through a PNE may lead to patients avoiding seeking out future dental care. 
Some participants stated that the impact of this effect would be worsened in 
areas where general dental health was already poor and that the majority of 
patients already have a degree of fear towards dental treatment (N5 – 
Reputation of dental profession): 
 
P – “The other negative aspect [...] is the public confidence in the service because if 
they find lots of this adverse publicity, it might mean that a lot of people won’t want 
to come and see the dentist for their routine check-up and so on” 
 P – “if you walk into a dentist for a lot of people there’ll be an assumption that this is 
all tightly controlled. There’s good governance in place and if I go here what I get is 
gonna be safe and then something like this happens and they suddenly go ‘ok, if this 
can happen here, it can happen anywhere’ and then potentially some people lose trust 
in dentistry and then they’re maybe not getting the preventative work that they need.. 
And that worried me because I know what our department’s trying to achieve in terms 
of oral health and it worried me that the two things were in conflict. Em, I didn’t like 
that at all and I didn’t like the thought that our incident happened in a community 
whose need for good oral health was really high.” 
P - “because a lot of people have a bit of a phobia or a fear of the dentist, sometimes 
it’s hard enough to get people to go, you then throw into that, you might get infected, 
which could be what people believe, then you’ve just made things worse.” 
 
 
Respondents acknowledged that patient notification may have a dramatic impact 
on the reputations and revenue of involved dental practices (N6 – Reputation of 
involved dentist/practice). Participants expressed sympathy for those practices 
where a genuine mistake had occurred as they felt that patients would not take 
this into consideration: 
 
P - “It’s bound to adversely affect their patient trust and that practice, especially if 
it’s in the papers and things, they might well lose patients from, I’ve never, we’ve 
never gone back and assessed the impact of changed patient numbers or whatever but 
I’m sure that must happen, so it’s not something to be taken lightly from the dental 
practices’ perspective either.” 
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P – “there’s always reputational risks for the dental practice so even if there’s no 
transmission events, just the fact that the patient has received a letter may actually 
not just affect reputation but the business, ultimately could even destroy the business 
so that’s something which has to be taken into account.”  
P – “they will feel that people will blame them (the dental practice) for whatever 
reason [...] that it looks as if they’ve done the wrong thing whether they have or 
whether they haven’t.” 
 
 
One participant pointed out that even if an incident involved only one dental 
HCW, the reputations of all those working at the practice may be affected 
especially when those managing the incident are trying to protect the HCW’s 
confidentiality and patients are not told who specifically is associated with the 
incident:  
 
P – “one tends to be at great pains not to say whether it’s a dentist or a dental 
assistant or a dental whatever, they talk about a dental health care worker. So you 
don’t know who it is and therefore it could be anyone of them so you might all feel a 
bit tarnished. So in the course of trying to protect [...] the individual then it can 
backfire on the other people within that practice.” 
 
 
Even though the reputational consequences for the HCW or practice involved are 
considered a negative PNE aspect, it was not reported to be a factor that would 
hold significance in the debate over the decision to notify (N6 – Reputation of 
involved dentist/practice): 
 
P – “you see protection of public health is the paramount so reputation for just a small 
[...] practice, it wouldn’t be a priority” 
 
 
One participant commented that reputational consequences could be fairly mild 
and predicted that over time the impact would be lessened: 
 
P – “there were many people who did not believe that this (dental HCW) had done 
anything wrong so I suspect the practice would have carried on [...] the public have 
short memories.” 
 
 
Others stated that the notification letter can also be altered to mitigate 
reputational impact on the dental practice or HCW. Respondents explained that 
if an honest mistake had occurred and been reported swiftly, those managing 
the incident would be more inclined to try to protect the reputation of the 
practice and/or HCW involved through careful selection of the wording utilised 
in the notification letter: 
 
P – “I think that (conducting a PNE) would be horrible, I think in that situation (where 
the practice have made a one off error which they reported swiftly), it would be 
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horrible for the practice and I think. You would hope that, cause that wasn’t our 
situation, but you would hope you’d be able to kind of protect them in the sense of 
explaining to patients, [...] .You know, there’s a way of wording it in terms of you 
know, these things happen and there’ll be a full process put in place to ensure that it 
doesn’t happen again and they’re co-operating and all that type of thing.” 
 
3.5.2.5 Theme 5: IMT personal experiences/training 
Table 13: Theme 5 – IMT personal experiences and its sub-themes 
THEME 5: IMT PERSONAL EXPERIENCES 
IMT 1 (Personal experiences) IMT members’ experiences or training 
which may influence the decision to notify 
patients 
The theme of ‘IMT personal experiences’ was inspired by the major CFIR 
construct; ‘Characteristics of individuals’ as well as the sub-constructs 
‘Knowledge & beliefs about the intervention’ and ‘Other personal attributes’ 
(Table 13).  
The data gathered via these interviews support the concept that the personal 
opinions and experiences of IMT members are likely to have an effect on the 
patient notification decision-making process. One participant emphasised the 
importance of making sure that people with the correct expertise and priorities 
are making the decision: 
 
P – “you have to be really careful who’s making that decision and that they’re basically 
qualified to make the decision so [...] I suppose it’s making sure you’ve got the right 
group of people to make that decision with you eh I guess em, to make sure you’re 
making the right decision and not a decision based on either something that’s not so 
relevant like cost or eh, em, reputation or something like that. You need to be making 
the decision only based on risk, risk to the patient” 
 
 
Participants explained that they were able to draw on their knowledge from 
previous exercises to facilitate a more efficient notification process and 
commented that managing an incident gave them a new perspective on patient 
notification and would perhaps make them change their approach to decision-
making in the future: 
 
P – “I think, over time because we’ve done so many [...] there’s, kind of, a greater 
understanding about what needs to be done and how it needs to be sorted...” 
P – “so I think we’ve found ways to deal more efficiently [...] with the tracing of 
individuals [...] we’ve found ways of actually doing that in a much less labour intensive 
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way. Em, so the kind of electronic databases [...] stuff that can be done by machine 
rather than by individuals sitting in front of the screen so it’s got a lot better.” 
P – “Knowing now what I know about all the other downsides to it, I wouldn’t do it 
because I don’t think we could argue it just in the interests of transparency” 
P – “I remember at the time I was [...] content that we had to inform people, I could go 
along with that, I might not today but I could go along with it then. Cause I’ve been 
through the experience now” 
 
 
One participant demonstrated that specific personal experiences could influence 
decision-making. They were particularly aware of the BBV-infected patients’ 
plight, having treated such patients in the past and this, they felt, made them 
keener to notify patients and not risk leaving persons unaware of the presence 
of serious infection. 
 
P – “I guess now you’ve asked me a really interesting question because right at the 
beginning of my career when I was (position) I did treat patients with hepatitis B [...] 
it’s quite possible that that early experience of actually me providing their regular 
treatment and it’s not a pleasant treatment...” “I still remember some of the 
individuals so yeah maybe that makes me a bit more interventional.” 
3.5.2.6 Theme 6: Standards 
Table 14: Theme 6 – Standards and its sub themes 
THEME 6: STANDARDS 
S1 (Ethical concepts) Ethical concepts, norms/values in the 
medical profession/public health 
S2 (Peers’ actions) Guided by peers, influenced by what 
others have done in similar circumstances 
S3 (Outside organisations, experts and 
policies) 
Influence of outside organisations, 
experts, government, higher 
management. Guidance documents, laws 
and policies 
S4 (Public opinion) Public opinion 
The theme of standards is derived from the concept that decision makers may 
act in accordance with what is expected (Table 14). This may relate to current 
legislation and guidance or advice from experts, higher management and 
colleagues. IMT members may also be guided by certain principles and ethical 
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concepts, within the field of healthcare. This theme is inspired by the CFIR 
categories; ‘peer pressure’, ‘external policies & incentives’ and ‘culture’. 
Participants conveyed that there were three main concepts that guided their 
decision-making process: prioritising the health of the patient or population 
above all else whilst respecting the concept of transparency and the patients’ 
right to know (S1 – Ethical concepts): 
 
P - “As far as I’m concerned when I make the decision I always consider the benefit to 
the [...] person that has been exposed to first” 
P – “I think also the kind of culture in health services [...] has changed and [...] if 
something happened that shouldn’t have happened, I think that our culture now would 
be pretty much to tell people, unless it was so marginal and unimportant that there 
really wasn’t anything to tell” 
 
 
Respondents explained that it was common to err on the side of caution and that 
a risk averse culture exists within healthcare:  
 
P – “the organisation tends to err on the precautionary principle. We can’t always be 
100% certain so let’s go for it so, more often than not the recommendation is [...] to go 
for a PNE unless as I said you are able to be quite certain that there wasn’t really any 
sort of risk to the patients at all.” 
 
 
They felt that, as a healthcare provider, they had a duty of care to patients and 
to not cause the harm that would be inflicted via the psychological impact of 
notification:  
 
P - “personally I really don’t want to unduly worry people and I think that can have a 
negative impact and it’s a harm itself, first do no harm. Em, I think it’s important that 
you make a balanced decision, including that in it.” 
 
 
Respondents also explained that there exists a clear and obvious responsibility 
for NHS patients but the duty to notify, test and treat private patients was ill-
defined: 
 
P – “we had [...] a specific duty in regards to patients who had used that practice 
because they were using it as NHS patients but there were some patients who were 
completely outwith the NHS system and some of us argued that we had a duty to them 
too because as public health professionals we have a population duty therefore 
whether it’s in a private facility or not, if there’s a risk then we have a population 
duty.” 
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Respondents explained that IMT members were guided by their public health 
colleagues when it came to making the decision of when to notify patients (S2 – 
Peers’ actions). Being able to get help from colleagues appeared to be primarily 
linked to who you knew within the public health field: 
 
P – “I did, as part of the sort of initial trying to make a decision [...] I did [...] send out 
a distress call to my colleagues to say ‘Help! Has anyone done this before?’ and I did 
get a response from colleagues in another area who directed me to a paper they had 
actually written” 
P – “it depends on whether you know who to phone but [...] it’s quite useful to chat 
through someone else and go actually I don’t think we should escalate that”  
 
 
One participant stated that having conducted a PNE, he/she was now regularly 
contacted by others seeking advice whilst another called for creation of a list, 
that public health consultants could access, which detailed persons who had 
managed different types of incidents over the years: 
 
P – “I’ve had so many people come to me, asking me, when they’ve had similar things 
because they’ve found out through the grape vine that I’ve had an incident. So I find 
myself giving my experience to lots of other people who are then em, having the same 
thing.”  
P – “almost having like a, maybe like UKAP having somewhere where they have a list of 
everybody who’s had (an incident) so, you can always go back if you wanted to” 
 
 
Participants stated that consulting UKAP following discovery of an infected HCW 
was helpful and considered the norm (S3 – Outside organisations, experts and 
policies). Participants explained that UKAP had a clear process for assessing 
infected HCW related incidents which benefited from patient input and the 
experience gained from assessing many other incidents: 
 
P - “the reason that I like UKAP [...] is actually in the set up of that, patients are 
involved [...] in the decision-making and therefore you’ve kind of got that input, as 
well as [...] professionals etc. you’ve got that kind of consistency of approach” 
P - “three involved infected dental practitioners so they were much easier [...] because 
UKAP has a process that at least makes it very easy for you to follow and you know 
what you’re doing.”  
P – “No, I think conferring with UKAP ok, with their experience that is one critical thing 
so have we cross checked with them what would they think? So, yeah...” 
LG – “So, if they supported your decision that would give you a bit more comfort, a bit 
more confidence” 
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P – “Oh yes, in fact yeah, this is what we did, we say look, we’ve reached this decision 
and we’re gonna have to write to UKAP to confirm” 
P – “I think with the healthcare worker stuff of course [...] there is UKAP [...] in 
essence they’ve decided, you know, what criteria they’re gonna use they’ve got the 
decision makers they’ve got patients involved in that and they’ve got the consultation 
around that and I think that the healthcare workers actually what happens is much 
more standardised as a result of UKAP” 
 
 
Participants explained that responses to infection control incidents may lack 
consistency as, unlike an infected HCW incident, there was no expectation or 
precedent for IMTs to contact UKAP (S3 – Outside organisations, experts and 
policies): 
 
P – “...but with the infection control stuff I think people may or may not seek 
(inaudible) advice (from UKAP) on that and make much less standard decisions really on 
that.” 
 
 
Two respondents described an unofficial, expert group which gathers in England 
and can be sought out for advice in relation to infection control incidents. 
Participants called for formalisation of this current group or creation of a group 
similar to UKAP, which could aid with the assessment of infection control 
breaches: 
 
P – “the informal group that has already started that we are approaching, that group 
needs to be basically resourced and formalised into something like UKAP which .... so 
where they can then draw on expertise from all over the place eh, em, and then come 
up with the evidence and the guidelines and the toolkits and that would make it easier 
so we’re not always reinventing the wheel anytime a new one comes along” 
P – “it appeared that they had an unofficial group where they looked at these sort of 
incidents that were not your typical UKAP but involved decontamination incidents. So 
it’s not an official group by any means, it’s just a group of sort of, interested people 
with various sorts of expertise....so they actually did the risk assessment and made the 
recommendation [...] that we needed to do the notification exercise so, and you know, 
I was happy to go with them.” 
 
 
It was also emphasised by some participants, however, that outside experts or 
advisory organisations, may not truly understand the level of work that goes into 
conducting a PNE: 
 
P – “there’s been lots of eh, you know, internal politics that ‘oh [...] they (the outside 
organisation) don’t know what it takes to do these things [...] they just sit in a room 
and say, yeah, go forth and do a notification but actually that might knock down our 
service [...] we might have to put things on hold or we might have to get in extra staff 
to do this. So they’re often not aware that they may make advice but that they can’t 
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estimate the impact of what that’s going to be so it comes down to you locally to say 
well, ok, that’s the advice nationally but locally I don’t think we need to do this” 
P - “quite often we’re asked to get advice from UKAP and my experience with UKAP is 
that they take the path of least resistance so, if in doubt, because, they don’t have to 
do it themselves [...] actual notification exercises are done by the (board/trust) or the 
people at the sharp end, literally” 
 
 
Participants reported that both management and government desired a 
transparent, proactive approach with notification of patients and therefore may 
be an influential presence in the decision-making process (S3 – Outside 
organisations, experts and policies): 
 
P – “Their views would be more towards going public rather than not going public 
because politicians, being politicians [...]. They want to be popular with the public 
therefore they take the views that, if in doubt tell them and that’s the way things are 
moving and society’s moving” 
P – “Yeah, there was, amongst (higher management) here, not in (public health), there 
was a clear view that we should be doing something [...] and that even further than 
that we should be doing it proactively.” 
 
 
As previously mentioned, availability of guidance regarding the decision to notify 
following an infection control breach, is poor (S3 – Outside organisations, 
experts and policies). Participants did, however, outline a number of documents 
which could be applicable when considering disclosure and general incident 
management. Duty of candour was mentioned by many participants although not 
always in the context of using it to support patient notification as there 
appeared to be confusion over its applicability and interpretation: 
 
P – “you still don’t have to do it just for duty of candour we can still say the risk is 
negligible, we think this would cause more harm than good so we’re not doing it.” 
P – “so in the line of sort of, duty of candour, the need to tell people we told them it 
had happened but actually we assessed the risk to be so small we actually said but you 
don’t need testing and I think we ended up testing a very small number of individuals 
who were not reassured...” 
P – “I just happened to read it (duty of candour regulations) yesterday for other 
reasons [...] I was looking specifically for that (a clarification) in relation to another 
issue. Em, is the possible risk of harm enough for you to roll out a whole exercise? Or 
is, is it actual harm that it solely addresses? And it looks like it is wider than just 
actual harm.”  
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Sources of guidance mentioned by participants included a document entitled 
‘Lookback before you Leap’ (Cummins et al 2001), dental decontamination 
guidance, such as the Health Technical Memorandum 01-05, historical incident 
publications and instrument manufacturers’ guidance. Participants also referred 
to resources produced by UKAP and the document published by the Scottish 
Government and HPS: ‘Management of Public Health Incidents: Guidance on the 
Roles and Responsibilities of NHS Led Incident Management Teams’ (2017): 
 
P – “I haven’t necessarily kept up with what the UKAP guidance [...] but that is one of 
the first things I would do.” 
P – “for Scotland we have the ‘managing public health incidents’ so dental health 
incident would be part of that” 
P - “Public Health England has published generic guidance on how to deal with these 
types of incidents.” 
P – “And I would always refer to ‘Lookback before you leap’” 
P – “I suppose the only document I looked at were the [...] guidance for dental 
decontamination [...] HTM something” 
LG – “HTM 01-05?” 
P – “I did look at that to see if there was anything, you know, we could, sort of, that 
might say ok, this is good, this is bad [...] but, you know, that of course, that’s a guide 
on best practice it doesn’t actually tell you what to do when things don’t go right, so, 
that wasn’t really helpful” 
P – “actually for the infection control stuff you know we would go back to [...] 
manufacturer’s guidance [...] so if it’s equipment or whatever there may well be some 
quite detailed stuff” 
LG – “yeah cause they could tell you, kind of, variations on temperatures that are 
appropriate and things like that”  
P – “yeah” 
 
 
In general, however, participants called for more guidance on the management 
of infection control incidents and explained that the decision factors were more 
numerous and complex when considering patient notification following these 
types of incidents compared to assessment of a BBV-infected healthcare worker: 
 
P - “I think with the infection control stuff, the risk assessment stuff is much more 
difficult, there’s not a central way of doing that, probably the information’s more 
difficult, there’s many more variables, I think [...] then it sort of comes down to local 
judgement...” 
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P - “I would really like some sort of, something really concrete to come out of this [...] 
I would really like what we spoke about in terms of either a set of guidance or 
something around, here’s the risk associated with...cause that’s the big gap” 
P – “working through em, a system for dealing with the infection failures because I 
think at the moment, there is a lot of variability, em and I think its understanding all 
the factors that come into the decision-making and have a process that allows us to do 
that more consistently but also then be able to justify what we’ve done” 
P – “having some kind of guidance isn’t it? [...] that we can look at in one format 
because right now we’re probably going to various sources and stuff and whatever to 
try and collate things together and make an informed decision.” 
 
Participants stressed that the worst outcome of not proceeding to notification 
would be late discovery of an infected patient. Without knowledge and 
consequent treatment of their infection, the patient’s condition would have 
deteriorated over time and prognosis may be poor at diagnosis. The public may 
be angry or concerned that notification and testing had not been conducted and 
the reputation of the board or trust involved may be significantly damaged (S4 – 
Public opinion): 
 
P – “Yes and that is obviously a risk isn’t it? Em, that when you do make that decision 
that you’re not going to do a notification exercise and then somebody comes up, you 
know, a year later or something or whatever and says em, you know, em, I think I’ve 
caught something from this dental practice...oh dear.” 
P – “Well, there’s the very low risk that someone actually did get it from there...or, 
or, there could be no other identified risk factors by which they got it and they could 
show that they’d had an invasive procedure in the time that we were aware there was 
a risk of inadequate infection control at that certain practice and so you, you could say 
that person might come back and say this is now ten years later, if you told me earlier, 
I could have dealt with this and not have cirrhosis now.” 
 
They also stated that not notifying patients may be misinterpreted by the public 
as the medical profession trying to employ a traditional and immoral 
paternalistic approach. What the public would say or think about incident 
management was clearly an important consideration when deciding whether to 
conduct a PNE: 
 
P – “and if they then go why did the (board/trust) not tell us that things were wrong, 
you’re on a really sticky wicket, to say, well, we decided for you, not to tell you 
because we didn’t think it would be in your interest, that could potentially cause a 
huge mistrust of us” 
P – “clearly the media (inaudible) they don’t understand the niceties of why you didn’t 
tell them, so I think and increasingly with the way the society’s going this kind of 
allegation, nobody would like to be at the receiving end of it cause if your told that, 
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you know, you’re the doctor with the decision and eh, it’s a cover up, you didn’t want 
to spend the money to tell people or you’re playing, you’re playing god, you’re trying 
to be very paternalistic” 
 
3.5.3 Further results 
3.5.3.1 Using the stakeholder consultation to facilitate literature searching 
and guidance mapping 
The purpose of these stakeholder interviews was not only to provide a deeper 
insight into the complex PNE process but also to facilitate a more complete and 
accurate scoping review study process. Participants directly suggested or 
provided access to incident reports, publications and guidance. They made 
recommendations regarding places to search for these documents (Table 15) and 
gave invaluable advice on the variations of terminology that should be used for 
database searching (Table 16). 
Table 15: Organisations cited by stakeholder consultation participants for identifying 
incidents/expertise/guidance 
Health Protection Scotland 
United Kingdom Advisory Panel for Healthcare Workers with Bloodborne Viruses 
Centres for Disease Control 
Scottish Health Protection Information Resource (SHPIR) 
Scottish Health Protection Network 
European Centres for Disease Control 
Eurosurveillance 
Scottish Government 
Public Health England (HPA, PHLS) 
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre 
Informal PHE group 
British Medical Association 
General Dental Council 
Medical and Dental Defence Bodies 
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Table 16: Terms suggested by stakeholder consultation participants for database searching 
Incident 
Health Care Worker 
Patient Recall 
Lapses 
Health Settings 
Dental healthcare worker 
Patient Notification Exercise 
PNE 
Lookback 
Dentistry 
Notification 
Decontamination 
Infection control failure 
Blood Borne Viruses 
Hepatitis 
 
BBV 
Hep C 
Dentist 
Dental Practice 
Dental practitioner 
Hepatitis B 
Hepatitis C 
HIV 
Dental assistant 
Dental Nurse 
Blood borne virus transmission 
Infection 
Transmission 
3.5.3.2 Using the stakeholder consultation to facilitate effective data 
presentation and analysis 
Participants suggested what data outcomes would be useful and ways in which 
they could be presented. They examined preliminary findings and provided 
insight into the potential reasons behind patterns shown or correlations 
identified. For example, participants explained that the significant variation in 
percentage of patients tested from incident to incident could be explained by 
differing language used in letters to encourage or discourage testing. 
3.5.3.3 Using the stakeholder consultation to validate utility of research 
outcomes 
The utility of this doctoral work was validated through comments made by 
participants. Many emphasised that the collation of incident outcomes was 
needed to inform future management of dental incidents and expressed interest 
in accessing the findings of the work (Table 17). 
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Table 17: Comments made by stakeholders regarding the validity and utility of this dental PNE 
focused PhD research 
“I think it be useful, a good one, what you’re doing, useful to pull together all the 
evidence to date of the incidents, why the incidents happen, what the incidents are, 
what they have done and the outcome. Cost/benefit as well and I think just having that 
information would be quite useful.” 
 
“and that’s why I’m so supportive of putting all of this together.....you know, UK wide 
or worldwide, so that we can learn from them, it’s absolutely crucial” 
 
“although they are, you know, a pain to do but I think the more evidence and the more 
and that’s why I think your piece of work is great, the more we can get out there to 
help people who are faced with it and I think the more we’ll be able to tailor them and 
ensure that we are risk assessing them appropriately.” 
 
“I think the work in itself in trying to look at the literature and, you know, talk to 
people and come up with, you know, here’s, you know, what needs to happen even if 
it’s going to be a recommendation. Here is either a way by which we can gather up all 
the evidence that we’ve got already or here’s a repository where we can start to put 
these things or, you know, even here’s a template that you can put your report in and 
it collects all the information that would be helpful to other people em, you know, 
that could be done, or you know, recommendations for research, coming up with a 
toolkit, everything I...I just think the whole thing is just an area where you know 
there’s lots of, lots of eh issues and you know, even just your synthesis of that 
evidence you’ve found em, you know, when you start and you don’t have the time to go 
and search Medline and all the documents and try to make it up so what again, what 
we need is easily retrievable evidence that someone like yourself, who has been doing 
a PhD, is able to collate, somewhere where we can easily access it, that says, well, 
look here is all the evidence that we’ve got” 
 
“no, just be pleased to see an outcome of it. And see them all, all the dental incidents 
collated, combined, compared.” 
 
“Em, well, I just, I look forward to, to reading the output, I think it will be very 
interesting.” 
 
3.5.3.4 Using the stakeholder consultation to identify research gaps and 
subjects for future research 
Gaps in the field were outlined by participants and are presented as part of the 
narrative synthesis results. Table 18 summarises all issues which participants 
outlined as research gaps or suggested should be the focus of future studies. 
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Table 18: Issues or gaps in dental PNE research outlined by 11 participants involved in 
stakeholder consultation 
Issue/gap 
Number of 
participants 
who raised 
issue out of 
11 
Percentage 
of 
participants 
raising issue 
Concerns re: the uncertain risk assessment. 8 73% 
Desire for a standardised way of decision-making / guidance. 7 64% 
Desire for a better evidence base. 6 55% 
Desire for a closer look into monitoring and regulation of infection 
control in GDPs. 
5 45% 
What were dental staff’s views on incident management? 4 36% 
More studies on the ability of decontamination stages to remove 
blood/inactivate viruses. 
3 27% 
Data on which breaches / practices are historically linked to 
transmissions. 
3 27% 
Incidents need to be more frequently written up / findings 
disseminated. 
3 27% 
Cost analysis of notification process. 3 27% 
Desire for patient feedback on experience / management of incident. 3 27% 
Clarification on the duty to notify / take responsibility for private 
patients. 
2 18% 
Risks of transmission when HCW wearing gloves versus not wearing 
them. 
2 18% 
Need for a standardised system for writing up reports/better quality 
reports/reporting template. 
2 18% 
An assessment of the quality of dental HCWs infection control 
training. 
2 18% 
Exploration of the issue of staff having to whistle blow on their 
bosses, jeopardising their careers. 
2 18% 
Uncertainty surrounding the application of the duty of candour. 2 18% 
IMT’s not having powers needed to properly inspect / restrict / 
investigate practices. 
2 18% 
Desire for repository or database of incidents. 2 18% 
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During the interview, each participant was asked to specifically consider 
outcomes created by historic PNEs and outline which data from these older 
incidents would support them in their current decision-making. Each interviewee 
was given a list of outcomes and asked to pick the three types of data they 
would find the most useful (Table 19). 
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Table 19: Stakeholder consultation participant responses to interview question:  
‘To aid you in your decision you may want to consider the outcomes of previous dental 
notification exercises undertaken in the UK over the last ten years. In reference to the list of 
incident outcomes below, what are the three most important pieces of information that would 
inform your decision-making process on the need for a PNE in a ‘minimal risk’ incident?’ 
Data from historic incidents 
Number of 
times selected 
by participants 
as being useful 
Percentage 
of 
participants 
who 
selected 
option 
The degree of psychological distress caused to patients. 8 73% 
The number of new positive diagnoses that were found. 7 64% 
What were notified patients’ opinions on when they should be 
notified of these types of incidents? 
5 45% 
The number of those successfully notified who took up testing. 3 27% 
How often is the ‘patient’s right to know regardless of risk’ the 
main driver for undertaking a patient notification exercise? 
2 18% 
The percentage of those deemed to be ‘at risk’ who were 
successfully notified. 
2 18% 
How much did the letter alleviate notified patients stress? 2 18% 
How much did contact with a dedicated helpline alleviate notified 
patients’ stress. 
1 9% 
The monetary cost of undertaking the exercise. 1 9% 
The effect the notification exercise had on patients’ uptake of 
future dental services/care. 
1 9% 
Legal ramifications of exercise. 1 9% 
The number of those that called the helpline. 0 0% 
The number of those that requested/received counselling. 0 0% 
The effect the notification exercise had on patients’ levels of 
general dental anxiety. 
0 0% 
Degree of stress caused to staff managing the incident. 0 0% 
Degree of disruption caused to the normal health board/trust 
workload during management of the exercise. 
0 0% 
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3.6 Discussion  
3.6.1 What this study adds 
This stakeholder consultation exercise is the first to gather the thoughts and 
opinions of those who manage dental incidents within the UK using a novel tool 
developed to specifically assess the influential factors behind the decision to 
notify patients following a ‘BBV transmission risk’ healthcare incident.  
This study was an important step in the design and development of much needed 
guidance in this area. The stakeholder consultation means that any guidance 
created as a result of this doctoral work, is based on stakeholder needs and 
incorporates the advice and experience of UK decision makers.  Not only do 
findings from the stakeholder consultation enhance the scoping review study 
literature search and demonstrate the value of a decision-making algorithm but 
identification of research gaps may lead to future studies desired by UK 
stakeholders.  
This study outlines the methodological process for conducting a stakeholder 
consultation as part of a scoping review study. The scoping review study 
methodology is a novel process and demonstration of its execution may be 
beneficial to others who may be interested in utilising its structure. 
3.6.2 Methodological choices 
Purposive sampling was utilised in this semi-structured, qualitative, interview 
study as the aim was to seek out and record the responses of those with 
experience of managing public dental incidents: a niche group of people within 
the health care system (Marshall et al 1996). 
One-to-one interviews were conducted with participants in their place of work. 
This is a time consuming and expensive approach and on reflection, similar data 
may have been obtained in a focus group setting although participants would 
have had to travel to a central location from across the UK and their responses, 
especially if confidential in nature, may have been influenced by those around 
them. To save money and time the use of software such as Skype may have been 
valid, or engaging in secure email correspondence. However, the sensitive 
nature of the topics discussed may have made respondents less forthcoming with 
information in these less personal environments.  
Furthermore, with each participant having such an in-depth and unique story to 
share, giving each a focused, protected period of time facilitated the gathering 
of higher amounts of quality information. In a focus group situation, time would 
be split between each participant and stronger voices may claim more of the 
allocated time. It was also felt that a one-to-one interview situation would be 
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easier for participants and remove a barrier to taking part, as the chief 
investigator could visit them at their place of work at a convenient time. 
The questioning route was created with the consideration that these were to be 
what are described as ‘elite interviews’ – interviews of those with status and 
high levels of knowledge in relation to their field (Anyan et al 2013; Harvey 
2011). It is suggested by Harvey (2011) that elite interviewees may frequently be 
approached by those in the media and thus may feel uneasy about the nature or 
reasons behind an interview.  A great deal of consideration was given to the 
confidential information that may be discussed during this study’s interviews as 
a significant proportion of incident information is not in the public domain. 
Harvey (2011) emphasised that you must attempt to gain the trust of an elite 
interviewee which is why, in this study, transparency and maintaining an open 
dialogue with the participant was considered a priority and also why a 
‘respondent validation’ phase was included. 
Recommendations by Kreuger and Casey, who in 2000 published ‘Focus Groups: A 
Practical Guide for Applied Research’, influenced the flow of the questioning 
route which began with shorter, broader, easier questions and progressed to 
focused, harder, key questions. Their advice also led to the inclusion of ordering 
activities, open style questions, grouping of similar questions and a question 
regarding interviewees’ recommendations for improvements to the study. 
The paper by Britten (1995) contained excellent guidance on good interviewing 
skills such as open body language, positive responses and relaying information 
back to the interviewee to demonstrate that you are listening.  
3.6.3 Main findings 
3.6.3.1 Lack of access to evidence/support 
One of the key findings of this consultation was that IMTs must make a complex 
and multifactorial decision not only without access to guidance but also with no 
central repository where incident data can be accessed and with no formal 
channels for contacting others with similar experiences. 
IMTs do not appear to share their investigation experiences amongst boards or 
trusts through any channels. Respondents reported that getting access to data 
concerning historic incidents is difficult because research is limited and report 
writing following incidents is not conducted consistently or in a standardised way. 
Even if reports are written by IMTs they are often delayed in their release, not 
comprehensive and not published.  
In relation to infection control incidents, no panel or team, similar to UKAP, has 
been formally established to ascertain the risk and actions required. Not only 
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does this mean that IMT members do not have access to advisory support but 
there exists no assembled team of experts who could publish guidance, as UKAP 
have.  
It appeared that should a board or trust find themselves managing an incident of 
a specific nature for the first time, they were somewhat on their own. Health 
Protection Scotland and Public Health England could provide support but 
obtaining relevant advice could come down to who the IMT members know 
within the public health network. 
In regard to the benefits of notification, participants appeared to have a clear 
idea, based on sufficient evidence and personal experience, of how dental PNEs 
can benefit exposed patients. Negative effects, however, such as patient anxiety, 
reputational effects and impact upon dental care uptake, appeared to be based 
on educated assumptions and anecdotal evidence. 
3.6.3.2 Main influential factors of decision 
There was a consensus that risks were low but could not be calculated 
accurately due to a limited evidence base. The decision to notify, therefore, was 
not entirely based upon this estimation. Participants appeared to be under 
pressure to be open, regardless of the risk, and therefore focused on weighing 
the need to be transparent against the many negative outcomes of notification. 
Transparency was weighed against the opportunity costs of conducting 
notification, the significant expenditure of time as well as the predicted 
psychological impact on patients and reputational consequences for the dental 
profession which could result in patients not seeking out dental care. 
Respondents appeared to consider the importance of opportunity costs within 
the context of the NHS; an organisation currently under duress and in possession 
of limited resources. 
Many other environmental factors were identified, with the decision to notify 
lying within numerous contextual layers (Figure 5). For example, consideration 
was given to the context of current scientific knowledge and existence of 
medical advancements. Participants explained that over time, the knowledge 
and experience accrued shows that transmission risks are low, supporting the 
idea that PNEs are not needed. However, advances in treatments for BBV 
infections could make the identification of infected persons more desirable as 
their disease can now be treated swiftly and successfully. 
The decision to notify patients was complicated by legislative candour 
requirements. Participants had differing interpretations of the Duty of Candour 
guidance and how it applied to large-scale disclosure but most agreed that 
notifying patients would represent adherence to its principles. Pressure to be 
transparent was created by contemplating what the public would want, their 
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reactions to finding out an organisation had not been open with them and the 
current culture of transparency, which has arisen following times of medical 
paternalism. Public opinion was linked to presentation of the healthcare 
profession in the media, their changing perception of BBVs and their existing 
scepticism surrounding the integrity of government and organisations. Further 
pressure was created via the known opinions of government and higher 
management as well as the decision maker’s own ethical standpoint. 
Figure 5: Stacked Venn Diagram showing the contexts within which the decision to notify lies.  
3.6.3.3 Research gaps and issues 
Paucity in the guidance available, for both the risk assessment and decision-
making phases of incident management, was the main research gap outlined by 
participants. Participants called for this doctoral work to either include an initial 
draft of guidance or lead to the production of suitable documentation by others. 
Many respondents expressed a degree of frustration at having to deal with 
incidents which may have arisen due to factors out-with the boards control e.g. 
a system of monitoring that has failed. Participants called for an evaluation of 
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how practices are monitored and how infection control training is delivered. 
Changes to education and monitoring, however, have recently taken place and it 
may yet be too early to detect the effects. In 2016, changes were made to the 
way in which inspections are conducted in Scotland, with boards now having the 
power to conduct unannounced inspections of dental practices (The Scottish 
Government). This may lead to practices addressing and maintaining IPC 
processes but could also lead to more breaches being identified. Changes within 
dental infection control teaching have also occurred with the University of 
Glasgow Dental School employing a decontamination expert to lead a programme 
of dental infection control teaching with its own separate examination 
(Anonymous 2011). This will hopefully lead to better infection control education 
and consequently less incidents. 
Participants felt that exploration of the effectiveness of different 
decontamination stages would also aid in the creation of a robust risk 
assessment and expressed some confusion and frustration surrounding the 
allocation of certain roles/responsibilities following an incident. The participant 
who most often raised this point worked in England, where this appeared to be 
more of an issue. Perhaps the guidance; “Management of Public Health Incidents: 
Guidance on the Roles and Responsibilities of NHS led Incident Management 
Teams” eliminates this issue in Scotland.  
3.6.4 Strengths 
Interviewing each participant for a significant length of time and on a one-to-
one basis facilitated the gathering of in-depth data. Interviews were conducted 
face-to-face as opposed to via telephone or email exchange. These aspects of 
study design facilitated the discussion of sensitive information and hopefully put 
the respondent at ease. 
As consultants in public health, all participants had played a key role in the 
decision-making process regarding incident management and therefore could 
provide significant insight into its influential factors. 
The stakeholder consultation was comprehensive in that three out of four of the 
devolved nations were represented. This ensured that the experience of 
stakeholders with differing perspectives arising from location factors and health 
service structure could be considered. 
The same questioning route was used to guide all interviews. Consistency of 
questioning results in comparable responses and thus a more fruitful thematic 
analysis. A semi-structured interview style gives participants the freedom to 
discuss a plethora of issues without completely abandoning the goals of the 
interview and exploration of all research questions. 
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As an integral part of the scoping review study, the stakeholder consultation was 
beneficial in a number of ways. Firstly, presenting preliminary findings to 
interviewees facilitated the dissemination of early results to stakeholders and 
attainment of feedback on the utility of preliminary data. It provided an 
opportunity to learn how best to present current and future findings so that 
stakeholders will get the most from the data gathered. Participants provided 
explanations for correlations identified, gave advice on how to structure results 
and suggested data variables that merited comparison. 
Secondly, the consultation proved to be a highly useful networking exercise. 
Many participants requested that they be sent any resulting publications and a 
link to the associated thesis meaning that a channel for disseminating your 
findings is already in place upon completion of the study.  
3.6.5 Weaknesses  
While the stakeholder consultation was comprehensive in that three of the four 
devolved nations were represented, many of this study’s findings were based on 
incidents occurring in the Scottish healthcare setting as the majority of 
participants were working within Scottish boards. This may mean that the issues 
described by respondents may not be as applicable in England, Wales or 
Northern Ireland. 
Given more time, a larger sample size would have been prudent to enrich and 
support findings. Only one participant believed that transparency outweighed all 
other considerations and that patients should be notified no matter the level of 
risk involved or negative consequences of notification. A larger sample size could 
have facilitated the inclusion of more respondents with this view. 
As previously stated, all participants were consultants in public health meaning 
that the opinions and perspectives of those in other roles were not captured. 
The IMT is made up of those with a variety of roles: health protection nurses, 
local authority environmental health officers, communications officers, legal 
advisors, occupational health advisors, administration staff etc. Inclusion of 
those with an alternative IMT role would have strengthened this study.  
Some participants were approached based on KR’s awareness of their role and 
experience. It is possible that an awareness of KR’s involvement in the study 
may have influenced participant answer content. 
In regards to the development of the NFBI framework, presenting the results of 
inter-coder reliability in a ‘percentage agreement’ format is often seen as 
simplistic and may be criticised as it does not take into consideration coders 
selecting the same code by chance (Appendix 9). The effect of codes matching 
by chance, however, is thought to be lessened when a framework has many 
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codes, as was the case in this study. Use of advanced statistical calculations in 
this case was not appropriate as a) each code did not have the same chance of 
being chosen and b) all coders did not have the same type of background or 
levels of knowledge (Campbell et al 2013) (Appendix 9). 
There is debate in relation to the validity of including an inter-rater reliability 
process in thematic analysis studies. Some argue that the expectation for 
researchers to interpret and code data in the same way is unrealistic whilst 
others support its use and suggest that it increases the transparency and 
credibility of a qualitative study (Armstrong et al 1997). It is hoped that the NFBI 
framework will be considered a useful research output in its own right and that 
an inter-rater reliability stage will provide evidence of its credibility as a tool 
(Appendix 9). 
3.7 Conclusion 
This stakeholder consultation shows the need for collation of incident data, 
creation of guidance and a study assessing the psychological impact of 
notification, all aspects which highlight the value of the aims and results of this 
doctoral work as a whole. 
The stakeholder consultation explains some of the reasons why guidance does 
not currently exist, outlines the main influential factors that need to be part of 
guidance created and emphasises that consideration needs to be given to the 
context of decision-making. 
Whilst research is limited, risk assessments remain uncertain and Duty of 
Candour is unclear, the IMT will need to consider a multitude of factors when 
dealing with a dental infection control breach. A structured decision-making 
algorithm will aid them in their endeavour. This consultation exercise was not 
only instrumental in its design but should facilitate its dissemination in the 
future through contacts made. 
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Chapter 4. A systematic scoping review study search of the 
published and unpublished literature concerning investigations of 
BBV ‘transmission risk incidents’ within the dental setting. A 
narrative synthesis with collation and presentation of dental 
incident outcomes 
4.1 Introduction 
The main body of a scoping review study comprises a systematic type review of 
the literature guided by stakeholder consultation findings (Davis et al 2009). This 
review focuses on the outcomes of ‘BBV transmission risk’ dental incidents that 
have occurred in the developed world between 1990 and 2017. It also examines 
literature which discusses the merits of conducting large-scale patient disclosure 
following a healthcare incident. 
On examination of currently existing reviews, it was clear that early publications 
focused on the risks of HIV transmission from HCW to patient and revealed that 
worldwide, there have been only four reported instances of HIV transmission 
from HCW to patient: the Florida dental case and transmissions from a French 
nurse, French orthopaedic surgeon and Spanish obstetrician (Scully and 
Greenspan 2006; Mallolas et al 2006). 
As both HBV and HIV are spread via contact with blood and bodily fluids, it was 
thought by reviewers that examination of healthcare related HBV transmission 
may provide clues as to the risks of healthcare associated HIV transmission 
(Chamberland and Bell 1992; Robert and Bell 1994). HBV transmission within 
healthcare was historically quite common. Between 1970 and 1994, 34 HCWs 
(including 9 dentists) transmitted HBV to 350 patients (Robert and Bell 1994). 
There has, however, not been a proven HBV transmission event from dentist-to-
patient, within the developed world, since 1987 (Redd et al. 2007). 
Later reviews reflected the emergence of publications which reported on the 
management of infection control breach incidents. Younai’s 2010 review 
presented data on published, proven BBV transmissions in both US and UK dental 
settings and reported that between 1970 and 1987 there were nine clusters of 
HBV transmissions linked to dentists or oral surgeons. In regard to HCV, Younai 
(2010) reported that no proven transmissions, from dental HCW to patient or 
from patient-to-patient, had occurred, at that point in time, in the developed 
world. 
A 2016 review by Cleveland et al focused on American incidents which had 
occurred after 2003 and resulted in proven transmissions: a 2007 patient-to-
patient HBV transmission in New Mexico (Redd et al), a 2009 transmission of HBV 
to three patients and two volunteers of a temporary dental clinic (Radcliffe et al 
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2013) and transmission of HCV from one patient to another in Oklahoma in 2013 
(Oklahoma State Department of Health). 
An online worldwide outbreak database contains information on 3605 outbreaks 
caused by a plethora of pathogens occurring between 1936 and 2018 (Behnke et 
al 2019). The information available on dental incidents is, however, limited as 
many do not meet the definition of an outbreak and thus are not eligible for 
database inclusion. An incident having an associated scientific publication 
appeared to be a key factor in database inclusion and given that dental incidents 
rarely result in publication it is unsurprising that the database only held 
information for the 1990 Florida dental case and four pre-1990 HBV dentist-to-
patient transmission incidents (www.outbreak-database.com). 
Information is collated on healthcare related HBV and HCV outbreaks from 2007-
2014 on the ᵃ website (CDC 2014; CDC 2009). This data source is limited as it 
focuses on American data and their definition of an outbreak ie: equal to or 
greater than two linked cases. 
In conclusion, it is evident that there are very few recent, comprehensive 
reviews of dental BBV transmission risk incidents and that collation of these 
incidents and associated findings would be highly useful to those making the 
decision of whether to notify. Current reviews are limited by their American 
focus, 1990s context, concentration on HIV-infected HCWs and sole inclusion of 
incidents resulting in proven transmissions. 
Literature reviews conducted as part of scoping review studies are guided by 
stakeholder consultation findings. This study’s consultation found that, when 
deciding whether to notify patients, IMT members are likely to be guided by the 
experiences of other IMTs and outcomes of historic incident investigations 
(Chapter 3). These outcomes, however, are currently not easily obtained as 
dissemination of lessons learned from incident management is often poor or 
limited in reach.  
This review presents evidence from investigations that occurred throughout the 
developed world covering both those that did and did not result in patient 
notification and those that did and did not result in proven transmissions. It 
provides insight into the potential benefits and negative consequences created 
by PNEs as well as describing the dental infection control breaches that have 
been linked to historical transmission events consequently highlighting those 
breaches or failures that should perhaps be considered higher risk. 
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4.2 Aims 
i. To source and report on every published and unpublished dental incident5 that 
has occurred within the UK since 1990 and whether it resulted in patient 
notification or not. 
ii. To source and report on published dental incidents6 that have occurred 
elsewhere within developed country settings, since 1990. 
iii. To source and analyse published articles which discuss large-scale patient 
notification within a developed country context, post 1990. 
 
4.3 Methods 
Separate search strategies were employed to 1) identify all relevant published 
papers which discuss the management and outcomes of dental incidents and 2) 
identify unpublished dental incident reports. 
4.3.1 Literature search 
4.3.1.1 Preliminary search 
A preliminary search was conducted to establish that no similar scoping studies 
already existed within the evidence base. Google and The International 
Prospective Register of Systematic Reviews (PROSPERO) (NIHR 2019) database 
was searched using the terms outlined in Table 20. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Defined as those that created risk of/caused BBV transmission, in the dental setting, to patients (either 
from a BBV-infected HCW and/or inadequate dental infection control) 
6 As above 
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Table 20: List of terms used to search PROSPERO (NIHR 2019) and Google for similar studies or 
reviews to the one being executed and presented as part of this doctoral study 
Terms used to search PROSPERO (NIHR 2019) for similar reviews 
Scoping review AND Dental 
Scoping review AND Transmission 
Dental AND Transmission 
Infection control AND Patient notification OR Dental   
Dental AND patient-to-patient OR patient to patient OR healthcare worker to patient OR health 
care worker to patient 
Dentistry AND blood borne virus OR large-scale adverse event OR hepatitis B OR hepatitis C OR 
disclosure 
Dental AND hepatitis B, OR hepatitis C OR lookback OR look-back OR look back OR disclosure 
Terms used to search Google for similar reviews 
Scoping review HCV dentistry 
Scoping review HBV dentistry 
Scoping review HIV dentistry 
Scoping review dental transmission 
Scoping review patient notification 
Scoping review look back 
Scoping review large-scale adverse event 
Scoping review disclosure 
 
4.3.1.2 Search strategy 
Database searching combined with suggestions from educational supervisors 
resulted in a small sample of initial key papers. The titles and keywords of these 
papers along with advice on terminology received during the stakeholder 
consultation (Table 16) and guidance from a University of Glasgow librarian 
facilitated development of a literature review search strategy comprising three 
separate searches. Each search is outlined in tables 21, 22 and 23 with Appendix 
10 also presenting an example of the search strategy employed based on its use 
in the Ovid Medline database. 
Search 1 focused on the variations of PNE terminology with a dental context 
(Table 21). It was inspired by publication key words such as ‘dentistry’, ‘dental 
practice’, ‘notification exercise’, ‘look back’ and ‘patient notification’ 
(Millership et al 2007; Irwin and Millership 2002) and titles such as “What are the 
costs and benefits of patient notification exercises following poor infection 
control practices in dentistry?”(Close et al 2013) and “Costs of a limited patient 
notification exercise following infection control failures in a dental surgery” 
(Conrad et al 2011).  
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Table 21: Terms used in ‘search 1’ of Literature Review 
Dental OR “look back*” OR 
Dentist* OR “large-scale adverse event*” OR 
“Oral surger*” OR LSAE OR 
“Dental practice*” OR LSAEs OR 
Orthodonti* LBE OR 
 LBEs OR 
 Lookback* OR 
 (Notif* adj2 patient*) OR 
 (“medical error*” adj2 disclos*) OR 
 (“dental error*” adj2 disclos*) 
Columns combined with Boolean term ‘AND’ 
 
Search 2 was influenced by the key words ‘infection control’ and 
‘decontamination’ (Millership et al 2007) (Table 22). It aimed to capture those 
articles which may not specifically mention a transmission or notification 
exercise, such as the paper by Cheng et al (2013) “Management of an incident of 
failed sterilization of surgical instruments in a dental clinic in Hong Kong”. 
Table 22: Terms used in ‘search 2’ of Literature Review 
Dental OR Inadequate* OR Decontamin* OR 
Dentist* OR Poor* OR (infection* adj2 control*) OR 
“Oral surger*” OR Breach* OR Clean* OR 
“Dental practice*” OR Improper* OR Sterili#ation OR 
Orthodonti* Deficien* OR Sterili* 
 Fail* OR  
 Inappropriate* OR  
 Unclean* OR  
 Unsteril* OR  
 “not steril*”  
Columns combined with Boolean term ‘AND’ 
 
Search 3 focused on the description of the incident as a BBV transmission event 
(Table 23). This search was influenced by keywords such as ‘BBV’, ‘transmission’, 
‘HIV’, ‘AIDS’ and ‘blood borne virus’ (Redd et al 2007; Irwin and Millership 2002; 
Comer et al 1991) and titles such as “Dental Healthcare-Associated Transmission 
of Hepatitis C – Final Report of Public Health Investigation and 
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Response”(Oklahoma State Department of Health 2013) and “Patient-to-patient 
transmission of Hepatitis B virus associated with oral surgery” (Redd et al 2007). 
Table 23: Terms used in ‘search 3’ of literature review 
Dental OR Transmission* OR BBV* OR 
Dentist* OR Infection* OR HIV OR 
“Oral surger*” OR Infected OR HCV OR 
“Dental practice*” OR Spread OR HBV OR 
Orthodonti* Contracted Hepatitis OR 
  
“Human Immunodeficiency” 
OR 
  AIDS OR 
  
“Acquired Immunodeficiency” 
OR 
  “Hep B” OR 
  “Hep C” OR 
  “Blood Borne” 
Columns combined with Boolean term ‘AND’ 
 
These searches were conducted within three databases:  
- Ovid MEDLINE(R) In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations and Ovid 
MEDLINE(R) <1946 to Present> 
- Embase 1947-Present, updated daily 
- Web of Science Core Collection 
Searches 2 and 3 were conducted on the 6th of June 2016 and search 1 on the 
14th of June 2016. All three searches were continually updated until the 26th of 
January 2018. 
British Library services were utilised as well as contact with authors to source 
full texts as necessary. 
An iterative search strategy is advised in the execution of scoping review studies 
(Daudt et al 2013). Arksey and O’Malley (2005) emphasised that 
comprehensiveness and breadth are important and that inclusion/exclusion 
criteria can be “devised post hoc, based on increasing familiarity with the 
literature”.  
The limits of ‘English language’ and ‘post-1990’ were included later in the 
review process. All changes are shown in Figure 6, for example, articles 
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describing the 1990 Acer incident were excluded if published before May 19937. 
The reference lists of included articles were searched for further relevant 
articles (Figure 7). A fourth search was also included: ‘The Disclosure Search’, 
which expanded the search to include general, rather than solely dental, large-
scale disclosure literature (Figure 8). 
4.3.1.3 Limitations 
The following limitations were applied: 
Published post 1990 
AND 
Published in English Language  
4.3.1.4 Inclusion/exclusion criteria 
The following inclusion/exclusion criteria were applied: 
Focus on discussion or management of (a) specific dental incident(s)8 
OR  
Be considered an opinion piece on large-scale PNEs. 
AND 
Must be presented in the context or setting of a developed country. 
AND 
If article focuses on the 1990 Florida Acer dental incident, must have been 
published post May 1993 
 
4.3.1.5 Search strategy flow chart 
The flowchart featured in Figure 6 outlines the main literature review process. 
For all search processes (Figures 6, 7 and 8), abstract scanning and scanning of 
full texts was carried out by two reviewers: the chief investigator (LG) followed 
by either Professor Jeremy Bagg (JB) or Dr Kirsty Roy (KR). Full text articles 
were excluded with reasons (Appendix 11, 12 and 13). The commercial reference 
management software package, EndNote®, was used to keep track of records. 
 
 
                                                          
7 Only papers published after this date contained up-to-date figures on transmission findings as this is when 
transmission to the sixth and final patient was identified. 
8 Defined as those that created risk of/caused BBV transmission, in the dental setting, to patients (either 
from a BBV-infected HCW and/or inadequate dental infection control).  
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Figure 6: Flowchart outlining process for selecting relevant papers for analysis.  
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Figure 7: Flowchart outlining process for selecting relevant papers from reference lists of those 
articles identified through main literature review process - ‘references of references’ search. 
Records found from scanning references of included articles 
(n= 122) 
Records after abstract scan 
(n= 45) 
Abstracts/FT records not found 
(n= 17) 
Records excluded  
(n= 60) 
Records after full text scan 
(n= 27) 
FT records excluded with 
reasons (Appendix 13) 
(n= 18) 
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Figure 8: Flowchart outlining process for selecting relevant papers from ‘The disclosure search’.  
4.3.2 Unpublished incidents search 
Unpublished, UK incident reports were identified via the following approaches; 
1) Reports of incidents in Scotland were identified by one of this study’s 
educational supervisors Dr Kirsty Roy, a senior epidemiologist within HPS who 
provides expert advice and support to public health teams responsible for 
managing incidents involving BBV-infected HCWs or dental infection control 
failures in Scotland.  
2) The Chief Dental Officers of each devolved UK nation were emailed.  
3) Every Health Protection Team across England, Wales and Northern Ireland was 
called or emailed.  
Terms used: Disclosure OR notif* OR disclosing OR disclosed OR informed OR informing OR inform AND 
Large-scale OR “Large scale” OR multiple OR many OR number* 
Limitations: 1990-2018, English Language, in Title 
 
Web of Science Core Collection  
26/03/18  
(n= 615)  
Ovid MEDLINE ® In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations and 
Ovid MEDLINE ® 1946-Present AND 
Embase 1947-Present, updated daily  
26/03/18 
(n= 420) 
 
 
Records following title scan 
(n= 27)  
  
Records following title scan 
(n= 21)  
  
Records excluded 
(n= 594)  
  
Records excluded 
(n= 393)  
  
Records combined 
(n= 49)  
Records found through 
other sources (n=1) 
  
Records following duplicate removal 
(n= 31) 
Records following abstract scan 
(n= 8) 
Records following full text scan 
(n= 8) 
Records excluded 
(n= 21)  
FT Records 
excluded 
(n= 0)  
Records excluded 
(n= 18)  
Abstracts/FT records  
not found 
(n=2)  
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4) The UK Advisory Panel for Healthcare Workers Infected with Blood Borne 
Viruses (UKAP) was contacted.  
5) Those interviewed as part of the stakeholder consultation (Chapter 3) were 
asked if they knew of any relevant incidents. 
4.3.3 Data extraction 
Arksey and O’Malley (2005) referred to this stage as ‘Charting the Data’ and 
outlined that this process involves the application of “a common analytical 
framework to all the primary research reports” facilitating collection of 
“standard information on each study”. 
A single data extraction form was designed to record information on study 
location, year, focus, study design and type of journal used for publication 
(Arksey and O’Malley 2005). 
A further four different data extraction forms were used to gather dental 
incident outcomes from the literature (Appendix 14). Their design was inspired 
by the four different types of dental incidents described (Table 24), this study’s 
research questions and data items presented in previous reviews (Blatchford et 
al 2000; Cleveland et al 2016; Close et al 2013). 
Table 24: The four types of forms used to facilitate extraction of dental incident outcome data 
1: Identification of a BBV-infected dental HCW with notification of patients 
2: Identification of a dental infection control breach with notification of patients 
3: Identification of both a BBV-infected dental HCW and dental infection control breach with 
notification of patients 
4: No notification of patients following a ‘BBV transmission risk’ dental incident 
 
Suitability of the data extraction forms was tested via the CI and two research 
team members using the forms to collect data from the same eight publications, 
two from each incident category (Table 24). Each team member recorded data 
from the sample papers in isolation and without conferring. A meeting was held 
to establish whether the forms were resulting in consistent and predictable data 
extraction. Following this, second drafts of the collection forms were created 
and used to gather data on all incidents. 
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4.4 Results 
The qualitative review findings are presented in the form of a narrative synthesis 
whilst incident outcomes, which were mainly quantitative, are collated and 
presented in the form of charts, tables and graphs with accompanying 
descriptions of findings and statistical analyses (performed using Microsoft Excel 
2010®). Section 4.4.3 presents data on the broad characteristics of the 
PNE/dental BBV transmission literature. 
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4.4.1 Collation and presentation of dental incident outcomes 
4.4.1.1 What dental incidents have occurred in the UK and other developed 
countries? 
Information regarding 149 dental incidents, occurring within the developed 
world, was available from both published and unpublished sources (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9: Diagrammatic summary of 149 dental incidents, which occurred within developed 
countries between 1990 and 2017, identified from published and grey literature. (Images 
sourced via Microsoft Office 2010® ‘Clip Art’ Function) 
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Using data from 148 incidents (one had no information on year of occurrence) 
Figure 10 shows how the proportions of incident types being managed, have 
changed over time. The total number of incidents being investigated appears to 
have risen from 1990-2017 and the proportion of incidents that relate to dental 
infection control has increased from 1990 to 2017. Dental infection control 
incidents made up 3.6% of all incidents from 1990-1999 but from 2010 to 2017 
they accounted for 35.8%.  
 
Figure 10: Stacked column chart showing the number of dental incidents occurring between 
1990 and 2017. 
Unfortunately, data beyond location, year, nature of incident and PNE use were 
unavailable for 54% (81) of the 149 incidents. Multiple attempts were made via 
email, telephone calls and letters to obtain this missing information, without 
success. Data from the 68 incidents for which sufficient information was 
available are presented hereafter and in Appendix 15. 
There are four reported dental incidents that have resulted in BBV transmission 
from patient-to-patient or HCW-to-patient (Table 25). 
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Table 25: Dental incidents that were associated with at least one identified, proven transmission  
Additional notes 
Transmissions 
identified 
Nature of Incident 
 
Incident 
Details 
 
Index patient underwent 
tooth extraction, bone graft 
and implant placement under 
IV sedation; source patient 
had multiple extractions done 
under IV sedation. 
1 patient-to-
patient HCV 
- "reuse of contaminated 
vials"  
- Use of older, rusted 
instruments that could not 
be sterilised properly.  
- Delegation of IV sedation to 
non-certified dental 
assistants.  
- "Lack of autoclave 
monitoring and 
maintenance."  
- Dental offices had no 
infection control plans.  
- No biological monitoring of 
autoclave for last 6 years.  
- Sterilization room 
unorganised and unclean.  
- Soaking of instruments in 
cold disinfection which was 
changed every 28 days. 
2013 
USA 
Dental 
Practice 
(Oklahoma 
State 
Department of 
Health 2013) 
No one oversaw infection 
control at site. Outbreak 
occurred during time when 
there had been a seven-fold 
increase of reports of acute 
HBV infections in W.Virginia. 
Patient 1 – Extractions and 
prophylaxis 
Patient 2 – Extractions and 
restorations 
Patient 3 – Extractions 
Volunteer 1 – Escorted 
patients to waiting area 
Volunteer 2 – Maintenance 
of clean and dirty medical 
equipment  
HBV to 3 
patients and 
2 volunteers 
- No barriers between 
operating areas 
- All operations in close 
proximity 
- Handpieces not sterilised 
between uses 
- Sterilised instruments left 
unwrapped 
- Patients brought their used 
anaesthetic cartridges from 
station to station 
2009 
USA 
Temporary 
dental clinic 
in 
gymnasium 
(Radcliffe et al 
2013) 
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Index patient had 7 teeth 
extracted; source patient had 
3 teeth extracted. 
1 patient-to-
patient HBV 
- Unknown  
- “cross-contamination from 
an environmental surface is 
one possibility” 
2002 
USA 
Oral Surgery 
(Redd et al 
2007) 
 
Patients underwent exams, 
radiographs, extractions, 
scalings, LA administration, 
anterior composites, RCT, 
veneer, bridge and crown 
placement, gum resections. 
4 of the 6 infected patients 
shared dental visit days but 
only 2 had invasive 
procedures done on the same 
day. Patient G shared no 
treatment days with the other 
patients and for Patient I, 
specific visit days were 
unknown. 
HCW to 6 
patients HIV-infected dentist 
1990 
U.S.A 
Dental 
Practice 
(Ciesielski et al 
1994) 
 
4.4.1.2 Do PNEs achieve that which they set out to do? 
A tripartite working group (AGH, EAGA and UKAP 2011) outlined the three main 
purposes of patient notification, following discovery of an infected HCW: 
1) “Provide patients with information about the nature of the risk to which they 
have been exposed” 
2) “Detect any HIV infection, provide care to the infected person and advice on 
measures to prevent onward transmission” 
3) “Collect valid data to augment existing estimates of the risk of HIV 
transmission from an infected worker to patient during exposure prone 
procedures.” 
Although these aims related only to HIV-infected HCWs, intuitively, any large-
scale patient notification following a ‘BBV transmission risk’ incident would have 
similar goals.  
Review of the identified reports suggests that most PNEs meet the first aim as a 
high percentage of those put at risk following a dental incident can usually be 
contacted (65-100%,  = 89.9%) (Figure 11). Though there is some indication that 
as the number of ‘at risk’ patients increases, the percentage of those able to be 
notified decreases, with a moderate, negative correlation between number of 
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those deemed to be ‘at risk’ and percentage successfully notified, being 
observed (Figure 12). 
Figure 11: Bar chart showing percentage of patients who were deemed to be successfully 
notified out of all those deemed to be at risk in both infected HCW and dental infection control 
related PNEs.  
(Each bar contains the total number of patients deemed to be at risk in each incident. In addition to those 
notified via letter, patients were deemed to have been ‘successfully notified’ if they learned about the 
incident via the media and consequently contacted the board/trust. A patient was deemed to have not been 
contacted if either the board/trust did not have the patient’s address and thus a letter could not be sent or if 
a patient’s letter was returned undelivered. The figure for the patients deemed to be ‘at risk’ was taken from 
reports with the removal of any patients who were discovered to be deceased). 
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Figure 12: Scatter plot graph with linear trend line showing percentage of patients notified out 
of those deemed to be at risk against number of patients deemed to be at risk. Pearson 
correlation coefficient (r)= -0.5393, p=0.014 (r²) = 0.2904. 
With regard to the aim of detecting HIV (or other BBV) infection, this is 
dependent on the number of notified patients that are tested. Figure 13 shows 
that BBV testing uptake can be highly variable with a range of 3.5% to 100% of 
notified patients coming forward. Just over a third of incidents tested less than 
50% of notified patients and a similar proportion tested over 80%. 
Figure 13: Bar chart showing percentage of patients who were tested out of those successfully 
notified in both dental infected HCW and dental infection control breach related PNEs. (Each bar 
contains the total number of patients deemed to have been notified in each incident.) 
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Uptake of testing also appears to have a moderate negative correlation with the 
number notified as the percentage of those coming forward for testing decreases 
with increasing numbers (Figure 14). 
Figure 14: Scatter plot graph with linear trend line showing percentage of patients tested out of 
those notified against number of patients notified. Pearson correlation coefficient (r)= -0.5275, 
p= 0.018 (r²) = 0.2483. 
Stakeholder consultation respondents theorised that uptake of testing may also 
be connected to the language used in the notification letter. Unfortunately, only 
nine publications provided information regarding notification letter content. 
Based on limited information, it appears as though there is no relationship 
between notification letter language and testing uptake (Table 26). A risk 
description of “extremely low” was associated with high testing uptake 
percentages of 96.2% and 94% whereas the potentially less reassuring description 
of “small” was associated with a lower uptake of 33.2%. The term “out of an 
abundance of caution the ADH recommends” resulted in a high uptake of 93.6%. 
These data, although limited, suggests that there are other factors at work and 
that language in the letter may not have significant effect on testing uptake. 
The only data item which exhibited a logical correlation, was testing uptake 
following patients being told “no further action is required on your part”, which 
resulted in a low uptake of 10.2%. 
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Table 26: Percentage of those tested presented with description of risk in letter and language 
used in relation to advised action regarding BBV testing 
Incident 
Percentage 
tested (%) 
Description of risk in letter 
Language used to 
encourage/discourage/describe 
testing 
41 96.2 "the infection risk is extremely low"  
40 94.0 
"we believe the health risk is 
extremely low" "it was not possible to 
rule out the possibility that one or 
more patients were exposed to an 
infection" 
 
149 93.6 
"It is important to know that at this 
time no illnesses have been linked to 
this situation and that we do not know 
whether you were actually exposed to 
infectious material.  What has been 
identified thus far is only the potential 
for disease transmission." 
Out of an abundance of caution, the 
ADH recommends that you be 
screened for infection. 
1 86.3 
"May have been exposed" "We do not 
know if you were personally exposed"  
10 72.8 "very low" 
 
47 69.7 
we believe, based on the most current 
reliable scientific evidence, that the 
likelihood that you were infected with 
the HIV virus as a result of contact with 
this student is extremely low 
"We strongly recommend that you 
be tested" 
22 61.1 
"reassure you that it is unlikely you 
have been infected" "you 
understandably are frightened" 
"urge you to seek the free testing 
and counselling that is available" 
"For your peace of mind, I suggest 
you please contact the local health 
department for free testing and 
counselling" 
4 33.2 
"small" "impossible to estimate this 
risk accurately" 
"the health board believes that 
patients should be informed and 
have the opportunity for appropriate 
counselling and testing for these 
infections" 
16 10.2 "possible infection risk" "low" 
"no further action is required on 
your part" 
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Table 27 presents data on the diagnoses identified as a result of 37 PNEs. It 
shows that of 21 exercises, which resulted in the diagnosis of at least one BBV-
infected person, only in one third of cases was the incident conclusively 
excluded as the source of their infection (through identification of alternative 
risk factors and/or genetic sequencing). 
Table 27: Diagnoses found following the testing phases of 37 PNEs including findings from 
further investigation of these identified infections. 
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1 4208 4209 4209 
96 (2.28%) HCVᵃ  
6 (0.14%)HBV  
4 (0.09%)HIV 
63 HCV 
at least 32 
out of 
63HCVs 
N 
44 HCV 
samples 
genotyped 
2 247 247 247 
11 (4.45%) HBV 
0HCV 0HIV 
NM NM NM 
3 24 24 24 
3 (12.5%)ᵇ HBV(res) 
0HIV  
0HCV 
NM 
2 out of 3 
had RFs 
N, the 1 HBV 
(res) with no 
other RFs was 
not genotyped  
4 1137 1137 1137 
1 (0.09%) HBV(res)  
12 (1.29%)HCV  
0 HIV 
9HCV 
1HBV 
NM but 7 
out of all 
13 had RFs 
8 out of 13 
could be 
compared 
8 2780 2780 2780 
9(0.32%) HBV  
 4(0.14%) HCV 
3 HBV and 
3 HCV 
6 out of 6 
(but 1 
extra HBV 
case 
diagnosed 
after 
treatment 
but not via 
PNEᶜ) 
7 out of 13 
positive cases 
(does not 
specify which 7 
but one was 
patientᶜ) no 
matches found 
9 N/A 35 N/A 0 HCV N/A N/A N/A 
10 2665 2665 2665 
11(0.41%) HCV  
20(0.75%) 
HBV(res)ᵈ 
0HIV 
All new 
at least 7 
HCV had 
risk factors 
At least 9 
HBV had 
risk factors 
N 
3 were not, 
but all had RFs 
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11 ~750 ~750 ~750 0HBV 0HIV 0HCV N/A N/A N/A 
15 135 135 135 
2(1.48%) HBV(res) 
0HCV 
0HIV 
2 out of 2 
2 out of 2 
(1 from 
high 
incidence 
country, 1 
extensive 
travel) 
N/A 
16 137 137 137 5 to 7 (e) (e) (e) 
18 ~2250 ~2250 ~2250 
0HIV 0HBV  
<5(max 0.18%) HCV 
<5 out of 
<5 
NM Y 
19 4521 4521 4521 
8(0.18%) HCV,  
2(0.04%) HBV 
0HIV 
5 HCV NM NM 
22 
approx 
1100 
N/A N/A 10(0.83%) HIVᶠ 
10 out of 
10 
4 out of 10 
Y 
 all 10, 6 with 
no RFs 
matched. 
23 1279 N/A N/A 28(2.18%) HIV 28 
24 out of 
28 
N 
2 out of 4 
without RFs 
were not 
sequenced. 
24 N/A N/A 493 0HBV N/A N/A N/A 
25 61 N/A N/A 0HIV N/A N/A N/A 
27 1631 N/A N/A 0HIV N/A N/A N/A 
28 3096 N/A N/A 0HIV N/A N/A N/A 
29 154 N/A N/A 0HIV N/A N/A N/A 
37 41 N/A N/A 0HIV N/A N/A N/A 
40 1658 1658 1658 NM 
2 HBV, 2 
HCV 
NM 
"did not find 
evidence of 
clustering" 
41 507 507 507 
7(1.38%) HCV 
2(0.39%) HBV 
0HIV 
7 out of 7, 
2 out of 2 
NM NM 
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42 389 389 389 
5 HBV 
+ 1(0.25%) HBV 
found as part of 
PNE 
 
NM 
0 out of 4 
index pts 
had RFs, 
5th lost to 
follow up. 
Extra HBV 
pt found 
through 
PNE NM. 
N, 4 index pt 
compared all 
had genotype 
D and identical 
in partial 
sequence 
47 85 N/A N/A 0HIV N/A N/A N/A 
52 3011 3011 N/A 2(0.07%) BBV NM NM NM 
54 389 389 389 5(1.29%) HCV(res) 5 out of 5 NM 
"no linked 
pairs were 
established" 
55 37 N/A 37 0HIV (HBV NM) N/A N/A N/A 
56 248 249 248 
1(0.4%) HIVᶠ  
3 (1.2%) HCV  
19 HBV(res) and  
1 HBV(active) 
(8.1%) 
1/1 HIV, 
1/3 HCV, 
20/20 HBV 
22 out of 
22 
NM 
57 
around 
10,000ᵍ 
around 
10,000ᵍ 
around 
10,000ᵍ 
17(0.17%) HBV 
8(0.08%) HCV 
1(0.01%) HIV 
NM 
9 had RFs, 
9 had 
possible 
RFs, 8 had 
none 
N 
61 >500 N/A N/A 0HIV N/A N/A N/A 
64 630 N/A N/A 0HIV N/A N/A N/A 
110 899 N/A N/A 0HIV N/A N/A N/A 
137 ~274 N/A N/A 0HIV N/A N/A N/A 
138 26 N/A N/A 0HIV N/A N/A N/A 
139 78 78 78 0HIV 0HBV 0HCV N/A N/A N/A 
140 962 N/A N/A 35(3.6%) HIV NM 
33 out of 
35 
N 
149 900 N/A N/A 5(0.56%) HIV 5 out of 5 4 out of 5 
Y, all 5 
different 
a = 6 of these were household contacts of the dentist, not patients 
b = If including source and index case (5/26), prevalence would be 19.23% HBV 
c = Patient diagnosed after dental treatment but before PNE. Patient is not included in diagnoses found 
through the exercise. Patient’s blood sample did undergo genetic testing and did not match the other 
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samples. 
d = 1 person had both HCV and HBV(res) 
e = “no new positive cases of blood borne infection were identified/detected/linked to the period of risk of 
the incident” (Unpublished report) 
f = Includes index case 
g = based on looking at overall New South Wales testing and seeing a 10,000 person increase from previous 
months. 
h = patients were newly diagnosed and had not been previously aware of their infection or had their 
infection diagnosed before the PNE. 
 
RFs = Risk Factors 
NM = not mentioned 
(res) = Resolved infection/viral clearance following infection. Viral particles are no longer circulating in the 
blood stream. Genotyping and/or genetic sequencing cannot be performed. 
(active) = Active infection, viral particles and markers are circulating in the blood stream 
 
During data extraction, incident outcomes were categorised as green, orange or red. Green values 
represented those data items that were clearly and consistently presented in the literature, red values 
denoted missing information and orange values represented information that had been contradicted or 
presented in an unclear manner (Figure 17; Table 27). 
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4.4.1.3 Influential factors behind the decision to notify patients 
The stakeholder consultation revealed that the perceived level of transmission 
risk involved in an incident was the most important influential factor behind the 
decision to notify. Table 28 outlines numerical risk estimates presented in seven 
papers and reports. 
Table 28: BBV transmission risk estimations presented in dental incident reports/papers 
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5 
0.00003 per 
1000 pts 
seen 
NM 
0.000003 per 
1000 pts seen 
0.00006 
per 1000 
pts seen 
0.000093 
(almost 1 in 
10,000) per 
1000 patients 
seen 
No 
6 
0.00003 per 
1000 pts 
seen 
NM 
0.000003 per 
1000 pts seen 
0.00006 
per 1000 
pts seen 
0.000093 
(almost 1 in 
10,000) per 
1000 patients 
seen 
No 
7 
0.00003 per 
1000 pts 
seen 
NM 
0.000003 per 
1000 pts seen 
0.00006 
per 1000 
pts seen 
0.000093 
(almost 1 in 
10,000) per 
1000 patients 
seen 
No 
13 1 in 63,500 1 in 86,500 
1 in 
10,500,000 
1 in 
264,000 
1 in 65,000 -1 
in 52,000 
No 
14 1 in 59,000 1 in 63,000 
1 in 
118,000,000 
1 in 
1,224,000 
1 in 60,000 - 1 
in 56,000 
No 
17 NM NM 
1 in 
26,000,000- 1 
in 6,900,000 
1 in 
179,000- 1 
in 48,000 
1 in 117,000-1 
in 31,000 
Yes  
(but without 
recommendation 
for testing) 
21 NM 1 in 800,000 
1 in 
300,000,000 
1 in 
25,000,000 
1 in 770,000 No 
NM = Not Mentioned 
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Perceived transmission risk was associated with the nature of the breaches that 
had occurred. For the 42 incidents that involved infection control failures, nine 
did not contain enough detail to establish the precise breaches that had 
occurred. Figure 15 shows how frequently different breaches were associated 
with the other 33 incidents. Of these, 76% featured multiple breaches. The most 
common failure was use of unsterilised instruments (13/33) followed by poor 
disinfection (11/33). 
A statistically significant association was not identified between breach type and 
notification (Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.561) However, those that appeared most 
likely to result in notification included poor training, not changing gloves as 
regularly as required, absence of disinfection, poor sterilisation and the illegal 
practice of dentistry. 
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Figure 15: Number of dental incidents involving specific breaches and whether or not they 
proceeded to patient notification.  
(AWD = automated washer disinfector. LDU = local decontamination unit. a= Breaches associated with a 
patient-to-patient HBV transmission in the U.S.A (Redd et al 2007) b= Breaches associated with a patient-to-
patient HCV transmission in the U.S.A (Oklahoma State Department of Health 2013) c= Breaches associated 
with transmission of HBV to 3 patients and 2 staff members in the U.S.A (Radcliffe et al 2013) ‘Cleaning’ 
refers to manual cleaning or use of the ultrasonic bath, ‘Disinfection’ refers to use of an AWD. ‘Poor 
disinfection’ refers to improper AWD use/functioning or use of chemicals in place of an AWD. ‘Sterilisation’ 
refers to use of a vacuum or non-vacuum steam steriliser.) 
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Reasons given in the literature for notifying patients or not notifying patients are 
summarised in Tables 29 and 30. Each reason was assigned a broad, descriptive 
category to facilitate analysis.  
 
Perceived transmission risk was the most frequently cited reason for both 
proceeding and not proceeding to notification following an infection control 
incident (Tables 29 and 30). Specifically, investigators decided not to proceed 
due to the low risks involved (77%) and the anxiety that would be caused to 
patients (38%). Proceeding to notification following an infection control breach 
was linked to the perception of high risk (39%), the desire to be transparent (22%) 
and advice from experts (22%).  
 
Table 29: Reasons presented for not notifying patients. 13 dental infection control incidents for 
which data were available. 
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Total 10 5 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 4 
a = Disbenefit versus benefit, predicted low uptake of testing 
b = Practice had good records of adherence to standards. Similar recent decision made by peers 
c = Low prevalence of BBVs in population 
d = Minimally invasive procedures performed 
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Table 30: Reasons presented for notifying patients. 23 dental infection control incidents for 
which data were available. 
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4.4.1.4 Financial cost 
Only 11 out of 44 incidents that proceeded to notification, presented financial 
cost information. Table 31 outlines the high costs associated with PNEs (range 
£14,958.90 - £488,609.94,  = £176,298.27). There appears to be no correlation 
between cost and numbers of those ‘at risk’ (r= 0.44 r²= 0.19 p= 0.227) or 
number of BBVs tested for (r= 0.25 r²= 0.062 p= 0.452) but there does appear to 
be a fairly strong, positive relationship between cost and numbers tested (Figure 
16). 
Table 31: Financial cost of notification exercises presented with number of those for which 
notification was attempted, number of patients tested and number of BBVs tested for.  
Incident Location 
Attempted to 
notify 
Numbers 
tested 
Cost (£) 
Number of 
BBV 
infections 
tested for 
1 USA 5999 4209 488,609.94 3 
8 UK 7625 3096 311,573.78 3 
28 UK 5929 3096 300,000.00 1 
19 UK 22000 4521 250,000.00 3 
56 UK 591 249 180,000.00 3 
18 UK 5100 2250 132,000.79 3 
17 UK 5100 0 104,998.29 0 
9 UK 60 35 85,936.00 1 
11 UK 1500 750 40,000.00 3 
27 USA 1489 1631 32,389.64 1 
15 UK 3972 135 14,958.90 3 
For US incidents, values have been converted to British pounds for inclusion in this table. 
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Figure 16: Scatter plot graph with linear trend line. Numbers of patients tested against financial 
cost of PNE. Pearson correlation coefficient (r) = 0.785 (r²) = 0.617 p= 0.0041. 
4.4.1.5 Missing and/or vague information 
Incident data sources often presented vague information or had missing data. 
During data extraction, incident outcomes were categorised as green, orange or 
red. Green values represented those data items that were clearly and 
consistently presented in the literature, red values denoted missing information 
and orange values represented information that had been contradicted or 
presented in an unclear manner (Figure 17; Table 27).  
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Figure 17: Incident outcomes and the frequency with which they feature in reports or 
publications. 
Figure 17 demonstrates that information sources always presented clear data on 
where the incident had occurred and, when applicable, what infection the HCW 
had. A numerical estimation of the BBV transmission risk was most often missing 
from reports (90%) and when reported, a high proportion of information 
regarding sequencing and risk factors of identified infected patients was vague 
in nature (40% and 33% respectively). 
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4.4.2 Narrative synthesis 
This narrative synthesis is structured around the factors, identified from the 
literature, as influencing the decision to notify patients following a dental ‘BBV 
transmission risk’ incident (Table 32). 
Table 32: Structure of narrative synthesis 
Influential Factor Section 
Context 4.4.2.1 
Perceived Transmission Risk 4.4.2.2 
Benefits of notification to 
the patient, the managing 
organisation and the wider 
scientific community 
4.4.2.3 
Negatives of notification to 
the patient, the managing 
organisation and the wider 
scientific community 
4.4.2.4 
Standards and expectations 
based on governing bodies, 
public opinion and actions of 
peers 
4.4.2.5 
Perceived Complexity 4.4.2.6 
Design of Notification - Can 
the process be amended to 
lessen the impact of 
negative consequences?  
4.4.2.7 
Feedback on PNE outcomes 4.4.2.8 
 
4.4.2.1 Context 
Comer et al (1991) stated that decision-making is done in an environment of 
“evolving guidelines and regulations” with changes to “societal and professional 
philosophies”. 
 
The authors of the papers reviewed, highlighted that public fear surrounding HIV 
was particularly heightened during the mid-late 1980s (Pinching 2000; Hancocks 
2006) and that reassurance following an incident was perhaps more important 
during this time (Taylor 1992). One may assume that fear was heightened in this 
era by a lack of knowledge and treatment options as well as the fact that 
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prognosis, following infection, was poor (Closen 1996), however, Taylor (1992) 
and Cottone et al (1992) suggested that public anxiety may also have been 
intensified at this time by reports of the Acer case transmissions (the ‘Florida’ 
dentist case). Currently, no papers provide concrete evidence to support the 
idea that the public’s feelings are now more in line with scientific evidence 
which shows risks of transmission are low.  
 
It is worth noting that the dental environments reported to be associated with 
BBV transmissions of the past, no longer reflect today’s settings. Infection 
control standards have improved since the early 1990s with HBV immunisation of 
HCWs, glove use, separate LDUs, introduction of AWDs and an increase in the use 
of single-use items being just a few examples of modern-day improvements that 
reduce the risk of BBV transmission (Croser 2006; Cleveland et al 2016; Hancocks 
2006). 
 
Just as modern infection control practices may reduce risk and thus the need for 
PNEs, some argue that as BBVs can now be more effectively treated and 
managed, the justification for notification and identification of infected 
individuals is actually stronger (Weaver 2014; Hancocks 2006; Croser 2006). 
 
Finally, the papers reviewed reported that decision makers may be influenced by 
trends in public opinion. Pinching (2000) outlined that the modern patient 
expects a decreased display of “professional paternalism” and a higher level of 
respect for their personal opinions and wishes. Maguire et al (2016ᵃ) stated that 
in recent times there has been “a call for open communication” when things go 
wrong. These ideas are reflected by the recently introduced statutory, UK 
organisational Duty of Candour (GMC 2015; The Scottish Government 2018). 
4.4.2.2 Perceived transmission risk 
The papers reviewed identified a number of aspects that contribute towards the 
perceived transmission risk associated with an incident. These included the 
nature of the infection control breach, the presence of index patient(s) or 
proven transmissions, the types of dental procedures being performed, the 
nature of the health care environment, the integrity of the practice or individual 
involved, the type of pathogen(s) involved, the background prevalence of BBVs 
in the community and the circumstances surrounding historic dental 
transmissions. 
When assessing transmission risk one may wish to consider a calculated 
numerical estimation. Those provided in the literature, however, almost 
exclusively relate to the transmission of HIV from HCW to patient and are 
significantly out-dated (Appendix 16). Weller (1999) advised readers that 
estimations such as these represent an average and do not take account of 
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changing circumstances or context, for example, changes in the infectivity level 
of the HCW, performance of different procedures or variation in operator skill. 
Alternative methods have been used historically to estimate HIV transmission 
risks numerically, including consideration of: 
- Historical patterns of HBV transmission in healthcare. HBV is more infectious 
than HIV and similarly spread via blood-to-blood contact. There are more reports 
of HBV transmissions meaning a larger evidence base is available for analysis 
(Chamberland and Bell 1992; Robert and Bell 1994). 
- How often transmission occurs in the other direction ie: from patient-to-HCW 
using figures associated with risk of transmission following percutaneous injury 
(0.3% HIV, 3% HCV, 30% HBVeAg+) (Closen 1996; Comer et al 1992; Millership et 
al 2007; Robert and Bell 1994).   
Transmission risks were most often qualitatively described with IMTs concluding 
that BBV transmission risks associated with dental infection control breaches or 
infected dental HCWs were ‘low’ and more often ‘very low’, ‘minimal’ or 
‘negligible’ (Mason et al 2008; Heuer 1992; unpublished reports 2001-2017). 
4.4.2.2.1 Perceived transmission risk: details of past transmission events 
HIV-infected dental HCWs 
 
In 1990, David Acer, a dentist in Florida, was reported to have transmitted HIV 
to six of his patients. These transmissions were identified due to discovery of an 
index patient with no other risk factors followed by the detection of five other 
patients, who also had no alternative explanation for their infection (Ciesielski 
et al 1994). All six patients had viral sequences that closely resembled the 
dentist’s viral strain and were distinctly different from local controls. (Further 
details regarding this extensively investigated and reported case are provided in 
Appendix 17). 
  
Existence of this case, and specifically the uncertainty surrounding the precise 
route of transmission, has had a strong impact on the perceived risks of receiving 
treatment from BBV-infected HCWs (Longfield et al 1994; Comer et al 1992; 
Mishu and Schaffner 1994). The simple fact that transmission was proven to have 
occurred is enough evidence to support the concept that patients have been 
placed at some level of risk following discovery of an infected dentist (Irwin and 
Millership 2002; Weinstein and Keyes 1991). In fact, many reports of PNEs, which 
occurred not long after the Acer case, cited these transmissions as being their 
main reason for notifying and testing patients (Longfield et al 1994; Cohen et al 
1992; Arnow et al 1993). More recently, however, this incident is used to 
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highlight the rarity of HCW to patient HIV transmission (Cleveland et al 2016; 
Croser 2006). 
 
Authors advised that the Acer case should influence neither the understanding of 
HIV transmission risks in the dental setting nor the creation of policy and/or 
guidance (Hardie 1993) as: a) the route of transmission remains unknown, b) its 
investigation and findings are mired in a degree of mystery and c) it represents a 
cluster of transmissions. Chamberland and Bell (1992) explained that clusters 
“represent unusual and often incompletely understood events where the risk of 
transmission was greatly increased and cannot be used to estimate transmission 
risk across the board”. 
 
There have been many reports of PNEs executed in response to HIV-infected 
dentists that have not identified transmission. In the US, by the year 2000, of 
22,579 patients treated by 66 HIV infected HCWs (29 of whom were dentists or 
dental students), no HCW-to-patient transmissions were identified (Croser 2006). 
Authors emphasised, however, that these results only represent approximately 
20% of the infected HCWs’ patients and that it is unclear which patients received 
more or less invasive procedures (Robert and Bell 1994). In the UK, 22 look-backs, 
which involved testing approximately 7000 patients, from 1988-2001, did not 
result in the discovery of any associated transmissions (Scully and Greenspan 
2006). 
 
HBV-infected dental HCWs 
HBV transmission from dentist-to-patient has not been documented since 1987 
(Cleveland et al 2016). From 1972 to 1986, however, there were nine HBV 
transmission clusters associated with ten dentists (Blatchford et al 2000), eight 
of whom were HBeAg positive, a marker of high infectivity. All had a high viral 
load, a history of sharps injuries and were performing invasive procedures 
without the use of gloves (Chamberland and Bell 1992; Blatchford et al 2000). In 
one case investigators could show a correlation between patient infection and 
numbers of extractions undergone (Ciesielski et al 1991). Evidence of these past, 
multiple HBV transmissions has been cited as a reason for the notification of 
patients (Longfield et al 1994). 
HCV-infected dental HCWs 
There has never been a documented transmission of HCV from dental HCW to 
patient (Condon 2008; Croser 2006; Cleveland et al 2016). 
Patient-to-patient transmission 
There have been three reported incidences of patient-to-patient transmission 
within the dental setting, all of which occurred in the USA. In 2002, HBV was 
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transmitted from one patient to another in an oral surgery setting. The index 
patient was treated two and a half hours after the source patient and both 
patients underwent multiple extractions with use of IV medications. Route of 
transmission in this case was never established but contamination of 
environmental surfaces was postulated (Redd et al 2007).  
In 2013, 1,137 patients were treated in a temporary dental clinic, staffed by 750 
volunteers over a two-day period. HBV transmission occurred amongst three 
patients and two volunteers, again with an unknown route of spread. The clinic 
was set up in a school gymnasium with no one allocated to oversee infection 
control, no barriers between treatment stations and with patients being asked to 
transport their own instruments and used anaesthetic syringes between stations 
(Radcliffe et al 2013).  
In 2015, one patient-to-patient HCV transmission was identified following testing 
of patients treated at an oral surgeon’s practice where multiple infection 
control breaches were discovered. The most likely mode of transmission was 
deemed to be re-use of contaminated vials (Oklahoma State Department of 
Health 2013).   
UK investigators acknowledged that although these transmissions occurred out 
with the UK (where the delivery of dental service differs) they are proof that 
transmission can occur (Conrad et al 2011; Mason et al 2008; Henderson et al 
2017).  
Following UK based dental infection control breach incidents, published sources 
reveal that 8735 exposed patients have been tested with no identified 
transmissions to date (Conrad et al 2011; Close et al 2013; Roy et al 2005; Mason 
et al 2008; Henderson et al 2017).   
Authors advised caution when estimating risks through consideration of historic 
transmissions, as they felt that the number of transmissions identified may be 
markedly under-estimated. Not all patients are tested and BBV infection can go 
undetected due to its asymptomatic disease course (Redd et al 2007). 
4.4.2.2.2 Perceived transmission risk: proven transmission identified as part of 
initial investigation 
Many authors suggested that PNEs are clearly indicated by the existence of 
proven transmission. In fact, decisions regarding patient notification are 
reported to be more complex and nuanced if there is absence of an initially 
identified transmission (Maguire et al 2016ᵃ; CDC 2019ᵃ). UKAP strongly advise 
notification if transmission has already been identified (Close et al 2013) and 
many authors outlined that this should be standard practice (Conrad et al 2011; 
Arnow et al 1993). Mason et al (2008) supported this approach by indicating that 
if a transmission or index case has not been identified the risk associated with an 
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incident is probably very low whilst Mishu and Shaffner (1993) postulated that as 
transmissions are likely to occur in clusters (such as in the Acer case) starting 
the investigation with an index patient or known transmission may be more 
prudent and fruitful than focusing solely on the infected HCW.  
4.4.2.2.3 Perceived transmission risk: dental HCW/practice professionalism 
Two cases demonstrate the importance of considering a practice’s or individual’s 
integrity and professionalism. In 2000, Roy and colleagues (2005) investigated 
the source of a patient’s HCV diagnosis as it was suggested that dental 
treatment may have been the source of infection. Cross matching revealed no 
excess HCV infection in the practice population and there were no other samples 
with which to compare the index case’s viral strain. The dentist had been 
removed from the dental register in 1997 and was being investigated for fraud. 
In 2001, the dentist revealed in court that they had used unsterilised 
instruments on patients. In light of this new information a PNE was initiated (Roy 
et al 2005).  
 
A similar scenario arose in 2013 when allegations of re-use of single use items 
were made against a Scottish dentist (Henderson et al 2017). During the 
investigation of these allegations the practice was uncooperative and its actions 
suspicious. The practice delayed inspections and the IMT was provided with 
fraudulent documents. Staff appeared to have been coached in preparation for 
investigative interviews and expressed consistent, mimicked answers to 
questions. The IMT decided to conduct patient notification but not offer testing. 
Shortly after the notification exercise, confirmation of earlier allegations, 
including the addition of more serious ones emerged and the IMT was inclined to 
repeat the PNE, this time with the offer of testing (Henderson et al 2017). Both 
these cases demonstrate that evidence of fraudulent or unprofessional behaviour 
can indicate the need for a PNE as initial investigative details or allegations 
cannot be relied upon. 
4.4.2.2.4 Perceived transmission risk: healthcare environment 
It was suggested in some papers that the quality of infection control employed 
by those involved in incidents may be linked to the healthcare environment. 
Radcliffe et al (2013) outlined that locations such as temporary clinics may 
increase transmission risk as they are challenging to establish and run in a way 
that complies with infection control standards due to close quarters and poor 
water supply access whilst Comer et al (1992) suggested that a dental school 
environment is less concerning as infection control processes are likely to be 
compliant. 
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Three of the four recorded dental BBV transmission cases occurred in unique 
settings which do not mirror UK high street practice; two in an oral surgery 
environment (Redd et al 2007; Oklahoma State Department of Health 2013) and 
one in a temporary dental clinic (Radcliffe et al 2013). 
4.4.2.2.5 Perceived transmission risk: nature of the dental procedures undergone 
by patients 
Types of procedure undergone by patients rarely appeared to influence the 
response in the papers reviewed. Intuitively, however, procedures that are more 
invasive, resulting in greater exposure of patient tissues and production of blood, 
would be associated with a higher risk.  
Performance of dental extractions may be linked to an increased chance of 
transmission. This procedure was associated with three out of the four proven 
BBV transmission cases. Both the source and index patients in the New Mexico 
and Tulsa cases underwent extractions as well as all three infected patients from 
the West Virginia investigation (Redd et al 2007; Oklahoma State Department of 
Health 2013; Radcliffe et al 2013) (Table 25).  
The UKAP EPP categorisation assesses the risk of BBV transmission from HCW-to-
patient. Procedures are graded not only based on the capacity for patients’ 
tissues to be exposed but also the chances of HCW injury (PHE 2016). This 
categorisation is not necessarily applicable to assessing the risk associated with 
infection control breaches. 
In the early 2000s, UK incident investigators acknowledged that the UKAP EPP 
definition of the time9, meant all patients who had undergone dental treatment 
beyond examination with a mirror alone were considered ‘at risk’. This meant 
that type of procedure became an irrelevant factor, with attempts to notify all 
exposed patients being made (Gaudoin 2000; Irwin and Millership 2002).  
In 2008, a UK IMT chose to create its own categorisation of procedures when 
managing a dental infection control breach (Mason et al) (Table 33). The team 
did not, however, use this novel categorisation to establish which patients were 
to be notified but instead used it post-notification to establish if there was a 
connection between BBV infection and nature of procedures undergone (Mason 
et al 2008).  
Similarly, Longfield et al (1994) used procedure data post-notification to report 
the percentage of patients, tested as part of their PNE, who had one of seven 
types of dental procedure. In fact, only in the reports of four out of the 44 
incidents that resulted in notification, has procedure type been used to limit the 
                                                          
9 In 2016, dental procedures were re-categorised, with many more procedures being classed as non-
exposure prone (PHE 2016). 
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number of patients notified (Arnow et al 1993; Cottone et al 1992; People with 
AIDS Coalition of New York 1999; Fitzgerald et al 2010). More often papers 
reported assessing procedures after notification, to look for correlations or 
understand the scope of dental treatment performed by dentists (Dickenson et al 
1993; Longfield et al 1994; Mason et al 2008). Table 33 outlines incidents where 
authors graded dental procedures and details of how these categories were 
utilised in the management or analysis of an incident. 
Table 33: Dental incidents where IMTs categorised dental procedures performed on exposed 
patients. Presents information on how the categorisation was used to influence numbers 
notified or explore specific correlations. 
Categorisation of dental 
procedures conducted 
Type of 
incident 
Did categorisation 
influence which 
patients were 
notified? 
Country and  
Reference 
Were the 
categories used in 
another way? 
All procedures except 
exam with mirror, 
considered EPP 
Infected 
HCW 
No, attempted to 
notify all exposed 
patients. Decision 
of who to 
notify/test was 
not based on 
procedures. 
Irwin and 
Millership 
2002 
UK 
No 
EPP determined by expert 
group. EPPs were defined 
as surgical extractions, 
dento-alveolar surgery, 
implant surgery and perio 
surgery 
Infected 
HCW 
Unknown. No 
patients were 
notified 
(unclear if this 
decision was 
based on 
procedures) 
Condon 2008 
Australia 
No 
All procedures except 
exam with mirror 
considered EPP 
Infected 
HCW 
No, attempted to 
notify all exposed 
patients. Decision 
of who to 
notify/test was 
not based on 
procedures. 
Gaudoin 2000 
UK 
No 
5 categories. Cats 3-5 
included extractions, oral 
surgery procedures, 
periodontal procedures, 
prophylaxis and 
endodontic procedures. 
Infected 
HCW 
Yes, those who 
underwent cat 3-5 
procedures 
notified with 
option to expand 
notification, to 
those who 
Arnow et al 
1993 
USA 
No 
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Cats 1 and 2 included any 
other procedures involving 
needles, high speed burs, 
sharp instruments and 
those that involved no 
sharp instrument use. 
underwent cat 1-2 
procedures, if 
transmissions 
found. 
EPP defined as surgical 
dental procedures, scaling 
and root planning therapy 
Infected 
HCW 
Yes, all patients 
who had their 
definition of an 
‘EPP’ 
Cottone et al 
1992 
USA 
No 
7 procedure categories. 1) 
oral surgery 2) periodontics 
3) prosthodontics 4) 
endodontics 5) restorative 
6) adjunctive 7) other 
Infected 
HCW 
No, attempted to 
notify all exposed 
patients. Decision 
of who to 
notify/test was 
not based on 
procedures. 
Longfield et al 
1994 
USA 
Established which 
patients took up 
testing in relation 
to the category of 
their procedure. 
Three categories. 
Incidentally invasive (no 
sharp instruments except 
dental explorer, violation 
of oral mucosa does not 
happen frequently and 
injury to HCW is unlikely). 
Moderately invasive (non-
surgical but violation of 
oral mucosa, use of sharp 
instruments including burs. 
Haemorrhage but no gross 
open wounds eg. non-
surgical periodontal 
therapy, restorative 
dentistry and non-surgical 
endodontics.) Surgically 
invasive (open wounds, 
XLAs, flaps, excision of 
lesions) 
Infected 
HCW 
No, attempted to 
notify all exposed 
patients. Decision 
of who to 
notify/test was 
not based on 
procedures. 
Comer et al 
1992 
USA 
Established the 
proportion of 
dental procedures 
performed by the 
dentist that fell 
into each 
category. 
3 categories. Non-invasive, 
minimally invasive and 
invasive. Non-invasive 
included advice, 
instructions, treatment 
Infection 
control 
breach 
No, attempted to 
notify all exposed 
patients. Decision 
of who to 
notify/test was 
Mason et al 
2008 
UK 
Established 
whether presence 
of infection was 
associated with a 
category of 
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planning with no 
periodontal assessment. 
Minimally invasive 
included xrays, denture 
production stages, fissure 
sealants, application of 
topical fluoride. Invasive 
covered all other 
procedures. 
not based on 
procedures. 
procedure. 
NM 
Infection 
control 
breach 
Yes, only those 
who had 
extractions were 
notified 
People with 
AIDS Coalition 
of New York 
1999 
USA 
No 
NM Infected 
HCW 
Yes, only “those 
deemed to be at 
possible medium-
high risk of 
transmission” 
notified. 
Fitzgerald et 
al 2010 
Ireland 
No 
NM = Not Mentioned 
 
4.4.2.2.6 Perceived transmission risk: prevalence of BBVs in local population 
The contribution of background prevalence of BBV infection to the overall 
estimated transmission risk is significant and was included in many risk 
assessment calculations reported in the papers reviewed (Millership et al 2007). 
Mason et al (2008) cited this as the main reason why risks associated with 
infection control breaches in the UK are low, rather than as a result of the 
nature of the breaches involved. 
Documented transmissions have tended to occur amongst populations with a 
higher background BBV prevalence. The transmissions in West Virginia occurred 
at a time when there had been a seven-fold increase in the reporting of acute 
HBV infection in the state from 1997-2012 (Radcliffe et al 2013). The Tulsa HCV 
transmission investigation diagnosed 96 HCV-infected persons following testing 
of 4209, indicating a high prevalence of 2.3% (Oklahoma State Department of 
Health 2013). The Acer case PNE not only identified six patients thought to be 
infected by the dentist but four other cases out of 1,100 patients tested HIV-
positive (Ciesielski et al 1991). In the same Florida area, following identification 
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of two other HIV-infected dentists, Jaffe et al (1994) identified 28 unrelated HIV 
cases out of 1279 tested and Dickenson (1994) identified 25 unrelated HIV 
infected patients out of 1192. These figures represent relatively high HIV 
percentage prevalences of 2.2% and 2.1% respectively.   
Prevalence estimations were reportedly made based on knowledge of nationwide 
BBV infection rates, characteristics of the patient population involved and the 
proportion of undiagnosed cases (Henderson et al 2017). During the investigation 
of their incidents, Cheng et al (2013) were acutely aware that in Hong Kong HBV 
prevalence is high (1-8%) whilst Millership et al (2007) estimated that prevalence 
would be low in a mostly white and middle class population.  
While some papers indicated that a high background prevalence of BBV infection 
can increase predicted transmission risk, others reported that high levels of 
population immunisation can reduce it. HBV immunisation was cited as the 
reason behind limited spread in two incidents, one in the US which found that of 
25 patients tested, 16 had been immunised (Redd et al 2007) and one in Hong 
Kong which identified that 152 of 247 patients tested, had been vaccinated or 
previously infected with HBV, resulting in immunity (Cheng et al 2013).  
4.4.2.2.7 Perceived transmission risk: type of pathogen involved 
HBV is the most transmissible BBV followed by HCV and HIV (Irwin and Millership 
2002; Croser 2006; Blatchford et al 2000; Close et al 2013). HBV is more 
environmentally stable (Robert and Bell 1994) and 100 times more infectious 
than HIV (Dental Protection Ltd 2002). However, as mortality rates were 
historically higher following HIV infection compared to HBV, the risks were 
considered comparable between the two viruses (Breo 1993; Shaw 2008). Older 
papers stated that the “severity of risk outcome contributes to the risk” 
(Iheukwumere 1997) and that the risk was low but “not so low as to nullify the 
catastrophic consequences of an accident” (Closen 1996). Arguably this is no 
longer the case with modern BBV therapy. 
Following discovery of a dental infection control breach or infected dental HCW, 
those managing the incident are primarily concerned about the transmission of 
BBVs. Other relevant transmissible pathogens include herpes viruses, bacteria, 
fungi, parasites and prions (Scully and Greenspan 2006; Croser 2006; Cheng et al 
2013). Millership et al (2007) and Cheng et al (2013) explained that the focus on 
BBVs is due to the fact that bacterial infections, if transmitted, will result in 
short-term, self-limiting illnesses. Furthermore, they may not even be detected 
during a PNE which takes place long after the incident in question. In contrast to 
a self-limiting, relatively low impact bacterial infection, Weaver (2014) 
highlighted that the majority of BBV-infected patients will be unaware of their 
infection, become chronic carriers of the disease and be at high risk for 
developing HCC and cirrhosis if they remain undiagnosed. 
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Millership et al (2007) acknowledged the possibility of prion transmission 
following a dental infection control breach. They stated, however, that 
estimating this risk is difficult and that no action, such as testing or treatment, 
can be taken by patients after they learn of their exposure (Millership et al 
2007).  
Cleveland et al (2016) highlighted that respiratory infection can also be a 
concern and may be spread through inhalation of pathogens during dental 
treatment (Cleveland et al 2016). In 2003, Legionnaires disease was transmitted 
via dental unit waterlines to an elderly, female patient in Italy, who, 
unfortunately, died as a result of her exposure (Cleveland et al 2016).  
Cheng et al (2013) were clearly concerned about the risks of tetanus in their 
incident. The authors explained that tetanus vaccination was offered to exposed 
patients as transmission via dental treatment had been reported in the past 
(Ajayi and Obimakinde 2011) and because it can be fatal (Cheng et al 2013).  
4.4.2.2.8 Perceived transmission risk: nature and/or severity of breaches 
As previously outlined, in 2013, following a PNE associated with a Scottish dental 
infection control breach incident, new, more serious breaches were reported 
leading to a second round of notification, this time with testing being 
encouraged (Henderson et al 2017). The second set of reported breaches 
mirrored the first but included additional allegations of amalgam carriers and 
ultrasonic scalers not being sterilised (only surface wiped), as well as the re-use 
of endodontic files, burs, 3 in 1 tips and impression trays following processing 
(Henderson et al 2017). The decision to promote testing following discovery of 
these additional allegations shows that these specific breaches were deemed to 
be more serious meriting an enhanced response.  
Breaches involving re-use of contaminated syringes have been associated with 
many nosocomial transmissions (CDC 2019ᵃ; Cleveland et al 2016; Shields 1995) 
and are connected to all four documented dental transmissions (Ciesielski et al 
1994; Redd et al 2007; Radcliffe et al 2013; Oklahoma State Department of 
Health 2013) (Table 25). 
4.4.2.3 Benefits of notification to the patient, the managing organisation and 
the wider scientific community 
4.4.2.3.1 Benefits: diagnoses made 
BBV diagnosis leads to earlier treatment for affected patients (Gaudoin et al 
2000; Hébert 2015; Maguire et al 2016ᵃ; Blatchford et al 2000) with an 
associated improved disease prognosis (Radcliffe et al 2013) and reduction of 
onward transmission (Blatchford et al 2000; Gaudoin et al 2000).  
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Radcliffe et al (2013) emphasised that very early identification of an incident 
can also facilitate provision of PEP (for HIV and HBV). This is demonstrated in 
the management of the 2010 Hong Kong incident (Cheng et al 2010). Cheng and 
his team (2010) provided HBV prophylaxis following discovery of an infection 
control breach in a Hong Kong University dental clinic. The breach was identified 
very shortly after a ‘one off’ incident which put patients at risk for three days 
(Cheng et al 2010). Administration of preventative prophylaxis can be an added 
benefit of notification, but only if the incident has been recent and responses 
are rapid. 
 
Dickenson (1994) outlined an additional benefit of detecting cases by stating 
that patients are better able to cope with their disease if they know the source 
of their infection. This is, in part, shown through Runnel’s emotional description 
of the mental anguish suffered by Kimberly Bergalis (the first patient discovered 
to have been infected by Dr Acer) when she attempted to understand how she 
had become infected (Runnells 1993).  
4.4.2.3.2 Benefits: using PNEs to highlight the importance of adequate infection 
control 
Making the dental profession and public aware of PNEs can result in a renewed 
focus on infection control issues and policy. The Acer case resulted in changes to 
US policy and the proposition of new bills concerning the management of 
infected HCWs (Green 1992; Gerbert et al 1991).  
Authors reflected on their incidents’ causes and how a similar event could be 
prevented in the future, seeing the investigation as an opportunity for learning 
and improvement (Henderson et al 2017; Comer et al 1991; Eklund and Marianos 
2013). Henderson et al (2017) reported that the IMT wrote a letter to the 
Scottish Chief Dental Officer detailing their concern that routine inspections had 
not detected any issues regarding the dental practice they later investigated. 
Pashley et al (1991) reported that after their PNE, infection control standards at 
the dental hospital had improved and patients were better at spotting issues. 
Cottone et al (1992) outlined that following their investigation, patient records 
were much improved and Maguire et al (2016ᵃ) emphasised how patients had 
noticed a cleaner, more organised clinic following their PNE. 
Conversely, some papers reported that PNEs do not always have the desired 
effect of infection control improvement. Horowitz (1994ᵃ) and Gerbert et al 
highlighted that reporting of transmissions where the route of infection is 
unknown, can lead to dental HCWs actually losing faith in the compliant 
infection control methods they are currently employing. Gerbert et al (1991) 
showed that a significant proportion of dental HCWs do not necessarily respond 
to transmission reports in a significant way, with only 8% of dentists stating in 
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1991, that they would change or had changed their infection control practices as 
a result of the Acer case. 
4.4.2.3.3 Benefits: reassuring patients 
Many of the papers reviewed, identified the reassurance given to patients 
through notification and testing as another potential benefit of a PNE (Shaw 
2008; Henderson et al 2017; Hancocks 2006; Blatchford et al 2000; Fitzgerald et 
al 2010). Pinching (2000) stated that this reassurance is even more important 
when the public are already aware of an incident but have been given an 
exaggerated or sensationalised description of the risks by the media. 
4.4.2.3.4 Benefits: engendering/maintaining patient trust through transparency 
Notifying patients was described by some authors as a way of demonstrating a 
commitment to transparency thereby preserving public trust (Dickenson 1994). 
Some stated that notification would maintain levels of trust in healthcare (Shaw 
2008; Hébert 2015; Maguire et al 2016ᵃ). Others went further by stating that 
notification actually enhances and improves patient trust (Dudzinski et al 2010; 
Blatchford et al 2000).  
Heuer (1992) demonstrated how the decision to notify can result in positive 
media headlines, such as “Northwestern Acts Wisely on AIDS case” whilst Taylor 
(1992) pointed out that transparency in an investigation’s early stages could 
eliminate the risk of incident details becoming public knowledge via another 
route, which may create the impression that an organisation is trying to hide 
information from patients. 
4.4.2.3.5 Benefits: PNEs add to the evidence base 
In 1999, Weller highlighted that until sufficient evidence was gathered, it would 
not be possible to state definitively that risks were low and that negative PNE 
consequences vastly outweighed the need to notify exposed patients. Gathering 
further data to enhance our understanding of healthcare related BBV 
transmission, was, however, not perceived by authors as a key reason for 
conducting notification but an added benefit (Longfield et al 1994; Arnow et al 
1993; Jaffe and Liberti 1995), facilitating easier decision-making and creation of 
policy in the future which in turn would promote utilisation of a PNE response in 
more specific, high-risk situations (Pinching 2000; Irwin and Millership 2002; 
Hancocks 2008; Fitzgerald et al 2010).  
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4.4.2.4 Negatives of notification to the patient, the managing organisation 
and the wider scientific community 
4.4.2.4.1 Negatives: anxiety caused to patients and staff 
Many papers outlined the significant anxiety that patients may experience 
following notification, but few supported their statements with objective 
evidence of its existence and/or severity (Shaw 2008; Croser 2006; Conrad et al 
2011; Hébert 2015; Hancocks 2008; Martin 2006). Indeed, Pinching (2000) 
suggested that investigators may have a misplaced idea of the severity of 
anxiety caused, as their exposure to notified patients may solely involve 
handling complaints or dealing with a small proportion of acutely distressed 
patients.  
 
The limited evidence provided in papers, both supported and refuted the idea 
that post-PNE patient anxiety is significant. In 2000, Blatchford et al posted a 
survey to patients who had been notified of an HBV-infected dentist. Results 
suggested that anxiety was less extreme than postulated in the literature, as 
only 15% reported feeling ‘very anxious’ on receipt of their letter, with 41% 
feeling ‘slightly anxious’ (Blatchford et al 2000). These percentages dropped 
further following contact with the helpline, which was established during the 
PNE for those affected (Blatchford et al 2000).  
 
The literature review identified three other small studies that had been 
conducted in relation to anxiety following dental incident notification. These 
involved call handlers either making note of patients’ demeanours or asking 
them directly about anxiety during helpline phone calls (Pashley et al 1991; 
Monteith et al 1995; Taylor 1992). Pashley et al (1991) reported that 58% of 153 
patients were deemed to be calm, 28% were anxious and 14% angry. These 
results were mirrored in Taylor’s study (1992) where the “vast majority” of 
patient reactions were deemed to be “favourable” and of around 500 calls, only 
1% of patients were very upset, 17% were concerned/apprehensive and 82% had 
good reactions (Taylor 1992). In contrast to these findings, Monteith et al (1995) 
found that 74% of 130 patients who had been notified of an HIV-infected dentist 
reported feeling anxious on receipt of their letter, although in this case patients 
were asked directly about their feelings and no specific level of anxiety was 
recorded.  
 
In 1996, Closen explained that the public were very unclear about the infectivity 
of HIV and subsequently both Shaw (2008) and Croser (2006) emphasised that 
there remained, a strong, public perception that it is an easily acquired 
infection. Byers (1993) stated that fear of HIV will not dissipate until a cure or 
vaccine is discovered whilst Shaw (2008) stated that it was “natural for people 
to be afraid of catching HIV” but reminded readers that the public’s fears 
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surrounding transmission were not in line with scientific evidence, suggesting 
decisions should not be based upon predicted anxiety. 
 
Dudzinski et al (2010) emphasised that they did not consider “temporary 
anxiety” “a significant argument against disclosure” and Canadian courts argued 
that the stress caused by notification is not as severe as that associated with a 
psychiatric illness (Hébert 2015). Although current evidence suggests that 
patient anxiety associated with notification is generally not extreme, there is 
evidence which suggests a small number of patients will suffer significant 
anxiety that may continue even beyond receipt of a negative BBV result 
(Dudzinski et al 2010). This concept is supported by Blatchford et al (2000) who 
reported that one patient out of 46 still felt anxious after receiving their 
negative blood test results and by Taylor (1992) who outlined that two out of 47 
patients requested private counselling following PNE involvement. Finally, it is 
worth noting that a large number do often go on to sue the institution or dental 
HCW involved for the emotional distress caused (McDonald 2016). 
 
Many authors outlined the ways in which anxiety caused by notification might be 
reduced through the manner in which it is conducted and the language used 
(Pinching 2000). Gaudoin et al (2000) recommended use of the term ‘pre-test 
discussion’ in place of counselling as they felt the latter term may cause more 
alarm. The impact of how the message is communicated has also been 
considered. Following a 1991 notification exercise in Manchester the High Court 
ruled that a letter was an inappropriate way in which to notify patients as it 
would cause more alarm than a face-to-face discussion, but this verdict was 
reversed on appeal (Pinching 2000; Blatchford et al 2000). 
4.4.2.4.2 Negative: resource and opportunity costs 
 
Dickenson et al (1993) and Mason et al (2008) outlined that the benefits of PNEs 
may be outweighed by their extensive costs. SHEA (1992) stated that 
unnecessary PNEs waste resources whilst Longfield et al (1994) explained that 
the decision to notify may be influenced by the availability of resources deemed 
necessary to conduct the exercise.  
Only six published papers provided PNE cost estimations (Conrad et al 2011; 
Close et al 2013; Longfield et al 1994; Irwin and Millership 2002; Molinari and 
Nelson 2014; Robinson and Challacombe 1993). Molinari and Nelson (2014) 
reported that the Tulsa case of 2013 had cost over 1 million dollars whilst 
Robinson and Challacombe (1993) stated that the four year investigation 
surrounding the Acer case had cost approximately four million dollars. Irwin and 
Millership (2002) stated that their exercise cost “in excess of £300,000”. 
Longfield et al (1994) were more specific, outlining costs of $45,200 and 
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presenting a list of what was paid for, although, they did not outline the actual 
cost of each specific aspect and explained that their estimation did not include 
salary costs for 49 staff members.  
Two dental incident papers reviewed specifically focused on financial cost 
(Conrad et al 2011; Close et al 2013). In 2011, Conrad et al retrospectively 
calculated costs following a limited PNE. Each IMT member was provided with a 
questionnaire asking them to estimate the time they had dedicated to the 
exercise (Conrad et al 2011). Costs were calculated in terms of patients notified 
and patients tested and they compared these values to those of other exercises 
(Conrad et al 2011). They concluded that PNEs have high baseline costs and do 
not appear to be heavily dependent on number of patients involved (Conrad et al 
2011). They explained that a dental PNE in Essex resulted in a cost of £80 per 
person notified out of 3825 patients compared to £1,562.47 per patient in their 
exercise, which involved the notification of 60 people. Conrad et al (2011) also 
concluded that the highest costs were associated with senior staff wages 
followed by legal advice and set-up/operation of the helpline. 
In 2013, Close et al similarly found that staff costs were the most significant 
expenditure, accounting for 68.2% of their total estimated costs of £311,513.78. 
Unfortunately, the cost breakdown by Close et al (2013) was not as detailed as 
that presented by Conrad et al (2011), with simpler categories of ‘staff costs’, 
‘laboratory costs’ and ‘other costs’. Limitations of the study by Conrad et al 
(2011) included issues with recall (IMT members were questioned over a year 
after the first IMT meeting) and accuracy of staff wage costs, as pay scales were 
used to estimate these. Calculations by Close et al (2013) may be more accurate 
as data concerning staff time was accrued on a monthly basis. An additional 
aspect to Close et al’s study (2013) was the consideration of costs incurred by 
patients who attended for testing, such as those related to travel and childcare, 
although not time off work.  
It is not surprising that the papers reviewed identified staff costs as a major part 
of the overall costs associated with PNEs given that they require a significant 
amount of staff time. In Irwin and Millership’s 2002 paper they explained that 
36,000 records had to be examined in order to identify 5929 patients at risk. 
Extra staff, including IT consultants, had to be hired to create and manage both 
a new patient database and programme for handling calls and testing 
appointment requests, requiring 2020 hours of programming time (Irwin and 
Millership 2002). 
While many authors considered the importance of opportunity costs, in the 
existing challenging fiscal environment for NHS health care (Croser 2006; Conrad 
et al 2011) none of the publications reviewed, presented data on the costs of 
diverting time and resources away from other potential healthcare projects. 
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Irwin and Millership (2002) postulated that this may be due to the predicted 
complexity involved in such a calculation.  
Authors such as Green (1992) and Chamberland and Bell (1992) suggested that 
money could be better spent on prevention of the common BBV transmission 
routes such as sexual contact and IVDU. Shaw (2008), Dickenson et al (1993) and 
Close et al (2013) took the concept of amended funding allocation further by 
suggesting specific avenues of investment. Shaw (2008) suggested that more 
money should be spent on educating the public about low BBV transmission risks 
in healthcare whilst Close et al (2013) theorised that if diagnoses are found 
during PNEs, an alternative form of targeted BBV screening may be appropriate. 
Finally, Dickenson et al (1993) suggested that money should be put into assessing 
dental HCW adherence to infection control standards thus potentially preventing 
incidents from occurring in the first place. Even when healthcare is considered 
as a whole, Hébert (2015) pointed out that BBV transmission due to poor 
infection control is rare and from a numerical perspective is less significant than 
other healthcare lapses such as surgical, prescribing, diagnosis or communication 
errors. 
4.4.2.4.3 Negatives: reputational effects to the dental HCW and/or practice  
The experience of the infected HCW, specifically maintenance of their 
confidentiality, during and following a PNE, is the main focus of many articles 
(Byers 1993; Taylor 1992; Christianson et al 1993; Dental Protection Ltd. 2002; 
Weinstein and Keyes 1991; Comer et al 1991; Heuer 1992; Cottone et al 1992). 
 
Unique features of the HCW or practice involved may complicate efforts to 
maintain confidentiality. For example, Byers (1993) explained that an 
investigation connected to a prison dentist resulted in breach of confidentiality 
as there was only one dentist working at the prison in question.  
Longfield et al (1994) demonstrated, through the management of their incident, 
that an infected HCW’s identity can remain unknown to the public if careful 
steps are taken during notification. Authors such as Irwin and Millership (2002) 
and Arnow et al (1993) explained how they avoided breach of the HCW’s 
confidentiality through the preparation of legal injunctions and ensuring as many 
staff involved in handling calls or booking appointments remained unaware of 
the HCW’s identity. Arnow et al (1993) also suggested that if a different 
institution to the one involved in the incident can manage the PNE, this will 
further protect the confidentialities of those involved.  
Numerous authors outlined that should it become common for dental HCWs and 
practices to be subject to a plethora of negative consequences, following 
investigation of their infection or incident, they may be less likely to come 
forward with BBV infection related issues (Closen 1996; Christianson et al 1993; 
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Irwin and Millership 2002; Chiodo and Tolle 1992). As a result, not only could 
exposed patients remain un-investigated but infected HCWs would not receive 
appropriate management of their infection leading to deterioration of their 
condition and risks of onward transmission (Chiodo and Tolle 1992; Sampson 
1991; Pinching 2000). 
Authors also suggested that following a PNE, damage to the dentist’s reputation 
may result in a reduction in patient numbers and loss of business (Green 1992; 
Croser 2006; Closen 1996; Christianson et al 1993). This may be an intuitive 
outcome of notification but there is very little evidence to support this concept. 
Wagner et al (2015) examined uptake of testing as well as use of general and 
dental treatment services at five Veterans Health Administration facilities 
following six PNEs, two of which were dentally related. Unfortunately Wagner et 
al (2015) did not have access to information regarding the individual patients 
who were involved in each PNE, therefore they could only examine total 
numbers of patients treated before and after the notification periods. At 12 
months post-incident there had been a decline in patients returning for 
treatment but rates rebounded to normal levels by 18 months (Wagner et al 
2015). Unfortunately they did not present information on the amount by which 
return rates had initially dropped (Wagner et al 2015). Taylor (1992) similarly 
reported a limited effect on their dental school patient base following their PNE. 
However, this may have been because patients were aware that the HIV-infected 
student was no longer delivering treatment (Taylor 1992).  
In 1995, Thorogood described a survey in which members of the public were 
questioned about how they might react should they discover their dentist was 
infected with HIV. Thorogood (1995) stated that people have ‘public’ and 
‘private’ responses (Thorogood 1995). The ‘public’ response is theorised to be 
more reasonable in nature, where being comfortable with treatment from an 
infected HCW is the ‘correct’ response (Thorogood 1995). Qualifying remarks, 
however, such as “it depends on how well I knew the dentist” or “assuming they 
take precautions” reveal that the participant does not want to appear naïve to 
the dangers of transmission (Thorogood 1995). The concept of ‘public’ and 
‘private’ feelings being in conflict is aptly shown through a participant’s 
response to the question of whether they would remain in an infected dentist’s 
care: “I want to say yes, but it has to be no” (Thorogood 1995). Other studies 
clearly demonstrate that participants would leave the care of an infected 
dentist. For example, Christianson et al (1993) quote a study which revealed 
that only 32.5% of patients would remain with their dentist if they discovered 
they were infected. 
4.4.2.4.4 Negatives: reputational effects on dentistry 
Some authors postulated that following involvement in a PNE, patients may not 
only fail to return for dental treatment at the implicated practice, but avoid 
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utilising all dental services (Horowitz 1994ᵃ; Hébert 2015). This would mean that 
notification could lead to a decline in the dental health of the local area. Croser 
(2006) and Blatchford et al (2000) state that PNEs destroy the trust between 
patients and the dental profession whilst Close et al (2013) took this further by 
stating that confidence in the entire medical profession may be lost. 
 
As with other perceived negative PNE consequences, a decreased uptake of 
general dental treatment is postulated by many authors, without much 
evidentiary support. Horowitz (1994ᵇ) suggested that the Acer case caused a 
reduction in dental attendance but provides no supporting evidence for this 
statement. Following the Acer case, Gerbert et al (1991) surveyed 168 dentists 
of whom only 2% reported that some of their patients had given the Acer case as 
a reason for cancelling their appointments, though 45% had wanted to talk about 
the case. Gerbert et al (1991) reported that the ADA had concerns that “patients 
may avoid the dentist due to a freak accident (the Acer case) that is not well 
understood” and that media headlines of the time read “many dental 
appointments cancelled after HIV report” and “medicine tries to calm fears over 
dental HIV spread report”.  
4.4.2.4.5 Negatives: reputational effects on those managing the incident 
Reputational consequences to those managing the incident were exclusively 
discussed in US articles (Dudzinski et al 2010), particularly those involving dental 
schools (Pashley et al 1991; Taylor 1992; Heuer 1992) or the VA (Maguire et al 
2016ᵃ; Elwy et al 2014). In two separate studies, Maguire et al (2016ᵃ) and Elwy 
et al (2014) found that loss of trust was perceived to be the most significant cost 
of notification in VA facilities. Elwy et al (2014) did however highlight that VA 
employees may have a biased outlook as they may exclusively be exposed to 
patients who are very upset and whose complaints they cannot adequately 
respond to as there was a reported lack of knowledge transfer throughout the 
facility.  
Taylor (1992) and Maguire et al (2016ᵃ) discussed factors that could further 
increase the damage to an institution which included releasing information 
which at a later date has to be corrected or amended, result delays, poor letter 
content, negative media coverage and lack of detail regarding both what 
occurred and steps that have been taken to ensure it will not happen again. 
4.4.2.4.6 Negatives: legal vulnerability  
As mentioned earlier, patients may sue for the emotional distress caused by 
learning that they have been placed at risk of BBV infection and the consequent 
period of worry experienced whilst waiting for test results (Closen 1996; Hébert 
2015). Two conflicting ideas are presented in the literature regarding 
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notification and its legal consequences. Hébert (2015) and Dudzinski et al (2010) 
theorised that notifying patients creates an increased risk of litigation whereas 
Shaw (2008), SHEA (1992) and Chafe et al (2009) advised that notification can be 
conducted in an attempt to mitigate or reduce an institution’s legal vulnerability, 
since legal consequences may be more severe should patients subsequently 
discover they had not been notified.  
There is limited information in the literature regarding the legal outcomes of 
patients suing for the emotional distress of notification. Henderson et al (2017) 
reported that, according to news reports, more than 800 patients were suing the 
dentist associated with the infection control incident in Scotland, in 2013. In two 
other cases, 38 patients sued a HIV-infected dentist’s estate following his death 
in 1991 (‘The Delaware Care’) and six patients sued Northwestern University 
following patients being notified of an HIV-infected dental student (‘The 
Northwestern Case’) (Anon 1995ᵃ; Anon 1995ᵈ; Anon 1997ᵇ; Anon 1997ᶜ; Anon 
1998). Detailed information on the litigation aspects are available for both the 
American incidents and outlined in Table 34 below. 
Table 34: Two legal cases where patients sued BBV-infected dentists for the emotional distress 
caused by notification. 
The Delaware case:  
Patients were suing the HIV-infected dentist’s estate for alleged negligence, 
recklessness, battery, fraudulent misrepresentation and acting on false 
pretences. Patients’ claims of battery were denied as they could not provide 
evidence of physical harm (Anonymous 1995ᵃ; Anonymous 1995ᵈ). It was also 
stated that battery is not a suitable claim in a class action suit, as each plaintiff 
must specifically outline what unconsented, offensive touching occurred 
(Anonymous 1995ᵈ). Battery, within the medical setting usually refers to a 
different procedure being performed than the one the patient consented to 
(Anonymous 1995ᵈ). Plaintiffs were unsuccessful as no physical harm was 
incurred and fears deemed to be unreasonable. 
There were those who disagreed with ‘The Delaware case’ outcome and believed 
that patients’ fears were not unreasonable as the dentist was reported to have 
lesions on his arms, poor infection control standards and, after being advised to 
stop by a healthcare professional, continued practising (Anonymous 1995ᵈ; 
Anonymous 1995ᵃ; Anonymous 1997ᵃ). Justice Duffy stated that the risk was 
shown to be significant through the institution sending out notification letters 
(Anonymous 1995ᵈ). 
The Northwestern case:  
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Plaintiffs were suing for breach of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, battery, common law fraud, breach of contract, negligent 
malpractice and dental malpractice (Anon 1997ᵇ). 
Plaintiffs were unsuccessful initially as they could not prove that there was “a 
medically verifiable possibility of their becoming infected” (Anon 1997ᵇ; Anon 
1997ᶜ). Plaintiffs were also unsuccessful on appeal as they could not provide 
‘proof of actual exposure’ (Anon 1998). 
‘Proof of actual exposure’ is defined as the plaintiff’s ability to show that he or 
she actually came into contact with an infected person’s blood or bodily fluids 
(Anon 1998). It is also described as the need for a plaintiff to show that “HIV was 
present in an alleged disease transmitting agent and that a medically accepted 
channel of transmission existed” (Anon 1997ᵇ). The battery claim was rejected 
as consent was not absent. The claim for consumer fraud was also rejected as 
treatment at the dental school was not a commercial enterprise but an 
educational facility. Duties would only be considered breached by the student 
and school if actual harm had resulted. Emotional distress was not deemed to be 
severe enough to merit claims (Anon 1997ᵇ; Anon 1998). 
 
Authors make arguments for and against the legitimacy of claims by notified 
patients. Some say that the existence of the Acer transmissions makes fear of 
infection reasonable (Closen 1996) and that AIDS, specifically, is a disease 
dreaded and greatly feared by the public (Anon 1997ᵇ). Some, however, 
highlighted that the distress caused by notification is not comparable to a 
psychological illness (Hébert 2015) and that awarding damages for emotional 
distress sets a precedent of responding disproportionately to feelings that may 
be “trivial”, “temporary” or “faked” (Anon 1997ᵇ). This would result in a higher 
number of claims (Anon 1995ᵈ), leading to more pay outs, increased insurance 
costs and less funding available to those who actually become infected as a 
result of these incidents (Anon 1997ᵇ). Some stated that the fears arising from 
notification are often based on a public misconception of the transmissibility of 
HIV. Awarding claims may therefore encourage patients to remain uneducated 
about the true risks of transmission (Anon 1997ᶜ; Anon 1997ᵇ; Anon 1995ᵈ).  
 
Closen (2006) postulated that publicising large cases, where patients are 
awarded monetary compensation, will make other dentists more reluctant to 
breach standards or put patients at risk (Closen 1996). However, in conflict with 
this concept is the idea that severe legal consequences will discourage 
institutions from notifying patients (Anonymous 1997ᵇ; Anonymous 1997ᶜ). 
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4.4.2.5 Standards and expectations based on governing bodies, public 
opinion and actions of peers 
4.4.2.5.1 Standards: perceived public opinion regarding incident and response 
Members of the public value transparency (Chiodo and Tolle 1992) and have a 
strong desire to be notified following transmission risk incidents (Wagner et al 
2015). 
 
In 1992, Cohen et al assessed changes in public concern regarding dental HIV 
transmission, after investigation of the Acer case. Patients showed a strong 
desire to be notified, with 84.5% of 968 participants wishing to be told if their 
dentist were infected with HIV (Cohen et al 1992). In 1995, approximately 96% of 
130 patients who called a PNE helpline, following being notified of a HIV-
infected HCW, felt they had a right to be told of the incident (Monteith et al 
1995). Later, in 2000, Blatchford et al sent questionnaires out to patients who 
had been notified of an HBV-infected dentist. Their results revealed that 93% of 
291 participants felt patients should always be told (Blatchford et al 2000). 
Finally, in 2014 Elwy et al interviewed 27 patients who had been involved in a 
variety of PNEs, all of whom explained that although initially distressing, the VA 
followed the right course of action in notifying them of the incident (Elwy et al 
2014).  
 
Pinching (2000) described the existence of a ‘blame culture’ in which someone 
always needs to be found responsible for mistakes and that generally, the public 
do not trust those in professional roles. Some authors acknowledged that 
patients may be concerned about healthcare professionals choosing a 
paternalistic course of action which reflects historical medical practice (Closen 
1996). To address this, several authors cited avoiding paternalism, as a reason to 
notify (Blatchford et al 2000; Breo 1993; Henderson et al 2017; and Chiodo and 
Tolle 1992). Hébert (2015) suggested that even following notification, patients 
may remain sceptical and question whether disclosure is being conducted to 
promote patient safety or mitigate legal vulnerability. Maguire et al (2016ᵇ) in 
their analysis of historical press reports, identified that the media may fuel 
scepticism by frequently reporting that managing organisations were being 
secretive or hiding the truth, especially if notification had been conducted more 
than 75 days post-incident. 
4.4.2.5.2 Standards: medical ethics, norms and values 
Authors referred to widely acknowledged medical standards and ethical concepts 
such as patient autonomy (Iheukwumere 1997), non-maleficence (Blatchford et 
al 2000), professional duty of care (Conrad et al 2011; Hancocks 2008) 
transparency (Maguire et al 2016ᵃ) and a commitment to always putting patients 
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first (Weaver 2014). Hébert (2015) emphasised that the ethics concerning 
disclosure of errors to single patients are clear but become much more nuanced 
and complex if an incident involves many patients.  
 
Dudzinski et al (2010) outlined both the duty-based and utilitarian ethical 
schools of thought. A duty-based approach requires fulfilment of one’s pre-
established duties no matter what the consequences. A utilitarian approach 
involves ascertaining which course of action would result in both minimal harm 
and maximum benefit for those involved (Dudzinski et al 2010). They argued that 
both approaches support disclosure but that the utilitarian theory is more easily 
challenged in a large-scale patient disclosure case (Dudzinski et al 2010). The 
authors concluded that disclosure should be the norm unless a strong, ethically 
based case can be made against it (Dudzinski et al 2010).  
 
Some authors referred to general strategies used within medicine to determine 
the amount of information that patients need to know. Shaw (2008) explained 
that, in surgery, the most common and serious risks are disclosed. Chiodo and 
Tolle (1992) explained that disclosure of every risk is highly impractical and 
unnecessary, citing that a risk equal to or more likely than 1 in 10,000 was a 
common threshold used for surgical risk disclosure. Iheukwumere (1997), 
however, explained that surgical risk should not be based on a numerical 
estimation but whether it is deemed to be material to either the HCW or the 
patient. Basing the decision on the patient’s idea of a material risk is less 
paternalistic and referred to as the ‘reasonable patient standard’ (Closen 1996).  
 
Although not an ethical concept, a norm outlined in the literature was ‘erring on 
the side of caution’ when risks were uncertain (Iheukwumere 1997), with health 
service managers often being described as ‘risk averse’ (Pinching 2000). 
Calculations of risk were always done with a margin of safety (Millership et al 
2007) as was the case in the exercise described by Henderson et al (2017) where 
notification was triggered by allegations that could not be refuted and were thus 
assumed to be true. 
4.4.2.5.3 Standards: guidance and/or policy 
No official decision-making or risk assessment tool is available to UK IMT 
members when deciding whether patients should be notified following a dental 
infection control incident. Maguire et al (2016ᵃ), Chafe et al (2009) and 
Dudzinski et al (2010) highlighted that guidance on notification following a 
localised incident, affecting one patient, is clear and available but is limited in 
relation to large-scale disclosure. Closen (1996) stated that the CDC’s policy of 
investigating incidents on a “case by case” basis, a stance shared by UKAP, 
results in varied IMT responses. Dudzinski et al (2010) suggested that if harm has 
occurred, disclosure is clearly warranted whereas guidance on ‘near miss’ 
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incidents is unclear. Although authors called for the creation of guidance 
(Henderson et al 2017; Millership et al 2007), Mason et al (2008) cautioned that 
this is an area “where judgement […] rather than merely the application of rules 
and regulations” may be required. 
A small number of authors reported that adherence to guidance and/or policy 
influenced their decision to notify (Appendix 18). When discussing VA facility 
incidents, Hébert (2015), Elwy et al (2014) and Maguire et al (2016ᵃ) all reported 
that the organisation possessed very clear policies, such as VHA directive 2008-
02, which favour disclosure of incidents to patients, even if patient harm is not 
obvious, severe or yet present. VHA decision makers are guided by both ethical 
considerations and a suggested numerical threshold for notification: “when 1 
patient or more of 10,000 patients is expected to have a short-term or long-term 
health effect that would require treatment or cause serious illness if untreated” 
(Dudzinski et al 2010). Dudzinski et al (2010) and Hébert (2015), however, 
pointed out that this threshold may be difficult to utilise in practice as 
investigators are often unaware of the number of patients who have been 
harmed until after notification and testing have occurred.   
As UKAP only provides advice concerning infected HCWs (UKAP 2019), most UK 
investigative teams turned to groups of experts or public health organisations 
such as Health Protection Scotland (in Scotland) or the Health Protection Agency 
(HPA) (in England and Wales) following infection control incidents. 
4.4.2.5.4 Standards: expert panels, organisations and/or peers 
Many IMTs made their decision on patient notification following consultation 
with experts and/or appropriate organisations. American investigators often took 
advice from the CDC and the ADA (Cottone et al 1992; Jacob 1991; Comer et al 
1991). In the UK, when investigating an infected dental HCW, advice from UKAP 
(or EAGA in the days before UKAP was established) was always reported to be 
sought by the IMT (Gaudoin et al 2000; Irwin and Millership 2002; Mason et al 
2008). Martin (2006) highlighted that once received, UKAP’s advice is 
“considered mandatory by most”. In regards to a dental infection control 
incident English and Welsh IMTs occasionally took advice from the HPA (Conrad 
et al 2011; Close et al 2013). There were also reports of UKAP being consulted 
following infection control incidents where dental HCWs were practising illegally, 
suggesting that they occasionally give advice slightly outwith their remit 
(Unpublished report 2007).   
Although only a small number of authors reporting an incident specifically 
mentioned being guided by how incidents had been managed in the past 
(Cottone et al 1992; Heuer 1992; Millership et al 2007), 11 of the 20 published 
incident articles provided details of other dental investigations. This suggests 
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that even if not specifically outlined, the majority of teams (61%) are probably 
influenced, to some degree, by what others have done in the past.  
 
SHEA (1992) outlined an additional way in which the historical incident literature 
might influence decision makers. They stated that frequent publication of 
articles related to those incidents which resulted in notification, over those that 
did not, gives the impression that a PNE is, or should be, the standard response 
(SHEA 1992). Of 56 articles published in relation to a specific incident between 
1990 and 2017 only five per cent focused on incidents that did not trigger 
notification (Condon 2008; York and Arthur 1993; Millership et al 2007). 
4.4.2.6 Perceived complexity 
4.4.2.6.1 Perceived complexity: predicted efficacy of PNE 
Both Dudzinski et al (2010) and Chafe et al (2009) emphasised that incident 
management is filled with challenges, which extend far beyond the initial aim of 
ascertaining who is at risk. Whilst the literature indicates that a greater 
perceived complexity associated with incident management does not influence 
the decision to notify there is some evidence that suggests that if the logistics of 
notification appear simpler, the team may be more inclined to pursue 
notification. The perceived ease of conducting a PNE may be influenced by: the 
involvement of only a small number of ‘at risk’ patients (Taylor 1992; Cheng et 
al 2013), patient data being easy to access and/or of high quality (Dickenson et 
al 1993; Heuer 1992; Longfield et al 1994) or the time period for which patients 
were placed at risk being clearly defined (Longfield et al 1994).  
 
Authors reported that missing or incomplete patient records represented a 
barrier to patient notification (Henderson et al 2017; CDC 2019ᵃ; Radcliffe et al 
2013; Merchant 2014; Hanley 2013). Reasons behind IMT’s being unable to locate 
and utilise patient details included: general poor record keeping (Merchant 2014), 
the number of patients who regularly join and leave dental practices (Irwin and 
Millership 2002), failure of patients to register with GPs (Irwin and Millership 
2002), patient records not having an accompanying NHS number (Irwin and 
Millership 2002) and, in one case, destruction of patient records by the dental 
HCW (Roy et al 2005). Specifically, authors reported that most often it was very 
difficult to ascertain what types of procedure patients had undergone 
(Chamberland and Bell 1992; Irwin and Millership 2002; Weller 1999). In Roy et 
al’s incident, information was only available on when patient treatment plans 
started and ended, based on centralised, payment information, with no specific 
details on the procedures conducted (2005).  
 
Irwin and Millership (2002) explained that those managing incidents often must 
obtain permissions from the HCW or involved dental practice to access them. 
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This issue was encountered by Roy et al (2005) who were unable to obtain 
details from legal investigators regarding the specific way in which instruments 
were deemed to be ‘unsterile’ following a dentist’s admission of their use in 
court. 
 
Patient records are not the only forms of information that may be unavailable to 
IMTs. In both the Acer and West Virginia cases investigators could not observe or 
record the quality of infection control practices, as the clinics were no longer 
providing patient care (Chamberland and Bell 1992; Radcliffe et al 2013). 
 
Once attempts have been made to notify all ‘at risk’ patients, the ability to 
detect transmission is further inhibited by limited testing uptake (Jaffe and 
Liberti 1995). Testing is rarely conducted for more than 50% of notified patients 
(Henderson et al 2017; Gaudoin et al 2000; Close et al 2013; Jaffe et al 1994). 
Irwin and Millership (2002) pointed out that once extensive resources are 
dedicated to conducting a PNE, concentrated efforts must be made to test as 
many of those ‘at risk’ as possible whilst Weller (1999) explained that poor 
testing uptake results in an underestimation of risk associated with these 
incidents.  
 
A potential connection between wording of the notification letter and testing 
uptake was reported by Close et al (2013). Exposed patients from two separate 
districts were notified of an infection control breach, with different letters 
being sent to each area resulting in uptake percentages of 21% and 53% (Close et 
al 2013). Henderson et al (2017), who had to repeat their PNE, reported that no 
patients, of 5100 contacted in the first exercise, requested testing whereas in 
the second round (following alterations to the letter which now advised testing), 
uptake was 44%.  
 
Dickenson et al (1993) suggested that low testing rates may be due, in part, to 
elderly or physically impaired patients being unable to make the trip to the 
testing clinic, though Longfield et al (1994) showed no relationship between age 
and testing uptake.  
 
Wagner et al (2015) found that African Americans were significantly less likely to 
return for testing (OR of 0.74 for HCV, 0.46 for HIV and 0.66 for HBV) compared 
to white patients. Hébert (2015) postulated that this difference may reflect a 
lack of trust in the healthcare system or perceived lack of access to it.  
 
In addition to the potential effects of age and race, Longfield et al (1994) 
showed that methods of notification may have an effect on testing uptake. 
Patients notified by letter were 11 times more likely to come forward for testing 
than those who had been notified in another way (Longfield et al 1994). Testing 
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uptake was also positively associated with a history of more and/or recent 
dental visits (Longfield et al 1994). 
 
PNEs primarily aim to identify transmissions that may have occurred as a result 
of an incident but they are rarely discovered (Shaw 2008; Croser 2006). 
Millership et al (2007) emphasised that the costs of notification must be 
balanced against the likelihood of detecting transmissions. In fact, no patient-to-
patient transmission has ever been identified in the UK following a dental 
incident.  
 
Millership et al (2007) likened the process of identifying transmissions to 
searching “for a needle in a haystack”. Infected patients may not present 
themselves for testing as they do not consider themselves to be infected, with 
symptoms often being absent or mild (Radcliffe et al 2013). Furthermore, to 
prove transmission has occurred, the viral genetic sequences of two infected 
individuals need to be compared (Millership et al 2007). Millership et al (2007) 
presented risk assessment calculations for three incidents that they decided did 
not merit notification. They predicted the probability of detecting one 
transmission pair in eight different scenarios (Millership et al 2007). These 
scenarios reflected differences in number of patients seen each day, length of 
time patients were at risk and testing uptake (Millership et al 2007). They 
estimated that in all scenarios the chance of detecting a transmission pair was 
less than 1.00 (Millership et al 2007).  
 
Even if infections are identified, linking them to the incident can be challenging. 
Samples often cannot be obtained for all infected patients, restricting the 
comparison of viral genetic sequences (Jaffe et al 1994; Mason et al 2008). Also, 
for those who show evidence of past BBV infection, genotyping or sequencing 
cannot be performed as viral particles are no longer present in the bloodstream 
(Mason et al 2008). Radcliffe et al (2013), in their investigation, described how 
low viral titres meant that only partial or limited genetic sequencing could be 
conducted.  
 
Even following genetic sequencing, the concept of a proven transmission can 
remain under debate. Identification of transmission relies on the presence of a 
strong relationship between genetic sequences, backed up by convincing, 
epidemiological evidence (Cleveland et al 2016). Viruses mutate over time so if a 
long period of time has passed since the incident, sequences can be harder to 
link (Radcliffe et al 2013). Debate over sequencing conclusions can most clearly 
be seen in relation to the Acer case. Here, sequences were examined many 
times by multiple research teams using differing methods and local controls 
(Crandall 1995).  
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One of the aims of notification is to provide patients with “an accurate 
description of the risk” to which they have been exposed (Maguire et al 2016ᵃ). 
Risk communication can be very challenging (Wagner et al 2015). Chiodo and 
Tolle (1992) explained that “accepting risks in life can be purely subjective and 
logically inconsistent”. Breo (1993) proposed that if HIV is mentioned, patients 
become solely focused on their fear of contracting AIDS, blinding them to all 
other messages. Both Gaudoin et al (2000) and Closen (1996) highlighted the 
contradiction in attempting to communicate low levels of risk when it is evident 
that the risk clearly merited notifying the patient.  
 
Elwy et al (2014) showed that patients preferred notification via telephone 
whilst Dudzinski et al (2010) suggested a compromise; notifying those at higher 
risk of infection verbally and using a letter for those at lower risk. This 
represents a balance between the economically prudent process of sending a 
letter and the personable, but resource intensive, action of speaking face-to-
face (Elwy et al 2014).  
4.4.2.6.2 Perceived complexity: Media influence and local area knowledge of an 
incident pre-PNE 
Local residents may already have some knowledge that an incident has occurred. 
This may arise through discussion within the community (SHEA 1992), news 
reports (Maguire et al 2016ᵇ) or the release of information related to GDC fitness 
to practice hearings (Henderson et al 2017). Many investigators cited the 
importance of notifying patients before any media leaks (Wagner et al 2015; 
Maguire et al 2016ᵇ; Irwin and Millership 2002). The media were portrayed in a 
negative light and described as being a highly inappropriate vehicle for 
disseminating information about an incident. Pinching (2000) explained that the 
media can “fuel anxiety with misinformation” and a Dental Protection report 
(2002) outlined that the media take a “scare mongering approach, rather than a 
reasoned, scientific based consideration of all the facts”. This approach by the 
media was reflected in headlines that were published following the 2014 
Ayrshire and Arran incident eg: “Dentist who sparked HIV scare for 6,000 
patients and infected four with Hepatitis C by using dirty equipment” (Davies et 
al 2016). Note the mention of HIV as the media are aware of the public’s 
disproportionate but heightened fear of this infection (Henderson et al 2017). 
Furthermore, the statement that four patients contracted HCV as a result of 
their treatment is incorrect (Henderson et al 2017).  
 
Some authors argued that when conducting patient notification, media 
involvement is unavoidable (Dudzinski et al 2010) although Conrad et al (2011) 
reported that their incident generated no media interest and both Taylor (1992) 
and Heuer (1992) explained that bigger, contemporary and unrelated media 
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headlines may mean an incident story goes unnoticed. Fitzgerald et al (2010) 
emphasised that a quick response with rapid testing of exposed patients causes a 
swift reduction in press coverage.  
 
In light of the media’s strong influence authors recommended early 
establishment of a proactive, positive relationship with the press (Maguire et al 
2016ᵃ; Elwy et al 2014; Comer et al 1991; Gaudoin et al 2000). Taylor et al (1992) 
demonstrated an excellent level of preparedness in relation to media 
communications associated with their incident. They approached a reporter with 
whom they had a good relationship and provided their own video footage of 
clinics and sound bites for use in reports.  
In 2016ᵇ, Maguire et al conducted a study to assess how VA incidents were 
described and presented in the media by reviewing and analysing historic reports. 
Their main aim was to establish if the messages that the VA organisation wanted 
to disseminate were being relayed by the media (Maguire et al 2016ᵇ). Maguire 
et al (2016ᵇ) found that the media often reported delays in response and testing 
whilst claiming that the VA were clearly not learning lessons from past incidents 
as breaches were recurring. Overall, however, 77% of 148 reports were 
reassuring and 76% described the cause of the incident but only 39% of reports 
encouraged patients to seek testing and 4.7% included elements of an apology 
(Maguire et al 2016ᵇ). 
Both Wagner et al (2015) and Jaffe et al (1994) suggested that media channels 
can be utilised to improve and amplify the notification process. Roy et al (2005) 
and Merchant (2014) described incidents where local media was used to reach 
out to those patients for whom contact details were unavailable.  Cohen et al 
(1992) however, suggested that the media may only be successful in reaching 
those who are more educated, older and white. 
4.4.2.7 Design of notification - can the process be amended to lessen the 
impact of negative consequences? 
In responding to the need for notification whilst acknowledging the costs of the 
exercise, a balance can be struck through adaptation of the process (Conrad et 
al 2011). Limited notification saves resources and reduces the number of 
patients who are made anxious (Weller 1999; Arnow et al 1993) whilst meeting 
the duty to disclose (Conrad et al 2011). It potentially limits reputational effects 
on the practice involved, as less people in the community are made aware of the 
incident and facilitates a faster response as there are fewer patients to notify 
(Arnow et al 1993). Weller, however, warned readers that notifying only those at 
risk could still create substantial media interest and result in large costs (Weller 
1999). 
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The most common limitation employed was reduction in numbers of patients 
notified based on risk or ease of contact. In the incident reported by Henderson 
et al (2017) only those patients currently registered with the practice were 
notified and Dickenson et al (1994) only contacted patients who were identified 
as residing in the local area. In some cases patients were only notified if they 
were treated shortly after a potential source patient (Redd et al 2007; Conrad et 
al 2011) whilst others were notified based on the procedures they had undergone 
(Fitzgerald et al 2010; Cottone et al 1992; Arnow et al 1993). In one incident, 
the CDC advised that the patients of an HIV-infected dentist need only be 
notified if they were treated during a two week period when he had dyshidrosis 
(blisters on his hands) or if the dentist had incurred a sharps injury during their 
procedure (Byers 1993).  
Close et al (2013) explained that a single attempt to notify patients was 
acceptable if the risk was low whilst Weller (1999) suggested that all patients 
who underwent an EPP should be notified but for those deemed to be at higher 
risk, BBV testing should be specifically encouraged.  
The greatest deviation from a conventional PNE was described by York and 
Arthur (1993). Their investigation, following the discovery of three HIV-positive 
navy dentists, involved no patient involvement or testing beyond that which all 
navy personnel received routinely (York and Arthur 1993). Regular testing of 
navy personnel meant records could be thoroughly examined as part of the 
investigation (York and Arthur 1993). Patients who had received a negative HIV 
test before dental treatment and a positive one after, were investigated (York 
and Arthur 1993). All patients in this group had other risk factors for their 
infection (York and Arthur 1993). The authors also indicated that if a 
transmission had been identified the investigation would have been extended 
(York and Arthur 1993).  
4.4.2.8 Feedback on PNE outcomes 
It is not easy to assess the true effectiveness of PNEs. Often the large number of 
patients involved limits the follow-up that can be done to ascertain whether 
everyone was successfully notified (Chafe et al 2009) or why some patients did 
not get tested (Hébert 2015). IMTs are often unaware of the true extent of the 
damage that has been caused by their PNE and some have questioned what 
methods are available to measure this (Wagner et al 2015). 
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4.4.3 Characteristics of the body of literature 
Scoping review studies seek not only to analyse and collate study findings but 
provide general information on the ways in which the research field is explored 
and presented through publication providing “a descriptive overview of the 
reviewed material” (Pham et al 2014). They present data on publication 
characteristics such as the focus or topic of papers identified, approaches or 
methodologies used, study types, countries of origin, and years in which papers 
were published (Colquhoun et al 2010; Brien et al 2010; O’Brien et al 2010). 
This section provides a general description of the body of literature regarding 
dental healthcare related BBV transmission and PNEs. Tables and charts 
alongside descriptive text outline the features of the published literature in this 
field. 
There were 105 journal articles identified in this review that addressed dental 
BBV transmission or large-scale patient notifications, The line graph in Figure 18 
shows that the number of journal articles published, peaked during 1993 and was 
in decline from the mid-1990s to early 2000s. In recent years, publication 
activity has been low with an average of two publications per year from 2000 to 
2017. 
Figure 18: Line graph with markers showing the numbers of articles that were published in 
journals, relating to dental BBV transmission or large-scale patient notification, from 1991-2017 
within a developed country setting. (7 articles were excluded as they were either erratums or news 
articles.) 
The large number of articles published between 1991 and 1995 can be linked to 
two prominent cases involving infected dental HCWs. Of the 52 journal articles 
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published between 1991 and 1995, 27% were related to the Acer case and 12% 
described the case of an infected dental student from the Medical College of 
Georgia. 
Figure 19: Pie chart showing the different information sources used to gather articles or reports 
on dental BBV transmission or large-scale patient notification. 
The majority of articles (n=98) were sourced from peer reviewed journals but as 
Figure 19 shows, a wealth of information was obtained from the website 
Dr.Bicuspid.com, an American dental news site run by an editorial board of 
dentists and dental specialists. It describes itself as a “free, member-driven 
website dedicated to general dentists, specialists, and other dental 
professionals” (Dr Bicuspid). 
From the early 1990s to the present day there has been a shift in the type of 
incidents being reported. There were 39 infected dental HCW articles published 
between 1990 and 1999 whereas only five were published from 2000-2017. In 
comparison, the number of articles describing infection control incidents has 
increased. There were none from 1990 to 1999 whereas nine were published 
between 2000 and 2017. The number of publications describing decisions made 
not to notify has remained consistently very small over the years (three in total 
between 1990 and 2017). 
Many of the papers identified were simply descriptive reports whilst others were 
opinion pieces discussing the merits of notification. Researchers would 
occasionally aim to explore a specific PNE phenomenon whilst investigating and 
reporting on their incident (Table 35). Of the seven articles which reported on a 
specific incident and had an additional focus, two involved an economic 
evaluation, three focused on the needs and issues of the infected HCW and two 
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looked at the relationship between types of procedures performed and infection 
rates, one of which used a nested case-control study approach. 
Table 35: Formats of journal articles that provided information on large-scale patient 
notification and/or dental healthcare related BBV transmission (n=105). 
Study Type 
Number of  
journal articles 
Editorial/opinion piece/letter 41 
Case report 18 
News article/update/Dental association news 10 
Review 8 
Case report with specific focus or additional study element 7 
Questionnaire study 6 
Legal case description 5 
Phylogenetic analysis study 3 
Interviews of stakeholders with thematic analysis of qualitative data 2 
Thematic analysis of media content 1 
Case-control study examining patient behaviours following notification 1 
Abstract 1 
Erratum 1 
Conference proceedings 1 
 
Table 36 shows that there is significant variability in the types of journals that 
publish articles regarding dental ‘BBV transmission risk’ incidents and the 
outcomes of their associated investigations. 
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Table 36: Number of articles which contained information on dental incident outcomes and the 
types of journal they were found within.  
Types of journals that contained articles which reported on dental incident 
outcomes/Dental ‘BBV transmission risk’ incidents (n=84/98*) 
Journal Type Number of articles 
Medical 18 
Dental 16 
Dental Association 13 
Dental Education 7 
Public Health 5 
HIV/AIDS, Infectious Disease 
Medical Ethics 
AIDS policy and law 
Infectious Disease/Public Health 
Law Review 
Lymphology 
Immunology 
Research 
Science 
Virology 
<5 
*7 Erratum and News articles excluded 
Table 37 outlines the terminology used in titles of journal articles which discuss 
the pros and cons of large-scale patient notification in the medical setting. 
Table 38 outlines the terms used in titles of papers which discussed dental ‘BBV 
transmission risk’ incidents. 
Table 37: Terms used in titles of journal articles which primarily discuss large-scale patient 
notification (n=13/98*) 
Title Term  
Number of article titles 
containing term 
Disclosure, Large-scale 5 
HIV, Notification, Disclosing 3 
Dental, Healthcare 2 
Infection control failure(s), Error, Transmission, Large-scale, 
Lookback, Look-back, Multiple, Honesty, Dentistry, Health 
care, Dentist(s), Surgery, Warn, Unsafe injections, Patients 
1 
*7 Erratum and News articles excluded 
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Table 38: Terms featured in the titles of journal articles and books which discuss/report on 
(potential) dental BBV transmission (n=85/100*) 
Term included in title 
Number of article 
titles containing 
term 
Percentage of 
articles/books 
containing 
term 
HIV OR AIDS OR Hepatitis OR Infection OR Virus 74 86% 
Dental OR Dentist(s) OR Dentistry 52 60% 
Transmission 21 24% 
Patient(s) 20 23% 
Worker(s) 11 13% 
“Health care” 10 12% 
Exercise, HIV-infected, HIV-positive, Case(s), Risk, 
Student, Investigation(s), Positive, Surgery, Infected, 
Health-care, Office, Failure, Failed, Infectious, 
Management, Look-back, Practice(s), Clinic, Ethics, 
Pathogen(s), Personnel, Incident, Told, School, Oral, 
Test(s), Testing, Public, Blood-borne, Clustered, 
Protection, “Right to know”, Professional(s), 
Transmitted, “Blood borne” , Invasive, Procedure(s), 
Provider(s), Surgeon, “Looking back”, Doctor(s), 
Healthcare, Practitioner, Sterilization, Instruments, 
Unsterilized, Equipment, Testing, Poor, Notifying, 
Status, Seropositive, Seroconversion, Patient-to-
patient, Medical, Contact, Messy, Alert(s), Violation, 
Ethical, Legal, Professional-to-patient, 
Announcement 
<10 <10% 
3 article titles did not contain any of the terms presented in this table, these included; ‘Above All Do no 
Harm’ (Merchant 2014), ‘Take a lesson from Tulsa’ (2013) and ‘Written Off’ (2006). 
*7 Erratum and News articles excluded 
 
Even though the literature review aimed to collate information from journal 
articles published in developed countries, the UK and US were the main two 
countries of origin for publications identified (Figure 20). 
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Figure 20: Pie chart presenting information on journal articles country of origin. (7 articles were 
excluded as they were either erratums or news articles.) 
4.5 Discussion 
4.5.1 What this study adds 
There are a small number of published papers and databases in which incident 
outcomes have been collated. These resources, if not outdated, are often 
limited in their breadth and tend to exclusively collate incidents that resulted in 
transmission, involved HIV-infected HCWs and/or occurred in the US (Cleveland 
et al 2016; Shields 1995; Chamberland and Bell 1992; Robert and Bell 1994; 
Samaranayake 1991; Ciesielski et al 1994; Younai 2010). 
This review was novel in its aim to source and report on all published, dental 
incident outcome papers from the developed world. It also represents the first 
study of its kind to attempt to collate information on all dental incidents 
managed within the UK, regardless of whether they led to publication or patient 
notification. 
A collation of incidents such as the one presented here gives stakeholders quick 
and easy access to the historical evidence base, allowing decisions to be made 
more quickly with confidence that their conclusions are based on past outcomes 
and experiences. 
This review reveals the positive and negative aspects of notification, the degree 
to which PNEs meet their intended aims, the factors which influence the 
decision to proceed to patient notification and some of the field’s research gaps. 
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4.5.2 Main findings 
4.5.2.1 Evidence to support the existence/significance of positive and 
negative PNE outcomes 
There is limited evidence to identify with certainty the positive and negative 
consequences of notification. The perceived existence of these consequences by 
decision makers is based on intuition and anecdotal evidence. For example, it is 
natural for one to assume that making the public aware of an incident will 
damage the reputations of the dentists and/or practices involved. However, 
there is only one published study which examines this phenomenon and its 
finding, that reputational effects may be limited and short term, may only be 
applicable to a large establishment such as a VHA facility (an environment not 
necessarily reflective of smaller, UK, high-street dental practices). Similarly the 
assumption that many patients will experience severe anxiety upon being 
notified of an incident is supported by evidence which is out-dated, limited and 
contradictory (Blatchford et al 2000; Pashley et al 1991; Montieth et al 1995; 
Taylor 1992). Certainly, no published evidence exists to support the idea that 
patients would avoid dental treatment following involvement in a PNE, yet this is 
a prudent and unsurprising concern of some decision makers.  
Damage to the reputation of those managing incidents was only discussed in 
American papers. This may be linked to the fact that management of US 
incidents is often handled by those who have, in part, been responsible for the 
breaches/errors as opposed to in the UK where incident management is handled 
by an external board/trust. It may also reflect the idea that healthcare in 
America is associated with financial gain. 
Financial costs associated with undertaking a PNE appear to be high and 
unpredictable. Their values do not correlate with numbers of patients ‘at risk’, 
numbers notified or numbers of BBVs tested for and only show a potential, weak 
correlation with patients tested. When costs are reported, which occurred only 
in 25% of incident reports, calculations are often missing key elements, 
presented in a vague manner or represent estimations with no standardised way 
to report them. Even when comparable cost categories are examined there 
appears to be high variability, suggesting that costs are dependent on many 
complex factors that are currently not understood. Using current data, decision 
makers would only be able to make a rough estimation of how much a PNE would 
cost.  
Until further research is conducted, especially regarding feedback from notified 
patients, many of the positive and negative outcomes of notification will be 
based on common sense, personal experience and expert opinion. 
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4.5.2.2 Influential factors 
Chafe et al (2009) stated that the difficulties associated with notification 
included “seeking legal advice, locating and contacting patients” and “not 
knowing all the facts” as well as “the real or perceived political pressure to limit 
communication or shift blame to specific people”. When discussing the decision 
to notify patients following unsafe injection practices, a CDC case study paper 
advised that “evidence, ethics and economics” should be considered (CDC 2019ᵃ). 
Absence of a correlation between breach type and progression to a PNE suggests 
that either other influential factors are at work or more likely that adequate 
evidence does not exist to support a decision based on breach type. Most likely 
it is a combination of the two. Basing the risk estimation on the nature of the 
breaches that have occurred may also be unwise as it is clear that risk of 
transmission is not always mitigated through good infection control as HBV 
patient-to-patient transmission occurred in a New Mexico oral surgery clinic 
where infection control standards were considered high (Redd et al 2007).  
Types of dental procedure performed did not appear to influence the decision to 
notify. This may be because, under historic BBV-infected HCW guidance, 
virtually all dental procedures were considered to be EPPs. It may also be 
related to the time that would be required to categorise patients or the poor 
quality of dental records which would not facilitate this process.  
Assessment of infection control and adherence to standards has always been an 
important consideration in incident investigation. However, recent cases, 
described by both Roy et al (2005) and Henderson et al (2017) highlighted the 
need to take a closer look at general integrity of the dentist or practice involved. 
Evidence shows that being uncooperative with investigators or additional charges 
of fraud could indicate more widespread or serious breaches.  
Limited conclusions could be drawn from historical ‘proven transmission’ events 
as they are rare, occurred a long time ago, lack contextual detail and/or are 
related to HBV, the most infectious BBV, thereby creating an exaggerated 
perception of risks involved. One must acknowledge that BBV transmission from 
a dental HCW to a patient has not occurred since 1990 (Ciesielski et al 1991). 
Before this time, HBV was the main virus of concern. In the modern dental 
setting, risks concerning BBV transmission from HCW-to-patient appear to have 
been mitigated through immunisation of HCWs and use of appropriate PPE. 
Patient-to-patient BBV transmission in the dental setting is more concerning as it 
has occurred recently (three times in the past 20 years) (Redd et al 2007; 
Radcliffe et al 2013; Oklahoma State Department of Health 2013). These cases of 
proven transmission unfortunately do not provide much insight into which 
breaches should be associated with the highest risks as their circumstances are 
varied with a significant degree of speculation as to their causes. The limited 
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conclusions that can be drawn suggest that incidents involving syringe reuse, 
multi-dose vials, extractions or oral surgery settings are most concerning. 
Historical incident outcomes support the concept that dental related BBV 
transmission rarely occurs and risks are low. Those BBV-infected patients 
identified are usually established as being incidental i.e. unlinked to an incident 
via genetic sequencing results or, more frequently, because they have 
alternative risk factors for their infection. Excluding incident-related 
transmission based on alternative risk factors should be conducted with caution 
as with thorough investigation, almost everyone could be established as having 
some form of BBV risk factor. One must therefore remember that transmission 
rates may not be as low as evidence suggests if a) not all ‘at risk’ patients are 
tested and b) patients are routinely excluded based solely on having alternative 
risk factors. 
It is unclear how much numerical risk estimations influenced the decision to 
notify patients. These estimations appeared to only be presented when 
notification was not done (Millership et al 2007; unpublished report 2014; 
unpublished report 2015) suggesting that they are used more often to support 
the decision that non-disclosure is suitable due to low risks rather than to 
specifically tip the decision towards or away from PNE implementation.  
Decision makers may wish to consider the predicted efficacy of their planned 
PNE. In regard to the capacity for PNEs to achieve their aims, it was comforting 
to see that IMTs were usually able to notify a large proportion of ‘at risk’ 
patients. Testing uptake, in contrast, was shown to vary greatly and often be 
less than 50%. Stakeholders highlighted, however, that low uptake may not 
reflect IMT failures. If the team believes the risks associated with the incident to 
be low and primarily wish to reassure patients rather than promote testing, low 
testing uptake may reflect a suitable outcome.  
4.5.2.3 Research gaps 
Both the literature review and stakeholder consultation phases of a scoping 
review study have the shared aim of highlighting research gaps in the field and 
making recommendations for future studies. This literature review certainly 
identified a plethora of research gaps within the evidence base. Authors 
highlighted the need to explore specific PNE factors such as the anxiety caused 
to patients (Hancocks 2008) or the financial and opportunity costs of the 
notification process (Mason et al 2008). 
The absence of suitable infection control PNE decision-making guidance is an 
issue encountered more frequently as infection control breaches are shown to 
account for an increasing proportion of dental incidents. Why is this the case? It 
seems highly unlikely that dentists’ standards of infection control are worsening. 
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It is more likely that detection of issues has improved or that as infection control 
standards have risen more dental practices are found to be in breach of 
regulations with previous, less stringent practices no longer being accepted.  
Not only are decision makers hampered by an absence of guidance but also an 
inability to ascertain what others have done in the past. A large proportion of UK 
incidents do not result in publication (87%). This value is also most likely an 
under estimation as many of the unpublished incidents were identified through 
contact with UKAP an organisation focused on management of infected HCWs. A 
lack of publication activity means that lessons learned and incident data are not 
disseminated to decision makers. Even when incidents were published there 
appeared to be no standardised way of reporting dental incidents and there 
were inconsistencies in both the amount and detail of information presented. 
There was great variability in the types of journal that featured articles on 
patient notification. 
Incident information was commonly presented either in a vague manner or not 
at all. The most likely information to be missing included the calculated risk of 
BBV transmission (missing in 82-93% of cases) and the cost of the exercise 
(missing in 74% of cases). The most common information to be presented in a 
vague format were data concerning the investigation of identified diagnoses. It 
was often very difficult to ascertain the steps that had been taken following 
diagnoses of patients to disprove or prove a link to the incident in question. 
Information regarding the total number of diagnoses found was usually present, 
however, information regarding whether diagnoses were new to the patients 
(28%), whether these newly diagnosed cases had alternative risk factors for 
infection (33%) and/or sequencing performed (40%) was often vague or 
presented in a complex manner. Creation of a standardised reporting framework 
would be helpful. The data extraction forms created for this doctoral project 
(described in section 4.3.3 and presented in Appendix 14) could serve this 
function.  
Those managing incidents also highlighted issues with both identifying and 
classifying ‘at risk’ patients using dental records. Irwin and Millership (2002) 
called for there to be a minimum level of patient information that must be 
recorded by dental practices as generally records examined in incident 
investigations were found to be poorly maintained and/or difficult to obtain at 
all. 
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4.5.3 Strengths 
This type of broad literature and evidence overview gives the reader access to 
an extensive summary of the subject area and allows researchers to see clearly 
both those studies that have been undertaken and the further research that is 
needed. A single resource which collates and describes a large proportion of 
dental incidents will benefit decision makers who do not have time to review all 
available evidence following discovery of an incident.  
 
A scoping review study strategy meant literature for this review was not limited 
by quality, source or publication status. This provides access to a larger volume 
of data with greater variability – an especially important factor when presenting 
data on a subject which has a low amount of high quality research. Although not 
a traditional systematic review, this study still utilised a systematic strategy 
facilitating replication of methods and increasing user confidence in the 
comprehensiveness of its results.  
4.5.4 Weaknesses 
All reviews have the common weakness of becoming instantly outdated once 
they are completed and published. However, one of the main weaknesses of this 
review was the inability to source further information in relation to 54% of 
incidents. This is thought to be due to a number of factors such as the low 
number of incidents that result in publication (14/108 UK incidents), the lack of 
a central repository or database where incident data are stored and, finally, the 
possibility that boards or trusts may have been reluctant to share incident 
reports or details with the CI, a relatively unknown contact. This final theory is 
supported by the fact that, based on UKAP data, there were many UK dental 
incidents for which boards and trusts would have had information but the 
majority of calls and email requests sent to all UK IMTs, for incident details, did 
not prompt a response. 
 
A large proportion of the reviewed literature was old (79% of 105 journal articles 
were published more than ten years ago), but this was simply the nature of the 
information available and was an issue that could not be mitigated. It may mean 
that some findings may be influenced by an older context and not necessarily 
applicable to the management of a modern incident. 
 
Both the meta and narrative synthesis of this review collate and present 
concepts together. However, caution should be exercised when drawing 
conclusions from these data as all incidents are managed within greatly varying 
contexts, for example the year, location or nature of incident. A significant 
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proportion of the incidents presented occurred in the 1990s (19%) and/or in the 
USA (24%). 
 
When interpreting the results readers should also be aware that key incident 
data within reports were often estimated, vague or missing. This means that not 
only should results again be interpreted with caution but also that high-level 
statistical analysis was neither feasible nor appropriate. 
4.5.5 Methodological choices 
A developed-country setting literature searching limitation was considered 
appropriate as population prevalence of BBV infection and dental infection 
control practices would be comparable to the UK and therefore any outcomes 
would be appropriate in influencing future UK guidance (Mahboobi et al 2013; 
Scully and Greenspan 2006). The limitation of ‘post 1990’ was chosen based on 
the concept that, before this time, infection control practices were more lax.  
Glove wearing, use of steam sterilisers and being immunised against HBV was not 
commonplace in the early to mid-eighties (Burke and Wilson 1989; Smith et al 
2007; Scully et al 1993). Gordon et al (2001)  conducted a systematic review 
which examined the changes in infection control practices throughout the 
developed world from 1980-1999. They explained that:  
“Since the mid-1980s, recommended measures such as the wearing of gloves, 
masks, and the autoclaving of handpieces have been reviewed regularly [...] In 
particular, the concept of universal infection control, whereby all patients are 
treated as potential carriers of pathogenic micro-organisms, has become 
accepted best practice.” (Gordon et al 2001)  
Scully and Greenspan (2006) highlighted that in 1982 HBV vaccination became 
available to HCWs and that from 1983 to 1992 there was a 74% increase in HCW 
vaccination. Upon consideration of the literature and expert advice, ‘post 1990’ 
was deemed to be a prudent time limitation as this represents the beginning of 
an era of enhanced infection control and greater understanding of BBV 
transmission risks. 
Often multiple sources were used to extract data related to incidents with 
certain facts or figures occasionally contradicting one another. The figure chosen 
to be presented was decided upon based firstly on the quality of the source (ie: 
a peer reviewed journal was considered to be a more reliable source than an 
online news update) and secondly on the frequency of its presentation in 
different sources. More than half (53%) of infection control incident reports or 
publications lacked sufficient detail concerning the breaches that had occurred. 
This meant that discerning the exact infection control or decontamination step 
or steps omitted was difficult and a degree of interpretation was needed. For 
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example, the phrase “use of unsterilised instruments on patients” intuitively 
indicated that instruments were not entered into any stage of the 
decontamination process before being used on a subsequent patient, but the 
statement is open to interpretation (Roy et al 2005). There was a plethora of 
issues when estimating, collating or presenting the financial costs of notification. 
Reports rarely outlined financial costs and when they did, great discrepancies 
could be found between their calculation and reporting styles.  A number of 
reports had categories such as ‘other costs’ which were ambiguous (Close et al 
2013). Some reports included staffing costs (Conrad et al 2011; Close et al 2013) 
whilst others did not (Longfield et al 1994) and the ways in which notification 
was achieved varied greatly from incident to incident.  
4.6 Conclusion 
Current evidence is clearly limited and it is difficult to ascertain the true impact 
of the different positive and negative PNE outcomes. Future research, however, 
does not need to explore every factor, only those which the literature shows will 
actually impact upon the decision to proceed to patient notification. These can 
be summarised as the risk of transmission, the anxiety caused to notified 
patients, the concept of transparency and resource allocation.  
 
No significant correlations were identified amongst incident features rendering 
prediction of future outcomes by IMTs difficult. Collation and comparison of 
incident data was challenging due to vague and/or inconsistent reporting as well 
as incidents being highly contextual.  
 
Although these issues are present and important to consider, guidance is needed, 
even if it is based on limited evidence. Those in the field must work with 
existing evidence and decision makers will benefit from the provision of a useful 
guide to complement their expert opinion. 
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Chapter 5. Mapping guidance and policy documentation in relation 
to dental ‘BBV transmission risk’ incidents and large-scale 
disclosure 
5.1 Introduction 
A policy mapping exercise, executed as part of a scoping review study, provides 
an opportunity to place stakeholder opinion and literature review data within a 
contemporary policy context (Anderson et al 2008). It has been defined as both a 
process which is “designed to identify the main documents and statements from 
government agencies and professional bodies that have a bearing on the nature 
of practice in that area” (Anderson et al 2008), and an exercise which “might 
have the objective of mapping how policy documents provide advice and 
guidance around” a specific subject (Peters et al 2017). 
To facilitate the design of an appropriate decision-making algorithm, mapping 
and analysis of dental PNE guidance was deemed essential. It was anticipated 
that inspiration for the content and design of the algorithm would almost 
certainly be drawn from the extant guidance. 
5.2 Aims 
i. To establish the amount, detail and focus of guidance that currently exists in 
the area of large-scale notification following medical incidents. 
ii. To aid in the creation of a decision-making algorithm10 by identifying any 
relevant guidance content or design that could be adapted for use. 
5.3 Methods 
Although a significant number of scoping review studies make reference to policy 
mapping few give specific detail regarding its execution. Keating et al (2006) 
simply listed the medical databases searched and terms used whilst Ross et al 
(2004) provided more detail on their identification of relevant documents and 
extension of their search to include the references of identified documents. Ross 
et al (2004) utilised a framework for thematic analysis of policy content and 
graded each piece of guidance based on its applicability to their study aims. 
                                                          
10 An algorithm which will guide the decision-making process of when to proceed to patient notification 
following a dental infection control incident. 
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5.3.1 Search strategy 
Using recommendations from experts, stakeholders, the Medical, Veterinary & 
Life Sciences (MVLS) College Librarian and University Public Health lecturers as 
well as the CIs personal knowledge and utilisation of the resource ‘Grey Matters’, 
102 websites were identified for searching (Appendix 19). Grey Matters is 
essentially a list of healthcare data websites and is described as a practical tool 
for searching health-related grey literature (CADTH 2015). A simple Google 
search was also conducted and reference lists of all source documents were 
scanned for further guidance of relevance. 
A systematic strategy was developed for searching the sites identified. Specific 
terms were consistently used within the search boxes of each website, to 
identify relevant guidance. This was followed up by a manual search of the site. 
Twenty four detailed terms were used and if low numbers of results were 
generated, eleven broader terms were used (Table 39). The Google search was 
conducted using not only the 24 detailed search terms but six additional terms 
(Table 39). 
A spreadsheet was used to record the search terms used, the sites searched, the 
dates they were searched, any documents found that appeared to fit the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria and any issues or problems encountered. 
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Table 39: Search terms used in 102 healthcare organisation websites to identify guidance 
documents related to the decision to conduct a dental PNE 
Detailed search terms Dental patient notification 
 Dentist patient notification 
 Dentistry patient notification 
 Oral surgery patient notification 
 Dental transmission 
 Dentistry transmission 
 Dentist transmission 
 Oral surgery transmission 
 Dental large scale adverse event 
 Dentist large scale adverse event 
 Dentistry large scale adverse event 
 Dental incident report 
 Dental look back exercise 
 Dentistry look back exercise 
 Dentist look back exercise 
 Dental patients notified 
 Poor dental infection control 
 Poor dental decontamination 
 Dirty dental instruments 
 Dental infection control breach 
 Poor dental cross infection control 
 HIV dentist 
 Hepatitis B dentist 
 Hepatitis C dentist 
Broad search terms Dentistry 
 Dentist 
 Dental 
 Blood borne virus 
 Transmission 
 Oral Surgery 
 Patient notification exercise 
 Look back exercise 
 Large scale adverse event 
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 Incident management 
 outbreak 
Extra terms used for 
Google search 
Public health incident management 
guidance 
 Patient notification exercise 
guidance 
 Look back exercise guidance 
 Dental BBV transmission 
 Dental patients at risk of HIV 
 Dental patients at risk of hepatitis 
 
5.3.2 Inclusion/exclusion criteria 
All guidance identified that met the following criteria was retained for further 
analysis: 
 
- It gave advice on how to grade/assess the risk associated with an infected 
HCW/infection control incident 
OR 
- It gave advice on when to notify patients following an infected HCW/infection 
control incident 
OR 
- It gave advice on the threshold for duty of candour/disclosure 
 
AND  
 
- It was published by a healthcare organisation or is a document reported to 
have been used by stakeholders in the assessment or management of a relevant 
incident 
AND 
- It applies to / was published in a developed country setting / context 
AND 
- Was published post 2000 
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Guidance was excluded if it: 
 
- Was published/written by authors rather than an organisation UNLESS directly 
used or recommended by a consultant/individual who has managed an incident 
- Featured no risk assessment or advice on notification and was not considered 
disclosure/candour guidance 
- Was a general document on adverse event/clinical incident management 
UNLESS it included risk assessment/grading/matrix 
- Was only applicable to a small, localised area such as a single NHS trust or 
board. 
- Had been made obsolete by new documentation (excluding open disclosure 
guidance) 
 
 
5.3.3 Data analysis 
Following application of the exclusion/inclusion criteria, summaries were 
created for each document. Consideration was given to their focus, whether 
they included a risk assessment/matrix/severity grading tool, whether they 
outlined factors which could be considered when deciding whether to notify 
patients following an infection control incident and whether they gave guidance 
on when and when not to notify patients.  
If a document referred to a risk assessment tool but did not include it, a note of 
the tool was made and incorporated into the final results/discussion (Appendix 
20). 
Documents were separated into five categories to facilitate interpretation and 
analysis: 
- General guidance on managing/grading public health incidents or 
outbreaks 
- Guidance on the management of BBV infected healthcare workers 
- Open disclosure/Duty of Candour guidance 
- Guidance on the implementation of PNEs/Lookbacks 
- Management of a specific infection control breach incident 
 
 
 
 
202 
 
5.4 Results 
Initial searching resulted in the identification of 226 potentially relevant 
guidance documents (Figure 21). Following application of the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria 49 documents from 10 countries were deemed eligible for 
inclusion in the narrative synthesis (Figure 22). 
 
No UK guidance exists to aid IMTs with decision-making regarding large-scale 
patient notification following an infection control breach incident. General 
guidance on incident management is available but it does not provide detail on 
the risk/benefit analysis that needs to be done when considering a PNE. The 
relevant guidance documents identified as part of this policy mapping exercise 
are either sourced from another developed country or, more commonly, simply 
linked to the general subject area.  
 
 
 
Figure 21: Radial diagram showing number and sources of all identified guidance documents 
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Figure 22: Radial diagram showing the numbers of each type of guidance document selected for 
analysis based on main focus. 
5.4.1 General guidance on managing/grading healthcare 
associated infection incidents or outbreaks 
General guidance was identified which gave advice concerning both healthcare 
associated infection/outbreaks and, more broadly, the management of all 
incidents which could affect public health, including food outbreaks and 
environmental hazards.  
Guidance on the subject of general public health incident management was 
identified from European authors Schroder-Back et al (2014), the UK (Health and 
Safety Executive 2001) and each of its devolved nations (NSS 2019ᵃ; Healthcare 
Improvement Scotland 2018; HPS and NSS 2017ᵃ; HPS and NSS 2017ᵇ; Scottish 
Government 2008; PHE 2014ᶜ; Public Health Wales 2014; PHA 2018; Health and 
Social Care Board 2016) as well as Ireland (Health Service Executive 2017) 
Australia (New South Wales Government 2014; Australian Government – NHMRC 
2010) and the USA (Conway et al 2011).  Both the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC 2011) and the World Health Organisation (2016ᵇ) 
also published relevant documentation. 
When considering applicable guidance, a dental infection control incident could 
be considered a clinical adverse event (Conway et al 2011; Healthcare 
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Improvement Scotland 2018), significant adverse incident (Health and Social care 
Board 2016), healthcare infection exposure incident (NSS 2019ᵃ; HPS and NSS 
2017), public health incident (HPS and Scottish Gov 2017) or healthcare 
associated infection risk (Scottish Government 2008) making many general 
guidance documents potentially relevant. 
Most guidance contained a toolkit for assessing the risk associated with an 
incident. A risk value or grading was most often created based on combining 
scores within a grid related to the predicted or actual impact of an incident and 
the likelihood of it occurring or recurring (HIS 2018; Scot Gov 2008; ECDC 2011; 
Australian Gov-NHMRC 2010; Health and Social Care Board 2016; HSE 2017; NSW 
Gov 2014). The incident grading was used to establish, in the majority of cases: 
- whether certain expert teams should be assembled (HPS and Scot Gov 
2017; Public Health Wales 2014; Public Health Agency 2018) 
- who the incident should be reported to (HPS and NSS 2017; Public Health 
Agency 2018) 
- timescales for addressing issues (ECDC 2011; PHE 2014ᶜ) 
- whether it should be declared a certain type of incident eg: a serious 
adverse event, an outbreak (Public Health Wales 2014; Health and Social 
Care Board 2016). 
 
Specific incident grades never directly influenced decisions regarding informing 
patients. However, elements incorporated into the grading tool, such as 
resources and staff required, number of patients affected, predicted 
media/public interest and potential patient harm are certainly applicable to a 
patient notification decision (HSE 2017; PHW 2014; HPS and Scot Gov 2017; PHE 
2014ᶜ; Scottish Gov 2008). Appendix 20 presents data on the toolkits identified 
including the guidance documents they are from, what they aimed to measure 
and the nature of advice given depending on the grade or level of risk associated 
with the incident. In essence, the risk assessment tools presented in these 
documents are simply a guide to aid decision makers in understanding the 
severity of the scenario with which they are dealing and therefore how swiftly 
and intensely risks should be managed or controlled. 
 
As well as risk assessment matrices and incident grading systems, these 
documents provided advice concerning the importance of both sharing lessons 
learned following incident management (HPS and Scot Gov 2017; Public Health 
Wales 2014) and keeping accurate records of decisions made and the reasoning 
behind them (HPS and Scot Gov 2017). Guidance included reporting templates 
and advice on the minimum amount and type of information that should be 
collated following an incident (NSS 2019ᵃ; HPS and NSS 2017; Conway et al 2011). 
For example, if an incident is classed as being ‘amber’ or ‘red’ using the NHS 
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Scotland HIIAT tool, a Healthcare Incident Infection Outbreak Reporting 
Template (HIIORT) must be completed (HPS and Scot Gov 2017).  
 
An additional and unique document which was classed as providing general 
incident management guidance was published by Schröder-Bäck et al in 2014. 
They proposed using key ethical questions under seven headings to support 
ethically based, public health decision-making (Table 40). 
Table 40: The Seven Principles of Public Health Ethics as described and published by Schröder-
Bäck et al 2014. Reproduced with permission. 
Non-Maleficence 
- Will no one be harmed by the proposed intervention? 
- Are especially children prevented from harm? 
Beneficence 
- Is the intervention of any good to every single person taking part in this 
intervention? 
- Overall, for both non-maleficence and beneficence, is it possible to assess whether 
more benefit than harm is produced by intervening (or not intervening) and, if so, 
on what side (benefit or harm) does the equation finally fall? 
Health Maximisation 
- Is the proposed intervention effective and evidence-based? Does it improve 
population health? 
- Does it have a sustainable, long-term effect on the public’s health? 
- Is there a community added value to the proposed intervention? 
Efficiency 
- Is the proposed intervention cost-effective? 
- Awareness of scarcity of public money; saved money can be used for other goods 
and services. 
Respect for Autonomy 
- Does the intervention refrain from employing coercion and manipulation? Does it 
foster free choice? 
- Is there really ‘informed consent’ to take part in the intervention? 
- Is self-responsibility not only demanded but also possible for every person? 
- Are privacy and personal data respected? 
- If the intervention is paternalistic, is this justifiable? 
- Does the intervention promote the exercise of autonomy? 
Justice 
- Is no one (including third parties) stigmatised, discriminated against or excluded as 
a consequence of the proposed intervention? 
- Is the institution proposing the intervention publicly justified and acting 
transparently? 
- Is the proposed intervention not putting sub-populations at risks of being 
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excluded from social benefits and/or universal access to health care? 
- Does the intervention exacerbate social and health inequalities (inequities)? Does 
it fight inequalities (inequities)? 
- Does the intervention consider and support vulnerable sub-populations (e.g. 
migrants)? 
- Does the intervention promote rather than endanger fair (and real) equality of 
opportunity and participation in social action? 
- Does the intervention refrain from eroding a sense of social cohesion and 
solidarity? 
Proportionality 
- Is the intervention the least infringing of possible alternatives? 
- Are costs and utility proportional? 
 
5.4.2 Guidance on the management of BBV-infected HCWs 
Guidance which provides direction following the identification of an infected 
HCW often includes advice concerning risk assessment and decisions regarding 
patient notification (Henderson et al 2010; PHE 2017ᵃ; Australian Government 
Department of Health 2018; Queensland Health 2013). It was postulated that 
reviewing this guidance may provide some indication as to the elements that 
should be assessed following an infection control incident and the factors which 
may influence the decision to notify. 
Much of this guidance attaches level of risk to the infectivity of the HCW, the 
type of BBV involved and the nature of the procedures performed (Queensland 
Health 2013; Australian Gov Dep of Health 2018; Henderson et al 2010; PHE 
2017ᵃ). In the context of a dental infection control breach this would equate to 
the infectivity of any potential source patient identified and the types of dental 
procedure undergone by both source and exposed patients. However, following 
an infection control breach, one must remember that in comparison to most 
BBV-infected HCW incidents there is a risk of all three BBVs being transmitted. 
In 2017, a useful, integrated guidance document was published by Public Health 
England. It combines and updates a number of historical documents regarding 
the management of infected HCWs within the UK (PHE 2017ᵃ)11.  
5.4.2.1 Types of procedures performed 
UK guidance indicates that risk of transmission from HCW to patient only exists if 
EPPs are being conducted (PHE 2017ᵃ)11. An EPP describes a procedure where 
there is a risk of HCW injury with consequent bleeding into patient tissues as 
                                                          
11 This guidance was updated in 2019 
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sharp instruments are used, the worker’s fingers are not visible at all times and 
the patient’s tissues are exposed (PHE 2017ᵃ). EPPs are separated into three 
categories with Category 3 procedures being the most invasive and risky eg. 
cardiothoracic surgery (PHE 2017ᵃ). There are no dental procedures which are 
classed as Category 3 EPPs but almost all dental procedures are EPPs (PHE 2016). 
5.4.2.2 Type of BBV infection 
Infected HCW guidance also bases level of risk on the specific BBV involved 
(Henderson et al 2010; PHE 2017ᵃ). This is shown, in UK guidance, through the 
differing working restrictions imposed on BBV-infected HCWs based on the 
nature of their infection (PHE 2017ᵃ). A HCW infected with HBV or HIV may 
perform EPPs depending on viral load, uptake of treatment and monitoring 
whereas if positive for HCV, the HCW may not conduct EPPs (PHE 2017ᵃ). In 
Australia, regulations are stricter, with BBV-infected HCWs not being allowed to 
perform EPPs under any circumstances (Queensland Health 2013; Australian Gov 
Dep of Health 2018). The US appears to have less restrictive regulations, as 
HCWs infected with any BBV may perform EPP Categories 1 and 2 as long as 
certain criteria are met, such as double gloving and seeking advice from an 
expert panel (Henderson et al 2010). 
5.4.2.3 Viral load 
The risk surrounding treatment from an infected HCW, and therefore their 
working restrictions, are shown to be strongly linked to their viral load and 
associated level of infectivity (Tables 41 and 42).  
Table 41: Working restrictions placed on UK BBV-infected HCWs based on viral loads (PHE 2017ᵃ) 
Virus 
Acceptable (very low) 
viral load. HCW can 
conduct EPPs 
Viral load needs to be 
confirmed through 
repeated testing. If still 
above acceptable level, 
HCW must cease 
conducting EPPs 
Viral load indicates 
HCW must 
immediately stop 
conducting EPPs 
HBV <200 IU/mlᵃ 200-399 IU/mlᵇ ≥400 IU/mlᶜ 
HIV <200 copies/mlᵈ 200-999 copies/mlᵉ ≥1000 copies/ml 
HCV Cannot perform EPPs 
IU/ml = International Units per millilitre of blood 
a = In the updated 2019 guidance this value has been changed to <60 IU/ml 
b = In the updated 2019 guidance these values have been changed to 60-199 IU/ml 
c = In the updated 2019 guidance this value has been changed to >200 IU/ml 
d = In the updated 2019 guidance this value has been changed to <50 copies/ml 
e = In the updated 2019 guidance these values have been changed to 50-999 copies/ml 
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Again, US regulations are shown to be less restrictive as if viral load is low 
enough, BBV-infected HCWs in the US may also conduct Category 3 procedures 
(Henderson et al 2010). 
Table 42: Working restrictions placed on American BBV-infected HCWs based on viral loads 
(Henderson et al 2010) 
Virus 
Acceptable (very low) viral load 
which means HCW can conduct 
EPPs cat 1, 2 and 3* 
Viral load which means HCW can 
only conduct EPPs cat 1 and 2* 
HBV <10⁴ GE/ml ≥10⁴ GE/ml 
HIV <5x10² GE/ml ≥5x10² GE/ml 
HCV <10⁴ GE/ml ≥10⁴ GE/ml 
GE/ml = Genome equivalents per millilitre of blood 
* as long as HCW adheres to certain criteria 
Guidance also indicates situations or findings that would increase risk of 
transmission from a HCW that would similarly apply to a source patient. If they 
are HBeAg positive or carry a pre-core mutant version of HBV transmission risks 
will be higher (PHE 2017ᵃ, Henderson et al 2010)12. 
5.4.2.4 Infected HCWs - the need for patient notification 
Infected HCW guidance not only gives risk assessment and monitoring advice but 
also gives specific guidance regarding the need for patient notification.  
UK 
In response to a BBV-infected HCW, the key influential factor contributing to the 
decision to notify, is whether a probable, iatrogenic transmission has already 
been identified (PHE 2017ᵃ). If so, notification of all patients, regardless of EPP 
category, covering the entirety of the HCW’s employment history (or at least 
back to the date of their most recent negative test, if available) is advised (PHE 
2017ᵃ). If there are no identified transmissions, consideration of other factors 
such as quality of infection control and the health status of the HCW is advised 
(PHE 2017ᵃ). Physical conditions such as skin lesions or mental impairments such 
as dementia may increase risk of transmission. Presence of these factors along 
with the HCW’s infection, indicate the need for a PNE (PHE 2017ᵃ). Specific 
advice regarding HIV-infected HCWs is given12. It states that even if there are no 
identified transmissions or reports of poor infection control, a PNE must still be 
conducted for those patients who underwent Category 3 EPPs (PHE 2017ᵃ)12. 
In general UK guidance advises that every assessment of an infected HCW should 
be done on a case by case basis and that responses should be “practical and 
proportionate to the risk of transmission” (PHE 2017ᵃ). Generally they advise 
                                                          
12 This is no longer outlined in the PHE guidance which was updated in 2019 
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that when making the decision to notify, cross matching findings, the nature of 
the procedures conducted and expert advice are important (PHE 2017ᵃ)13. 
Australia 
Australian guidance similarly advises that generally, each scenario should be 
considered on a case by case basis (Australian Government DoH 2018; 
Queensland Health 2013). Their guidance states, however, that if an infected 
HCW is found to have been conducting EPPs, patient notification is generally 
indicated (Australian Government 2018; Queensland Health 2013). Flexibility 
regarding this point, however, is shown through later advice. Authors explain 
that if there is no identified probable transmission, notification should be 
restricted to those patients who underwent Category 3 EPPs (Australian 
Government 2018; Queensland Health 2013). If there is a suspected transmission 
or presence of additional factors, such as poor infection control or HCW 
impairment, all patients who underwent an EPP of any category should be 
notified (Australian Government DoG 2018; Queensland Health 2013). 
USA 
CDC guidance provides a list of situations involving infected HCWs where patient 
notification would be prudent (Henderson et al 2010): 
- A HCW has been conducting Category 3 procedures with a viral load higher than 
is permissible (Table 42). 
- There is strong evidence of an identified, associated transmission. 
- The specific clinical specialty and types of procedures conducted are 
associated with a higher transmission risk. 
- There is a history of frequent sharps injuries or high rates of postoperative 
infection. 
- Presence of poor infection control. 
- The HCW has physical or mental impairments which may increase risk of 
transmission. 
5.4.3 Open disclosure / duty of candour guidance 
Key guidance regarding the decision of when to notify patients following an 
incident was found within documents which discussed the requirements for open 
disclosure or circumstances which trigger an organisational, statutory duty of 
candour. 
                                                          
13 If there is no index case/ probable transmission, cross matching is no longer advised as part of the PHE 
guidance which was updated in 2019 
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5.4.3.1 Duty of candour within the UK 
The Duty of Candour, which now applies to both England and Scotland, places a 
legal requirement on both NHS health care organisations and providers to be 
open with patients when things go wrong (CQC 2014; RCS 2015; GMC 2015; 
Scottish Government 2018). Statutory Duty of Candour in both Scotland and 
England does not apply to individuals who have a professional, but not statutory, 
duty to be candid (CQC 2014; RCS 2015; GMC 2015; Scottish Government 2018). 
In 2014, Statutory Duty of Candour was introduced in England for health service 
bodies (CQC 2014). Its implementation was in direct response to 
recommendations made following investigation of an English NHS Foundation 
Trust and its resultant report, the Francis inquiry (Francis 2013). In 2015, the 
duty was extended to all English facilities which provide NHS healthcare (RCS 
2015; GMC 2015). The requirements of the English Duty of Candour differ 
depending on whether the incident involves a ‘health service body’ eg. NHS trust 
or ‘registered person’ eg. a dental practice (RCS 2015; GMC 2015). For health 
service bodies, a notifiable incident includes both incidents that have resulted in 
harm and those that (in the reasonable opinion of a healthcare professional) 
could result in harm (RCS 2015; GMC 2015). For ‘registered persons’ the duty 
only applies to incidents that have caused harm (RCS 2015; GMC 2015). Failure 
to comply with the English Duty of Candour can lead to a criminal conviction, 
which is not currently the case in Scotland (UK Faculty of Public Health 2019).  
In 2018, Scotland implemented the Duty of Candour (Scottish Government 2018) 
which is set out in the Health (Tobacco, Nicotine etc and Care) (Scotland) Act 
2016. The Scottish Duty of Candour closely mirrors the English duty with minor 
differences e.g. the health care professional who assesses whether harm has 
occurred, or could occur, must not be linked to the incident in any way (Scottish 
Government 2018). The Scottish duty applies to NHS boards and service 
providers in the same way, with both needing to notify patients if harm has or 
could have occurred (Scottish Government 2018). The Scottish Government 
website does outline, however, that ‘could result in’ is akin to the term ‘likely 
to result in’ and state that “if the registered health professional thinks that it is 
unlikely that harm will occur, then the duty of candour procedure need not be 
activated” (Scottish Government 2018). 
5.4.3.2 Other disclosure guidance documents 
Pivotal disclosure guidance documents were identified in relation to a number of 
developed countries: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the USA, Scotland, 
England, Ireland and Denmark. Common themes identified from these guidance 
documents included the ethical imperative to notify patients, basing the 
notification decision on levels of patient harm, considering the potential for 
future patient harm following an incident and the benefits of reducing litigation 
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and increasing patient trust (AHRQ 2016; VHA 2018; Danish Society for Patient 
Safety 2008; Health Service Executive 2013; Health and Disability Commission 
2009; Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare 2014; Health 
Quality Council of Alberta 2006; College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario 
2003; Canadian Patient Safety Institute 2011; Canadian Medical Protective 
Association 2017; Nova Scotia Health 2005; NPSA 2009; Healthcare Improvement 
Scotland 2015) 
The decision to notify patients following a ‘no harm’ or ‘near miss’ incident is 
mostly described as discretionary (Health Quality Council of Alberta 2006; 
College of Physicians and Surgeons Ontario 2003; NPSA 2009; AHRQ 2016). Some 
guidance does refer to the concept of potential or future harm (Health Quality 
Council of Alberta 2006; CEC 2014; VHA 2018; CMPA 2017) but varies in how it is 
described or quantified. As previously outlined the Scottish Duty of Candour 
guidance document states that a notifiable incident includes those that “could 
result” in specific outcomes (Scottish Government 2018). The Canadian Patient 
Safety Institute (2011) stated that “disclosure must occur if there is a risk of 
potential future harm” and that “if potential for future harm exists [the] 
decision depends on future likelihood of important clinical consequences”. 
Patient notification thresholds from the examined guidance are outlined in 
Appendix 21 alongside specific advice given regarding multi-patient disclosure or 
assessment of potential, future harm. 
5.4.3.3 Ethical/professional duty to be open with patients 
While many documents provided thresholds for prompting a notification, they 
also advised that each situation should be judged on a case by case basis. 
Furthermore, while recognising that duty of candour had introduced a legal 
requirement to notify, the ethical arguments for notification, following a greater 
variety and severity of occurrences, were still strong (GMC 2015; CQC 2014; RCS 
2015; Scottish Government 2018). The guidance also reminded healthcare 
providers that the professional duty of candour remains applicable and has been 
both advised and encouraged for decades and that open disclosure comes hand 
in hand with a move away from the historical paternalistic medical culture 
(Healthcare Improvement Scotland 2015; Royal College of Surgeons 2015; Care 
Quality Commission 2014; Health and Disability Commission 2009; Canadian 
Medical Protective Association 2017; The Scottish Government 2018; Agency for 
Healthcare and Research Quality 2016; Health Quality Council of Alberta 2006). 
5.4.3.4 Multi-patient disclosure 
In some countries open disclosure documents specifically indicated that their use 
was solely relevant to incidents involving single patients (AHRQ 2016; Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare 2014; CQC 2014; College of 
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Physicians and Surgeons Ontario 2003; GMC 2015). In addition, the advisory 
content of many other documents implied that their use applied only to single 
patient incidents through outlining approaches that would only be possible when 
disclosing to a single patient. For example, the CQC (2014) advised that 
disclosure should always be undertaken verbally and ideally in person. Both the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2016) and New South Wales Health 
(2014) outlined that notification must take place within 24 hours of an incident 
being identified. New South Wales Health (2014), along with the Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care (2014), stated that preferably 
the patient should decide both whether harm has occurred and what level of 
harm merits explanation, a process not possible when managing an incident 
involving hundreds or thousands of patients. 
No UK guidance refers to multi-patient disclosure, but three documents 
published by Irish, Australian and Canadian organisations presented brief, 
general advice for these types of incidents (CEC 2014; Canadian Patient Safety 
Institute 2011; Health Service Executive 2013). Essentially, they stated that all 
incidents should be managed on a case by case basis, seeking advice from 
relevant experts whilst undertaking “a complex weighing of clinical probabilities 
and ethical obligations” (Canadian Patient Safety Institute 2011). 
Notification of multiple patients is advised by the Health Service Executive (2013) 
when “likelihood of exposure is high”. When lower, consideration of a number of 
factors is required such as the “ethical obligations” of the organisation (Health 
Service Executive 2013). Both the VHA (2018) and Nova Scotia Health (2005) 
provide more detail in relation to the decision-making process to follow when 
multiple patients are involved in an incident. The Nova Scotia Health framework 
(2005) outlines that response options should be established through 
“brainstorming and facilitated discussion of stakeholders” and encourages users 
to reflect on “ethical principles at play” and “institutional core values”. It also 
advised that decision makers consider the issues from multiple perspectives eg: 
“the harmed or potentially harmed individuals” as well as “society at large”. 
5.4.3.5 Disclosure of adverse events to patients – VHA guidance 
The VHA (2018) provides detailed guidance on disclosure of adverse events and 
recommends that an initial panel conducts a thorough investigation of the 
incident, including site visits and assessment of evidence. The resulting risk 
assessment is used to inform one of three recommendations: 1) that patient 
notification is required, 2) that it is not necessary, or 3) that the risk is 
uncertain and further discussion and assessment are needed (VHA 2018). The 
latter recommendation triggers assembly of a second panel – the Clinical Review 
Board (VHA 2018). This panel explores “the probability and severity of harm 
resulting from the adverse event” as well as considering “salient ethical 
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principles; risk of harm to patients and potentially-affected third parties; 
benefit and burden of disclosure to patients, including medical, psychological, 
social, or economic; impact on the institution’s perceived integrity and its 
capacity to provide care and treatment for all patients; as well as applicable 
policy and relevant precedent” (VHA 2018). A list of salient questions is provided 
for consideration and presented in Table 43. 
Table 43: Questions featured in VHA guidance – Disclosure of Adverse Events (2018) 
VHA (2018) 
1. DO WE HAVE ALL THE IMPORTANT FACTS RELEVANT TO THE DECISION? 
2. HAVE WE INVOLVED EVERYONE WHO SHOULD BE PART OF THIS DECISION? 
3. DOES THIS DECISION REFLECT ORGANIZATIONAL, PROFESSIONAL, AND SOCIAL VALUES? 
4. DO THE LIKELY BENEFITS OF THE DECISION OUTWEIGH ANY LIKELY HARMS? 
5. DOES THIS DECISION ESTABLISH A GOOD MODEL FOR FUTURE DECISION-MAKING? 
6. HOW WOULD THIS DECISION LOOK TO SOMEONE OUTSIDE THE ORGANIZATION? 
 
5.4.4 Guidance on the implementation of PNEs / lookbacks 
Three pieces of guidance were identified which mainly focused on the conduct 
of PNEs (Health Service Executive 2015; Cummins et al 2001; NSW Gov 2007). 
These documents mirror the open disclosure and duty of candour documents, by 
outlining which experts should be approached for advice, the roles of those on 
the IMT and how the final report should be structured (Health Service Executive 
2015; Cummins et al 2001; NSW Gov 2007). 
Irish guidance had more of a PNE decision-making focus as it clearly presented 
the key criteria that should be considered when deciding whether to proceed to 
patient notification (Health Service Executive 2015) (Table 44). The guidance 
stated that patients must have 1) been exposed to some form of hazard and that 
2) “a means of amelioration exists” i.e: treatment (Health Service Executive 
2015). The authors stated that concern for patient safety must be balanced with 
the need to ensure the PNE does not cause widespread distress (Health Service 
Executive 2015). 
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Table 44: Key criteria to consider when making decisions regarding patient notification 
following a healthcare related incident (Health Service Executive 2015) 
 
5.4.5 Management of a specific infection control breach incident 
Seven guidance documents focused directly on the management of an infection 
control breach (Patel et al 2008; USAF DECS 2009; CDC 2012; Anon 2016; CDC 
2019ᵇ; CDC 2015; Weber and Rutala 2013). All were published in the US. Two of 
these documents were included in this synthesis as they were reported to have 
been used by public health stakeholders in the past, but were in fact peer 
reviewed scientific papers as opposed to formally developed guidance (Patel et 
al 2008; Weber and Rutala 2013).  
The CDC (2012), US Airforce (2009) and Californian Dental Association (Anon 
2016) all used the article by Patel et al (2008) as a basis for their guidance. The 
process guides the user to assign an incident to one of two risk categories:  
- category A, where there is a clear and significant risk to patients  
- category B when the risk is low, uncertain or hypothesised  
(Patel at al 2008).  
 
If Category B is chosen, consideration of other factors, such as public concern, 
the duty to disclose and potential harm caused to patients by notification, is 
advised (Patel et al 2008). Notification is advised regardless of which category is 
chosen, the only difference being the recommendation that a category B 
incident may not merit testing of patients (Patel et al 2008). It is made clear 
that use of this process is only applicable when there is no associated known 
transmission event, as that would clearly indicate a high-risk scenario with a 
need for patient notification and testing (Patel et al 2008). Patel et al (2008) 
advised that since there is significant uncertainty linked to a quantitative 
- The potential extent of the issue and the level of exposure to the hazard 
- Evidence of harm that has occurred 
- The likelihood of future harm occurring  
- The potential and actual (if relevant) outcomes of the issue (eg. undiagnosed and 
therefore untreated HCV infection) 
- Severity of potential outcome (HSE impact table 2014 can be used to rate) 
- The potential cohort of service users affected (number of patients affected, ages, 
category of service user) 
- The manner in which harm would be ameliorated (e.g. repeat investigation /onward 
referral for treatment) 
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calculation of risk in these situations, a qualitative consideration of risk is more 
appropriate.  
Just as Patel et al (2008) highlighted that an identified transmission event 
indicates a higher risk, and thus an enhanced response, so too did the CDC 
(2012) advise that following discovery of syringe re-use or contaminated multi-
dose vials, notification is imperative. 
The method described by Patel et al (2008) represents one of the two main 
processes presented in the literature for assessing infection control incidents. 
Weber and Rutala (2013) outlined a 15 step process with three key stages which 
relate to the decision to notify patients (steps 7, 10 and 12). In step 7, the 
authors encourage the reader to consider if the breach in question could actually 
lead to patient infection (Weber and Rutala 2013). They explained that 
decontamination processes, especially sterilisation, have wide safety margins 
meaning small deviations from the programmed process may not represent a 
significant danger to patients (Weber and Rutala 2013). Step 10 involved 
assessing if harm had already been caused, for example by testing specific 
patients and/or examining medical records (Weber and Rutala 2013).  In 
reference to step 12, Weber and Rutala (2013) stated that “if it is determined 
that the failure could result in adverse patient events, then patients should be 
notified”. 
Weber and Rutala (2013) outlined that when the risk of patient infection is 
extremely low, notification may not be justified. The authors suggested that a 
risk of less than one in one million would meet this criterion and that in the 
medical field, pre-procedure, patients are generally not advised of risks which 
have a less than 1% chance of occurring (Weber and Rutala 2013). 
Further, relevant guidance was identified on the CDC website in the form of a 
healthcare investigation checklist, although this resource is specifically designed 
to assess an incident where investigations have begun with identification of a 
single index patient and only targeted testing of connected patients is 
recommended (CDC 2015). 
5.5 Discussion 
5.5.1 What this study adds 
This review represents the first known attempt to comprehensively map 
guidance that may support the decision-making process in relation to the 
notification of patients following a dental infection control breach. The findings 
of this mapping exercise serve as both the inspiration for the novel decision-
making algorithm, presented in Chapter 6, and a list of guiding documentation 
which is easy for stakeholders to access and utilise. 
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5.5.2 Main findings 
In general, existing public health guidance provides a broad overview of the 
stages involved in incident assessment and management but detail is needed 
regarding the decision to notify multiple patients of an incident. 
Many of these documents apply to a variety of healthcare contexts, some of 
which differ greatly to the scenario of a UK board or trust faced with a dental 
infection control incident. Examination of this type of general incident 
management guidance, however, still provided inspiration for the structure of 
the dental, PNE decision-making algorithm as its advice mirrored the elements 
needed in such a toolkit: 
- A risk assessment 
- Advice regarding communication with the public 
- Ethical considerations 
- Who should be involved in incident management and any decisions made? 
 
Many of the grading systems identified emphasised the factors that should be 
considered when assessing the impact that an incident will have. These elements 
would similarly apply to a dental infection control breach and included the 
degree of patient harm, resources required, number of patients affected and 
negative publicity created. These grading systems also demonstrated the main 
way in which risk is assessed, namely a comparison of impact and likelihood. 
Even though little guidance on the decision to notify was provided, these 
documents presented a good selection of toolkit structures which helped to 
inform the design of the novel toolkit presented in Chapter 6.  
The applicability of most disclosure guidance was limited by the advice that 
notification be undertaken when a specific level of, or, indeed, any degree of 
harm had befallen the patient (Healthcare Improvement Scotland 2015; Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality 2016; Australian Commission on Safety and 
Quality in Healthcare 2014; College of Physicians and Surgeons Ontario 2003; 
Health and Disability Commission 2009; Nova Scotia Health 2005). Following an 
infection control breach, a number of patients may have been exposed to a risk 
but may not necessarily have incurred any harm. Knowledge of harm having been 
caused can usually only be established after notification and testing has already 
taken place hence it cannot be used pre-PNE to establish the need for one. 
It was postulated that the restrictions placed on BBV-infected HCWs based on 
type of virus, viral load and procedures conducted, could be used as a guide to 
indicate which infection control breaches may carry higher risks.  
British guidance suggests that the highest risk of transmission is associated with 
HCV-infected HCWs, including dentists, who are advised that under no 
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circumstances are they permitted to perform EPPs. HIV is also given special 
consideration, even though it is the least infectious of the BBVs. Patients who 
have been treated by a newly discovered and unmonitored HIV-infected HCW 
and undergone category 3 EPPs, must be notified, regardless of other factors 
such as identified transmissions or poor infection control (PHE 2017ᵃ)14.  
In the UK, HCW viral loads of ≥400 IU/ml and ≥1000 copies/ml for HBV and HIV 
respectively were shown to be associated with a high risk as at this level, 
dentists were instructed to immediately cease performing EPPs (PHE 2017ᵃ)15. 
American HCWs, whose viral load is above a certain level (HBV >10⁴ GE/ml, 
HIV >5x10² GE/ml, HCV >10⁴ GE/ml) are not allowed to perform category 3 
procedures (Henderson et al 2010). This suggests that following an infection 
control breach, any source patient with comparable viral load levels would 
similarly generate a high risk of transmission. 
The category of EPP that had been performed was shown to be important, as 
notifying patients of HIV-infected HCWs (HCV, HIV, HBV in Australia) was only 
advised if they had specifically undergone category 3 procedures. This is advised 
regardless of any identified, potential transmissions (PHE 2017ᵃ)16. In a dental 
infection control breach scenario this may equate to a higher risk being 
associated with incidents where the dentist had been performing procedures 
with a greater propensity to produce blood and/or expose tissues. 
The applicability of these guidance documents to a dental infection control 
breach is, however, limited. First, it would not be possible to base a risk 
assessment on whether EPPs have been performed as 1) virtually all dental 
procedures are categorised as such, 2) in dental practice there would always be 
a mixture of EPP 1 and 2 procedures performed and 3) EPP categorisation is 
designed to specifically assess the risk associated with treatment delivered by an 
infected HCW not an infection control breach. A higher risk could perhaps be 
attached to breaches occurring in specialist dental practices, where category 2 
procedures, such as implant placement, are regularly conducted.  
In an infection control breach, the type of virus involved would be an irrelevant 
risk assessment factor, as all three BBVs can be transmitted. Being guided by 
viral load values in an infection control breach scenario is also unlikely as many 
breaches are discovered or reported late, with patients having been exposed 
many months before. The viral load of a potential source patient, at the time 
the breach is discovered, will be unlikely to reflect its level at the time of 
patient exposure. 
                                                          
14 This guidance was updated in 2019 
15 As above 
16 As above 
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In consideration of the decision of whether to conduct patient notification 
following identification of a BBV-infected HCW, all guidance clearly states that 
identification of a suspected transmission indicates the need for a PNE. If a 
potential transmission has not been identified, guidance asks us to consider 
other factors, such a poor infection control or the HCW’s physical or mental 
impairments. In the context of an infection control breach, if we consider the 
infected HCW to be equivalent to a source patient (perhaps identified via cross 
matching) then poor infection control, associated with an identified source 
patient, would be grounds for conducting a PNE.  
Significant differences in guidance were observed based on country. Regarding 
the management of BBV infected HCWs, Australia’s guidance was the most 
restrictive and presented a low threshold for proceeding to patient notification. 
In contrast to Australia and the UK, the US places lower levels of restriction on 
infected HCWs. This is surprising as, apart from France and Spain, the USA is the 
only other country to be linked to HIV transmission from HCW to patient 
(Ciesielski et al 1994). Restriction variations may be due to unknown political 
and social influences on the levels of risk accepted by patients from different 
countries. 
With an absence of guidance on whether to conduct a PNE following an infection 
control breach, UK IMTs may be influenced by open disclosure/duty of candour 
guidance. Guidance on when open disclosure is required following a healthcare 
related incident tended to be general and vague. This is understandable as 
healthcare incidents can be highly variable in relation to their nature and 
context.  
 
Through interpretation of the UK Duty of Candour legislation, it appears that a 
dental practice in England would only need to notify patients if harm had 
occurred following an incident, whereas in Scotland both incidents that had 
caused, or could cause, harm would trigger the duty (CQC 2014; RCS 2015; GMC 
2015; Scottish Government 2018). 
 
The VHA’s guidance, Disclosure of Adverse Events (2018), was found to be the 
most relevant and useful piece of guidance as it presented a clear pathway of 
decision-making for stakeholders to follow. The structure and content of this 
guidance was highly influential in the creation of the toolkit presented in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
 
While some of the guidance identified did present information on the different 
thresholds for open disclosure/duty of candour (Appendix 21), it is important to 
note that many of these documents give advice based on incidents affecting 
single patients and do not refer to, or address, the challenges faced when 
notifying multiple patients. 
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Applying open disclosure guidance to a healthcare incident, where it is not yet 
known whether patients have come to harm, can depend on the interpretation 
of terms used. UK duty of candour guidance indicates that a patient should be 
notified if “in the reasonable opinion of a health care professional” the incident 
“could result in” harm (CQC 2014; RCS 2015; GMC 2015; Scottish Government 
2018). One can appreciate the challenge in interpreting subjective terms and 
attempting to establish, for example, what level of likelihood is connected to 
the phrase “could result in”. 
 
In relation to the management of an infection control breach, very specific and 
relevant guidance was outlined by Patel et al (2008) and Weber and Rutala 
(2013). These documents, however, still possessed numerous limitations. Patel 
et al (2008) gave very clear guidance on the incident details that should be 
recorded and considered but then categorised incidents into only two broad 
types: A and B. Both type descriptions were fairly vague and open to 
interpretation with a simple penultimate step entitled “decision regarding 
notification and testing” (Patel et al 2008). Weber and Rutala focused more on 
how to assess and manage the incident rather than how to make a decision 
regarding patient notification with the twelfth step of their process entitled 
“consider patient notification”. 
5.5.3 Strengths and weaknesses 
This is the first systematic policy mapping exercise to assess guidance on the 
management of general public health incidents, infected HCWs, infection control 
breaches, lookbacks and open disclosure. It was highly comprehensive with 
special consideration being given to specific documents that were recommended, 
or already being used, by public health decision makers. This mapping exercise 
had a detailed and systematic approach which facilitates repeatability and 
reassures the user that the subject has been covered extensively. 
A broad range of guidance was identified and a list of relevant documents, 
summaries and desired advice can be accessed and utilised swiftly by 
stakeholders. 
While comprehensive, it is possible that some documents have been missed. This, 
however, was considered unlikely as the strategy utilised a great number of 
different sources. It should also be noted that the guidance mapping exercise, 
executed as part of a scoping review study, involved no quality assessment phase. 
This means that documents did not undergo in-depth analysis. Stakeholders may 
therefore be extracting findings and advice from guidance which is poorly 
produced and/or based on weak evidence.  
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Finally, the currency of advice provided in guidance can quickly become 
outdated as documents and policies are constantly being updated. For example, 
following completion of this scoping review study, a piece of highly relevant UK 
guidance was updated in July this year (PHE 2017ᵃ updated July 2019). This 
updated guidance now stipulates that a cross matching exercise is no longer 
required following the identification of a BBV-infected HCW, with no associated 
transmissions, or index patients (PHE 2017ᵃ updated July 2019). Also, “a patient 
notification exercise (PNE) will only be recommended if transmission is 
identified through an index case report, or if the local risk assessment identifies 
factors that increase the risk of BBV transmission from the HCW” (PHE 2017ᵃ 
updated July 2019). The updated 2019 guidance includes changed viral load 
ranges which indicate when a BBV-infected healthcare worker should cease 
performing exposure prone procedures and/or undergo additional testing. The 
updated guidance also no longer associates an increased transmission risk with 
those HBV-infected healthcare workers who are HBV ‘e’ antigen positive or who 
carry a pre-core mutant version of the virus (PHE 2017ᵃ updated July 2019). 
5.6 Conclusions 
In summary, no document gave clear guidance on the decision to notify multiple 
patients following an infection control breach. Nearly all relevant guidance 
advised using clinical judgement and a case-by-case approach when responding 
to a large-scale public health incident. No quantitative thresholds were provided 
and when the risks were considered low or uncertain most guidance eventually 
led the user to a general list of complex factors that should be considered. This 
can limit the utility of these documents as the user is still left with a difficult 
and multi-factorial decision. Following detailed examination, however, several 
conclusions can still be drawn, which may aid those in their decision to notify 
patients following a dental infection control breach: 
 
- If a potential, probable transmission is identified, which appears to be linked 
to the incident in question, notification is deemed essential. 
- Identification of a source patient alone could be a strong indication for 
notification, especially if that source patient has a high viral load, underwent a 
more invasive procedure and/or is HBeAg positive or carrying a pre-core mutant 
strain of HBV. 
- Duty of candour is not an automatic indication to notify patients in a large-
scale adverse event scenario and depends on the IMT’s interpretation of how 
likely it is that patient harm, in this case infection, has occurred. 
- The risks given to patients before surgery could be used as a guideline for the 
threshold figure of when to notify patients or as specifically suggested by Weber 
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and Rutala (2013), a 1 in 1 million chance of transmission, could be used as the 
lower limit for initiating a PNE. 
- Re-use of multi dose vials or syringes is a high-risk breach that should result in 
patient notification. 
- Consideration should be given to breaches which have historically been 
connected to transmissions within the dental setting. 
- Certain decontamination stages, such as sterilisation, have very wide safety 
margins and therefore one should consider the nature of the breach and whether 
instruments have been partially or fully processed. 
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Chapter 6. Design of an evidence-based decision making algorithm 
to aid incident management team members with the decision of 
whether to notify patients following a dental infection control 
breach incident 
6.1 Introduction 
Healthcare guidance ensures that patients consistently receive high-quality, 
evidence-based care (NICE 2019). Adhering to guidance reassures healthcare 
providers that their treatment planning is appropriate and that their legal 
obligations are being met (NICE 2019). Guidance also helps to ensure that 
resources are allocated to the most effective and prudent healthcare 
interventions (NICE 2019). 
Appropriately developed guidance should be created via a number of key steps. 
A topic which addresses a gap in guidance and is considered a priority for 
improvement of patient care should be identified by relevant stakeholders 
(SDCEP 2019). It is then common for a scoping review study to be undertaken to 
establish the quality and amount of evidence available in the subject area as 
well as the feasibility of guidance development (SDCEP 2019).  
Following a more in-depth review, a multi-disciplinary team often referred to as 
a steering or guidance development group will convene to write the guidance 
based on the highest quality evidence available (SDCEP 2019).  When there is an 
absence or lack of this high-quality evidence “other published literature and 
unpublished work may be sought” and “where authoritative evidence is not 
available, the guidance development group may decide to make 
recommendations based on expert opinion” (SDCEP 2019). Following 
development, guidance documentation is often disseminated for stakeholder 
consultation, facilitating the assessment of feedback from a much larger cohort 
of the professional community (SDCEP 2019). Once guidance is finalised and 
published, a set period is established for review of the documentation eg. every 
five years (SDCEP 2019). 
It is theorised that UK IMTs would benefit from the development of decision-
making guidance in relation to the need for implementation of a PNE following a 
dental infection control incident. Guidance would create consistency in IMT 
discussion across the UK and improve consistency of incident response to similar 
infection control breach scenarios. Guidance would also provide reassurance 
that all appropriate factors were being considered in regard to patient safety, 
ethical considerations and resource allocation. Those who authored papers 
regarding UK dental infection control incidents frequently expressed a desire for 
creation of guidance: 
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“Given that the decision to notify is a crucial part of management of such 
incidents, health protection teams would benefit from a decision-making tool to 
help assess the need for patient notification and testing where risk to patients 
is low. This would allow a robust assessment of all the relevant factors 
including potential risks, based on what is known from the existing evidence 
about the probability of a transmission event, and harms involved in notifying 
patients (or not notifying patients).” (Henderson et al 2017). 
“To ensure consistent practice within the UK the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence should produce guidance on PNEs for the NHS [...] which 
will combine a robust economic evaluation with the views of stakeholders 
including patients.” (Mason et al 2008). 
“There is no UK guidance, however, on whether patients should be notified 
when they have been exposed to dental instruments which may have been 
contaminated with a BBV [...] In the absence of national guidance, decisions 
must be made in individual situations on the level of risk considered 
acceptable.” (Conrad et al 2011). 
As high-level evidence is not currently available in the area of PNE 
implementation, especially in regard to infection control breaches, it was 
prudent to gather evidence from a number of different sources: the published 
and grey literature, expert opinion, current related guidance and stakeholder 
opinion. The decision-making algorithm presented in this chapter (Figure 23) 
represents a collusion of all evidence and data collected as part of each stage of 
this doctoral study’s scoping review study. 
6.2 Aim 
This chapter focuses on addressing the fourth aim of this doctoral study (chapter 
1.6): to design and present an evidence-based decision-making algorithm which 
will aid IMTs with the decision of when to notify patients following a dental 
infection control breach. 
6.3 Methods 
Key aspects considered in the PNE decision-making process were ascertained, 
and placed in order of importance, based on evidence from the literature and 
stakeholder input. Decision factors were allocated an order in the algorithm’s 
flowchart design, based on their importance and capacity to influence decision-
makers. The algorithm was designed in consultation with the CI’s educational 
supervisors who provided expert advice on dentistry, BBV transmission and 
incident management. 
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The algorithm utilises grading systems in phases 3 and 4. These types of matrices 
are presented in many other guidance documents as a method of assessing risk 
associated with medical incidents by applying a number or colour to an incident 
based on different risk related factors (Appendix 20). 
The algorithm is designed to be a guide for discussion and source of 
recommendations rather than as a prescriptive checklist resulting in an absolute 
outcome. This was considered an appropriate design feature as evidence is 
limited and incidents will always have unique contextual aspects. 
Within the algorithm assessment of risk is incorporated in a number of ways. As a 
reflection of the process reported to be followed by stakeholders, degree of risk 
is addressed before any other incident factors in the toolkit. Decision makers are 
guided to consider specific scenarios initially for which study findings revealed a 
potentially greater need for patient notification. These included the presence of 
any transmissions/index patients or use of multi-dose vials/re-use of syringes. 
Even though the literature reveals that it is not currently conducted in a 
consistent or significant way by IMTs, the algorithm advises decision makers to 
consider the nature of both the procedures conducted and breaches that have 
occurred. American guidance documents published by Patel et al (2008) and 
Weber and Rutala (2013) incorporated such considerations and UK stakeholders 
expressed a desire for more guidance in this area with a reported lack of 
knowledge regarding the ways in which dental instruments are used or exposed 
to blood in general practice. A matrix was devised by the CI which was based on 
personal knowledge of dental practice, decontamination processes and BBV 
transmission. The matrix evaluates the propensity for specific dental instruments 
to come into contact with blood, to retain blood on their surfaces and 
encourages users to consider broadly if any attempt at cleaning, disinfection or 
sterilisation has been made. 
As the literature reflected an inclination to proceed to notification when it was 
predicted that the PNE process would be easier, perhaps due to a limited 
number of exposed patients or comprehensive and organised patient notes, this 
was incorporated into the decision-making algorithm. Decision makers were 
guided towards patient notification if the number of those exposed was less than 
50. This value was somewhat arbitrarily chosen but was also based on the 
numbers of patients normally involved in historic incidents and the fact that 
both Cheng et al (2013) and Taylor (1992) cited the low numbers of patients 
involved in their incidents (250 and 47 respectively) as being influential in their 
decision to notify, due intuitively to the associated minimal resource 
requirements. 
The numerical values presented in the toolkit were chosen based on literature 
findings. Dudzinski et al (2010) outlined that the VHA use a numerical risk cut off 
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value of 1 in 10,000 when considering notification of patients. Values were also 
based on the management of historical incidents by UK IMTs where notification 
was associated, in one case, with a calculated BBV transmission risk value of 1 in 
31,000 (unpublished report 2013) but not conducted following risk assessments 
with results of 1 in 52,000 (unpublished report 2015) and 1 in 56,000 
(unpublished report 2015). 
Ethical arguments for and against patient notification were incorporated into the 
algorithm as they were shown to be very important to decision makers. In the 
stakeholder consultation, participants conveyed that there were three main 
ethical concepts that guided their decision-making process. These included 1) 
prioritising the health of the patient or population above all else, 2) valuing 
transparency and 3) respecting the patients’ right to know. Participants 
explained that they felt that, as healthcare providers, they had a duty of care to 
patients and to not cause the harm that would be inflicted via the psychological 
impact of notification.  Within the literature, authors referred to widely 
acknowledged medical standards and ethical concepts such as patient autonomy 
(Iheukwumere 1997; Blatchford et al 2000), non-maleficence (Blatchford et al 
2000), transparency (Maguire et al 2016ᵃ) and a commitment to always put 
patients first (Weaver 2014). Some articles were entirely based upon the ethical 
discussion of whether large-scale notification should be conducted following a 
low risk health care incident (Hébert 2015; Pinching 2000; Weller 1999; CDC 
2019ᵃ; Dudzinski et al 2010; Fromson and Kenney 2010; Chafe et al 2009; 
Blatchford et al 2000). The ethical questions posed in VHA guidance (2018) and 
the ethical principles outlined by Schröder-Bäck et al (2014) were instrumental 
in the design and inclusion of the ethical questions posed to decision makers at 
the end of the algorithm. 
The algorithm presented in this chapter will aid incident management teams 
with the assessment of dental infection control breach incidents but only in 
relation to those which involved dental instrument processing breaches. It is not 
currently designed to assess incidents which purely involved other types of 
breaches such as limited handwashing, glove use or environmental 
contamination.  
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6.4 Results: 
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Figure 23: Patient notification exercise (PNE) post-dental decontamination breach (DDB) 
decision-making (DM) algorithm 
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6.5 Discussion 
The algorithm presented in this chapter represents the first piece of published 
guidance designed to aid UK IMTs with the decision of whether to proceed to 
notification following a dental infection control breach. It is influenced not only 
by the published literature but guidance from other developed countries, 
stakeholders and unpublished incident data.  
6.5.1 Algorithm design 
First and foremost, those utilising the algorithm are asked to consider if there is 
evidence of transmission associated with the incidents. Index patient presence 
was incorporated into the toolkit despite some sentiment that identification of 
all affected patients may occur during the pre-PNE investigation, without the 
need for a PNE. However, there is currently not enough evidence to support this 
idea and it is still a prominent decision factor currently used by UKAP and IMTs. 
Those utilising the algorithm are also guided to consider the numerical 
estimation of BBV transmission risk associated with the incident. Inclusion of this 
stage was carefully considered. As previously outlined, currently, stakeholders 
do not significantly base their decision regarding disclosure to patients on these 
values but they did express a desire to do so and recognised that these 
estimations could potentially be very useful following further research. 
Uncertain risk assessments are caused by a multitude of factors. Firstly, there is 
a lack of research into the effectiveness of different instrument 
decontamination steps and their ability to remove blood or inactivate viral 
particles. Secondly, incident publications rarely present numerical risk data and 
when they do, figures are often outdated or irrelevant (Closer 1996; Millership et 
al 2007; Shaw 2008; Weller 1999). Finally, IMT members are often uncertain as 
to the extent and exact nature of the breaches that have occurred, therefore 
they cannot be incorporated into the risk calculation in a meaningful way.  
Numerical estimations were still included in the toolkit as it was felt that should 
the IMT members reach the end of the decision-making process, having 
considered a multitude of other factors, and still be uncertain as to the need for 
a PNE, these values can be used as a final step, either to reassure stakeholders 
that the risk is low and therefore notification is not required or conversely that 
the risk is high and a PNE is needed.  
The algorithm’s numerical risk thresholds are partially based on historical 
incidents’ risk assessments and whether they progressed to patient notification. 
The fact that notification was or was not historically associated with certain 
numerical risk estimations does not mean that these were the main influential 
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factors behind the decision to notify as other factors may have been responsible 
for the IMTs decision. 
A flowchart structure was considered appropriate as it lends itself well to the 
process of decision-making. It allows a measured response with the concept that 
a definitive decision may be made based on the result of a first, highly 
important question or, if necessary, a series of questions which decrease in level 
of perceived importance. Flowcharts were found to be incorporated into a 
number of relevant decision-making guidance sourced from the UK and other 
developed countries (VHA 2018; Healthcare Improvement Scotland 2018; Health 
Service Executive 2015; New South Wales Government 2007; Public Health 
Agency 2018).  
6.5.2 Strengths and weaknesses 
The algorithm incorporates a wide range of decision factors and goes beyond an 
assessment of risk alone meaning that users can be certain that their discussion 
has touched on all salient points. Outside of the risk assessment, users are asked 
to consider the feasibility of limited notification, the credibility of the 
allegations made, the number of patients involved and the potential ethical 
motivations behind notification.  
Given the lack of evidence identified in the scoping review study, especially in 
regard to the nature of infection control breaches and their associated 
transmission risks much of the algorithm is based on expert opinion and the 
incident management experience of a limited number of stakeholders. Some of 
the algorithm questions may also be open to interpretation or unanswerable due 
to limited incident information, and ultimately users may still be faced with a 
series of ethical questions which are challenging to answer and fail to resolve 
IMT indecision. Nonetheless, the algorithm provides a framework to lead 
discussions and ensure actions are deliberated and justified.  
As previously outlined, the algorithm is only suited for use in situations where it 
is postulated that dental instruments have not been properly cleaned and/or 
sterilised. It is not suited to the evaluation of incidents involving other infection 
control breaches such as a lack of handwashing or glove changing. This decision 
reflects the nature of the evidence available, the current design of relevant 
guidance and the expertise of the chief investigator.  
The stakeholder consultation revealed that decision makers desire more 
guidance specifically on the assessment of decontamination processes and how 
effective they may be in removing blood and thus reducing risk. Evidence from 
the literature highlighted that risk assessments are undertaken with 
consideration of the percutaneous risk of transmission; a risk only associated 
with instrument use (Millership et al 2007; Unpublished reports 2001-2017). 
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UKAP and Public Health England gave guidance on the types of procedure that 
are considered more invasive with greater exposure of tissues and hence one can 
extrapolate which instruments are associated with higher risks (PHE 2016). 
Having a dental background meant that the chief investigator was suitably 
placed to provide guidance on dental instrument use. Experts (KR and JB) 
advised that breaches out with instrument contamination, are not the priority in 
a risk assessment as they are considered to be much lower risk events. 
In summary, it was decided that currently, inclusion of non-instrument based 
infection control breaches was not appropriate. The evidence base assessed was 
not deemed to be strong enough to support it. It is currently very difficult to 
assign a qualitative or quantitative risk to a non-instrument associated infection 
control breach as the evidence base does not appear to provide examples of this 
process or enough information to facilitate its creation. 
The algorithm needs further evaluation (and piloting). A second stakeholder 
consultation, such as that suggested in Table 7 (step 15), could serve this 
purpose. It is important that this algorithm is evaluated and validated by a 
greater number of those working in the field. It will also need to be reviewed on 
a regular basis as the evidence base changes and grows. 
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Chapter 7. Discussion 
7.1 What this doctoral study adds 
It appears that infection control breaches occurring in the dental setting are 
being reported and managed with increasing frequency within the UK (5 from 
1990-1999, 15 from 2000-2009 and 25 from 2010-2017). In the US, there have 
been three recent dental incidents resulting in BBV transmission to seven 
patients (Redd et al 2007; Oklahoma State Department of Health 2013; Radcliffe 
et al 2013). UK IMTs currently have access to neither an up-to-date collation of 
dental incident outcomes nor guidance regarding the decision of whether to 
notify patients following a dental infection control breach. In response to this 
lack of evidence and absence of guidance, this doctoral work aimed to 1) source 
and report on all dental incidents which may have resulted in the exposure of 
patients to a BBV transmission risk in developed countries, thereby creating a 
repository of dental incident outcome data and 2) design and present an 
evidence based decision-making algorithm, based on stakeholder input, 
literature evidence and current guidance, which will aid IMTs in the decision of 
whether to notify patients following a dental infection control breach. 
This is the first study of its kind to collate both published and unpublished UK 
dental incident data and to present information regarding both incidents that 
led to notification and those that did not. It is also the first study to gather input 
from UK IMT decision makers regarding PNEs and map the available guidance 
concerning the decision to conduct large-scale notification of patients following 
a healthcare incident. 
This study generated a multitude of research outputs. Use of the scoping review 
study methodology as a comprehensive search strategy and study in its own right 
is a recent practice. The scoping review study protocol presented in Chapter 2 
can therefore be used by those who wish to follow not only the steps laid out by 
Arksey and O’Malley in their original 2005 framework but incorporate 
adaptations presented by other authors (Brien et al 2010; Daudt et al 2013; 
Levac et al 2010; Rumrill et al 2010) and the Joanna Briggs Institute (Peters et al 
2017) over the last ten years.  
The NFBI framework (Chapter 3) represents a novel tool for thematic analysis of 
transcripts in studies which aim to assess the influential factors behind the 
decision to notify patients following a ‘BBV transmission risk’ healthcare incident.  
The data extraction forms used to gather information from incident reports 
(Appendix 14) can be used by those managing incidents to record the details of 
their incident. Use of these forms would create standardised data gathering 
which, in turn, could facilitate inclusion of incident data onto a central database 
and easier comparison and collation of incident outcomes. 
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Data gathered from stakeholders, the literature and guidance documentation 
were used to create the decision-making flowchart presented in Chapter 6. This 
algorithm, desired by decision makers, represents the first UK guidance of its 
kind. It will aid those who have to make the difficult decision of whether to 
notify patients following a low risk incident and hopefully reduce inconsistency 
in the PNE decision-making process. 
7.2 Methodological choices 
The scoping review study approach provided the solution for a scenario in which 
it was difficult to collate data from multiple heterogeneous sources, varying in 
quality and ease of acquisition. Conducting extensive scoping review studies as 
pieces of research in their own right is a fairly new concept. Due to the lack of 
standardisation and formal guidance, elements from various scoping review 
studies described in the literature were used to create a novel process, 
encompassing information from multiple sources (Chapter 2.3).  
The theoretical elements of a scoping review study are clear but can be 
challenging to implement in practice. With no limitations on quality and source, 
the resulting volume of data can be immense, meaning that one must carefully 
consider the search limitations and the amount of data that can be processed in 
a defined length of time. The search process should be iterative but also 
systematic. Both specific search steps and numbers of articles can be difficult to 
organise and eventually present in a clear manner, when inclusion and exclusion 
criteria are in flux. 
Since there is no incorporated quality assessment phase, conclusions should be 
interpreted with caution and meta-analysis of any quantitative data would be ill 
advised. However, without the stringent parameters of an RCT based systematic 
review or meta-analysis, scoping review studies represent an opportunity to 
provide broad overviews of subject areas where current research is limited but 
needing to be examined and made applicable to real world scenarios. 
7.3 Strengths and weaknesses  
The strengths and weaknesses of each specific study phase are discussed within 
each relevant chapter. However, upon consideration of the scoping review study 
as a whole, it represents a one stop source of information for those who are 
faced with management of an incident involving a dental infection control 
breach. None of the three scoping review study components presented here have 
been conducted previously and their execution resulted in a plethora of research 
outcomes, including the derivation of a proposed and desired decision-making 
algorithm. This review clearly highlights gaps in the current evidence base 
meaning that future research can be targeted and useful. 
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As the research questions and inclusion criteria of scoping review studies are 
very broad in nature, the volume of literature generated during their 
preparation is substantial. A balance must therefore be struck between the 
breadth of the review and the time available (Daudt et al 2013). 
There are undoubtedly a number of unpublished, relevant incidents that were 
not included in this review as not every UK IMT provided a response to inquiries. 
Collation and comparison of incident data within this study was very challenging 
as the reporting of data was highly variable due to the absence of standard 
reporting methods and differing sources of information. On certain occasions, 
interpretation of which data values to include was needed which may have 
introduced inaccuracies. As the quality of included studies was not assessed and 
data were limited, high level statistical analysis was also not possible. 
7.4 Main findings 
7.4.1 Factors which contribute to the decision regarding large-
scale patient notification following a ‘BBV transmission risk’ 
dental incident. 
This scoping review study identified many different factors that IMTs considered 
in relation to the decision to notify patients following an infection control failure. 
The influence of the factors, however, varied between incidents, with some 
having more bearing than others, and certain factors being considered important 
to some decision makers but not to others. 
The scoping review study revealed that stakeholders considered the most 
important factor influencing the decision to notify patients to be the risk of 
transmission associated with an incident. However, the level of risk, especially 
in the form of a numerical estimation, was rarely applied to incident 
management in a structured or consistent way, potentially because of the 
challenge in determining the exact nature and extent of breaches, and hence 
risk to patients, in the dental setting. There was a consensus that risks could not 
be calculated accurately and that at best; only qualitative descriptions such as 
‘very low’ or ‘negligible’ could be applied. Decision makers acknowledged that 
transmission risks in dentistry are generally low due to the nature of the 
procedures conducted and the low number of reported dentally related BBV 
transmissions.  
Although clearly influential, conclusions could not easily be drawn from 
historical ‘proven transmission’ events as they are rare, with most occurring long 
ago and/or lacking contextual detail. BBV transmission from a dental HCW to a 
patient has not occurred since 1990 (Ciesielski et al 1994). Patient-to-patient 
BBV transmission in the dental setting is more concerning as it has occurred 
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three times in the past 20 years (Redd et al 2007; Oklahoma State Department of 
Health 2013; Radcliffe et al 2013). The circumstances of these cases are varied 
with a significant degree of speculation as to their causes. The limited 
conclusions that can be drawn suggest that incidents involving syringe reuse, 
multi-dose vials, extractions and oral surgery settings may be most concerning 
(Figure 25).  
Multiple sources suggested that if transmissions have already been identified, or 
are strongly suspected, then notification and testing is undoubtedly necessary 
(Figure 25). However, of the four proven, reported dental transmission events 
since 1990, no further transmissions were identified via their associated PNEs. 
This suggests that transmissions are all reliably detected prior to the use of a 
PNE. However, the decision not to notify when you have such clear evidence 
that a risk exists through presence of an index patient, would need to be clearly 
justified.  
Stakeholders indicated that there was significant pressure to be candid with 
patients following an incident, a mantra which has arisen due to historical 
paternalism and an awareness of the new Duty of Candour legislation, which 
potentially overrides any consideration of risk level. Stakeholders considered 
what the public would want and their reactions to finding out an organisation 
had not been open with them. Unsurprisingly, notification was deemed essential 
when members of the public were already aware of an incident (Figure 25). 
A reluctance to rely completely on numerical estimations combined with a 
limited ‘historical transmission’ evidence base, an inability to ascertain the true 
extent of breaches and consideration of Duty of Candour made incident risk level 
a somewhat moot factor in the decision-making process. 
Transparency was often weighed against the negative outcomes of notification: 
perceived opportunity costs, the significant expenditure of time, staff and 
workload as well as the predicted psychological impact on patients and 
reputational consequences for the dental profession which could result in 
patients not seeking out oral health care. 
Currently, however, one cannot identify with certainty the severity and impact 
of negative PNE consequences. It is assumed, for example, that many patients 
will experience severe anxiety upon being notified of an incident but evidence 
to support this is limited and contradictory (Blatchford et al 2000; Moneith 1995; 
Pashley 1991; Taylor 1992). Certainly, no published evidence exists to support 
the idea that patients would avoid dental treatment following PNE involvement, 
yet this is a prudent and unsurprising concern of decision makers. 
Many conflicting ideas or theories were outlined regarding the effects of 
notification (Figure 24). For example, it was postulated by some authors and 
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stakeholders that patients would lose trust in an organisation that had informed 
them of an incident, but others stated that trust may actually be enhanced 
because the organisation has been open and honest. Without evidence, decision 
makers were unclear if notification resulted in a net increase or decrease in 
patient trust. 
 
Until further studies are conducted, especially regarding feedback from notified 
patients, many of the positive and negative outcomes of notification will be 
based on common sense, personal experience and expert opinion.  
 
Guidance on when open disclosure was required following a healthcare incident 
tended to be vague. When given, notification thresholds were presented in a 
qualitative rather than quantitative manner and most disclosure guidance based 
the requirement for notification on the concept of patient harm already caused. 
Use of these documents for PNE decision-making in an infection control breach 
scenario is therefore impossible as one cannot know for certain whether harm 
(BBV transmission) has occurred before notification and testing. One could also 
argue that the anxiety-based harm caused by notification is ironically 
tantamount to the ‘harm thresholds’ for notification presented in the guidance 
and legislation. 
Guidance for implementing the Duty of Candour legislation within the UK was 
clearly on the minds of decision makers (Figure 25) and indicated that a patient 
should be notified if “in the reasonable opinion of a health care professional” 
the incident “could result in” harm (CQC 2014; GMC 2015; RCS 2015; Scottish 
Government 2018). This terminology is very much open to interpretation. 
Careful examination of a Scottish Government (2018) website figure revealed 
that “could result in” equated to the term “likely to result in” leaving the 
decision maker to contemplate when the outcome of patient harm, following an 
incident, should be considered more likely than not. Furthermore, it is important 
to note that Duty of Candour guidance makes no distinction between an incident 
involving a single patient or many patients. Adhering to Duty of Candour and 
implementing a notification exercise following a large-scale adverse event 
involving many patients, may be logistically challenging. 
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Figure 24: Visual representation of the decision factors and/or PNE features that are in direct 
conflict and/or contradict one another. 
UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING 
EXTENT/NATURE OF ALLEGATIONS 
RELIABLE/MULTIPLE ALLEGATION 
SOURCES, STRONG SUPPORTIVE EVIDENCE 
NOTIFICATION MAY CAUSE SEVERE PATIENT 
ANXIETY 
NOTIFICATION MAY REASSURE PATIENTS 
LETTER MAY ASSURE PATIENT THAT 
TRANSMISSION RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH 
INCIDENT ARE LOW 
ACTION OF SENDING LETTER MAY CAUSE 
PATIENT TO BELIEVE RISKS INVOLVED MUST BE 
SIGNIFICANT 
ONLY A SMALL NUMBER OF INFECTIONS, THAT 
ARE UNRELATED TO THE INCIDENT, MAY BE 
FOUND 
IDENTIFYING ANY INFECTED PERSONS IS MORE 
IMPORTANT NOW AS EFFECTIVE TREATMENTS 
EXIST 
PATIENTS MAY BECOME MISTRUSTFUL OF 
HEALTHCARE SERVICES IF NOTIFIED OF AN 
INCIDENT 
NOTIFICATION MAY ENGENDER MORE TRUST IN 
A SERVICE AS PATIENTS FEEL THAT THE 
ORGANISATION IS BEING OPEN AND HONEST 
BY NOT NOTIFYING PATIENTS, RESOURCES 
WILL BE SAVED 
WITHOUT NOTIFICATION UNDIAGNOSED PATIENTS 
MAY PRESENT LATER WITH COMPLICATIONS THAT 
REQUIRE MORE RESOURCES TO TREAT 
INFECTED PATIENTS MAY REMAIN UNDIAGNOSED 
IF NOTIFICATION IS NOT CONDUCTED 
INFECTED PATIENTS MAY STILL REMAIN 
UNDIAGNOSED IF NOTIFICATION IS DONE, AS 
NOT EVERYONE IS CONTACTED/TESTED 
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Figure 25: Visual representation of factors which appeared to strongly indicate the need to 
notify and test patients following a dental incident as reported by authors of incident literature 
and stakeholder consultation participants. (Images sourced via Microsoft Office 2010 ‘Clip Art’ 
Function) 
Additional influential factors included consideration of the involved practice or 
dentist’s professionalism. Recent cases (Roy et al 2005; Henderson et al 2017) 
highlighted the need to take a closer look at general integrity of the dentist or 
practice involved. Being uncooperative with investigators or additional charges 
of fraud could indicate more widespread or serious breaches and therefore a 
need for notification due to an increased transmission risk. 
Stakeholder consultation participants indicated that if it was predicted that 
execution of a PNE was going to be made easier in some way e.g. due to 
accurate records or a low number of ‘at risk’ patients, one may be more inclined 
to conduct notification. This was not however, really reflected in the literature 
or guidance.  
Financial and opportunity costs, although acknowledged to be significant, were 
not influential to the decision to notify. The focus was on appropriately 
responding to the risks created by the incident and ensuring patient safety. 
Consensus was that cost should not be a highly influential decision-making factor 
and attaching importance to it may be perceived to be immoral, going against 
the concept of a patient-focused response. However, diverting resources away 
from other projects and towards a PNE will affect patient care. It could be 
argued that NHS time and money is taken away from programmes of work which 
may benefit larger numbers of patients than a PNE ever would.  
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In summary, notification appeared to be conducted based on the need to err on 
the side of caution. Patient safety and autonomy were the priorities and with a 
challenging risk assessment, no guidance or information from other IMTs and 
unclear Duty of Candour guidance, PNEs appeared to be utilised in order to 
mitigate the risks of not adhering to Duty of Candour legislation and/or leaving 
patients undiagnosed. Decision makers are in conflict over the need to be 
transparent and non-paternalistic whilst responding appropriately to risks, 
minimising harm caused through patient anxiety and potentially wasting 
resources. 
7.4.2 Research outputs 
The main output of this doctoral study is a novel decision-making algorithm: The 
Patient Notification Exercise post Dental Decontamination Breach (PNE post-DDB) 
Decision-Making Algorithm (Figure 23). This resource is designed to be used by 
IMT members when deciding whether to notify patients following a dental 
decontamination breach. Its design is inspired by the needs of those interviewed 
as part of the stakeholder consultation (Chapter 3), the dental incident 
literature analysed as part of the comprehensive literature review (Chapter 4) 
and current guidance in the subject area (Chapter 5). 
The results of this doctoral study also include the scoping review study protocol 
presented in Chapter 2.3, the NFBI thematic analysis framework presented in 
Appendix 8 and the Incident data extraction/reporting forms presented in 
Appendix 14. 
7.4.3 Conclusions and recommendations  
Anderson et al (2008) outlined that not only can a scoping review study identify 
research gaps but it can also outline future prudent research questions or study 
designs. The following lists conclusions, areas for further study and 
recommendations identified through the scoping review study undertaken for 
this doctorate. 
1. Paucity in the guidance available, for both the risk assessment and 
decision-making phases of dental infection control incident management, 
was the main research gap outlined by authors and stakeholders. The 
absence of suitable guidance in this area is an issue encountered more 
frequently as infection control breaches were shown to account for an 
increasing proportion of dental incidents (10.7% during 1990-1999 to 37.3% 
during 2010-2017). Use of general incident management grading systems, 
in their current form, does not result in clear messages regarding the 
decision to notify patients. Many of the grading systems emphasise the 
factors that should be considered when assessing the impact that an 
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incident will have and provide a broad overview of the stages involved in 
incident assessment and management, but further detail is needed, 
especially regarding the decision to notify patients. The decision making 
algorithm presented in this thesis should be piloted in response to a 
relevant scenario so that stakeholders can provide feedback on its utility 
and facilitate any necessary changes/improvements (Figure 23). 
2. Not only are decision makers hampered by an absence of guidance but 
also an inability or struggle to ascertain what others have done in the past. 
There is no central repository for incident data, incident details are rarely 
published and there is a lack of sharing of lessons learned amongst public 
health teams. A large proportion of UK incidents do not result in 
publication (87%). This lack of publication activity combined with 
experiences not being shared internally amongst IMTs, means that both 
lessons learned and incident data are not disseminated to decision makers, 
resulting in inconsistencies in responses to similar UK dental infection 
control breaches. When reports are made available or their data are 
presented in published journal articles, no standardised method of 
reporting exists and there is great variability in the types of journal that 
feature articles on patient notification.  Findings from this doctoral study 
support either the creation of a central repository of ‘BBV transmission 
risk’ incident information or an increase in publication activity with 
agreement on the type of journal most suited for presentation of such 
articles. Either way, standardised data collection needs to be encouraged 
to facilitate comparison of homogenous incident outcomes. Standard data 
collection forms, such as those presented in Appendix 14, should be 
distributed for use by UK IMTs and considered by public health journals as 
the minimum data set required for publication. 
3. Use of the decision-making algorithm presented in Chapter 6 is 
encouraged. The algorithm is designed to guide both the flow and 
structure of decision-making, reassure IMTs that all necessary factors have 
been considered and provide consistent justifications for decisions 
reached, which can be communicated to third parties easily with 
reference to the algorithm. As VHA guidance outlines, the decision 
process should be “documented in a way that can be easily referenced for 
any similar future cases” (2018). Although useful, the algorithm is based 
on the limited, available evidence that currently exists and therefore will 
require regular reassessment and review including the consideration of 
wider infection control breaches such as glove use or hand hygiene. 
4. The Duty of Candour and its application to large-scale incidents and 
dental practices must be clarified. It is recommended that further 
guidance is formulated, by those who originally drafted the Organisational 
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Duty of Candour legislation, to aid IMT members in understanding its 
applicability to large-scale patient disclosure. 
5. A great number of papers, which discuss large-scale patient notification, 
referred to the significant, predicted psychological impact that being 
informed of the risk of BBV infection, will have on patients (Shaw 2008; 
Croser 2006; Conrad et al 2011; Closen 1996; Hébert 2015; Hancocks 2008; 
Martin 2006; Blatchford et al 2000; Pashley et al 1991; Monteith et al 
1995). On examination of historical incident reports the most commonly 
quoted reason for not proceeding with patient notification, after ‘low 
transmission risk’ and ‘absence of associated transmissions’, was concern 
regarding the distress/anxiety that would be caused (Table 29). In the 
stakeholder consultation, the ‘degree of psychological distress caused to 
patients’ was the most commonly reported incident outcome for which 
participants desired more research data (Table 19). As an addendum to 
the scoping review study, a study proposal was developed to examine the 
psychological impact of patient notification following a dental incident, 
the ‘PINE’ study. Appendix 22 outlines the process used to develop the 
questionnaire designed to gather information on the psychological impact 
of being notified of a dental incident – a ‘think aloud’ interview process. 
Comments on the usability and appropriateness of the questionnaire were 
gathered from study volunteers and used to shape the design of the 
questionnaire in iterative stages. Appendix 23 outlines a proposal for the 
PINE study (Psychological Impact of Notification Exercises). It is proposed 
that the questionnaire, developed through the ‘think aloud’ study process, 
would be posted to those involved in a notification exercise. 
Recommendations regarding study design, sample size and data analysis 
are given. The questionnaire itself is presented in Appendix 24. 
6. Authors and stakeholders highlighted the need to explore the financial 
and opportunity costs of the notification process. Cost was never the sole 
influential factor behind the decision not to notify patients but was shown 
to be important. A detailed cost evaluation is needed to truly understand 
specifically the opportunity costs of not pursuing other healthcare 
projects such as alternative means of testing or aiming to further improve 
dental infection control. A cost evaluation would also ideally convey the 
money saved through earlier detection and consequent earlier, and thus 
less intensive, treatment of BBV infections.  
7. Participants in the stakeholder consultation felt that exploration of the 
effectiveness of different stages in the decontamination cycle would aid 
in the creation of a more robust risk assessment. An awareness of the 
effectiveness of different processes in the removal of blood from 
instruments or inactivation of viruses would allow an assessment to be 
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made as to how serious the omission of a particular step or steps is, in 
terms of transmission risk. One must consider, however, if pursuit of a 
stronger risk assessment is worthwhile when there will always be 
uncertainty caused by not knowing exactly how a procedure was 
done/breach occurred and based on the concept that Duty of Candour 
may override any risk assessment. 
8. Findings from this doctoral study strongly support utilisation of a limited 
notification response where possible. Limited notification can be seen as 
a compromise between the two options of conducting or not conducting a 
PNE. Limited notification involves adapting the process in a manner which 
reduces expenditure of resources or involvement of all practice patients. 
Limited notification has numerous benefits. By notifying only those 
patients who are deemed to be at the highest risk, IMTs somewhat adhere 
to the principles of Duty of Candour whilst resources and time are saved 
with less patients having to undergo the distress of notification and 
testing. The parameters of a limited notification process are also flexible 
based on initial exercise findings. Should any diagnoses connected to the 
incident be identified during an initial phase of notification and testing, 
further patients can be contacted. This means that a measured response 
in relation to the risks involved can be made. It is also important to note 
that no reports were identified during this scoping review study which 
described a negative response by exposed patients who later discovered 
that they had not been notified – one of the key concerns when 
considering limited notification. 
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Appendix 1: Published BBV healthcare associated outbreaks 
occurring in the UK between 2000 and 2018. 
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Year Setting 
Number of patients 
involved in 
outbreakᵃ 
(healthcare 
associated 
transmissions only) 
Suspected mode of transmission Reference 
2002 
General 
Medical 
Wards / 
Surgery 
5 HBV 
(Source patient 
transmitted HBV to 
4 patients) 
Source to patients A, C and D – 
Unknown, but stayed on same ward. 
Source was in isolation when sharing 
a ward with patients C and D. 
 
Source to patient B – Both had 
abdominal surgery performed on the 
same day by the same surgical team. 
Patient B operated on directly after 
source patient but in different 
theatre. Theorised that surgeon’s 
head torch may have been vector for 
transmission. 
Harling et al 
2007. Passage 
from India: an 
outbreak of 
hepatitis B 
linked to a 
patient who 
acquired 
infection from 
health care 
overseas. 
2004 
to  
2006 
Care Homes 
18 HBV 
(3 outbreaksᵇ. 
Outbreak A involved 
7 residents of the 
same care home, 
plus another 
resident from a 
different care 
home. Outbreaks B 
and C were also 
linked to care 
homes: 3 linked 
cases in one, 7 in 
the other.) 
All cases linked to BGM device use. 
In outbreak A, BGM devices were 
known to be shared in the care 
home with 7 linked cases. 
Duffell et al 
2010. Five 
hepatitis B 
outbreaks in 
care homes in 
the UK 
associated with 
deficiencies in 
infection control 
practice in blood 
glucose 
monitoring 
2011 Renal Ward 
2 HBV 
(HBV/HCV co-
infected source 
patient transmitted 
to one other 
patient) 
Source and index patient shared 
same renal ward for 6 days and were 
in adjacent beds. Both had CKD and 
insulin dependent diabetes. Both 
underwent frequent BGM. 
Ward was found to have “poor hand 
hygiene [practices], visible 
contamination of blood glucose 
testing equipment and other shared 
equipment with blood, visible blood 
within the procedure room and lack 
of clarity of ward cleaning 
procedures. [...] the ward was 
cramped and cluttered with 
equipment. There was also a high 
Kliner et al 
2015. 
Identification, 
investigation 
and 
management of 
patient-to-
patient hepatitis 
B transmission 
within an 
inpatient renal 
ward in North 
West England. 
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turnover of patients.”  
 
“source patient had an open surgical 
wound on his diabetic foot, which he 
would not allow staff to dress 
appropriately. The patient 
repeatedly removed the dressings 
and frequently contaminated the 
floor and his bed linen with blood. 
Although this blood was promptly 
cleaned [...] He also would not stay 
around his bed space to prevent 
contamination of the environment 
and frequently sat on the index 
patient's bed.” 
2014 
A&E 
department 
2 HCV 
(1 source patient 
transmitted to one 
other patient) 
“Although the exact route of 
transmission could not be 
determined [investigations] 
indicated that the most plausible 
explanation was surface 
contamination of shared equipment, 
particularly the blood gas analyser, 
combined with staff failing to change 
gloves after each procedure and 
perform hand hygiene.” “ 
Johannessen et 
al 2018. 
Molecular and 
epidemiological 
evidence of 
patient-to-
patient hepatitis 
C virus 
transmission in 
a Scottish 
emergency 
department. 
2017 Renal Ward 
2 HCV 
(1 source patient 
transmitted to one 
other patient) 
Source and index patient shared 16 
days of treatment on the ward. 
Inspections revealed poor hand 
hygiene frequency and technique 
with inappropriate PPE. Elements of 
the environment and care 
equipment were soiled with blood. 
Garvey et al 
2017. Use of 
genome 
sequencing to 
identify 
hepatitis C virus 
transmission in 
a renal 
healthcare 
setting. 
A&E – Accident and Emergency 
BGM – Blood Glucose Monitoring 
CKD – Chronic Kidney Disease 
HBV – Hepatitis B Virus 
HCV – Hepatitis C Virus 
PPE – Personal Protective Equipment 
a = defined in this table as two or more linked cases 
b = Two events considered ‘outbreaks’ in this article where not considered as such in this table. One 
case was incorporated into outbreak A and the other only involved identification of a single HBV positive 
resident. 
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Appendix 2: Blood borne virus testing of 2250 patients in an 
unusual, repeated dental patient notification exercise: 
challenges faced and lessons learnt. Henderson et al. 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
289 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
290 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
291 
 
 
 
 
 
 
292 
 
 
 
 
 
 
293 
 
 
 
 
 
 
294 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
295 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
296 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Participant information sheet for stakeholder 
consultation 
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Appendix 4: Stakeholder consultation interview questioning 
route 
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Appendix 5: Stakeholder consultation consent form 
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Appendix 6: Thematic analysis process conducted on example stakeholder transcript extracts 
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1. Extract 
2. Distillation of 
concept/idea 
3. Interpretation in 
context of CFIR 
framework 
4. CFIR thematic 
allocations 
5. Changes to themes with 
explanations 
6. Final thematic code 
applied 
“so the most important 
thing is early diagnosis 
and the fact that we have 
a treatment that is 
effective and em less side 
effects and so people can 
actually  either get some, 
with Hep C, get treated or 
with HIV reduce viral load 
and also transmission as 
well” 
Notifying and testing 
patients will facilitate 
diagnosis of blood borne 
viruses and allow patients 
to access effective, 
modern treatments 
earlier. 
 
 
The stakeholder is 
aware of the patients’ 
needs and that 
conducting a 
notification exercise 
with testing may meet 
those needs, however, 
it could also simply be 
described as a benefit 
or relative advantage 
over not conducting 
notification. 
Outer Setting (A) – 
Patient needs and 
resources 
 
Intervention 
Characteristics (C) – 
Relative advantage 
Relative advantage was developed 
into the themes perceived 
benefits and negatives with the 
concept of ‘meeting patient’s 
needs’ being incorporated into the 
benefits theme. 
Once all applicable codes were 
incorporated into the ‘benefits’ 
theme. This theme was broken 
down with all codes being 
allocated to one of five codes 
which included code B1. 
Benefits - B1 
(Diagnoses made resulting 
in earlier treatment and 
reduction of onwards 
transmission) 
“with everything we do, 
because we have limited 
resources there’s always 
an opportunity cost so 
especially with big 
incidents like the one in 
(location), [...] a number 
of public health 
professionals, [...] when 
they were dealing with 
this exercise, they 
couldn’t do, they couldn’t 
spend the time on doing 
other things possibly even 
you know even 
preventative...” 
Within the NHS there is an 
awareness of finite 
resources. It is important 
to consider that dedicating 
staff time to one project 
will deprive another 
project of time and 
attention. The effect of 
this may be more 
significant if the incident is 
large and the ‘other 
project’ is considered 
important. 
The stakeholder is 
clearly describing 
opportunity costs 
which would fit into 
the CFIR cost theme, 
however, he/she also 
discusses a 
consideration of 
available resources and 
relates this idea of 
back to his/her own 
board/trust 
experiences and an 
awareness that 
notification was not 
compatible with their 
ongoing projects and 
Intervention 
Characteristics (H) 
– Cost 
 
Inner Setting (E2) – 
Available Resources 
 
Inner Setting (D2) - 
Compatibility 
It was recognised that 
stakeholders would often discuss 
and consider the resource and 
opportunity costs of a notification 
exercise in the context of what 
was available/ongoing within their 
boards/trusts therefore the 
themes of ‘cost’, ‘available 
resources’ and ‘compatibility’ were 
incorporated into one overarching 
theme of cost which included staff 
time, opportunity costs and direct 
monetary output.  
Once there was a move away from 
themes being based on the CFIR 
structure of different 
settings/contexts and their 
Negatives - N2 
(Resources used, time, 
staff, money. 
Workload/logistics. 
Opportunity costs.) 
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1. Extract 
2. Distillation of 
concept/idea 
3. Interpretation in 
context of CFIR 
framework 
4. CFIR thematic 
allocations 
5. Changes to themes with 
explanations 
6. Final thematic code 
applied 
regular objectives.  influential impact. Cost was 
assigned to the final broad theme 
of ‘negatives’. 
“Their views would be 
more towards going 
public rather than not 
going public because 
politicians, being 
politicians and you know 
increasingly politicians 
becoming very...what’s 
the word I’m looking for? 
They’re very populist. 
They want to be popular 
with the public therefore 
they take the views, that, 
if in doubt tell them and 
that’s the way things are 
moving and societies 
moving so think that has 
significant influence 
because it’s very difficult 
for you, we can give them 
medical advice but 
unfortunately we as 
professionals don’t run 
the NHS, it’s run by 
politicians and senior 
managers and they will 
take the view, is that if 
The opinions of 
government very much 
influence the decision 
making process because 
the incident management 
team are answerable to 
them. If examined by the 
government, the decision 
to notify is not based on 
medical information or a 
specific level of risk – it is 
based on public opinion 
and the public desire 
transparency. 
The stakeholder is 
describing outer 
setting influences; 
courses of action 
dictated by the 
government and public 
opinion. He/she 
touches on patient 
needs ie. the public’s 
need for transparency 
but there is more a 
focus on the decision 
being guided by 
governmental input 
and their policies. 
There is also a feeling 
of slight tension in 
regards to the fact that 
the decision is coming 
from a standpoint 
where perceived public 
opinion is being 
prioritised at the 
expense of a medical 
based risk assessment. 
Outer setting (B) – 
Cosmopolitanism 
 
Outer setting (D) – 
External policy and 
incentives 
 
Intervention 
characteristics (A) – 
Intervention source 
It was felt that a new theme was 
need which focused on the 
influence of outside organisations 
and which would incorporate the 
CFIR themes of cosmopolitanism 
and intervention source. The 
concept of an overarching theme 
was devised which would focus on 
what the stakeholder felt they 
should do based on external 
forces and influences. This theme 
was called ‘standards’.  
The CFIR themes of ‘peer pressure’ 
and ‘external policy and incentives’ 
remained virtually unchanged 
throughout the thematic analysis 
process and were allocated to this 
overarching ‘standards’ theme. 
The theme ‘influence of outside 
organisations, experts, 
government and higher 
management’ was created and 
placed within the ‘standards’ 
theme set.  
External policy and incentives was 
renamed ‘guidance, law and 
policy’ and was eventually 
Standards – S3 
(Influence of outside 
organisations, experts, 
government, higher 
management, guidance, 
law and policy) 
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1. Extract 
2. Distillation of 
concept/idea 
3. Interpretation in 
context of CFIR 
framework 
4. CFIR thematic 
allocations 
5. Changes to themes with 
explanations 
6. Final thematic code 
applied 
there is a risk you need to 
let people know and I 
think that has significantly 
influenced a lot of the 
decision making process.” 
incorporated into the ‘influence of 
outside organisations, experts, 
government and higher 
management’ theme as it was 
recognised that all policies and 
guidance being accessed by the 
incident management teams came 
from outside organisations. 
“Em, well, your dental, 
the dental. You’re either 
gonna be dependent on 
records directly from the 
dental practice or from 
practitioner services [...] 
So, inevitably there’s, 
there’s gonna be record 
flaws, the data might not 
be right, person might 
have moved, person 
might have died, person 
might have changed 
dentists em, so all those 
issues come into the data 
and accuracy [...] and 
whether you can contact 
them.” 
Incident management 
team members must rely 
on data from external 
sources which may be 
inaccurate or incomplete. 
This makes notification of 
all at risk patients difficult.  
This could be 
considered an issue of 
poor access to 
complete and correct 
information during the 
notification process 
which would be 
assigned to the CFIR 
theme; ‘access to 
knowledge and 
information’ however, 
on a higher level this 
also represents a 
difficulty or inability to 
notify patients which is 
the purpose of patient 
notification exercise 
hence it could also be 
considered under the 
CFIR themes of 
‘complexity’ and ‘self-
Intervention 
characteristics (F) – 
Complexity 
 
Inner setting (E3) – 
Access to 
knowledge and 
information 
 
Inner setting (B) – 
Self-efficacy 
Complexity was drawn out as 
broad theme in itself with the 
overall idea behind this theme 
being the concept of whether 
certain factors such as knowledge 
of access to data and knowledge 
of population characteristics 
would indicate that it would be 
more or less difficult to achieve 
the aims of a notification exercise. 
Because this concept was one of 
estimation and perception the 
theme was renamed as ‘perceived 
complexity’.  
 
The theme of perceived 
complexity incorporated the CFIR 
themes of ‘complexity’, ‘access to 
knowledge and information’, ‘self-
efficacy’. 
 
Perceived complexity - C1 
(Predicted efficacy of 
notification exercise (are 
we going to be able to 
contact patients, get 
them to take up testing, 
will we find any 
diagnoses) also includes 
availability of and access 
to data. Profile of local 
area/population 
(ages/language barriers, 
mental capacity)  
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1. Extract 
2. Distillation of 
concept/idea 
3. Interpretation in 
context of CFIR 
framework 
4. CFIR thematic 
allocations 
5. Changes to themes with 
explanations 
6. Final thematic code 
applied 
efficacy’ The theme of ‘evidence strength 
and quality’ was also considered 
to be under the ‘Perceived 
complexity’ thematic heading but 
only in relation to evidence of 
efficacy of logistical steps in the 
notification process e.g. testing 
uptake, not evidence of 
transmissions or diagnoses found 
which were included in the 
‘transmission risk’ theme 
structure. 
“Em and just I think and if 
I’m being honest I think 
that, some of the trouble 
historically as well is that 
those that are kind of 
involved in risk 
assessment are those that 
have been involved in 
regulation as well, I think 
that biases people as well, 
if I’m being honest, you 
know, if you were 
responsible for inspecting 
the practice and then 
there’s a problem, there 
is a tendency to want to 
do nothing.” 
A decision maker may be 
disinclined to recommend 
notification because of 
their role within the 
organisation and their 
connection to the incident 
in question.  
This extract is clearly 
related to the CFIR 
theme of 
‘Characteristics of 
Individuals’ with the 
individuals being the 
incident management 
team, but crosses 
some thematic 
boundaries within that 
theme. In this extract 
the stakeholder is 
outlining that the 
decision maker’s belief 
regarding notification 
is that it indicates a 
significant issue and 
that if instigated would 
Characteristics of 
Individuals (A) – 
Knowledge and 
Beliefs about the 
Intervention 
 
Characteristics of 
Individuals (D) – 
Individual 
Identification with 
Organisation 
 
Characteristics of 
Individuals (E) – 
Other Personal 
attributes 
It was felt that it was not 
beneficial to have as many sub-
themes for ‘Characteristics of 
Individuals’ as are presented in the 
CFIR framework. All extracts which 
were deemed to link to one or 
more of the ‘Characteristics of 
Individuals’ sub-themes were 
assigned to a theme, now labelled 
‘Characteristics of IMT’. 
 
This theme was then broken down 
into two themes one of which 
focused on personal opinion of the 
decision maker in relation to 
notification and personal 
experiences/training of the 
decision maker. 
Characteristics of IMT – 
IMT 1 (Personal 
experiences/training) 
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1. Extract 
2. Distillation of 
concept/idea 
3. Interpretation in 
context of CFIR 
framework 
4. CFIR thematic 
allocations 
5. Changes to themes with 
explanations 
6. Final thematic code 
applied 
call into the question 
the actions of those 
who led to its 
occurrence this would 
relate to the theme of 
‘knowledge and beliefs 
about the 
intervention’. 
However, it also eludes 
to the motivation of 
the decision maker and 
how the decision 
maker sees themselves 
within the 
organisation. 
 
In the end, the two sub-themes 
were merged to facilitate thematic 
analysis as it was noted from the 
data that personal opinions about 
notification were always fuelled by 
personal experience and that the 
two were always linked.  
“I think in our situation 
because we could never 
pin down what the risk 
was because people 
weren’t being honest we 
could never reassure 
ourselves that it definitely 
hadn’t happened. Em, so 
we kind of had to.”  
If you cannot ascertain 
exactly what types of 
breaches have occurred 
then an assumption should 
be made that patients are 
at significant risk and 
notification/testing is 
necessary. 
In terms of the 
influences shown here 
regarding 
implementation of a 
patient notification 
exercise, many aspects 
can be considered. This 
extract refers to the 
credibility of evidence 
behind decision to 
implement notification 
and the confidence 
that it will have the 
desired outcomes of 
notifying and testing 
Too many themes 
deemed applicable, 
extract kept 
separate to be 
reanalysed 
following further 
development of 
themes 
Extracts which dealt with the 
concept that transmission risk to 
patients would influence decision 
making were challenging to place 
using the CFIR framework as it 
could be considered from many 
different viewpoints, none of 
which would allow deeper 
exploration of the theme or give 
enough focus to this important 
influential factor.  
It was clear that rather than 
dividing all the aspects to 
transmission risk and spreading 
them across multiple non-cohesive 
Transmission risk – T3 
(Incident details, nature 
of breaches, length of 
time patients at risk, 
types of procedures 
performed. Structure of 
practice/clinic/integrity of 
practice creates suspicion 
of further more serious 
breaches). 
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1. Extract 
2. Distillation of 
concept/idea 
3. Interpretation in 
context of CFIR 
framework 
4. CFIR thematic 
allocations 
5. Changes to themes with 
explanations 
6. Final thematic code 
applied 
patients who are truly 
at significant risk 
(‘Evidence strength and 
quality’) It also 
represents a moral or 
ethical imperative to 
err on the side of 
caution when it comes 
to consideration of 
patient safety 
(‘Culture’). It also 
represents a 
‘Complexity’ in 
achieving the goals of 
the intervention and 
an inability to gain the 
necessary ‘Access to 
knowledge and 
information’. 
CFIR sub themes it would be 
prudent to create a new theme – 
‘Transmission risk’. This theme 
would incorporate all the factors 
that contribute towards the 
perceived transmission risk. 
 
Once all applicable codes were 
incorporated into the 
‘transmission risk’ theme. This 
theme was broken down with all 
codes being allocated to one of six 
codes which became four after 
condensing ideas and merging 
concepts, for example, ‘structure 
of practice/clinic/integrity of 
practice creates suspicion of 
further more serious breaches’ and 
‘type of pathogen involved’ were 
included under the theme 
‘Incident details’. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7: Interpretation of the Consolidated Framework 
for Implementation Research (CFIR) framework based on the 
context of a dental patient notification exercise decision 
making process 
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CFIR framework codes Descriptions from CFIR framework 
Chief investigator’s 
description/interpretation 
Intervention Characteristics 
Intervention source Perception of key stakeholders about 
whether the intervention is 
externally or internally developed 
Was the plan to notify/not notify 
created by the board/trust or an 
outside organisation? 
Evidence strength/quality Stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
quality and validity of evidence 
supporting the belief that the 
intervention will have the desired 
outcomes 
How much quality evidence is 
there to suggest that what the 
board/trust does will work and 
meet its intended aims? 
Relative advantage Stakeholders perception of the 
advantage of implementing the 
intervention versus an alternative 
solution 
Advantages of one plan compared 
to other courses of action. 
Adaptability The degree to which an intervention 
can be adapted, tailored, refined or 
reinvented to meet local needs 
The degree to which the 
notification process can be 
adapted to meet local needs. 
Trialability The ability to test the intervention on 
a small scale in the organisation and 
to be able to reverse course (undo 
implementation) if warranted 
Can the intervention be tested on 
a small scale and reverse/cancel if 
needed? 
Complexity Perceived difficulty of 
implementation, reflected by 
duration, scope, radicalness, 
disruptiveness, centrality and 
intricacy and number of steps 
required to implement. 
Perceived difficulty of conducting 
notification ie: duration, scope, 
radicalness, disruptiveness, 
centrality and intricacy and 
number of steps required to 
implement.  
Design Quality and Packaging Perceived excellence in how the 
intervention is bundled, presented 
and assembled 
How is the intervention bundled 
and presented? 
Cost Costs of the intervention and costs 
associated with implementing that 
intervention including investment, 
supply, and opportunity costs. 
Costs associated with the 
intervention including investment, 
supply, and opportunity costs. 
Outer Setting 
Patients’ needs and 
resources 
The extent to which patient needs, 
as well as barriers and facilitators to 
meet those needs are accurately 
Are patients’ needs and the ability 
to fulfil them, well known by the 
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known and prioritized by the 
organization. 
board/trust. 
Cosmopolitanism The degree to which an organization 
is networked with other external 
organizations 
How well is the board/trust 
networked with other appropriate 
organisations? 
Peer pressure Mimetic or competitive pressure to 
implement an intervention; typically 
because most or other key peer or 
competing organizations have 
already implemented or in a bid for a 
competitive edge. 
Pressure to notify or not notify 
based on what other 
organisations/boards/trusts have 
done in the past. 
External Policies and 
Incentives 
A broad construct that includes 
external strategies to spread 
interventions including policy and 
regulations (governmental or other 
central entity), external mandates, 
recommendations and guidelines, 
pay-for-performance, collaboratives, 
and public or benchmark reporting. 
External guidance and/or policies 
Inner Setting 
Structural Characteristics The social architecture, age, 
maturity, and size of an organization. 
The board/trust’s size, experience 
and social architecture. 
Networks and 
Communications 
The nature and quality of webs of 
social networks and the nature and 
quality of formal and informal 
communications within an 
organization. 
The nature and quality of formal 
and informal communications 
within a board or trust 
Culture Norms, values, and basic 
assumptions of a given organization. 
Norms, values and basic 
assumptions of a board/trust. 
Implementation Climate The absorptive capacity for change, 
shared receptivity of involved 
individuals to an intervention and 
the extent to which use of that 
intervention will be rewarded, 
supported, and expected within their 
organization. 
The board/trust’s capacity for 
change, how receptive they are to 
change. How will change be 
rewarded/acknowledged. 
Tension for Change The degree to which stakeholders 
perceive the current situation as 
intolerable or needing change. 
The degree to which decision 
makers desire change. 
Compatibility The degree of tangible fit between How does the intervention fit with 
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meaning and values attached to the 
intervention by involved individuals, 
how those align with individuals’ 
own norms, values, and perceived 
risks and needs, and how the 
intervention fits with existing 
workflows and systems. 
decision makers existing values, 
work systems. 
Relative priority Individuals’ shared perception of the 
importance of the implementation 
within the organization 
Decision makers perception of 
how important the intervention is. 
Organisational Incentives 
and Rewards 
Extrinsic incentives such as goal-
sharing awards, performance 
reviews, promotions, and raises in 
salary and less tangible incentives 
such as increased stature or respect. 
Board/trust based incentives and 
rewards for following a particular 
course of action in relation to 
notification 
Goals and Feedback The degree to which goals are clearly 
communicated, acted upon, and fed 
back to staff and alignment of that 
feedback with goals. 
How clearly are the goals of the 
intervention communicated to 
staff, acted upon and fed back 
Learning Climate A climate in which: a) leaders express 
their own fallibility and need for 
team members’ assistance and input; 
b) team members feel that they are 
essential, valued, and knowledgeable 
partners in the change process; c) 
individuals feel psychologically safe 
to try new methods; and d) there is 
sufficient time and space for 
reflective thinking and evaluation. 
A positive working environment 
that can handle the intetrvention 
and have time to reflect on it. 
Readiness for 
Implementation 
Tangible and immediate indicators of 
organizational commitment to its 
decision to implement an 
intervention 
Clear commitment by board/trust 
staff members to the decision and 
the course of action. 
Leadership Engagement Commitment, involvement, and 
accountability of leaders and 
managers with the implementation. 
Commitment, involvement and 
accountability from 
leaders/managers 
Available resources The level of resources dedicated for 
implementation and on-going 
operations including money, training, 
education, physical space, and time. 
Money, training, education, 
physical space and time that can 
be dedicated to the 
implementation 
Access to knowledge and 
information 
Ease of access to digestible 
information and knowledge about 
Ease of access to information re: 
notification/non-notification and 
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the intervention and how to 
incorporate it into work tasks. 
how to do it. 
Characteristics of Individuals 
Knowledge and Beliefs about 
the Intervention 
Individuals’ attitudes toward and 
value placed on the intervention as 
well as familiarity with facts, truths, 
and principles related to the 
intervention.  
Individuals’ attitudes towards 
notification/non-notification; facts, 
truths, principles. 
Self-efficacy Individual belief in their own 
capabilities to execute courses of 
action to achieve implementation 
goals. 
Individual belief in own capabilities 
to execute a course of action to 
achieve goals. 
Individual Stage of Change Characterization of the phase an 
individual is in, as he or she 
progresses toward skilled, 
enthusiastic, and sustained use of 
the intervention. 
Characterization of the phase an 
individual is in, as he or she 
progresses toward skilled, 
enthusiastic, and sustained use of 
the intervention. 
Individual Identification with 
Organisation 
A broad construct related to how 
individuals perceive the organization 
and their relationship and degree of 
commitment with that organization. 
How do the decision makers 
perceive their own board/trust, 
their relationship with the 
board/trust and their commitment 
to it. 
Other Personal Attributes A broad construct to include other 
personal traits such as tolerance of 
ambiguity, intellectual ability, 
motivation, values, competence, 
capacity, and learning style. 
Personality traits of decision 
makers; intellectual ability, 
motivation, values etc. 
The CFIR framework theme ‘Process’, and its associated sub-themes, was not included in the analysis of this 
study’s data. 
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Appendix 8: Notification following BBV transmission risk 
incidents (NFBI) framework 
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Appendix 9: NFBI framework intercoder reliability and 
agreement exercise 
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An intercoder reliability and agreement testing phase was employed to evaluate 
the suitability of the NFBI framework which resulted from thematic analysis of 
the stakeholder consultation transcripts (Chapter 3).  
Inter-coder reliability is based on the concept that two individuals will assign the 
same thematic code from a framework to the same piece of data, in isolation. 
Inter-coder agreement is achieved through two individuals being able to agree 
on the application of the same code following discussion and debate (Campbell 
et al 2013). 
Two rounds of coding were conducted. The CI had already established the ‘units 
of meaning’ that made up a given transcript and codes were applied to these 
units in each case without conferring. Meetings were held to discuss the 
resulting percentage of matching codes and whether the framework needed to 
be altered or simplified to increase inter-coder reliability.  
A suitable level of inter-coder reliability is decided upon by the coders and 
relates to the intended purpose of the framework. As a rough guide Campbell et 
al (2013) outlined that most would consider a reliability percentage of 70-100% 
to be suitable.  
Once a suitable level of inter-coder reliability has been achieved, a discussion 
concerning any code disagreements can be undertaken to establish an associated 
level of inter-coder agreement. 
Two rounds of inter-coder reliability testing were conducted followed by one 
inter-coder agreement discussion. 
Round 1 of inter-coder reliability rating 
Having coded and thematically analysed the study’s 11 interview transcripts, the 
CI possessed an initial draft of the NFBI framework. The themes for the NFBI 
framework were presented to a further two coders (KR and JB) in a spreadsheet 
format. Each code was accompanied by a description and two corresponding, 
example, transcript segments.  
In each round of coding, two transcripts (an approximate 10% sample of all data) 
were separated into sections to be coded in isolation without conferring. 
The NFBI framework comprises ‘code families’, with secondary codes relating to 
the overall primary codes. This meant that inter-coder reliability could be 
calculated for both primary code assignment and entire code (primary and 
secondary) application.  
Overall inter-coder reliability was calculated by dividing the number of times 
coders agreed by the number of segments available to code (Campbell et al 
2013). 
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Results from the first round of the NFBI framework inter-coder reliability exercise 
Coders comparedA 
Percentage agreement for 
primary code 
Percentage agreement for 
Primary and Secondary code 
JB and LH 59/98 (60%) 43/98 (44%) 
KR and LH 61/98 (62%) 51/98 (52%) 
JB and KR 64/98 (65%) 42/98 (43%) 
 Mean = 62% Mean = 46% 
 
Round 2 of inter-coder reliability rating 
Following this initial coding exercise, a meeting was held to restructure the 
framework through collapsing, combining and redefining themes (Campbell et al 
2013). The CI then selected a further two transcripts and each coder coded the 
segments using the newly altered framework. Results are shown in the table 
below. The mean percentage agreement results between the first and second 
rounds of coding went up by 15% for application of both the ‘correct’ primary 
and secondary code. 
Results from the second round of the NFBI framework inter-coder reliability exercise 
Coders compared 
Percentage agreement for 
primary code 
Percentage agreement for 
Primary and Secondary code 
JB and LH 108/155 (70%) 96/155 (62%) 
KR and LH 114/155 (74%) 99/155 (64%) 
JB and KR 105/155 (68%) 90/155 (58%) 
 Mean = 71% Mean = 61% 
 
A level of inter-coder agreement was established (87%, 134/155) through 
meeting to discuss coding discrepancies and ascertaining whether a single code 
could be agreed upon for each segment. 
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Appendix 10: Outline of search strategy conducted as part of 
scoping review study literature review 
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Search within Ovid MEDLINE(R) In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations and 
Ovid MEDLINE(R) <1946 to Present> 
 
1. (dental OR dentist* OR “oral surger*” OR “dental practice*” OR 
orthodonti*).mp 
2. (“look back*” OR “large-scale adverse event*” OR LSAE OR LSAEs OR LBE OR 
LBEs OR lookback* OR (notif* adj2 patient*) OR (“medical error* adj2 disclos*) OR 
(“dental error*” adj2 disclos*).mp 
3. 1 AND 2 
4. (inadequate* OR poor* OR breach* OR improper* OR deficien* OR fail* OR 
inappropriate* OR unclean* OR unsteril* OR “not steril*”).mp 
5. (decontamin* OR (infection* adj2 control*) OR clean* OR sterili#ation OR 
sterili*).mp 
6. 1 AND 4 AND 5 
7. (transmission* OR infection* OR infected OR spread OR contracted).mp 
8. (BBV* OR HIV OR HCV OR HBV OR hepatitis OR “human immunodeficiency” OR 
AIDS OR “acquired immunodeficiency” OR “hep B” OR “hep C” OR “blood 
borne”).mp 
9. 1 AND 7 AND 8 
10. 3 OR 6 OR 9 
11. Limit 10 to 1990-Current 
12. Limit 11 to English Language 
 
[mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, floating sub-
heading word, keyword heading word, organism supplementary concept word, protocol 
supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, 
synonyms] 
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Appendix 11: Full text articles excluded with reasons in 
main literature search 
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Author Year Title Reason for exclusion 
Tumim LW 2006 Achieving Balance Focuses on guidance and when to 
proceed to notification. Mainly 
discusses restrictions on infected HCWs 
(UK and worldwide) 
Cavender JW 1992 AIDS in the healthcare setting: 
the congressional response to 
the Kimberley Bergalis case 
Only 1 paragraph on the Acer case. The 
document focuses on regulations that 
were proposed following the incident. 
Hancocks S 2008 A body of evidence Outlines that the decision to notify 
should be evidence based. Discusses 
and calls for guidance. Does not, 
therefore, quite meet criteria of 
outlining pros and cons of notification 
McIntyre I 2007 The caring face Does not discuss any specific cases. 
Very briefly touches on privacy of HCW 
during notification 
Miller C 1991 CDC updates guidelines Numerical data related to Acer case out 
of date. Focuses on working conditions 
for infected HCWs. Mentions 1 incident 
involving a dental student but no 
details and no references. 
Mauth T 1995 Charter Implications of 
compelling dentists to reveal 
their HIV status 
Not relevant as entire article focuses 
on infected dentists revealing their 
status pre-procedure 
Turkel S 2011 Current strategies for 
managing providers infected 
with bloodborne pathogens 
A summary of American Guidance 
regarding the working conditions of 
infected HCWs 
Cooper H 1993 Department of Health 
Guidelines for HCWs with 
HIV/AIDS infection 
Focuses on the conditions and the 
career of the infected HCW 
Oda G 2011 Development of a 
standardised process for 
conducting large-scale 
epidemiologic lookback 
investigations following 
improper reprocessing of 
reusable medical equipment 
Only has two sentences on a specific 
incidents. Data provided is not new. 
Anonymous 1991 Epidemiologic notes and 
reports update: transmission 
of HIV infection during an 
invasive dental procedure 
Duplicate 
Anonymous 1993 From the Centres for Disease 
Control and Prevention. 
Update: investigations of 
persons treated by HIV-
infected Health-care workers - 
United States 
Duplicate 
Anonymous 1991 From the Centres for Disease 
Control: Current Trends 
Duplicate 
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Mahboobi N 2010 Hepatitis B virus infection in 
dentistry: a forgotten topic 
Only one sentence on a specific 
incident. 
Nodzenski TJ 1993 HIV-infected health care 
professionals and informed 
consent 
Mostly discusses whether infected 
HCWs should disclose their status 
before performing procedures. Very 
small section on Acer case. 
Anonymous 1993 Infected dental student sued 
by patients 
No new numerical data. Only 1 
paragraph on a specific incident 
Robert LM 1995 Investigations of patients of 
health care workers infected 
with HIV. The Centres for 
Disease Control and 
Prevention Database 
Data merged together for 64 infected 
HCWs across all specialities, not 
enough detail given on specific dental 
cases 
Danila RN 1994 Look-back investigation follow 
up 
Discusses an infected physician not a 
dentist 
Bell DM 1993 Preventing HIV transmission to 
patients during invasive 
procedures 
Only 2 sentences on Acer case. 
Discusses pre:1990 dental 
transmissions 
Grace M 1993 Private and confidential Only 1 and a half sentences on Acer 
case. Article focuses on HCW's point of 
view 
Unknown 1991 Recommendations for 
Preventing transmission of 
human immunodeficiency 
virus, hepatitis B virus to 
patients during exposure-
prone invasive procedures 
Provides guidance that incidents should 
be considered on a case-by-case basis 
but no pros or cons outlined. Only 1 
paragraph on two specific incidents. 
Samaranayak
e LP 
1993 Revised guidelines for HIV-
infected health care workers 
Mentions 2 incidents but is not the 
focus of the article and no specifics. 
Discusses risk of HIV transmission, this 
may be a factor in the decision-making 
process but is not a pro or con of 
notification 
Allos BM 2007 Transmission of Hepatitis B in 
the health care setting: The 
elephant in the room...or the 
mouse? 
Mostly discusses the general theory of 
Hepatitis B acquired through 
healthcare. Mentions a specific incident 
but not enough detail or length. 
Anonymous 1991 Transmission of HIV-1 
infection during an invasive 
dental procedure--United 
States 
Discusses Acer case but too briefly and 
numerical data is out of date 
CDC 1992 Update investigations of 
patients who have been 
treated by HIV-infected 
health-care workers 
Duplicate 
Anonymous 1992 Update: transmission of HIV 
infection during invasive 
dental procedures 
Duplicate 
Tindall B 1992 Healthcare Workers Covers a varied range of AIDS topics 
but only mentions Acer case briefly. 
CDC 1991 Update: transmission of HIV Duplicate 
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infection during an invasive 
dental procedure - Florida 
Anonymous 1996 Jury says dentist did not infect 
patient with HIV 
Incident discovery was pre-1990 
Singh D 2001 Health care workers with AIDS: 
The Patient's Right to Know 
Mentions 2 incidents but mostly 
focuses on debate over disclosure of 
HCW's BBV status before treatment 
Schemo DJ 1992 Files of HIV infected dentist to 
be transferred 
Mainstream news article 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
333 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 12: Articles excluded from main literature search 
as related to Acer case and published pre-May 1993. 
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Anonymous 1991 
Update: transmission of HIV infection during an invasive dental 
procedure: United States 
Anonymous 1992 
Update: transmission of HIV infection during invasive dental 
procedures 
Anonymous 1991 
Update: Transmission of HIV infection during invasive dental 
procedures - California 
Anonymous 1991 
Update: transmission of HIV infection during an invasive dental 
procedure - Florida 
Anonymous 1991 
Update: transmission of HIV infection during an invasive dental 
procedure - Florida 
Anonymous 1992 
From the Centers for Disease Control. Investigations of patients who 
have been treated by HIV-infected health-care workers 
Coukos PS 1991 
The Bergalis case: assessing the impact of documented provider to 
patient HIV transmission on the public health process 
Ciesielski C 1992 Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus in a Dental Practice 
Palca J 1992 AIDS. CDC closes the case of the Florida Dentist 
Centres for 
Disease Control 
1990 
Possible Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus to a 
Patient during an Invasive Dental Procedure 
Ou CY 1992 Molecular Epidemiology of HIV transmission in a dental practice 
Breuer J 1992 
HIV and hepatitis B virus infection in health-care workers: A risk to 
patients? 
Hardie J 1991 A critique of HIV transmission during dental treatment 
Smith K 1991 A victim of AIDS - or medical negligence 
Kerr DL 1991 HIV transmission and Invasive Dental Procedures  
Anonymous 1991 Facts About AIDS for the Dental Team 
Anonymous 1991 Dental AIDS case 
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Appendix 13: Full text articles excluded from ‘references of 
references’ search with reasons 
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Author Year Title Reason for Exclusion 
Palca J 1992 The Case of the Florida Dentist Acer case pre May 1993 
Washington 
DC General 
Accounting 
Office 
1992 CDC's investigation of HIV transmission 
by a dentist 
Acer case pre May 1993 
Smith T 1992 The continuing case of the Florida 
dentist 
Acer case pre May 1993 
Lewis DL 1994 The dental AIDS cases -- murder or 
unsolvable mystery? 
Not a significant amount of 
information 
Debry R 1993 Dental HIV transmission Acer case pre May 1993 
Anonymous 1991 Florida Office linked to other HIV 
patients 
Acer case pre May 1993 
Bell D 1991 Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
transmission in health care settings: 
risk and risk reduction 
A focus on occupationally 
acquired HIV and 
seroprevalence of HIV in 
HCWs. Discusses Acer case but 
pre May 1993. 
Gooch B 1993 Lack of evidence for patient-to-patient 
transmission of HIV in a dental practice 
Acer case pre May 1993 
Weber DJ 1991 Management of the Health-care 
worker Infected with Human-
Immunodeficiency-Virus - lessons from 
Nosocomial Transmission of Hepatitis-
B virus 
Acer case pre May 1993 
Breo DL 1990 Meet Kimberly Bergalis--the patient in 
the 'dental AIDS case' 
Acer case pre May 1993 
Holmes EC 1993 Sequence Data as Evidence Acer case pre May 1993 
Breo DL 1990 The 'slippery slope': handling HIV-
infected health workers 
Acer case pre May 1993 
Unknown 1991 Special Investigation: Florida Dental 
Case. Unreported findings shed new 
light on HIV dental case 
Acer case pre May 1993 
McCarthy G 2002 Transmission of HIV in the dental clinic 
and elsewhere 
No significant data on 
incidents. Mentions incident 
Acer case very briefly. 
Goodman 1991 Transmission of Infectious-Diseases in All dental incidents mentioned 
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RA Outpatient Health-care settings are pre 1990 apart from Acer 
case but data is pre May 1993 
Perz JF  2010 US outbreak investigations highlight 
the need for safe injection practices 
and basic infection control 
Nothing dental related. 
Tulsa Health 
Department 
2013 http://www.tulsa-
health.org/news/tulsa-health-
department-oklahoma-state-
department-health-and-oklahoma-
board-dentistry#.UmQS4lOwWgl 
Duplicate 
Burton J 1992 AIDS. Reaction to HIV positive dental 
personnel. 
Summary of article already 
identified, no new information 
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Appendix 14: Dental incident data extraction forms 
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Form 1: Collection of data related to an infection control incident with notification 
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Form 2: Collection of data related to a BBV-infected HCW with notification 
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Form 3: Collection of data related to an infection control incident and BBV-infected 
HCW with notification 
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Form 4: Collection of data related to a BBV-infected HCW or infection control 
incident without patient notification 
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Appendix 15: Information on 68 dental incidents for which sufficient data were available to 
conduct further analysis 
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Yearᵃ 
Type of 
incident 
Dental 
HCW 
infection 
Location Nature of suggested breaches Information Sources 
1990 IH HIV USA N/A 
Witte 1993; Scully and Porter 1993; O'Brien 
and Goedert 1996; Anonymous 1995ᵃ; 
Anonymous 1995ᵇ; Scully and Greenspan 
2006; Horowitz 1994ᵃ; Runnells 1993; 
Horowitz 1994ᵇ; Horowitz 1994ᶜ Hardie 
1993; Robinson and Challacombe 1993; 
Ciesielski et al 1994; Barr 1996; Brown 1996;  
1990 IH HIV USA N/A 
Comer et al 1992; Sampson 1991; Comer et 
al 1991; Samaranayake 1991; Cowley et al 
1991; Scully and Porter 1993 
1991 IH HIV USA N/A 
Jaffe et al 1994; Anonymous 1995ᵃ; 
Anonymous 1995ᵇ 
1991 IH HIV USA N/A 
Longfield et al 1994; Jacob 1992; Anonymous 
1991 
1991 LN HIV USA - Suspicions re: use of washer disinfector Arnow et al 1993 
1991 IH HIV USA N/A Heuer 1992; Closen 1996; Anonymous 1997ᵃ 
1991 LN/IH HIV USA N/A Byers 1993 
1991 IH HIV USA N/A Lutz 1991; Cowley et al 1991; Jacob 1992 
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1991 IH HIV USA N/A 
Lutz 1991; Jakush 1991; Jacob 1992; 
Anonymous 1995ᶜ; Anonymous 1995ᵈ; 
Anonymous 1997ᵇ 
1991 IH HIV USA N/A Cottone et al 1992 
1991 IH HIV USA N/A 
Scully and Porter 1993; Mishu and Schaffner 
1993; Dickinson et al 1993 
1992 IH 
HIV and 
HBVe+ 
USA N/A Taylor 1992 
1992 IH 
2 HIV 
infected 
dentists 
USA N/A Scully and Greenspan 2006 
1993 NN HBV Canada N/A Christianson et al 1993 
1993 NN 
3 HIV 
dentists 
USA N/A York and Arthur 1993 
1995 IH HBV UK N/A Blatchford et al 2000; Unpublished report 
1995 IH HIV UK N/A Monteith et al 1995 
1998 IH HIV UK N/A Gaudoin et al 2000 
1998 LN N/A USA - Dentist "used dirty drill bits” Anonymous 1998 
2000 IH HIV UK N/A Irwin and Millership 2002 
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2000 NN N/A UK 
- HCV index patient presented with no RFs other than 
dental tx. 
Roy et al. 2005; Unpublished report 
2001 DI N/A UK - Use of unsterilised dental equipment on patients Roy et al 2005; Unpublished report 
2002 DI N/A USA 
- “We can only speculate about the mechanism of 
transmission; cross-contamination from an 
environmental surface is one possibility” 
Redd et al 2007; Cleveland et al 2016; 
Merchant 2014 
2004 DI N/A UK - Failure to sterilise dental instruments appropriately Unpublished report 
2004 DI N/A UK 
- Dentist not qualified and therefore serious concerns 
re: infection control practices 
Unpublished report 
2005 DI+IH HCV UK 
- Failure to “consistently wear gloves"  
- Failure to "employ a tray system for sterilising 
instruments" 
- Failure to "appropriately store instruments after 
sterilisation" 
Mason et al 2008 
2005 NN N/A UK 
- Main issue concerned zoning of instruments 
- Wore gloves but did not wash hands in between 
patients 
- Reuse of plastic disposable impression trays 
Unpublished report 
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2006 NN N/A UK 
- Re-use of LA cartridges 
- Poor decontamination records 
- Inappropriate decontamination room 
- Lack of weekly autoclave safety checks 
- Reservoir tank in autoclave never drained, only 
topped up 
Unpublished report 
2006 IH HIV Ireland N/A Fitzgerald et al 2010 
2007 NN N/A UK 
- Never autoclaving dental hand pieces  
- "Using cold disinfectant solution for sterilisation of all 
other instruments since the breakdown of the 
autoclave some time previously"  
- "Presence of dried blood on hand-mirror heads, on 
filling materials and on the dental chair" 
Millership et al 2007; Unpublished report 
2007 NN N/A UK 
- Re-used single use items between patients such as 
"surgical blades, suture needles, latex gloves and 
anaesthetic cartridges"  
- "Dental handpieces [...] sometimes sprayed with 
disinfectant rather than autoclaved"  
- Poorly maintained autoclave and lack of autoclave 
records 
- Surgical blades immersed in chemical disinfectant 
prior to use 
Millership et al 2007; Unpublished report 
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2007 NN N/A UK 
- Dental burrs were heavily contaminated with bone 
debris  
- No manual cleaning of dental burs 
- No autoclave records 
Millership et al 2007; Unpublished report 
2007 LN N/A UK 
- Dentist practising during suspension.  
- Infection control could not be verified 
Unpublished report 
2007 NN HBV UK N/A Unpublished report 
2008 DI N/A UK 
- Serious failures in infection control practice  
- Inadequate decontamination of blood contaminated 
equipment 
Close et al 2013; Dr Bicuspid Staff 2009 
2008 LN N/A UK 
- Instruments[...] cleaned in line with national guidance 
only at the end of each treatment session rather than 
between each patient 
Conrad et al 2011 
2008 IH 
HIV and 
HCV 
UK N/A Unpublished report 
2008 NN HCV Australia N/A Condon 2008 
2009 NN HCV UK N/A Unpublished report 
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2009 DI N/A USA 
- No barriers between operating areas,  
- All operations in close proximity  
- Hand pieces not sterilised between uses 
- Leaving sterilised instruments unwrapped 
- Patients bringing their used anaesthetic cartridges 
from station to station 
Radcliffe et al 2013; Cleveland et al 2016; 
Merchant 2014; Domino 2010ᵃ; Dr Bicuspid 
Staff 2010ᵃ; CDC outbreak table¹ 
2010 DI N/A USA 
- Failure to properly clean dental instruments.  
- Sink and strong soap for manual cleaning.  
- Improper wrapping of instruments for sterilising 
technique.  
- Poor knowledge of staff of decontamination guidance  
- No records of training. 
Merchant 2014; Dr Bicuspid Staff 2010ᵇ; 
2010ᶜ; 2010ᶜ; Domino 2010ᵇ; Department of 
Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General 
2011ᵃ; 2012ᵃ; 2012ᵇ 
2010 NN N/A UK 
- Hand pieces surface wiped with alcohol wipes instead 
of going through full decontamination process 
Unpublished report 
2011 DI N/A USA 
- Not changing gloves 
- Not sterilising instruments properly 
- Allegations of not cleaning/ sterilising instruments at 
all. 
Merchant 2014; Dr Bicuspid Staff 2011ᵃ; 
2012ᵃ; 2011ᵇ; 2011ᶜ; 2011ᵈ; 2011ᵉ; 2011ᶠ; 
2011ᵍ; 2010ᵉ; 2011ʰ; 2011ⁱ; 2011ᶨ; 2011ᵏ; 
2011ᶥ; 2011ᵐ; 2011ⁿ; 2011ᵒ; 2011ᵖ; 2011q; 
Department of Veterans Affairs Office of 
Inspector General 2011ᵇ 
2011 NN HBV UK N/A Unpublished report 
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2012 DI N/A 
Hong 
Kong 
- Failed sterilisation of instruments 
- Some of the instruments had not undergone thermal 
disinfection during washing steps 
Cheng et al 2013 
2012 DI N/A UK 
- Endodontic hand pieces not being decontaminated/ 
sterilised appropriately,  
- Sterilisation and decontamination not being 
performed in line with guidance 
- Staff were advised not to change gloves as frequently 
as is recommended 
- Endodontic instruments being re-used for the same 
patient at subsequent appointments 
Unpublished report 
2012 DI N/A UK 
 
- Poor decontamination processes  
- Dental nurses not trained in decontamination 
- Low numbers of instruments/ drills 
- Restriction of use of gloves 
- Inadequate cleaning equipment 
- Illegal practice of dentistry by owner 
Unpublished report 
2012 DI N/A USA - Re-use needles and syringes 
Merchant 2014; Dr Bicuspid Staff 2012ᵇ; 
2012ᶜ 
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2013 DI N/A USA 
- Breaches in standard infection control practices 
- Inappropriate management and administration of 
controlled drugs very likely 
- Re-use of contaminated vials 
- Use of older, rusted instruments that could not be 
sterilised properly. 
- Delegation of IV sedation to non-certified dental 
assistants. 
- Lack of autoclave monitoring and maintenance. 
- Dental offices had no infection control plans. 
- No biological monitoring of autoclave for last 6 years. 
- Sterilization room unorganised and unclean. 
- Soaking of instruments in cold disinfection which is 
changed every 28 days. 
Oklahoma State Department of Health 2013; 
Cleveland et al 2016; Weaver 2014; 
Merchant 2014; Molinari and Nelson 2014; 
Hanley 2013; Unpublished report; Dr 
Bicuspid Staff 2013ᵃ; 2013ᵇ; 2013ᶜ; 2013ᵈ; 
2013ᵉ; 2013ᶠ; 2013ᵍ; 2013ʰ; 2013ⁱ; 2013ᶨ; 
2013ᵏ; 2013ᶥ; 2013ᵐ; 2013ⁿ; 2013ᵒ; 2013ᵖ; 
Domino 2013ᵃ; 2013ᵇ; Bradley 2015; Tulsa 
Health Department 2013ᵃ; 2013ᵇ 
2013 LN N/A UK 
- Re-use of gloves between patients 
- Re-use of matrix bands 
- Aspirator tips through ultrasonic bath but not 
autoclave 
Henderson et al 2017; Unpublished report 
2013 NN HCV UK N/A Unpublished report 
2013 NN HIV UK N/A Unpublished report 
2013 IH HIV UK N/A Unpublished report 
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2013 NN HIV UK N/A Aitken et al 2015 
2013 LN N/A USA - Drugs possibly contaminated with infectious material 
CDC HAI outbreak table²; Unpublished 
report; Arkansas Health Department online 
update³; Arkansas State Dental Association 
online update⁴ 
2014 DI N/A UK 
- Re-use of endodontic files, burs, 3 in 1 tips, 
impression trays, gloves between patients, matrix 
bands. 
- Incomplete processing of aspirator tips" amalgam 
carriers, aspirator tips 
- Ultrasonic scaler tips surface wiped not sterilised.  
- Poor training of staff in decontamination 
Henderson et al 2017; Unpublished report 
2014 LN N/A UK 
- Re-use of PPE between patients 
- Re-use of instruments both unclean and unsterilised 
between patients 
- Not hand washing between patients 
- Failure to maintain clean and dirty areas 
Unpublished report 
2014 NN N/A UK 
- Heavy contamination discovered within internal 
lumens of endodontic ultrasonic tips 
Unpublished report 
2014 LN N/A USA 
 
- Insufficient time for cold sterilisation 
- Lack of proper scrubbing before disinfection.  
Merchant 2014; Goszkowski 2014 
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- No monitoring of steriliser. - Instruments sitting in a 
shallow basin, above fluid level of disinfectant.  
- Only 1 hand piece.  
- No knowledge of autoclave. 
2014 DI N/A Australia - Poor infection control New South Wales Government 2016 
2014 NN N/A UK 
- 3 in 1 tips not adequately decontaminated 
- Limiting use of disinfecting spray 
- No disinfection of water lines 
- Cats in surgery 
- No dates on sterilised instruments 
Aitken et al 2015 
2014 NN HIV UK - Suspicions re use of WD Unpublished report 
2015 NN N/A UK 
- Not always sterilising hand pieces between every 
patient 
- Reuse of matrix bands 
- Not disinfecting dental impressions before sending 
them to the lab. 
- Poor autoclave records. 
Unpublished report 
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2015 NN N/A UK 
- Re-use of potentially inadequately decontaminated 
etch tips, composite capsules, acrylic burs and 
endodontic hand pieces 
Unpublished report 
2015 NN HBV UK N/A Unpublished report 
2016 DI N/A USA 
- Cleaning (spray used) and re-use of burs 
- Not always washing hands 
Department of Veterans Affairs Office of 
Inspector General 2017 
2017 NN N/A UK - No working autoclave Unpublished report 
NM NN N/A UK - Lack of appropriate infection control procedures Unpublished report 
DI – Decontamination incident, IH – Infected healthcare worker LN – Limited notification, NN – No notification, NM – Not mentioned 
 
 
362 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 16: Numerical risk estimations presented in the 
literature regarding healthcare related BBV transmission 
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Risk 
Numerical 
estimation of 
chance of 
occurrence 
Breakdown of 
calculation 
Source Year Cited in 
“Probability of 
HIV 
transmission 
from a dentist 
to patient 
during a dental 
procedure in 
which the 
patient bleeds” 
1 in 2,631,579 to 1 
in 263, 158 
Based on 
assumption that 
dentist has 0.4% 
chance of self-injury 
during procedure, 
32% of contacting 
patients wound 
following injury and 
chance of HIV 
infection between 
0.03%-0.3% 
CDC 1991 
(Anon 1995ᵈ; 
Chiodo and 
Tolle 1992) 
“Probability of 
sporadic 
transmission 
from an 
infected 
surgeon to a 
patient during 
an invasive 
procedure” 
2.4 in 1 million to 
24 in 1 million 
NM CDC 1991 
(Ciesielski et 
al 1991; 
Weller 1999; 
Chamberland 
and Bell 
1992; 
Iheukwumere 
1997) 
“Risk of HIV 
transmission 
from infected 
surgeons” 
1 in 1 million 
operations to 10 
in 1 million 
operations 
NM Rhame 1990 
(Ciesielski et 
al 1991; 
Weller 1999; 
Chamberland 
and Bell 
1992; Closen 
1996) 
“Risk of HIV 
transmission 
from infected 
surgeons” 
0.5 in 1 million 
hours of surgery 
to 38.5 in 1 million 
hours of surgery 
NM 
Lowenfels 
and 
Wormser 
1991 
(Ciesielski 
1991; Weller 
1999; Closen 
1996) 
“Risk of HIV 
transmission 
from an 
infected 
surgeon to 
patients” 
Less than 1 in 1 
million 
procedures. 
NM 
Schulman 
et al. 
1994 
(Mishu and 
Schaffner 
1993) 
“Incident of 
HIV 
transmission” 
1 per 83,000 hours 
of surgery 
NM 
Lowenfels 
and 
Wormser 
1991 
(Chamberland 
and Bell 
1992) 
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“The 
probability that 
an infected 
surgeon 
performing 500 
surgeries in 1 
year will 
transmit the 
virus” 
0.2 in 100 to 2.8 in 
100 depending on 
surgical specialty 
NM CDC 1996 (Closen 1996) 
Risk of 
transmission of 
any BBV due to 
infection 
control failure. 
0.000093 (nearly 1 
in 10,000) for 
every 1000 patient 
seen 
Risk of patient 
having HBV was 
assumed to be 1 in 
1000, for HIV 1 in 
1000 and HCV 1 in 
2000. Transmission 
risk following 
instrument being 
used on infected 
individual, 
inadequately 
cleaned and then 
immediately used 
on patient was 
assumed to be the 
same as 
percutaneous risks 
(HBV close to 0% for 
HBVeAg-, 30% for 
HBeAg+, HIV 0.3% 
and HCV 3%). 
Millership 
et al. 
2007 
(Millership et 
al 2007) 
“Risk of 
catching HIV 
from a dentist” 
1 in 200,000 to 1 
in 2,000,000 
NM Bayer 1997 (Shaw 2008) 
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Appendix 17: Theories regarding the ‘Acer case’ 
transmissions and supporting evidence 
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Theory 1: Acer incurred sharps injury during procedure resulting in contact of his and the patient’s blood, 
either directly through bleeding onto exposed patient tissues or indirectly via use of the now contaminated 
instrument 
For Against 
- Dentists commonly incur sharps injuries (Ciesielski 
et al 1994) 
- Acer could have been more prone to injury 
through fatigue caused by infection (Horowitz 
1994ᵇ) 
- Needles were recapped (Ciesielski et al 1991)  
- Acer reported occasionally getting stuck with the 
needle when recapping (Barr 1996; Horowitz 1994ᶜ) 
- Infected patients all treated following Acer’s 
progression to AIDS when his blood would have 
been more infectious (Ciesielski et al 1991) 
- Postulated by CDC as most likely cause of 
infections (Witte 1993) 
- GAO reviewed entire investigation and supported 
CDC conclusions (Ciesielski et al 1994) 
- Not all patients had invasive procedures conducted 
(Shields 1993) 
- Acer reported no sharps injuries to the CDC 
(Shields 1995; Ciesielski et al 1991; Ciesielski et al 
1994; Barr 1996) 
- HIV is not easily transmitted, it is unlikely that as 
many as 6 patients became infected this way 
(Robinson and Challacombe 1993) 
- No patients recalled being treated without gloves 
(Ciesielski et al 1991; Horowitz 1994ᶜ) 
- No patients recalled the dentist sustaining a sharps 
injury during their procedure (Ciesielski et al 1991; 
Barr 1996) 
- Staff did not recall the dentist incurring any sharps 
injuries (Ciesielski et al 1994) 
 
Theory 2: Patient to patient transmission occurred through use of inadequately cleaned/sterilised 
instruments 
For Against 
- Infection control poor with disposable items being 
reused after submersion in germicide (Ciesielski et al 
1991). 
- Infection control described as “woefully 
inadequate”. Did not autoclave all instruments after 
every patient. Used alcohol to disinfect equipment 
(Barr 1996; Runnells 1993) 
- Administration of LA only procedure common to all 
infected patients (Shields 1993) 
- Patterns/procedures performed do not support 
theory. (Ciesielski et al 1994) 
- Volumes of blood that would be needed to cause 
transmission would not be found on contaminated 
instruments (Hardie 1993) 
- HIV is fragile. (Hardie 1993)  
- Patient sequences more similar to dentist than 
each other (Hardie 1993) 
- 43 days where 5 HIV infected patients shared 
treatment days with 78 non-infected patients and 
no transmissions occurred (Hardie 1993). 
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Theory 3: Acer deliberately exposed patients to his blood, potentially through injection of local anaesthetic 
contaminated with his blood or semen. 
For Against 
- Horowitz’s paper compares Acer attributes with 
those of serial killers and people who had been 
charged with intentionally exposing people to HIV. 
He concludes that 9 out of 11 characteristics 
matched (Horowitz 1994ᵃ; Horowitz 1994ᵇ; Horowitz 
1994ᶜ) 
- Unprofessional/unethical behaviour. Gave false 
name and false profession when receiving HIV 
treatment and ignored medical advice to stop 
working (Horowitz 1994ᵃ; Shields 1995; Runnells 
1993; Horowitz 1994ᶜ) 
- Unprofessional/unethical behaviour. Ignored 
friend who urged him to be tested in 1985 but 
reported to CDC that he was shocked to have been 
found to be HIV positive in 1986. (Horowitz 1994ᶜ) 
- Proven to have lied to investigators on multiple 
occasions eg. about having had no sexual contacts 
since learning of his AIDS diagnosis (Barr 1996) 
- Jaffe himself reported that Acer was deceptive, 
self-interested and not co-operative (Horowitz 
1994ᵇ) 
- Acquaintance supported murder theory (Breo 
1993; Anon 1995ᶜ; Ciesielski et al 1994). “he said 
something to the effect that, well, our society does 
not want to address the issue because they perceive 
it to be a homosexual problem, and when it begins 
to affect younger people and grandparents [...] then 
maybe society will do something.” (Runnells 1993; 
Horowitz 1994ᶜ) 
- As white or colourless, semen would not be as 
noticeable in a syringe of lidocaine (Pepper 1994) 
- No other reports of transmission of HIV occurring 
through dental treatment (Pepper 1994) 
- Administration of LA only procedure common to all 
infected patients (Shields 1993) 
- The provision of an initial blood sample may align 
with serial killer profile (Horowitz 1994ᵇ). 
- Staff may not have been present for LA 
administration. Common to hide needle/for patients 
to look away during LA administration (Horowitz 
1994ᵇ) 
- Very mixed accounts of his personality traits.  
Some say he was quiet and kind others say he drank 
heavily, was selfish, aggressive and knowingly 
placed others at risk of HIV via unprotected sex. 
(Barr 1996) 
- Patient reports of Acer being cold and unsociable; 
One of the infected patients stated that “Acer 
showed no remorse and expressed no apology after 
inflicting her with pain”. (Horowitz 1994ᶜ) 
- Acquaintance who originally supported murder 
theory changed story in sworn deposition (Breo 
1993; Anon 1995ᶜ; Ciesielski et al 1994) 
- Dentist initially co-operated by permitting 
interview and allowing sample of blood to be taken 
(Robinson and Challacombe 1993) 
- Patients all awake during procedures. Procedures 
observed by staff. Neither staff nor patients noticed 
anything unusual (Robinson and Challacombe 1993; 
Ciesielski et al 1994) 
- Intentionally infecting patients would have drawn 
attention to his practice and his infection. 
Something he was trying to keep secret. (Runnells 
1993) 
- Investigators stated that friends and family said 
Acer was a “very kind” and “gentle” man and that 
he couldn’t have done it. (Horowitz 1994ᶜ) 
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- Another infected patient stated; “I was terrified...I 
tried to crack jokes to try and break the ice for 
myself, and he didn’t even react....He came in and 
worked on my teeth and left.” (Horowitz 1994ᶜ) 
 
 
Theory 4: Instruments contaminated with dentist’s blood following performance of procedures on himself 
For Against 
May have used LA cartridges when conducting 
electrocautery on own oral lesions at home 
(Horowitz 1994ᵇ; Barr 1996) 
 
Dentist only received treatment on one occasion 
(Ciesielski et al 1994) 
Staff not aware of dentist ever treating himself 
(Ciesielski et al 1994; Robinson and Challacombe 
1993) 
 
 
Theory 5: Patients contracted their infections via other routes outside of dental treatment 
For Against 
Administration of LA only procedure common to all 
infected patients (Shields 1993) 
Patient A had sexual contacts even though she 
initially denied this (Brown 1996; Anon 1995ᶜ; 
Ciesielski et al 1994) 
Patient A originally claimed she was a virgin, but 
court ordered examination revealed hymen was 
consistent with sex and she tested positive for 
HPV18. (Barr 1996) 
Patient B had extramarital affair, sexual contact not 
tested (Brown 1996; Ciesielski et al 1994; Barr 1996) 
Patient B had indicated on two forms that she had 
had a blood transfusion and had indeed had several 
invasive surgeries (Anon 1995ᶜ; Ciesielski et al 1994; 
Barr 1996) 
Patient C had multiple sexual contacts (14 since 
1978) one homosexual contact and HIV infected 
prostitutes. 5 sexual contacts of Pt C could not be 
traced (Brown 1996; Ciesielski et al 1994; Barr 1996) 
Patient G had history of IVDU and sex with 
prostitutes (Ciesielski et al 1994). Patient G’s friend 
states that he visited a local crack house 3-4 times a 
week in mid 1980s and had traded crack for sex as 
well as having unprotected sex with a prostitute 
who later died of AIDS (Barr 1996). 
Patient I had multiple sexual partners and when her 
infection was first discovered, she initially 
mentioned that the source may be her boyfriend 
but 6m after case went public she stated boyfriend 
had tested negative when she tested positive and 
that he had been found to positive later (Barr 1996). 
1 sexual contact could not be traced out of 6 
CDC reported that sequences of Patient I closer to 
the dentist and the other patients than local 
controls: 
Within Patient I = 3.2% (0.3-5%) 
Dentist + Patient I = 4.3% (2.8-7.8%) 
Patient I + Patients A, B, C, E and G = 4.9% (2.1-8.1%) 
Patient I + 34 controls = 12.0% (6.8-17.9%) 
A, B, C, E + G sequences significantly closer to 
Patient I than 28 local controls (p=<0.0001) (Witte 
1993) 
Both Patient A’s sexual contacts did not have HIV 
(Brown 1996; Anon 1995ᶜ; Ciesielski et al 1994) 
Later established that Patient A was negative for 
HPV (Barr 1996) 
 
Patient B’s affair was early and sexual contact 
showed no signs of HIV/AIDS 15 years later (Brown 
1996).  
Since 1970s Patient B’s only sexual partner was 
husband who was negative (Anon 1995ᶜ; Ciesielski 
et al 1994) 
No hospital record of Patient B receiving transfusion 
(Anon 1995ᶜ; Ciesielski et al 1994; Barr 1996) 
Patient C denies homosexual contact and claims 
never paid for sex. (Ciesielski et al 1994)  
Patient C’s suspected homosexual contact was 
negative for HIV (Barr 1996) 
Patient G reported no IVDU or sex with prostitutes 
since late 1970s. Negative for HIV in 1986. Two 
sexual contacts since 1986 both negative for HIV. 
(Ciesielski et al 1994) 
Contact who could not be traced had had one sexual 
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(Ciesielski et al 1994) 
Not all sexual partners of Patient I tested, 5 out of 6 
(Witte 1993) 
Patient E had multiple sexual contacts. 2 out of 10 
were dead (not in relation to HIV but status 
unknown). 1 out of remaining 8 positive. (Ciesielski 
et al 1994) 
KB reported conducing ‘blood sisters’ pact with 
childhood friend. Blood to blood contact following 
needle prick on fingers. Friend never officially 
reported to be HIV negative. (Runnells 1993) 
Had 5 boyfriends (Runnells 1993) 
Debry analysed genetic sequence data and 
determined that results were inconclusive. Evidence 
did not suggest that dentist was or was not source 
of infection. (Crandall 1995) 
CDC’s choice of controls may have been 
inappropriate as some 90 miles away. (Robinson and 
Challacombe 1993) 
Hardie claims that control groups used by CDC did 
not reflect sequences of the infected patients due to 
differences in length of time of infection and use of 
therapy (Hardie 1993) 
Before case went public, one of Ciesielski’s 
colleagues stated that results of strain comparison 
were scientifically inclusive. (Barr 1996) 
Were controls inappropriate? Sequence data was 
changed many times. Could there have been 
contamination of blood samples (Barr 1996) 
Patient A, Kimberely Bergalis had unusually short 
incubation period of 2 years (Robinson and 
Challacombe 1993; Shields 1995) 
Patients had financial incentives to not share risk 
factors (Hardie 1993; Barr 1996) 
Dr Resnick called sequencing into question, claiming 
similar strains could be found within the community 
(Ciesielski et al 1994) 
Prevalence of HIV infected patients is similar to 
community at large (Barr 1996) 
KB had shared razors with dorm room mates and 
had cut foot on broken glass of dance floor. (Barr 
1996) 
contact with Patient I and protection was used. 
(Ciesielski et al 1994) 
Positive contact of Patient E tested positive in Dec 
1990 after acute retroviral syndrome in 1989 and 
had had negative results in Oct 1988 and Dec 1988. 
Patient E tested positive in Oct 1988. Contact also 
had different strain of virus than Patient E 
CDC reported that KBs friend with who she 
conducted ‘blood sisters’ act was “well”. 
Investigators “checked on her health” but later 
excluded as viral strains of patients and Acer 
matched (Runnells 1993) 
KB claimed to be a virgin and CDC could not find 
evidence to refute this (86) CDC say they tested “a 
number of those” with whom she had had “non-
intercourse intimacies” (Barr 1996) 
Acer and patients showed sequencing similarity of 
96% compared with controls which were 89%. 
Similarity between Acer and patients reflects 
sequence similarity within infected persons (95-
100%) and those between mother and child (94-
98%). (Myers 1994) 
Average distance between Acer and patients ranged 
from 3.4-4.9% whereas difference between Acer 
and local controls ranged from 5.8-16% (Dickenson 
et al 1993) 
Crandall re-examined DeBry et al. and Ou et al.’s 
genetic sequence data and supported their findings 
that dentist was source of infection. (Crandall 1995) 
In 1994, all sequence data reanalysed by Hillis and 
Heulsenbeck, they strongly supported the theory 
that Acer infected patients A, B and E, with doubt 
only cast on Patient G. (Ciesielski et al 1994) 
“analysis showed a similarity between the 
sequences from the patient (KB) and the dentist that 
were comparable to what had been observed for 
cases that had been epidemiologically linked” (Barr 
1996) 
“Using this DNA technology, it was possible for the 
CDC sequencing group eventually to match the 
viruses in the bodies of Acer, Kimberley and the four 
other infected patients to an accuracy of 99.94%.” 
(Runnells 1993) 
Viruses of dentist and patients A, B and C were as 
closely related as sequences found within an HIV 
infected person or those were patients are 
epidemiologically linked. 
The V3 sequences from the dentist and patients A, B 
and C were not related to pt D, 7/8 control patients 
and the 21 north American isolates. 
In a more stable area of the viral sequence. The 
dentist and patients A, B and C had an average 
difference of 1.8% whereas the average difference 
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amongst the 8 local controls was 4.8%. 
The dentist and patients A, B and C shared a unique 
pattern of amino acids that was absent in the other 
sequences analysed. (Runnells 1993) 
“All 6 patients had no other RFs for infection and all 
had viral strains that closely matched that of the 
dentist” (Robert and Bell 1994; Ciesielski et al 1994) 
Evidence surrounding potential, alternative patient 
risk factors presented by investigators hired as part 
of private litigation (Ciesielski et al 1994) 
Dr Resnick cast doubt on sequencing conclusions 
but had been paid over $57,000 to conduct 
additional sequencing and to provide consultant 
testimony for the dentist’s insurance company 
(Ciesielski et al 1994; Runnells 1993) 
These risk factors were discounted following 
discovery that the viral strains of the patient and 
dentist matched. (Barr 1996) 
 
 
Limitations of ‘Acer case’ investigation 
 
- Only one short interview with Acer (Horowitz 1994ᵃ; Ciesielski et al 1991; Barr 1996) and no dentist 
present (Horowitz 1994ᶜ) 
- Limited inspection of practice as practice had closed (Longfield et al 1994; Barr 1996; Horowitz 
1994ᶜ) 
- DNA method new therefore potential errors (Iheukwumere 1997; Hardie 1993) 
- No consensus on which statistical method to use (Brown 1996) 
- Patient records incomplete, no complete list of patients (Longfield et al 1994; Ciesielski et al 1991; 
Barr 1996) 
- Samples for sequencing were labelled creating bias (Hardie 1993; Barr 1996) 
- Looked at variable regions but examining stable regions could have been a prudent first step as, if 
different, links could be excluded. (Hardie 1993) 
- Did CDC use best region of genome? (Barr 1996) 
- Acer blood sample examined only on one occasion by CDC (Barr 1996) 
- By the time Acer’s interview was conducted his health and memory had greatly deteriorated (Barr 
1996) 
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Appendix 18: Guidance documents cited by authors of 
incident management papers and how they influenced 
decision-making and PNE processes (UK and Ireland) 
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Guidance or policy 
referred to 
How is it 
presented/described in 
the article? 
Specific 
Incident 
Context 
Reference 
Year 
guidance 
published 
Year used 
Management of 
Public Health 
Incidents, Guidance 
on the Roles and 
Responsibilities of 
NHS led incident 
management teams 
A document which 
outlines the “Generic 
organisational 
arrangements for 
managing [...] 
incidents” 
Dental Infection 
Control Breach 
Incident in 
Scotland 
Henderson 
et al 2017 
Updated 
2013 
2013 
AIDS/HIV infected 
health care workers: 
Guidance on the 
management of 
infected health care 
workers and patient 
notification 
Guidance indicates that 
“all patients who have 
undergone an [...] EPP 
[...] as far as practicable 
should be notified” 
HIV infected 
dentist in 
London 
Gaudoin et 
al 2000 
1998 ~1999 
The Prevention of 
Transmission of 
Blood borne disease 
in the Health-Care 
setting Department 
of Health and 
Children (Ireland) 
Guidance stipulated 
that a local expert 
group be assembled to 
ascertain if a PNE was 
required 
HIV infected 
dentist in 
Ireland 
Fitzgerald 
et al 2010 
2005 2006 
Association for 
Professionals in 
Infection Control and 
Epidemiology (APIC) 
recommendations 
Guidance outlined the 
purposes of notification 
HBV infected 
dentist in UK 
Blatchford 
et al 2000 
1991 1995 
Department of 
Health 
Guidance obliges 
health authorities to 
inform all patients who 
may have been at risk 
of infection by health 
care workers who are 
subsequently diagnosed 
HIV-positive 
HBV infected 
dentist in UK 
 Blatchford 
et al 2000 
1993 1995 
Wilson and Junger 
criteria 
Suggested for use in 
aiding the decision of 
whether to notify 
patients 
BBV infected 
HCWs 
Blatchford 
et al 2000 
1968 1995 
Rutala and Weber 
Modified version of 
framework used to 
calculate risk of 
transmission 
Dental Infection 
Control Breach 
in Scotland 
Henderson 
et al 2017 
2007 2013 
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Appendix 19: 102 websites searched for guidance documents 
as part of the policy mapping exercise 
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ADA, Centre for 
Evidence Based 
Dentistry  
http://ebd.ada.org/en 
Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality 
https://www.ahrq.gov/ 
Alberta Health and 
Wellness 
http://www.health.alberta.ca/ 
Australian 
Government/Departme
nt of Health 
http://www.health.gov.au/ 
Austrian Institute of 
Technology 
https://www.ait.ac.at/en/ 
Bandolier Knowledge  http://www.bandolier.org.uk/knowledge.html 
BBC World http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world 
Belgian Health Care 
Knowledge Centre 
(KCE)  
https://kce.fgov.be/en 
Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield association 
https://www.bcbs.com/ 
California Technology 
Assessment Forum  
https://icer-review.org/programs/ctaf/ 
Canada.ca https://www.canada.ca/en.html 
Catalan Agency for 
Health Information, 
Assessment and Quality 
(CAHIAQ) 
http://www.aatrm.net 
CDC https://www.cdc.gov/ 
CDR Weekly Archived 
Content 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hpa.org.uk/c
dr/archives/back_issues_list.htm 
Centre for Clinical 
Effectiveness - Monash 
Health 
http://www.monashhealth.org/page/CCE 
Centres for Medicare 
and Medicaid services 
https://www.cms.gov/ 
CIHI (Canadian Institute 
for Health Information)  
https://www.cihi.ca/en 
Consortium of 
European Social Science 
Data Archives 
https://www.cessda.eu/ 
Danish Health Authority  https://www.sst.dk/en 
DIMDI German Institute 
of Medical 
Documentation and 
Information  
https://www.dimdi.de/static/en/ 
ECRI Institute http://www.ecri.org.uk/ 
European Centres for 
Disease Control 
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/Pages/home.aspx 
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Euroscan International 
Network 
https://www.euroscan.org/ 
Eurosurveillance 1995-
2017 
http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ 
Faculty of Dentistry 
University of Toronto  
https://www.dentistry.utoronto.ca/ 
Faculty of General 
Dental Practice 
https://www.fgdp.org.uk/ 
French National 
Authority for Health 
https://www.has-sante.fr/portail/jcms/r_1455134/en/about-has 
GDC https://www.gdc-uk.org/ 
GOV.uk* https://www.gov.uk/ 
Health and Safety 
Executive 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/ 
Health Council of the 
Netherlands  
https://www.gezondheidsraad.nl/en/home 
Health Facilities 
Scotland  
http://www.hfs.scot.nhs.uk/ 
Health information and 
quality authority 
(Ireland)  
https://www.hiqa.ie/ 
Health Protection 
Scotland/HAI 
Compendium 
http://www.hps.scot.nhs.uk/ 
Health Quality Council 
of Alberta 
http://www.hqca.ca/ 
Health Quality Ontario http://www.hqontario.ca/ 
Health Systems 
Evidence  
https://www.healthsystemsevidence.org/?lang=en 
Healthcare 
Improvement Scotland 
http://www.healthcareimprovementscotland.org/ 
Healthcare Inspectorate 
Wales 
http://hiw.org.uk/splash?orig=/ 
HealthScotland http://www.healthscotland.scot/ 
Information 
Commissioners Office 
https://ico.org.uk/ 
Information Services 
Division Scotland 
http://www.isdscotland.org   
Institut national 
d'excellence en sante at 
en services sociaux 
https://www.inesss.qc.ca/en.html 
Institute for Clinical and 
Economic Review 
https://icer-review.org/ 
Institute for Clinical 
Evaluative Sciences 
https://www.ices.on.ca/ 
Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement 
http://www.ihi.org/Pages/default.aspx 
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Institute of Health 
Carlos 3  
http://www.eng.isciii.es/ISCIII/es/contenidos/fd-el-instituto/quienes-
somos.shtml 
Institute of Health 
Economics  
https://www.ihe.ca/ 
International Network 
of Agencies for Health 
Technology Assessment 
http://www.inahta.org/ 
Ireland - Health Service 
Executive 
http://www.hse.ie/eng/ 
Joanna Briggs Institute http://joannabriggs.org/ 
Latin American and 
Caribbean Health 
Sciences  (LILACS) 
http://metodologia.lilacs.bvsalud.org/php/level.php?lang=en&compon
ent=19&item=2 
Legislation.gov.uk http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
Ludwig Boltzman 
Institute for HTA 
(Austria) 
https://hta.lbg.ac.at/page/homepage/en 
Manitoba Centre for 
Health Policy 
http://umanitoba.ca/faculties/health_sciences/medicine/units/chs/de
partmental_units/mchp/ 
McGill University 
Health Centre 
https://muhc.ca/ 
McMaster University 
(CHEPA) (canada)  
http://www.chepa.org/ 
National Clinical 
Assessment Service 
http://www.ncas.nhs.uk/ 
National Guideline 
Clearinghouse  
https://www.guideline.gov/ 
National Health Care 
Institute Netherlands  
https://english.zorginstituutnederland.nl/ 
National Institute for 
Health and Care 
Excellence 
https://www.nice.org.uk/ 
New Brunswick Office 
of the Chief Medical 
Officer Of Health 
Division 
http://www2.gnb.ca/content/gnb/en/departments/ocmoh.html 
Newfoundland and 
Labrador Centre for 
Applied Health 
Research 
http://www.nlcahr.mun.ca/ 
NHS England https://www.england.nhs.uk/ 
NHS improvement: 
News and Alerts 
https://improvement.nhs.uk/news-alerts/ 
NHS National Institute 
for Health Research 
https://www.nihr.ac.uk/ 
NHS Scotland http://www.scot.nhs.uk/ 
NHS Wales http://www.wales.nhs.uk/ 
Norwegian Knowledge 
Centre for Health 
https://www.fhi.no/sys/ks/ 
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Services  
Office for National 
Statistics 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/ 
OpenGrey http://www.opengrey.eu/ 
OSHA https://www.osha.gov/ 
Ottawa Hospital 
Research Institute  
http://www.ohri.ca/home.asp 
Pan-Canadian HTA 
Collaborative  
https://www.cadth.ca/resources/hta-database-canadian-search-
interface 
Practitioner Health 
Programme 
http://php.nhs.uk/ 
Public Concern at Work http://www.pcaw.org.uk/ 
Public Health Agency 
Northern Ireland 
http://www.publichealth.hscni.net/ 
Public Health Wales http://www.publichealthwales.wales.nhs.uk/ 
Queensland 
Government Health 
https://www.health.qld.gov.au/home 
Robert Koch Institute https://www.rki.de/EN/Home/homepage_node.html 
Royal Australasian 
College of Surgeons  
https://www.surgeons.org/ 
Royal college of 
Surgeons 
https://www.rcseng.ac.uk/ 
Sahlgrensha Univ. 
Hospital (Sweden) 
https://www2.sahlgrenska.se/en/sahlgrenska-university-hospital/in-
english/ 
Scottish Dental Clinical 
Effectiveness 
Programme 
http://www.sdcep.org.uk/ 
Scottish Intercollegiate 
Guidelines Network 
http://www.sign.ac.uk/ 
Statistics Canada https://www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/start 
Statistics.Gov.Scot http://statistics.gov.scot/ 
SWEDISH AGENCY FOR 
HEALTH TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT AND 
ASSESSMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
http://www.sbu.se/en/ 
The National Reporting 
and Learning System 
https://report.nrls.nhs.uk/nrlsreporting/ 
The Northern Ireland 
Adverse Incident Centre 
https://www.health-ni.gov.uk/topics/safety-and-quality-
standards/northern-ireland-adverse-incident-centre-niaic 
The Scottish Public 
Health Observatory 
https://scotpho.nhsnss.scot.nhs.uk/scotpho/homeAction.do 
THETA (Canada) http://theta.utoronto.ca/home 
TRIP Database https://www.tripdatabase.com/ 
UK Data Service https://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/ 
UN Data http://data.un.org/Browse.aspx?d 
UNAIDS http://www.unaids.org/en 
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University of Aberdeen 
HERU  
https://www.abdn.ac.uk/heru/ 
University of British 
Columbia Centre for 
Health Services and 
Policy Research 
http://chspr.ubc.ca/ 
Viral Hepatitis 
Prevention Board 
http://www.vhpb.org/ 
Washington State 
Health Care Authority 
https://www.hca.wa.gov/ 
Welsh Government http://gov.wales/?lang=en 
World Health 
Organisation 
http://apps.who.int/ghodata/ 
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Appendix 20: Toolkits which can be used to assess the impact of a healthcare incident 
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Name of Toolkit/Process / 
Grading system. 
Guidance Document in which it features. What does the toolkit measure? 
What recommendations are made 
based on grade/level etc? 
Public Health England Incident 
Levels 
Communicable Disease Outbreak 
Management Operational guidance 
(PHE 2014ᶜ) 
Grades an incident from 1-5 based 
on predicted public health impact  
Resources required 
Public/Media Interest 
Size of Geographic Area 
Numbers of persons affected 
Incident Severity 
- Number and type of departments 
that should be involved in 
management 
- Role of Lead person 
- Role of person who signs off on 
press releases/statements 
- Activation of other specific 
processes or plans 
NCC MERP Index for Categorising 
Medication Errors 
Respectful Management of Serious 
Clinical Adverse Events 
(Conway et al 2011) 
AND 
Learning from adverse events through 
reporting and review: A national 
framework for Scotland 
(Healthcare Improvement Scotland 2018) 
Grades an error from A-I based on 
whether it reached the patient and 
the degree of harm caused 
Not specified 
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NHS Scotland Risk Assessment 
Matrix 
(adapted from AS/NZS 4360:2004 
‘Making it Work’) 
Learning from adverse events through 
reporting and review: A national 
framework for Scotland 
(Healthcare Improvement Scotland 2018) 
AND 
The Risk Management of HAI: A 
Methodology for NHS Scotland 
(Scottish Government 2008) 
Assigns level of RISK from low to 
v.high based on:  
Impact/Consequences of incident 
Patient Experience 
Objectives/Project 
Injury (physical or psychological) to 
patients, visitors or staff 
Complaints/claims 
Service/Business interruption 
Staffing/competence Financial 
Inspection/Audit 
Adverse publicity/reputation 
AND  
Likelihood of occurrence 
Not Specified 
Categorisation of adverse 
events/Guide to levels of review 
Learning from adverse events through 
reporting and review: A national 
framework for Scotland 
(Healthcare Improvement Scotland 2018) 
Assigns a category of adverse event 
from 1-3 based on: 
- Financial Loss 
- Negative publicity 
- Degree of harm caused 
- Suggested minimum level of 
review 
- Composition of review team 
- How to report findings/share 
lessons learned 
- Timescales for completion of 
stages 
Healthcare associated infection 
(HAI) incident/outbreak risk 
matrix (Adapted from the Watt 
The Risk Management of HAI: A 
Methodology for NHS Scotland 
(Scottish Government 2008) 
Assigns level of RISK from low 
(green) to high (red) based on: 
- Type of team required 
- Type of plan requiring 
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report 2002) - Level of patient harm 
- Public health implications 
- Nature of infection episode 
- Disruption of services 
- Public anxiety and concern 
implementation 
- Who to establish communications 
with 
Classification of public health 
incidents and suggested level of 
response 
Management of Public Health Incidents, 
Guidance on the Roles and 
Responsibilities of NHS led Incident 
Management Teams 
(HPS and Scot Gov 2017) 
Grades an incident from 0-5 based 
on: 
- Numbers involved 
- Effect on services 
- Actual or potential public health 
impact 
 
- Type of management team 
- Role of lead 
- Types of staff involved 
- Who to report to 
- Reporting/ 
assessment tools 
- Post-incident reporting 
Dynamic Risk Assessment Model 
Northern Ireland Infectious Disease 
Incident / Outbreak Plan 
(Public Health Agency 2018) 
Assigns a level of RISK based on 5 
criteria. A grade of 0-4 is given for 
each criterion: 
- Severity and prognosis of known 
cases  
- Confidence in hypothesis 
- Potential for the organism to 
spread given the circumstances 
Not specified 
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- Feasibility and predicted success 
of intervention 
- Context (Media, local concern, 
historical issues, professional 
knowledge, guidance available, 
concurrent events etc.) 
Information table for rapid risk 
assessment to support risk-
ranking algorithm (option 2: 
separate algorithms for 
probability and impact) 
Operational guidance on rapid risk 
assessment methodology 
(ECDC 2011) 
Assigns a level of RISK from very 
low to very high based on:  
- Probability of infection 
Possibility of further human exposure 
Susceptibility of population 
Infectivity of disease 
AND 
- Impact 
Likelihood of causing severe disease 
Number of people affected 
Availability of effective treatments/control 
measures 
Contextual factors 
Not specified 
Escalation/Risk Assessment 
Criteria (adapted from Health 
Protection Scotland Watt Risk 
The Communicable Disease Outbreak 
Plan for Wales ('The Wales Outbreak 
Plan') 
(Public Health Wales 2014) 
Assigns description of incident 
from minor-major based on: 
- Patient harm/interventions 
- Type of incident 
- Team to be assembled 
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Matrix) 
 
required 
- Disruption of services 
- Likelihood of further 
transmissions 
- Public anxiety 
- Use of specific plans/processes 
Risk Analysis Matrix 
Australian Guidelines for the Prevention 
and Control of Infection in Healthcare 
(Australian Government – NHMRC 2010) 
Assigns level of RISK from low to 
extreme based on: 
- Likelihood 
- Consequences 
- Context 
- Routine or specific procedures 
HSC Regional Impact Table and 
Risk Matrix 
Procedure for the Reporting and Follow-
Up of Serious Adverse Incidents 
(Health and Social Care Board 2016) 
Assigns level of RISK from low to 
extreme based on: 
- Impact 
Patient harm/interventions required 
Degree of deviation from professional 
standards/guidelines 
Reputational effects 
Financial consequences 
Resource demands 
Environmental effects 
Not specified 
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AND 
- Likelihood 
How often does/might this occur? 
Risk Assessment Tool 
HSE Integrated Risk Management Policy 
Incorporating an overview of the Risk 
Management process 
(Health Service Executive 2017) 
Assigns level of RISK from low to 
high based on: 
- Impact  
Harm to a person 
Service user experience 
Compliance 
Objectives 
Business continuity 
Adverse publicity/reputation 
Finance 
Environment 
AND 
- Likelihood 
Actual Frequency 
Probability 
“This rating will assist both in the 
evaluation of risk and the 
prioritisation of the management of 
risks” 
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Severity Assessment Code Matrix 
The NSW Health Incident Management 
Policy 
(NSW Government 2014) 
Assigns level of RISK from low to 
extreme based on: 
- Consequences 
Harm and interventions required (patients, 
staff, visitors) 
Disruption to services 
Financial consequences 
Environmental effects 
AND 
- Probability 
How often does/might this occur? 
- How to report 
- Who to report to 
- Type of investigation required 
 
 NIPCM Healthcare Infection 
Incident Assessment Tool (HIIAT) 
Chapter 3 - Healthcare Infection 
Incidents, Outbreaks and Data 
Exceedance 
(NSS 2019ᵃ) 
 AND 
Literature Review: Healthcare infection 
incidents and outbreaks in Scotland 
(HPS and NSS 2017) 
Assigns an incident a colour of 
green, orange or red based on 4 
criteria: 
- Severity of Illness 
- Impact on services 
- Risk of transmission 
- Public Anxiety 
- Forms requiring completion 
- Who to report to 
- Timescales for reporting 
- Necessity for preparation of press 
statements 
- Frequency of HIIAT review 
- Support from HPS 
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Appendix 21: Guidance given by different organisations on 
when to notify patient(s) following a healthcare incident 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
388 
 
Organisation Year Advice 
Healthcare 
Improvement 
Scotland (Sco) 
2015 
Single patient incident: Notify those who have suffered moderate or 
severe harm based on NPSA definitions. 
 
Further notes: There may be exceptional circumstances where it is 
not appropriate to inform a patient, or the family or carer of an 
adverse event. For example, because of the distress it would cause to 
the patient. 
Agency for 
Healthcare 
Research 
Quality (USA) 
2016 
Single patient incident: Notify patient if it is deemed to be a CANDOR 
event: an event that causes unexpected harm (psychological, 
emotional or physical). 
 
Further notes: Potential patient harm (unsafe conditions, near 
misses, no harm events) are not CANDOR events 
Health Quality 
Council of 
Alberta (Ca) 
2006 
Single patient incident: When a patient experiences harm while 
receiving healthcare, full and complete disclosure must occur. When 
an adverse event occurs and there is no apparent harm to the patient 
but the potential for harm remains disclosure is good to promote an 
open, transparent and trusting relationship. It also allows the patient 
and family to knowingly monitor his/her condition. 
 
Further notes: Times when disclosure may not be appropriate (when 
a patient’s condition provides a rationale not to disclose). However if 
in doubt best to err on the side of open disclosure. 
Royal College 
of Surgeons 
(Eng) 
2015 
Single patient incident: any unintended or unexpected incident that 
occurred in respect of a patient’s care that, in the reasonable opinion 
of a healthcare professional, could result in, or appears to have 
resulted in the patient’s death, severe harm, moderate harm, or 
prolonged psychological harm. 
 
Further notes: The words ‘could result in’ in the definition of a 
notifiable safety incident suggest that the unintended incident is likely 
to manifest harm in the future, even if no harm is immediately 
evident at present. 
National 
Patient Safety 
Agency (Eng) 
2009 
Single patient incident: notify a patient when an incident has led to 
moderate harm, severe harm or death 
 
Further notes: Problems if you discuss ‘no harm’ incidents with 
patients. 
- added stress to patients 
- potential loss of confidence in the standard of care 
- negative effects on staff confidence and morale; 
- decreased public confidence in the NHS. 
- Impractical 
- adding to staff workload 
- potentially interrupting their ability to provide patient care. 
However, the NRLS believes that where an incident led to moderate 
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harm, severe harm or death, the benefits outweigh these problems. 
Australian 
Commission 
on Safety and 
Quality in 
Health Care 
(Aus) 
2014 
Single patient incident: Disclosure always advised. 
Indications for a higher-level response (more comprehensive open 
disclosure process) 
- 1. Death or major permanent loss of function  
- 2. Permanent or considerable lessening of body function  
- 3. Significant escalation of care / change in clinical management  
- 4. Major psychological or emotional distress  
- 5. At the request of the patient 
 
Indications for a lower level response (less comprehensive open 
disclosure process) 
- 1. Near miss / no-harm incident  
- 2. No permanent injury  
- 3. No increased level of care required  
- 4. No, or minor, psychological or emotional distress.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
A lower-level response should only be initiated if the risk of further 
harm (from not conducting higher-level open disclosure) is unlikely.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
If harm unclear continue investigation until ascertained. 
 
Multiple patient incident: Large-scale disclosure, disclosing multiple 
adverse events or large-scale harm (or potential harm) to multiple 
individuals or the general public is out of scope of the Framework. 
Relevant health service organisations are advised to have procedures 
in place to expedite decision-making in the event of multiple or large-
scale incidents, and assess each situation promptly with legal counsel 
and public relations departments. 
 
Further notes: 
Near misses and no harm incidents 
- Will the distress or psychological harm of disclosing the information 
outweigh the benefit that could feasibly be achieved by disclosure? 
- Will disclosure reduce the risk of future incidents? 
- Will disclosure maintain patient, family and carer trust in the 
service? 
 
CQC (Eng) 2014 
Single patient incident: For a health service body e.g. NHS trust, 
patients should be notified when both harm has occurred or when it 
could occur. ‘Harm’ refers to death, severe harm, moderate harm and 
psychological harm. Moderate harm is defined as harm that requires 
a moderate increase in treatment or significant, but not permanent, 
harm. ‘Moderate increase in treatment’ means an unplanned return 
to surgery, an unplanned re-admission, a prolonged episode of care, 
extra time in hospital or as an outpatient, cancelling of treatment, or 
transfer to another treatment area (such as intensive care). 
 
For ‘Any other registered person’ who is ‘not a health service body’ 
patients should be notified when harm has occurred. ‘Harm’ refers to 
death, impairment of sensory or motor function, altered structure of 
body, prolonged pain, prolonged psychological harm, shortened life 
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expectancy. requires treatment by a health care professional in order 
to prevent the death of the service user, or any injury to the service 
user which, if left untreated, would lead to one or more of the 
outcomes mentioned. 
 
Further notes: Ethical duty (professional duty) exists when 
low threshold for notification - any harm or distress to patients. 
When the Scottish duty of candour comes into force it will be very 
similar to the English regulations. Only differences are that the 
medical practitioner making decision about harm must not be 
involved in the incident and that patients can decide if they wish to 
know further information                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
The College of 
Physicians and 
Surgeons 
Ontario (Ca) 
2003 
Single patient incident: an unintended outcome arising during the 
course of treatment, which may be reasonably expected to negatively 
affect a patient’s health and/or quality of life. This includes outcomes 
that occur as a result of individual or systemic acts or omissions. This 
also includes adverse events that result in unintended harm related 
to the care and/or services provided to the patient rather than to the 
patient’s underlying medical condition. 
This policy applies to all physicians who become aware, while treating 
a patient, that the patient has sustained harm in the course of 
receiving health care. 
 
Further notes: The patient should receive knowledge of a close call if 
there is still an ongoing similar safety risk for the patient, or if the 
patient is aware of the close call and an explanation will allay concern 
and promote trust. 
Health Service 
Executive and 
State Claims 
Agency (Ire) 
2013 
Single Patient Incident: Service users should be informed of the 
occurrence of an adverse event that has resulted in or is expected to 
result in harm to the patient. 
 
Multiple Patient Incident: There may be times when a single event 
will require notification to a large number of people. Large-scale 
disclosures need to be well thought out with some degree of 
rationale as to who needs to be targeted. A risk assessment will assist 
in identifying which service users have been potentially exposed to a 
safety incident/ adverse event and who are therefore at risk and 
require disclosure. Where the likelihood of exposure is high, the need 
to contact all affected service users is straightforward. When the 
likelihood of harm decreases the probability of harm in conjunction 
with weighing up ethical obligations is required. It is vital that this 
decision is made with the necessary input from all of the relevant 
parties and with consideration of a number of perspectives, including 
medical, ethical, legal, risk management and communications aspects 
to determine a structured, informed and targeted approach. 
 
Further notes: The need to disclose when there is no harm, but the 
potential for harm exists is influenced by the potential likelihood of 
severe consequences in the future. If it is unknown if harm has 
occurred it is recommended that disclosure takes place. If, after 
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consideration of the near miss event, it is determined that there is a 
risk of potential for future harm from the event then this should be 
discussed with the service user. 
Consider if there is a reason to defer disclosure at this time/can 
disclosure cause additional harm? 
Healthcare providers and services should consider what the 
reasonable person would want to know about the near miss event 
under the circumstances. 
When a clinician makes a decision, based on his/her clinical 
judgement, not to disclose to the service user that an adverse event 
has occurred, the rationale for this decision must be clearly 
documented in the service user’s healthcare record and this decision 
may need to be reviewed by the clinician at a later date, depending 
on the circumstances involved. 
GMC (UK) 2015 
Single patient incident: Every healthcare professional must be open 
and honest with patients when something that goes wrong with their 
treatment or care causes, or has the potential to cause, harm or 
distress. 
 
Further notes:  
This guidance also applies in situations where a patient may yet suffer 
harm or distress as a result of something going wrong with their care.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
A ‘near miss’ is an adverse incident that had the potential to result in 
harm but did not do so* 
*This does not include adverse incidents that may result in harm but 
have not yet done so – the patient must be told about these events 
and they must be reported in line with this guidance. 
VHA (USA) 2018 
Single patient incident: Disclosure is required for the following: 
 
- Adverse events that cause death or disability, lead to prolonged 
hospitalization, require life-sustaining intervention or intervention to 
prevent impairment or damage (or that are reasonably expected to 
result in death or serious and/or permanent disability) 
 
- Adverse events that have had, or are reasonably expected to have, 
an effect on the patient that is perceptible to either the patient or the 
health care team. For example, if a patient is mistakenly given a dose 
of a diuretic (a medication that dramatically increases urine output), 
disclosure is required because a perceptible effect has, or is 
anticipated to occur. 
 
- Adverse events that precipitate a change in the patient’s care. For 
example, a medication error that necessitates extra blood tests, extra 
hospital days, or follow-up visits that would otherwise not be 
required, or a surgical procedure that necessitates further (corrective) 
surgery. 
 
- Adverse events with a clinically-significant risk of serious future 
health consequences to patients, even if the likelihood of that risk is 
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small. For example, a known, accidental exposure of a patient to 
“ionizing radiation,” “a toxin,” “an organism,” or “infectious entity” 
associated with a rare, but recognized serious short-term or long-
term effect (e.g., blood borne pathogen infection or increased 
incidence of cancer).  
 
In some cases, however, no definite exposure of this type can be 
determined. Only an increased risk of exposure is known or thought 
to exist. In such cases, disclosure needs to be decided with careful 
deliberation considering the best interests of the patient, and 
weighing the risks and benefits of disclosure relative to the 
probability of serious future health consequences. If, after disclosure 
in such cases, it is later determined through the look-back process or 
subsequent investigation that harm did not occur, or that the risk of 
harm is actually negligible, disclosure of the new risk information 
must be made to the patient. Caution must be exercised in 
differentiating “clinically significant” risk of harm from harm that is 
only “plausible” or “hypothetical.” 
 
Multiple patient disclosure:  
The SME Review Panel is a panel convened to conduct fact-finding, 
including, as needed, site visits, literature reviews, and risk 
assessment regarding events that have the potential for a large-scale 
disclosure.  They will conclude that either (a) There is a negligible risk 
of harm, considering both the probability of harm and the severity of 
potential harm; therefore no disclosure is required and the issue 
should be closed (b) There is a clinically-significant risk of harm, 
considering both the probability of harm and the severity of potential 
harm; therefore disclosure is required and there is no need to 
convene a CRB (c) There is an indeterminate risk of harm, considering 
both the probability of harm and the severity of potential harm; 
therefore a CRB should be convened to consider whether disclosure is 
ethically warranted based on factors other than risk alone.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
The CRB (clinical review board) uses a transparent and systematic 
process to consider whether disclosure is ethically warranted in light 
of the indeterminate risk.                                                                                                                                                                                 
There is a presumptive obligation to disclose adverse events that 
cause harm or potential harms to patients. However, in the case of an 
adverse event that has the potential to affect dozens or even 
thousands of patients, a public health response also requires a 
determination of the probability and severity of harm resulting from 
the adverse event, as well as a weighing of additional factors, 
including, but not limited to: salient ethical principles; risk of harm to 
patients and potentially-affected third parties; benefit and burden of 
disclosure to patients, including medical, psychological, social, or 
economic; impact on the institution’s perceived integrity and its 
capacity to provide care and treatment for all patients; as well as 
applicable policy and relevant precedent. 
- 1. DO WE HAVE ALL THE IMPORTANT FACTS RELEVANT TO THE 
DECISION? 
- 2. HAVE WE INVOLVED EVERYONE WHO SHOULD BE PART OF THIS 
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DECISION? 
- 3. DOES THIS DECISION REFLECT ORGANIZATIONAL, PROFESSIONAL, 
AND SOCIAL VALUES? 
- 4. DO THE LIKELY BENEFITS OF THE DECISION OUTWEIGH ANY LIKELY 
HARMS? 
- 5. DOES THIS DECISION ESTABLISH A GOOD MODEL FOR FUTURE 
DECISION-MAKING? 
- 6. HOW WOULD THIS DECISION LOOK TO SOMEONE OUTSIDE THE 
ORGANIZATION? 
 
Further notes:  
VHA believes that there is an unwavering ethical obligation to disclose 
to patients harmful adverse events that have been sustained in the 
course of their Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) care, including 
cases where the harm may not be obvious, or where there is a 
potential for harm to occur in the future. 
Canadian 
Patient Safety 
Institute (Ca) 
2011 
Single patient incident: Flowchart shows that one should always 
disclose a harmful incident, generally disclose no harm incidents and 
near miss means generally need not disclose unless it is felt patient 
would benefit from knowing ie: there is an ongoing safety risk. 
 
Multiple patient incident: Guidance seldom addresses the distinct 
challenges of large-scale disclosure 
Which patients are ‘at risk’ and require disclosure 
As likelihood of harm decreases a complex weighing of clinical 
probabilities and ethical obligations may be required. Ultimately 
criteria for contacting patients should be conducted with risk 
assessment in mind 
Need access to evidence based risk assessment literature 
Anticipate challenges by having experts available to make decisions. 
 
Further notes: The need to disclose when there is no immediate harm 
but the potential for harm exists is influenced by the future likelihood 
of important clinical consequences and the urgency is determined by 
the ability to prevent, identify or mitigate future harm through clinical 
testing or treatment. When uncertain about whether harm has 
occurred. It is recommended that disclosure take place, however, 
further consultation may be required before proceeding. Consider 
consulting with clinical experts and as appropriate an ethics 
committee or similar experts for advice or sometimes legal council 
about the risk of future harm and the need to disclose. 
NSW 
Government 
(Aus) 
2014 
Single Patient Disclosure: Open disclosure is required whenever a 
patient has been harmed, whether that harm is a result of an 
unplanned or unintended event or circumstance, or is an outcome of 
an illness or its treatment that has not met the patient’s or the 
clinician’s expectation for improvement or cure. A disclosure 
discussion must occur whenever a patient has been harmed, whether 
that harm is a result of an unplanned or unintended event or 
circumstance, or is an outcome of an illness or its treatment that has 
not met the patient’s or the clinician’s expectation for improvement 
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or cure. 
Flowchart indicates - Always disclose a harmful incident, Generally 
disclose a no harm incident, Generally no need to disclose a near miss 
incident unless ongoing patient safety risk. 
 
Multiple patient incident: To guide decisions about open disclosure, 
expert advice may be required to assist with the determination of the 
level of risk. 
Appears to be mandatory when patient has been harmed or will be 
harmed but open disclosure always encouraged. 
 
Further notes: Open disclosure begins with the recognition that a 
patient has been harmed or will potentially be harmed by an ongoing 
safety risk as a result of receiving or not receiving treatment or care. 
In the case of a near miss disclosure is discretionary, based on 
whether it is felt the patient would benefit from knowing, for 
example, if there is a residual safety risk. 
Health and 
Disability 
Commission 
(NZ) 
2009 
Single patient incident: A consumer should be informed about any 
adverse event, ie, when the consumer has suffered any unintended 
harm while receiving health care or disability services 
An error that affected the consumer‘s care but does not appear to 
have caused harm may also need to be disclosed to the consumer. 
Canadian 
Medical 
Protection 
Association 
(Ca) 
2017 
Single patient incident: Patient should be notified when the clinical 
outcome is not as anticipated and whatever the reasons for harm, 
physicians are obligated to communicate directly with their patients. 
 
Further notes: Sometimes an incident has the potential for harm, that 
is, harm might manifest in the future. For example, a patient exposed 
to poorly sterilized equipment might subsequently acquire 
a viral infection. The infection would take time to declare itself and 
serial monitoring would be required. No harm incidents require 
disclosure.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
The patient should be informed about a near miss if there is a similar, 
ongoing safety risk for that patient, or if the patient is aware of the 
near miss and an explanation will allay concern and promote trust. In 
‘near misses’ the event did not reach the patient because of timely 
intervention or good fortune. In general, a near miss need not be 
disclosed, although there are exceptions. 
Nova Scotia 
Health (Ca) 
2005 
Single patient disclosure: At minimum the facts of the event and its 
impact on the client and on the care must be disclosed when an 
adverse event occurs during the process of providing health care and 
results in client injury, death or negatively impacts health (real or 
perceived). 
 
Multiple patient incident: Processes for disclosure become more 
complex in certain situations, for example where large numbers of 
individuals are involved. A comprehensive decision-making 
framework aims to assist in the step-by-step process of bringing the 
relevant stakeholders together, clarifying the issue, gathering and 
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examining the relevant information, identifying possible response 
options, considering the burdens and benefits of each and to whom, 
selecting a response and implementing a comprehensive strategy, 
and evaluating the outcomes. 
The Department of Health and health care agencies shall participate 
in collaborative communication planning when informing the public 
about adverse events which (1) involve multiple clients; (2) are 
perceived as a public health hazard; or (3) have the potential to 
undermine public confidence in the health care system.  
Danish Society 
for Patient 
Safety (Den) 
2008 
Single patient incident: Notify when patients have been harmed or 
are exposed to a serious risk of harm in their encounter with the 
health care services. 
 
Further notes: As a general rule, an apology should be offered to 
patients sustaining harm or having been exposed to unnecessary risk. 
However, it should be emphasised once again that not two patients 
are the same, and the same is true of the nature of events causing 
harm. It is not possible to make an exhaustive inventory of scenarios, 
dividing them into ’requiring an apology’ or ’not requiring an 
apology’. 
It is always a question of an individual assessment, and that 
assessment must pay special attention to the patient’s experience of 
what happened. 
As a general rule, patients should not be informed about near misses, 
defined as events that are prevented from happening due to timely 
intervention. 
Clinical 
Excellence 
Commission 
(Aus) 
2014 
Single Patient incident: Open disclosure is required whenever a 
patient has been harmed, whether that harm is a result of an 
unplanned or unintended event or circumstance, or 
an outcome of an illness or its treatment that has not met the 
patient’s or the clinician’s expectation for improvement or cure. 
Whenever a harmful incident occurs, the patient and/or their support 
person(s) must be informed. 
Flowchart indicates - Always disclose a harmful incident, Generally 
disclose a no harm incident, Generally no need to disclose a near miss 
incident unless ongoing patient safety risk.    
 
Multiple patient incident:  When there is potential for a number of 
people to be harmed by a common patient safety incident or series of 
incidents, each situation should be assessed promptly with legal 
counsel and public relations departments. Proactive disclosure is 
recommended. This may include a public announcement (e.g. a press 
conference) and description of what has occurred using various 
media; an apology for distress that the announcement may cause, 
details of the investigation underway and what would happen if it is 
identified that a person has been affected, and details of a dedicated 
toll-free contact number staffed by clinical members of the team and 
an email address 
 
Further notes: A disclosure discussion is also generally required when 
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a no harm incident has been identified, and may be required for ‘near 
miss’ incidents if there is an ongoing safety risk to the patient and the 
patient would benefit from knowing.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Even though no harm is immediately apparent, an ongoing patient 
safety risk may be present and the patient and/or their support 
person(s) may be aware that some sort of mistake or incident has 
occurred. For a near miss incident, disclosure is discretionary, based 
on whether it is felt the patient would benefit from knowing, for 
example, if there is an ongoing safety risk to the patient. Advice may 
be required from the senior treating clinician and/or open disclosure 
advisor to assist with the determination of risk. 
Scottish 
Government 
(Sco) 
2018 
Single patient incident: Organisations (as responsible persons) must 
activate the duty of candour procedure as soon as reasonably 
practicable after becoming aware that: 
• an unintended or unexpected incident occurred in the provision of 
the health, care or social work service provided by the organisation as 
the responsible person; 
• in the reasonable opinion of a registered health professional not 
involved in the incident: 
(a) that incident appears to have resulted in or could result in any of 
the outcomes mentioned below; and 
(b) that outcome relates directly to the incident rather than to the 
natural course of the person’s illness or underlying condition. 
The relevant outcomes are as follows: 
A. The death of the person. 
B. Permanent lessening of bodily, sensory, motor, physiologic or 
intellectual functions (including removal of the wrong limb or organ 
or brain damage) (“severe harm”). 
C. Harm which is not severe harm but which results in one or more of 
the following criterion: 
• an increase in the person’s treatment; 
• changes to the structure of the person’s body; 
• the shortening of the life expectancy of the person; 
• an impairment of the sensory, motor or intellectual functions of the 
person which has lasted, or is likely to last, for a continuous period of 
at least 28 days; 
• the person experiencing pain or psychological harm which has been, 
or is likely to be, experienced by the person for a continuous period of 
at least 28 days. 
D. The person requires treatment by a registered health professional 
in order to prevent: 
• the death of the person; 
• any injury to the person which, if left untreated, would lead to one 
or more of the outcomes mentioned in paragraph B or C.      
 
Further notes: If an event is unlikely to result in harm organisational 
duty of candour does not need to be activated. It is important to note 
that where the duty of candour procedure start date is later than one 
month after the date on which the incident occurred, an explanation 
of the reason for this has to be provided to the relevant person.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
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Sco – Scotland 
Eng – England 
Ire – Ireland 
Aus – Australia 
Den – Denmark 
Ca – Canada 
NZ – New Zealand 
USA – United States of America 
UK – United Kingdom 
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Appendix 22. Questionnaire development – the ‘Think Aloud’ 
interview study 
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Introduction 
Questionnaires are used to gather standardised information from a sample of 
participants who represent a wider population (Rattray and Jones 2007). The 
science and importance of good questionnaire design is the focus of a multitude 
of textbooks and papers (Rattray and Jones 2007; Bradburn et al 2004; Tsang et 
al 2017; Dillman 2007). If questionnaire design is done without adequate 
feedback or reflection, it can result in a poorly worded and structured survey 
with a high degree of response error (Boynton and Greenhalgh 2004). 
Researchers may choose to utilise a validated, pre-existing questionnaire to 
capture data. A validated tool has been tested for validity and reliability 
(Rattray and Jones 2007). Researchers have accessed, for example, whether the 
questionnaire gathers data that truly reflect and contribute to the entity being 
measured and whether the survey exhibits test-retest reliability. Use of a 
validated questionnaire saves time and reassures the researcher that they are 
using a tried and tested survey tool (Tsang et al 2017). However, if no validated 
tool, which measures your factor of interest, exists, a new questionnaire must 
be developed.  Adapting a pre-existing questionnaire for an alternative but 
connected use and still considering it validated, is not recommended. Altering a 
validated questionnaire in any way, such as re-ordering questions, can result in 
unexpected influences upon respondent answers and invalidate the tool (Juniper 
2009; Dowrick et al 2015). 
Whether your questionnaire is new or has been extracted from the existing 
literature, it should be piloted and tested to establish if it is fit for use on your 
specific, target population (Boynton and Greenhalgh 2004). A traditional piloting 
phase was not executed as part of this doctoral work but is, however, 
recommended in the main questionnaire study proposal (Appendix 23). The 
‘think aloud’ interview process described here, was used to aid development of 
the questionnaire and is not designed to replace a piloting phase but rather to 
complement it. 
What is a ‘think aloud’ or cognitive interview study? 
A ‘think aloud’ interview study or cognitive interviewing process involves asking 
a small sample of individuals to assess a newly designed tool or survey. 
Participants take part in an interview where they complete the instrument and 
voice their thoughts aloud. Their comments are then used to improve the 
content and design of the tool (Willis 2005ᶠ). 
The focus in a ‘think aloud’ interview is primarily on the participants’ 
interpretation of how questions should be read and answered, not the specific 
content of the answers themselves (Willis 2005ᶠ). The researcher is looking for 
feedback on factors such as readability, complexity and length (Willis 2005ᶠ). In 
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his key, methodological text, Willis (2005ᶠ) stated that we use cognitive 
interviewing to study how “targeted audiences understand, mentally process and 
respond to the materials we present”. Only a small sample size is required and 
multiple interviews with multiple rounds should result in a final instrument draft 
where many barriers to understanding and completion have been removed (Willis 
2005ᶠ; van Oort et al 2011; McCorry et al 2013).  
Roots of the ‘think aloud’ methodology lie in psychological research, specifically 
the concept of introspection (van Someren et al 1994). Discussion surrounding 
introspection began in the 1930s and was based on the idea that cognitive 
processes can be observed in the same way that physical aspects of our 
environment are (van Someren et al 1994). The origin of cognitive interviewing 
as a technique truly lies, however, in the early 80s with the development of the 
CASM approach: Cognitive Aspects of Survey Methodology (Willis 2005ᵃ). In 1984, 
Jabine et al outlined four key elements that underpin the concept of CASM. 
1: Question intent, what does the respondent believe the question to be asking, 
meaning of terms, what do specific words and phrases in the question mean? 
2: Recall of information, what kinds of information are asked about, retrieval 
strategy, for example does the respondent count each event by recalling them 
or estimation strategy. 
3: Motivation, are they devoting sufficient effort to answering the question. 
Sensitivity/social desirability, does the respondent want to answer, do they want 
to make themselves appear a certain way? 
4. Can the respondent match their internally generated answer to the response 
options provided in the question? 
The four elements of the CASM approach (Jabine et al 1984) 
Aims 
i. To obtain feedback on the design of a novel questionnaire  
ii. To alter the questionnaire based on participants’ comments thus resulting in a 
survey tool which is easy to understand, inoffensive and straightforward to 
complete. 
Methods 
Selection and recruitment of study participants 
An ideal pilot sample for this study would have been those who had recently 
been involved in a dental PNE. A suitable incident, however, had not recently or 
was not currently, being managed at the time of this doctoral study. Seeking out 
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those who had been involved in a historic exercise was considered but with the 
last relevant incident having occurred three years previously, respondent recall 
would most likely have been poor. 
Recruiting members of the public was considered, and although they would have 
aptly reflected the profile of future respondents it was postulated that 
communication with the general public regarding PNEs may create feelings of 
concern about the safety of their own dental healthcare provision. 
It was decided that a ‘think aloud’ study or cognitive interview technique would 
be used to develop the questionnaire with a traditional pilot phase being 
recommended as part of the main questionnaire study proposal (Appendix 23). 
A convenience sample was selected from those working within Glasgow Dental 
School. It was, however, stipulated that participants must not have a clinical 
background to avoid obtaining only healthcare professionals’ input and hopefully 
mirror the responses of those from a typical, general public background.  
A poster was placed in all Glasgow Dental School staff areas to publicise the 
study and invite recruits. Those who were interested in taking part were invited 
to email the chief investigator (LG). Interested parties were emailed a detailed 
participant information sheet and advised that should they still be interested, 
following its perusal, they should email the CI once more. 
Two rounds of interviews were conducted involving a total of eight participants, 
four in each round.  
Interview process 
Interviews took place within a private office space of Glasgow Dental School. 
Participants were asked to read and complete a ten-item consent form and to 
initial each point if they were satisfied with its content. The form was signed 
and dated by the participant and then co-signed and dated by the researcher 
taking consent. Participants were asked if they had any questions or concerns. A 
copy of the form was given to the participant for their personal records. 
Following consent, audio recording was commenced. Participants were then 
asked to select both an age range and highest level of education from a list of 
pre-assembled options and speak their selections aloud. 
The structure of the ‘think aloud’ interviews was carefully constructed based on 
examples in the literature and key ‘think aloud’ or cognitive interview 
methodology publications (Willis G 2005; Boeije and Willis 2013; McCorry et al 
2013; van Oort et al 2011). 
Participants were asked to read and complete the questionnaire whilst voicing 
their thoughts aloud. Throughout the interview, interaction with the participant 
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was limited in order to reflect a self-administered questionnaire environment. If 
the participant fell silent for a long period of time they were prompted to speak 
by asking them what they were thinking (Willis 2005ⁱ; McCorry et al 2013; van 
Oort et al 2011). 
The pre-questionnaire interview guide 
Before the participant began assessing and commenting on the questionnaire, a 
four-part, pre-questionnaire interview guide was followed that introduced the 
participant to the concept of ‘thinking aloud’. Part A was read to the participant 
by the CI and detailed the purpose and process of the ‘Think Aloud’ interview. It 
was modelled on an example script published by McCorry et al in 2013. 
It is considered good practice to incorporate a ‘think aloud’ participant training 
phase into the interview process (Willis 2005ᵈ). Part B of the guide prompted the 
interviewer to administer a ‘warm up’ questionnaire. This comprised a short 
series of questions on the weather and how the participant travelled to the 
interview. A similar short, introductory, questionnaire was included in van Oort 
et al’s 2011 ‘Think Aloud’ study. This training exercise allows participants to 
practise the skill of thinking aloud and tests their ability to identify mistakes or 
questionnaire difficulties. 
Part C involved providing the participant with a scenario letter. Participants 
were asked to imagine that they had received this letter in the post. The letter 
was modelled on those sent to patients involved in a Scottish dental incident and 
provided a context for the questionnaire. 
Part D involved the delivery of a short statement which encouraged the 
participant to not hold back with any of their comments or concerns as the the 
chief investigator was keen to receive constructive criticism in order to improve 
the questionnaire. 
Data analysis 
Each of the first four interviews were transcribed verbatim and, as the literature 
recommends, a report was compiled which mainly consisted of the questionnaire, 
annotated with participants’ comments (Willis 2005ᵇ). Each questionnaire item 
was presented alongside participants’ comments pertaining to that question. 
The report also included the demographic features of the participants, notes 
regarding how well participants were able to express their thoughts aloud and a 
final section which outlined any general comments participants made (Willis 
2005ᵇ; Boeije and Willis 2013). The CI, alongside research team member (AR) 
used their personal judgement to decide which comments would be used to 
influence the re-design of the questionnaire. 
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Interviewing and questionnaire re-design: an iterative process 
‘Think Aloud’ interviews should ideally be conducted in multiple rounds. This 
facilitates design alterations throughout the study with accompanying feedback, 
bringing the researcher ever closer to the production of a highly effective 
questionnaire (Boeije and Willis 2013; Willis 2005ᵍ). 
Following the first round of ‘Think Aloud’ interviews, contact with a UK public 
health consultant resulted in the acquisition of data surrounding a further, 
unpublished, study which had assessed psychological impact following a dental 
incident (unpublished report 2007). First interview round findings, along with the 
design features of this newly discovered study, influenced the creation of a 
second questionnaire draft (unpublished report 2007). A second round of 
interviews was conducted with four more participants and the new questionnaire 
version. 
Audio recordings were once again transcribed verbatim and a similar ‘report of 
findings’, that had been created following the first round of interviews, was 
produced. 
Ethical approval 
NHS research ethics committee approval was not required for the ‘think aloud’ 
interview study as it involved the recruitment and participation of NHS staff only. 
Ethical approval was, however, sought from Glasgow University MVLS College as 
well as NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Research and Development. 
As previously outlined, the study involved multiple rounds of interviews. A 
number of documents, including the questionnaire and recruitment poster, were 
altered following the first round thus a substantial amendment to the original, 
ethical approval was submitted and approved before initiation of the study’s 
second phase. 
Data management 
Consent forms were stored in a locked cabinet within Glasgow Dental School. 
Ethical approval requires that data related to the study be stored in a secure 
location for ten years. A data manager for the study was selected (AR) and 
knowledge regarding access to the data will be passed to another research 
colleague should AR leave his post.  
Each participant was allocated a unique identification number which was linked 
to their consent forms and used in subsequent transcriptions. 
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Results 
Participant demographics 
In total, this study had eight participants, four in the first round of interviews 
and four in the second. Six participants were male and two female. Three 
participants were 40-49, two were 30-39, one was 20-29, one 50-59 and one 60-
69. One participant’s highest level of education was a University degree with all 
other participants (7/8) possessing the highest level of education listed - a 
postgraduate degree. 
Comments on structure  
In the first round, three out of four participants explained that they felt the 
questionnaire was too long but those involved in round two, following alterations, 
found it to be of suitable length. 
In round two, participants commented that overall flow of the questionnaire was 
adequate but two participants felt that answer options were too close together 
which resulted in confusion as to which answer coincided with which arrow 
directing you to the appropriate follow-up section.  
One participant highlighted the need for consistency in the scales that were 
presented and commented that all scale options should be presented in the 
same manner throughout the questionnaire (e.g. all high to low or all poor to 
good etc.) 
In round two of the interviews one participant gave excellent advice concerning 
the structure of the open text questions. Some questions provided space for 
open text answers via a series of underlined rows. One participant explained 
that an open box, without lines, would accommodate inclusion of more text and 
not constrain any style of handwriting. 
Comments on subject and content of questions 
There were some aspects of the questionnaire that prompted differing opinions. 
In response to a question which focused on the reasons behind why patients may 
call an incident helpline, some participants felt that an open text response gave 
the participant freedom in their answer and felt that pre-determined response 
options may put ideas into the respondent’s head creating directed answers.  
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‘Reason for calling helpline’ question (PINE Questionnaire V1.0) 
 
An open text response was therefore used in the second round of interviews but 
was found to discourage detailed answers.  
 
‘Reason for calling helpline’ question (PINE Questionnaire V2.0) 
In the end a balance was struck by keeping the open text response but altering 
the wording of the question to encourage the provision of a more detailed 
answer. 
‘Reason for calling helpline’ question (PINE Questionnaire V3.0) 
 
Participants questioned the inclusion of a ‘general comments’ question as they 
felt it was not needed and would not yield useful results. One participant 
commented that some patients may write questions in such a box, forgetting 
that the questionnaire was anonymous and expect a response from the 
board/trust. 
8. Why did you attempt to contact the helpline? 
(Please tick all that apply) 
 
I was anxious                                                                                                           
I wanted more information    
I wanted to complain about the incident    
I wanted to complain about the content of the letter    
I wanted to be sure that I definitely had had contact with this practice    
I wanted to know more about Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C and/or HIV    
I wanted to know about Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C and/or HIV testing    
I can’t remember     
Other      Please state………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
6. Why did you attempt to contact the helpline? 
  
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...............................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
8. What information did you want from the helpline staff? 
(Please write your answer in the box below) 
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One participant reported that they felt asking someone why they did not get 
tested may not yield a response, as it was perhaps a more sensitive question. 
Comments on missing questions  
One participant made it clear that two extra questions needed to be added to 
the questionnaire. Firstly, a question regarding how the patient first heard about 
the incident, as it cannot be assumed that it was via the letter from the health 
board/trust. This answer could then be compared with levels of anxiety and 
other factors.  
Secondly the question asking about whether patients were tested needed to be 
extended to ascertain for which viruses they had been tested. Some incidents 
encourage patients to be tested for all BBVs but patients may not choose to be 
tested for all three. 
Comments on the ‘symptoms of anxiety’ question 
In the first round of interviews the ‘Impact of Events Scale’ (Horowitz et al 1979; 
Weiss 2007; Sundin and Horowitz 2002) was used to assess levels of anxiety 
following notification and how they affected daily functioning. Most participants 
had to re-read the question’s introduction a couple of times as they found the 
language used confusing. Multiple respondents found the tool’s questions to be 
repetitive and in a strange order with similar ideas not being presented together. 
Participants felt that patients may become frustrated or lose interest in 
completing the instrument. One participant felt that perhaps some of the tool’s 
questions were quite vague and that a number of patients may have reservations 
about, or be uncomfortable with, expressing the feelings included in them. 
In round two, hardly any difficulty was experienced by participants in 
interpreting and completing the ‘assessment of anxiety question’ which was now 
designed around the ‘Hospital Anxiety and Depression’ scale (Zigmond and Snaith 
1983). One participant did feel, however, that the question should be moved to 
an earlier point in the questionnaire where the other, incident related, anxiety 
questions featured. They also felt that the sub questions (a-e) should be 
arranged to be read from left to right as this reflected a more natural reading 
style. 
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Comments on the ‘opinions regarding risk and notification’ 
question 
This question undoubtedly caused the most issues, with all participants 
struggling to make sense of its structure and language both in the first and 
second rounds of interviewing. Many participants had to re-read the question 
multiple times. 
The design used in the first round of interviews resembled several rows of 
statements with tick boxes. Each row featured a description of the risk and a 
question as to whether that risk would merit patient notification. Risks were 
presented as a range of figures (eg. 1 in 10,000 – 1 in 100,000) alongside a 
‘Calman’s’ description of the risk (eg. the same as the risk of dying within 1 year 
in an accident at work) (1996). A final option of ‘patients should never be told’ 
was provided.  
It was hoped that the design would encourage the patient to tick ‘yes’ to all the 
risks they felt merited notification and ‘no’ to all the ones where they felt it was 
not required. In doing so, an answer would be provided for every row. 
Participants felt that a ‘don’t know’ option was needed and many did not grasp 
that ticking all of the risk options would be equivalent to selecting an option of 
‘patients must always be told’.  
One respondent explained that the ‘Calman’ (1996) descriptors did not clarify 
the nature of the risks but rather served as a distraction, making the participant 
think about cigarette smoking or having an accident at work. They also found 
the numerical representation of the risks confusing and commented that they 
would prefer use of descriptive words such as high, medium and low. 
Some respondents questioned the validity of asking patients, who had already 
been informed and involved in an incident, about triggers for notification. They 
explained that such patients may be too close to the situation to make an 
impartial decision. 
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‘Risk and notification’ question (PINE questionnaire V1.0) 
 
Following alteration of this question, second round participants still raised issues. 
They explained that the question was visually overwhelming and its structure 
complicated.  
The design of the question had been changed to include a column structure with 
only one answer now being required. Respondents explained, however, that the 
many tick boxes (one for each row) strongly suggested that multiple answers 
were to be provided. 
18. Please tell us when  you think patients should be told about these types of incidents by answering 
all of the following yes/no questions.  
 
Patients should  be notified when the chances of getting an infection (such as Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C 
and/or HIV) as a result of any incident are… 
 
a. between 1 in 100 and 1 in 1000 (the same as the risk of dying within 1 year from smoking 10 cigarettes 
a day) 
 
Yes             No     
 
b. between 1 in 1000 and 1 in 10,000 (the same as the risk of dying within 1 year in a road accident) 
 
Yes              No     
 
c. between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 100,000 (the same as the risk of dying within 1 year in an accident at 
work)  
 
Yes              No     
 
d.between 1 in 100,000 and 1 in 1 million (the same as the risk of dying within 1 year in a train accident) 
 
Yes              No     
 
e. less than 1 in 1 million (the same as the risk of dying within 1 year from being struck by lightning) 
 
Yes              No     
 
f. Patients should never be told 
 
Yes              No     
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‘Risk and notification’ question (PINE questionnaire V2.0) 
 
 
 
 
 
LOW RISK HIGH RISK 
17. When do you think patients should be told about incidents involving infection control errors/infected health care 
workers? 
(please circle one answer) 
 
a. Patients should never be told 
b. Patients should always be told 
c. Patients don’t always need to be told, it depends on the level of risk involved  
 
18. Please select only one of the following rows for your answer. 
Following the discovery of an infected health care worker/poor infection control, when should patients be told? 
(please tick only one row for your answer) 
 
 
 
A. 
When the 
risk is 
classed as... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HIGH 
(Higher 
than a 1 in 
100  
chance of 
infection) 
 
      
      
B.  
When the 
risk is 
classed as 
either... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MODERATE 
(a 1 in 100 
chance of 
infection) 
 
HIGH 
(Higher 
than a 1 in 
100  
chance of 
infection) 
 
    OR  
      
C.  
When the 
risk is 
classed as 
either...  
 
 
 
 
 
 
LOW 
(a 1 in 1000 
chance of 
infection) 
 
MODERATE 
(a 1 in 100 
chance of 
infection) 
 HIGH 
(Higher 
than a 1 in 
100 chance 
of infection) 
 
   OR OR  
      
D.  
When the 
risk is 
classed as 
either...  
 
 
 
 
VERY LOW 
(a 1 in 10,000 
chance of 
infection) 
 
LOW 
(a 1 in 1000 
chance of 
infection) 
 
MODERATE 
(a 1 in 100 
chance of 
infection) 
 
HIGH 
(Higher 
than a 1 in 
100 chance 
of infection) 
 
  OR OR OR  
      
E.  
When the 
risk is 
classed as 
either...  
 
 
MINIMAL 
(a 1 in 100,000 
chance of 
infection) 
 
VERY LOW 
(a 1 in 10,000 
chance of 
infection) 
 
LOW 
(a 1 in 1000 
chance of 
infection) 
 
MODERATE 
(a 1 in 100 
chance of 
infection) 
 
HIGH 
(Higher 
than a 1 in 
100 chance 
of infection) 
 
 OR OR OR OR  
      
 
F. 
When the 
risk is 
classed as 
either... 
LESS THAN 
MINIMAL 
(a 1 in 
500,000 
chance of 
infection) 
 
MINIMAL 
(a 1 in 100,000 
chance of 
infection) 
 
VERY LOW 
(a 1 in 10,000 
chance of 
infection) 
 
LOW 
(a 1 in 1000 
chance of 
infection) 
 
MODERATE 
(a 1 in 100 
chance of 
infection) 
 
HIGH 
(Higher 
than a 1 in 
100 chance 
of infection) 
 
OR OR OR OR OR  
      
 
Please skip to question 19 
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The final draft of this question can be seen to incorporate the positively 
received elements of the two previous drafts and eliminates features that 
received negative feedback. Calman’s risk descriptors (1996) have been removed 
and detailed information regarding risk quantification is available but has been 
separated from the responses. All risks are now described in words HIGH, LOW 
etc. and patients have to select only one option. Options have also been stripped 
of any visual complications.  
‘Risk and notification’ question (PINE questionnaire V3.0) 
 
19. When do you think patients should be told about incidents involving infection control errors/infected health care 
workers? 
(please circle one answer) 
 
a. Patients should never be told 
 
b. Patients should always be told 
 
c. Patients don’t always need to be told, it depends on the level of risk involved  
 
 
20. Following the discovery of an infected health care worker/poor infection control, when should patients be told? 
(please circle one answer)  
  
a. Patients should be told when the risk has been classed as HIGH 
 
b. Patients should be told when the risk has been classed as either MODERATE or HIGH 
 
c. Patients should be told when the risk has been classed as either LOW, MODERATE or HIGH 
 
d. Patients should be told when the risk has been classed as either VERY LOW, LOW, MODERATE or HIGH 
 
e. Patients should be told when the risk has been classed as either MINIMAL, VERY LOW, LOW, MODERATE or HIGH 
 
f. Patients should be told when the risk has been classed as either NEGLIGIBLE, MINIMAL, VERY LOW, LOW, MODERATE OR 
HIGH 
 
g. I don’t know 
 
 
 
 
RISK DESCRIPTION TABLE 
Level of Risk Chance of getting infection... 
HIGH ...greater than 1 in a 100 
MODERATE ...1 in 100 – 1 in 1000 
LOW ...1 in 1000 – 1 in 10,000 
VERY LOW ...1 in 10,000 – 1 in 100,000 
MINIMAL ...1 in 100,000 – 1 in 500,000 
LESS THAN MINIMAL ...1 in 500,000 – 1in 1,000,000 
NEGLIGIBLE ...less than 1 in 1,000,000 
 
Please skip to question 19 
You may use the 
information in this 
table to help you 
answer question 20 
if you wish 
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Comments on terminology 
Following both rounds of interviews, multiple participants commented that, 
generally, they found the language appropriate for a lay audience. Small issues 
surrounding terminology were occasionally raised, all of which were easily 
addressed. 
Participants had suggestions for alternative terms that were not critical to their 
understanding of the questionnaire but rather, represented a preference in 
language. For example when asked ‘how do you feel about the incident now?’, 
participants preferred the term ‘today’ in place of the word ‘now’. Use of the 
word nervous instead of anxious, was also preferred when considering feelings 
towards dental treatment. 
One participant highlighted that one could not ask someone to rank something 
on a scale of 1-5 if the answers did not represent a scale with continuous 
increasing or decreasing increments. An example of such a scale would be one in 
which there is was a middle option of ‘don’t know/can’t remember’; this scale 
cannot be considered a ranking. 
Multiple participants wanted to make sure that the appropriate, ethically 
responsible, terminology had been used in the question concerning gender 
identity.  
Discussion 
This study is the first to describe the development of a questionnaire which 
assesses anxiety following large-scale notification. The questionnaire’s design is 
inspired by experts in the field, questionnaire design literature, similar studies 
in the field and eight ‘think aloud’ interview respondents (Tsang et al 2017; 
Rattray and Jones 2007; Bradburn et al 2004; Boynton and Greenhalgh 2004); 
unpublished report 2007; Pashley et al 1991; Blatchford et al 2000; Monteith et 
al 1995). 
Main findings 
Both phases of this study revealed a plethora of issues with a questionnaire that 
was initially but incorrectly deemed to be highly appropriate following creation 
of the first draft which demonstrates the utility of the ‘Think Aloud’ process. 
The technique of thinking aloud was difficult for participants to master. Even in 
this group of highly educated individuals, many participants struggled to make 
the distinction between discussing the content of their answer and discussing 
issues of question interpretation. The warm-up questionnaire gave the 
participant a much-needed opportunity to practise the skill but often the most 
effective means of explanation involved the researcher demonstrating the skill 
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themselves. For future studies this author would recommend some form of 
demonstration of ‘thinking aloud’ by the researcher with an unrelated sample 
questionnaire. 
Strengths and weaknesses 
The ‘think aloud’ process was deemed to be a very useful exercise resulting in a 
high-quality final questionnaire draft. In contrast to piloting, where written 
responses are interpreted, interviews allow for an in-depth discussion. This is 
especially important where sensitive subjects need to be explored and complex 
concepts, such as risk perception, are to be assessed. Assessment of written 
responses alone, in a piloting phase, would not have facilitated such detailed 
and enlightening conversation. Those who design questionnaires are often blind 
to their faults and having multiple, lengthy conversations with respondents was 
very productive.  
Further strengths of this study include the decision to execute two rounds of 
interviews meaning that two drafts of the questionnaire were assessed. This 
author would highly recommend multiple rounds of interviews when refining the 
design of a questionnaire through ‘think aloud’ interviewing. 
A wide age range of participants were involved. Of nine age categories, ranging 
from 16-19 to 90+, five were represented. On reflection, however, participation 
of those with an age below 19 or higher than 69, would have been unlikely, as 
participants were selected from a working environment.  
A convenience sample from within Glasgow Dental Hospital saved time, 
facilitated a smooth ethical approval process and allowed multiple rounds of 
interviews with multiple alterations of the questionnaire (Willis 2005ᶠ).  
This author feels that, although it cannot replace a piloting process, the ‘Think 
Aloud’ interview approach is an under used technique that can highly benefit the 
development and design of questionnaires. It is a process which is especially 
beneficial when an entirely new questionnaire is being created and/or in 
circumstances where the chief investigator is new to the process of survey 
design. 
The ‘Think Aloud’ interview process involves a great deal of time as interviews 
can last anywhere from 15 minutes to two hours depending on the length of the 
questionnaire (Willis 2005ᵍ). If you choose to transcribe all interviews verbatim 
this also increases the time commitment considerably (Willis 2005ᵇ). This author 
would advise that researchers simply take notes on a copy of the questionnaire 
during the interview as an alternative to word-for-word transcription.  
There can be issues with participants straying from the subject matter (Willis 
2005ᵈ) or withholding negative comments as they wish to avoid offending the 
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researcher who they will presume designed the questionnaire. This author would 
advise that the interview is led by someone who did not design the questionnaire 
and that this is stated upon its commencement. A limitation specific to this 
study included the narrow range of educational backgrounds, with all but one 
out of eight participants having postgraduate degrees. Willis’ 2005 cognitive 
interviewing textbook does however emphasise that this is an issue of many 
‘Think Aloud’ studies.  
In comparison to piloting your questionnaire on a large, representative sample, 
there are a number of results that a ‘think aloud’ interview process cannot 
produce e.g. data to facilitate sample size calculations. Piloting is a valuable 
and necessary process for which the ‘think aloud’ interviewing process does not 
negate the need. 
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Appendix 23. Psychological impact of notification exercises 
(PINE) questionnaire study proposal 
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Introduction 
Three publications provided data on the psychological impact of dental, large-
scale notification. Two presented limited information on comments given by 
notified patients who called a designated, incident helpline. Both were 
connected to an HIV-infected dental HCW and took place in the 1990s (Pashley 
et al 1991; Monteith et al 1995). The third study possessed significantly more 
detail and was associated with an HBV-infected dentist in Glasgow (Blatchford et 
al 2000).  
All three studies possessed limitations in their approach and findings. The first 
study was associated with a US dental student who was diagnosed with HIV in 
1990 (Pashley et al 1991). The incident resulted in the college receiving calls 
from all 153 patients who were notified as part of the associated PNE (Pashley et 
al 1991).  
Those who answered calls attempted to capture information about the caller 
using a pre-defined checklist (Pashley et al 1991). Aspects to be recorded on the 
checklist included: how the caller had heard about the incident, the caller’s 
demeanour and their profile eg. were they a patient, reporter, dental 
professional? (Pashley et al 1991).  A number of issues with the content and 
structure of the checklist can be identified. When considering the patient’s 
demeanour, the check list prompts the user to tick all that apply from a list of 
options: calm, anxious, angry, hysterical and threatening (Pashley et al 1991). 
These options are not only limiting but do not allow assessment of strength of 
emotion e.g. a little anxious to very anxious.  
The idea of ticking a topic if it was raised is flawed as an assumption is made 
that if a matter is not raised by the caller, they have no opinion on it (Pashley et 
al 1991). Another limitation was the concept that the demeanour of the patient 
was interpreted by the person who took the call and not reported by the patient 
themselves (Pashley et al 1991). This obviously creates room for 
misinterpretation and is made worse by the fact that the caller is not face-to-
face with the data gatherer, which would allow a visual assessment of emotion 
(Pashley et al 1991).  
The team reported that “fourteen percent of callers were judged to be angry at 
the beginning of the call but seemed to become more calm as they were told of 
the testing plan” (Pashley et al 1991). This implies that those gathering data 
could record changes in callers’ emotions which is not evident on the checklist 
(Pashley et al 1991). In conclusion it is clear that the results presented (58% 
calm, 28% anxious and 14% angry) may not be reliable (Pashley et al 1991). 
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A very short article describes the second study which was conducted following 
the death of a London dentist with AIDS (Monteith et al 1995). This study 
similarly gathered data from patients who called the incident helpline. Of 130 
callers, 74% reported feeling anxious when they received the notification letter 
(Monteith et al 1995). Again, no indication is given of the degree of anxiety 
experienced. Ninety-six per cent thought that contact by letter was the best 
method of notification and “a similar proportion” felt that they had a right to be 
told (Monteith et al 1995). This study may be subject to non-response bias as 
data were gathered on those who called the helpline, not all involved in 
notification. Therefore those who did not call were automatically excluded from 
the study (Monteith et al 1995). 
In 2000, Blatchford and his team sent questionnaires to those who had been 
notified of treatment by an HBV-infected, UK dentist. 528 questionnaires were 
sent out with 291 returned, a 55% response rate (Blatchford et al 2000). The 
structure of the questionnaire mainly focused on asking respondents how they 
felt following each stage of the notification process: after receiving the letter, 
contacting the helpline and getting HBV test results (Blatchford et al 2000). The 
scale for each of these questions ranged from ‘Completely reassured’ to ‘Very 
Anxious’ with a ‘Can’t remember option’ (Blatchford et al 2000). This scale is 
unconventional with options that are not mutually exclusive as after reading the 
letter you may have been ‘Slightly reassured’ by its content but also still ‘Very 
anxious’ (Blatchford et al 2000).  
The questionnaire’s content was good as it included an assessment of whether 
notification was effective, whether enough information was provided and 
whether communications successfully alleviated anxiety (Blatchford et al 2000). 
A similar, newer study could explore further subjects such as effect of anxiety 
on daily activities and effect of notification on desire to seek out future dental 
treatment. Blatchford et al’s questionnaire does ask patients to provide an 
answer to whether patients should be notified following discovery of an infected 
HCW but does not provide a context of risk level (2000). 
An additional study was identified midway through the questionnaire design 
process. A British public health team distributed questionnaires to those 
attending for BBV testing following the practice of dentistry by an unregistered 
individual where infection control quality could not be verified (unpublished 
report 2007). 165 responses were received and results indicated high levels of 
anxiety with 45% indicating that they felt they might be infected before 
receiving test results (unpublished report 2007). The researchers went on to 
state that 17 individuals of the 45% felt that it was ‘likely’ they were infected 
(unpublished report 2007). Over three quarters of respondents reported 
experiencing somatic symptoms such as headaches or shaking (unpublished 
report 2007). Bias may exist in this case as those who took part could be 
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considered different, in certain respects, to the notified patients as they were 1) 
attending for testing and 2) volunteering to take part. 
Rationale for study 
Blatchford et al’s questionnaire was very detailed and represented a huge step 
forward in the evaluation of distress caused to notified dental patients (2000). 
Further anxiety elements, however, need to be explored along with a more up-
to-date representation of public opinion. Responses following an infection 
control incident rather than an infected HCW should be assessed and more 
detailed questions, relating to whether patients feel notification should be 
connected to the level of risk posed by the incident, should be included. 
Aims 
The purpose of this cross-sectional questionnaire study was to assess the 
significance and extent of the psychological impact of being notified as part of a 
PNE.  
Methods 
The proposal outlined below represents a series of recommendations. Many study 
design aspects will depend on the circumstances under which the research team 
wish to execute the research. 
Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire pack would include a cover letter, a participant information 
sheet, the questionnaire itself and a free post envelope. 
The questionnaire was designed in line with feedback received from participants 
of the ‘think aloud’ interview study (Appendix 22), guidance from Dr Alastair 
Ross (AR), a behavioural sciences lecturer based at the University of Glasgow and 
the aforementioned studies conducted by Blatchford et al (2000) and the UK IMT 
in 2007 (unpublished report). D. Dillman’s 2007 book; ‘Mail and Internet Surveys 
– The Tailored Design Method’, also proved to be highly useful. 
The primary outcome measure would be percentages of respondents reporting 
different levels of psychological distress following involvement in a dental PNE. 
Wherever possible, validated tools and question styles were used within the 
questionnaire. It is suggested that The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale17 
                                                          
17 Please note that in reference to the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale “a license agreement must be 
completed beforehand and a user fee is required to all users (commercial, healthcare organizations and 
academic users)” (www.gl-assessment.co.uk). 
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be used to gauge levels of distress caused to patients following notification 
(Zigmond and Snaith 1983). When asking about anxiety specifically related to 
current or future dental treatment, the Modified Dental Anxiety Scale could be 
used (Humphris et al 1995) and when inquiring about frequency of dental 
attendance the question structure from the latest Adult Dental Health Survey is 
useful (The Health and Social Care Information Centre 2009). In designing the 
question which asked about when patients feel they should be notified, Calman’s 
risk ratings (1996) were used to form the basis of response options and when 
asking about gender, the question was modelled on the structure advised in the 
‘Do Ask Do Tell’ guide produced by The Stonewall Organisation (2016). 
Sampling 
Distribution of the questionnaire would follow a UK based incident related to 
either the discovery of a BBV infected dental HCW and/or inadequate dental 
cross infection control.  
The study would commence as soon as confirmation had been received from the 
involved health board/trust that all anticipated testing was complete, so as not 
to interfere with the main PNE process. It is advised that the study should not 
proceed if the questionnaire is going to be received more than a year after the 
patient was originally notified of the incident. In Blatchford et al’s study, 
questionnaires were received seven months after the incident and response rate 
was still adequate (55%) (2000). 
The associated PNE would need to involve the intention to notify at least 500 
patients so that the resulting sample size, selected from this pool of notified 
patients, would be large enough to create sufficient statistical power in relation 
to the primary outcome of this study. 
Potential participants would come from the health board/trust’s list of exposed 
patients who had been notified as part of a recent dental PNE. This list would be 
screened for eligibility, a random sample would be drawn and letters would be 
sent. All of this would be done by health board/trust staff. 
The population would be defined as all patients deemed to be put ‘at risk’ by 
the incident, who are over 16 and had not been given a new BBV diagnosis as 
part of the PNE.  
To calculate the appropriate sample size for this study several different factors 
must be considered: 
- The population size (this will not be known until the incident has occurred 
and its corresponding exercise completed) 
- The expected response rate 
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- The amount of response data that will be manageable to input and 
analyse 
- The cost of printing and postage  
Sample size would be calculated more accurately, once the population size was 
known, but as a rough guide please see the table below (Dillman 2007). 
The figures outlined assume the highest level of variance (50/50 split) for each 
binomial question between the two groups of responders (those with high 
anxiety/desire to seek testing versus those with low anxiety/did not desire 
testing). This is based on four previous UK PNEs where the mean percentage of 
uptake of testing was 50% with a range of 33-73% (Close et al 2013; Mason et al 
2008; Conrad et al 2011; Roy et al 2005). 
Example sample size calculations for PINE study (Dillman 2007) 
Population 
Size 
Sample required 
Sample required factoring in a 
40% response rate 
600 234 585 
800 260 650 
1000 278 695 
2000 322 805 
4000 351 878 
6000 361 903 
8000 367 918 
10,000 370 925 
95% confidence level, sampling error of +/- 5% and 50/50 split in responses 
 
A response rate of 40% is estimated based on Blatchford et al’s response rate of 
55% (2000). A predicted response rate 15% lower than Blatchford et al’s was 
chosen because their questionnaire (2000) was shorter, less complex and 
conducted over 20 years ago when postal response rates were higher (Dillman 
2007). 
Ethical considerations 
As this questionnaire involves participation of NHS patients, ethical approval 
should be sought from the NHS Research Ethics Committee. Local R&D ethical 
approval should be sought from the Scottish health board or English trust 
managing the incident. 
Patients would be made aware that participation was voluntary and that 
choosing to participate would not affect their standard care in any way. Patients 
would be informed that once their questionnaires had been returned they would 
not be able to request the removal or alteration of any responses as they would 
be anonymous and could not be linked to individuals. 
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Data analysis 
Responses to the proposed questionnaire would be categorical, Likert or open 
text.  Data would be double entered into a statistical package using anonymised 
identifiers assigned to each questionnaire and featured on the hard copies of the 
questionnaires received. Quality assurance would be achieved through the use of 
range checks, histograms and frequency tabulations.  
Descriptive statistics would be presented as means (standard deviations), 
medians (Q1, Q3), or percentages, with 95% confidence intervals, as appropriate 
for the type of data. Categorical questionnaire responses would be cross-
tabulated to explore associations between two variables and chi-squared tests or 
Fisher’s exact tests would be used to test hypotheses. To test differences 
between groups when the outcome variable is ordinal (eg from a Likert scale), 
non-parametric tests would be used (eg Mann-Whitney U test or Kruskal-Wallis 
test). All measures of effect would be accompanied by 95% confidence intervals. 
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Appendix 24: Psychological Impact of Notification Exercises 
(PINE) Study Questionnaire 
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18 
                                                          
18 Please note that before using this questionnaire permissions must be sought in relation to question 4 which utilises 
part of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (Zigmond and Snaith 1983). “a license agreement must be completed 
beforehand and a user fee is required to all users (commercial, healthcare organizations and academic users)” (www.gl-
assessment.co.uk). 
 
 
423 
 
19 
 
                                                          
19 Please note that before using this questionnaire permissions must be sought in relation to question 4 which utilises 
part of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (Zigmond and Snaith 1983). “a license agreement must be completed 
beforehand and a user fee is required to all users (commercial, healthcare organizations and academic users)” (www.gl-
assessment.co.uk). 
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20 Please note that before using this questionnaire permissions must be sought in relation to question 4 which utilises 
part of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (Zigmond and Snaith 1983). “a license agreement must be completed 
beforehand and a user fee is required to all users (commercial, healthcare organizations and academic users)” (www.gl-
assessment.co.uk). 
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21 Please note that before using this questionnaire permissions must be sought in relation to question 4 which utilises 
part of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (Zigmond and Snaith 1983). “a license agreement must be completed 
beforehand and a user fee is required to all users (commercial, healthcare organizations and academic users)” (www.gl-
assessment.co.uk). 
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22 Please note that before using this questionnaire permissions must be sought in relation to question 4 which utilises 
part of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (Zigmond and Snaith 1983). “a license agreement must be completed 
beforehand and a user fee is required to all users (commercial, healthcare organizations and academic users)” (www.gl-
assessment.co.uk). 
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23 Please note that before using this questionnaire permissions must be sought in relation to question 4 which utilises 
part of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (Zigmond and Snaith 1983). “a license agreement must be completed 
beforehand and a user fee is required to all users (commercial, healthcare organizations and academic users)” (www.gl-
assessment.co.uk). 
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24 Please note that before using this questionnaire permissions must be sought in relation to question 4 which utilises 
part of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (Zigmond and Snaith 1983). “a license agreement must be completed 
beforehand and a user fee is required to all users (commercial, healthcare organizations and academic users)” (www.gl-
assessment.co.uk). 
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